UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

SIXTH EDITION

HAL G. RAINEY, SERGIO FERNANDEZ, AND DEANNA MALATESTA

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Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Illustrations

Praise for *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations, Sixth Edition*

“The best just keeps getting better. This is the definitive place for all serious students of public administration to start. It is the most comprehensive book in the field. It is required reading for MPA students, Ph.D. students, and all scholars in the field.”

—**Kenneth J. Meier,** Distinguished Scholar in Residence, American University

“This book is a must read for everyone in the community of public management in Korea, just like in many places all over the world. This new edition with Fernandez and Malatesta updates and continues this book's contributions. Undoubtedly, it provides a valuable resource for researchers and students who are interested in public management and applications of organization theory to public organizations. It is quite simply the best investigation of public organization and management that I have read.”

—**Young Han Chun,** Professor of Public Administration and Director of the Center for Organizational Diagnosis and Evaluations, Seoul National University

“This is the bible for public management scholarship. It is the first place to turn when looking for an accessible but rigorous analysis of research on basic aspects of organizational life in the public sector, such as how culture, leadership, and motivation matter. The interdisciplinary array of research on public management has become so voluminous as to seem overwhelming at times. *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations* performs an extraordinary curatorial task by turning these streams of work into a coherent and insightful body of knowledge. Anyone interested in how research can inform governance should start with this book.”

—**Donald Moynihan,** McCourt Chair, McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University

“Just when you think this book on public management could not get any better, Hal Rainey, Sergio Fernandez and Deanna Malatesta have delivered a new edition that covers all of the topics that you would expect, and more! Social media, hybrid organizations, leadership, diversity and relational contracting are now introduced to this standard work, while other topics have been updated with the most recent academic insights. A true treasure trove for students of public administration around the globe.”

—**Sandra van Thiel,** Professor of Public Management at Erasmus University Rotterdam and Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands

“The revised and updated edition of *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations* remains the *Encyclopedia Britannica* of public management; if you want to find out what has been written, and what is collectively said about the practice and theory of public management, look no further than the Rainey, Fernandez, and Malatesta comprehensive sixth edition.”

—**Richard M. Walker,** Chan Hon Pun Professor of Behavioural and Policy Sciences, Chair Professor of Public Management, and Dean, College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, City University of Hong Kong

“The newest (sixth) edition of *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations* masterfully connects the classical, core concepts of public management with the latest, evolving theories and research evidence on managing organizations. Readers will not only gain a thorough understanding of key dimensions of organizational structure, management and effectiveness—illuminated by rich case examples—but also a deep appreciation for the dynamics of public management that cut across sectoral boundaries and strategies for managing change and driving organizational improvement. This book is indispensable for students and scholars alike in the field of public administration.”

—Carolyn J. Heinrich, Patricia and Rodes Hart Professor of Public Policy, Education and Economics, Vanderbilt University

Instructor Resources

Comprehensive instructor resources to accompany this sixth edition of *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations* are available online at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey. Materials are organized by chapter and include the following:

- *PowerPoint slides for each chapter*. These follow the organization of the text and highlight the chapter themes and main subparts.
- *Key terms for each chapter*. A list of key terms is provided for each chapter.
- *Discussion questions for each chapter*. These questions can be used in class to prompt discussion on key themes or assigned to students as homework. The typical discussion question can be answered in one or two paragraphs.
- *Case studies*. Numerous cases, applicable to topics in multiple chapters.
- *Class exercise*. All class exercises can be completed in less than forty-five minutes of class time. These are designed to reinforce chapter lessons while encouraging collaborative learning among students.

UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

SIXTH EDITION

Essential Texts for Nonprofit and Public Leadership and Management

Hal G. Rainey, Sergio Fernandez, and Deanna Malatesta

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FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures

Tables

PREFACE

The editions of *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations* reviewed the literature on management and organization theory and suggested applications to the public sector grounded in evidence from research on public organizations and the people in them. The book has served as a text in graduate courses in public administration and public affairs programs. It has also served the needs of scholars, and it has a high number of citations in the Social Science Citation Index for a book of this type, in this field. The book's chapters describe concepts and insights from the organization and management literature that support leaders' and managers' efforts to think about the challenges they face and to take action to address those challenges.

The online instructor's guide (IG) includes a PowerPoint file for each chapter, lists of key terms and ideas, discussion questions, case studies, and exercises to aid instructors and to engage students. For this edition, the IG has been improved and updated. Additional case studies connect theory and research to management practice. The additions include a case focusing on Indiana's effort to retool its welfare system through a complex contract with an IBM-led group of cross-sector partners. In Part 1 of the case, students consider important techniques for instituting relational contracts and how competing institutional logics may affect collaboration success. In Part 2 of the case, students develop an appreciation for the challenges of developing and implementing a performance management system. A separate new case study engages students on the topic of implicit bias and its organizational and societal implications. After reviewing research on implicit bias, students consider how implicit bias could be a problem when using “big data” to make “democratic” decisions.

New coauthors provide the most significant change in this sixth edition. Professor Sergio Fernandez and Professor Deanna Malatesta, both of the O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, bring major strengths to the improvement of this edition. Professor Fernandez, who is also Extraordinary Professor in the School of Public Management and Administration at University of Pretoria, South Africa, studies public sector management and leadership, with a focus on employee empowerment, representative bureaucracy, performance, and government outsourcing. Professor Malatesta's research focuses on governance, public–private distinctions, and contracts.

The first chapter provides a conceptual framework for the major topics in the book, and the remaining chapters develop these topics by reviewing theories, research, and practices in the field of organizational and managerial analysis. The field of public management and organization has developed rapidly since publication of the previous editions. For example, the number of quasi-governmental organizations

(QUANGOs, or “hybrids”) has grown rapidly in many nations; this edition considers their characteristics and implications for democracy. This edition also considers changes in social media and its implications for interaction among policy actors and managers as well as how it has influenced decision making. Chapters in this edition have been expanded to cover new material and new developments. This includes research on how public managers lead and behave, effective performance in government agencies, initiatives to promote employee engagement in public organizations, demographic representation and diversity in public organizations, differences between public and private managers' perceptions of the personnel systems with which they work, “public values,” public service motivation and networks, collaboration in public service delivery, and public service motivation, which has been the subject of a wave of studies in numerous different nations.

This edition also expands coverage of recent developments in the study of work-related attitudes such as employee empowerment and employee engagement and positive organizational behavior, as well as recent developments in leadership concepts, including shared, authentic, and servant leadership. Coverage of collaborative forms of organization and governance, including networks, partnerships, and contracts, is more fully developed in this edition and now includes the theory of relational contracting. The chapters on the major topics of the book show that researchers have published a profusion of studies on these and other topics since the fifth edition appeared, thus raising a challenge for those who seek to review them all.

Previous editions of this book have analyzed, as does this one, the distinctions between public organizations and their members, on the one hand, and other types of organizations, leaders, and employees, such as those in the business sector, on the other. This edition adds two topics to this discussion that are particularly relevant to outsourcing and public–private partnerships: the US judiciary's approach to distinguishing between state actors and nonstate actors (The State Action Doctrine) and federal administrative policy recommendations (OMB Circular A-76) on inherently governmental services. Chapter Three presents a conceptual analysis of these distinctions, and what we mean when we refer to these different types of organizations and the people who work for them. Subsequent chapters describe research articles about public organizations and their people. Many studies of this type have appeared in recent years. Assembling these studies and describing them for the reader has posed a serious challenge, but a welcome one, because one of the book's objectives is to provide the most comprehensive compilation and review possible of such research-based analyses of public organizations.

Previous editions of the book covered classic works in management and organization theory. This edition continues to emphasize their theoretical relevance. Previous editions also covered important developments in the practice of general management and public management. The book provides such coverage, in part to make this edition useful for practicing managers and professionals and for students interested in such roles. It provides suggestions about managing relations with the media (Chapter Five), enhancing one's power and authority (Chapter Seven), managing for high performance (Chapter Six), conducting strategic decision-making processes (Chapter Seven), motivating employees (Chapter Ten), managing and leading organizational culture (Chapter Eleven), managing conflict (Chapter Twelve), leading organizational change (Chapter Thirteen), and effectively collaborating (Chapter Fourteen).

In addition, this book provides examples of how people in public organizations have put these ideas into practice. For instance, Chapter Eight describes a major structural reform that the US Internal Revenue Service undertook, and the structural changes made at a national laboratory in response to public concerns about its safety. Chapter Nine points out that many of the efforts to reform pay systems in government would have been much more effective if they had been informed by a clear understanding of a number of motivation theories. Chapter Thirteen shows how strategies for leading organizational change have led to successful large-scale change in government agencies, and how not applying such strategies has led to failure in other instances. Chapter Thirteen also provides a summary of points of expert consensus about successful management of large-scale organizational change. In covering these topics, this book pursues the theme that effective leadership involves the well-informed, integrative use of management concepts and ideas. Carl Von Clausewitz's classic treatise *On War* (1986, 1832) illustrates this theme. Clausewitz stated that he could not advise an individual commander on how to conduct a specific campaign because such situations are varied and contingent. Rather, he provided general insights on how to conceive of the nature of war. Even persons who loathe military force and military analogies should accept the point that people facing practical challenges often profit from general understanding and insight as much as from detailed prescriptions.

Audience

The audience for previous editions of *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations* included graduate students and scholars interested in public management and applications of organizational analysis to the public sector. Faculty colleagues at other universities have mentioned that their MPA and MPP students do not see the need for so many citations to academic research articles. Their doctoral students, however, value the reviews of academic literature and research and the citation of such work. Colleagues and anonymous reviewers have advised keeping the coverage of academic research. They insisted that this coverage represents a distinctive contribution and that we should avoid "dumbing down" the book. Even so, the publication of a vast number of books and journal articles since the previous editions make it impossible to cite and cover them all, even though so many of them deserve such attention. In this edition, we often rely on prominent examples and books and articles that provide summary reviews of major topics, because we simply cannot refer to all the valuable research that so many authors have published.

This edition also seeks to provide more examples and ideas pertaining to nations other than the US. The book draws heavily on information about the US, but evidence indicates its usefulness to readers in other countries, and this edition seeks to enhance that usefulness with attention to examples and ideas from other nations. This effort at internationalization is taking care of itself, in a sense. Increasing numbers of articles by authors from all continents now appear in major journals about public organizations and management in the US and in journals with an international focus. Many of the publications to which we refer in this edition are authored by researchers from nations other than the US, drawing on research about organizations and their personnel around the world.

In addition, as mentioned earlier, an instructor's guide is available. It includes key terms, examples, potential writing assignments, and case discussion exercises. The instructor's guide also includes and illustrates suggestions and alternatives for using the materials. These materials can enliven the topics and make them more accessible for MPA and MPP students. Microsoft PowerPoint presentations are also available for each chapter; they provide many graphics that can enliven a discussion of the topics. These resources are available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

Reviewers of the previous editions said that practitioners would be unlikely to delve into the detailed reviews of research and theory that this edition provides. This assumption underestimates many practicing leaders and managers who are thoughtful and reflective about leadership and management. They may dislike abstruse academic discourse because they are inclined to action and practical results. When practicing managers enroll in courses in academic settings, however, they often lead their classes in insight and interest in new ideas. They often spurn “war stories” and how-to manuals. This book can serve practicing managers and leaders who want a review of basic topics in the field.

Organization

Part One covers the dynamic context of public organizations. Its five chapters introduce the basic objectives and assumptions of the book and the conceptual framework mentioned earlier. Chapter One discusses the current context of public management in practice and in scholarship and the challenges this context raises for applying organization and management theory to public organizations. Chapter Two summarizes the history of organization and management theory, describing the development of the most important topics in the field. Chapter Three defines public organizations and distinguishes them from private ones, and provides an overview of the assertions about the nature of public organizations. Chapters Four and Five review the literature on organizational environments, particularly the political and institutional environments of public organizations.

Part Two focuses on key dimensions of organizing and managing, and on major topics in organization theory and management. Chapter Six examines goals, performance, and effectiveness in public organizations and strategies and practices related to high performance. Chapter Seven analyzes the role of power in organizations, reviews various approaches to decision making, and discusses strategic management. Chapter Eight focuses on organizational structure and design and how managers use information technology and social media. Chapters Nine and Ten provide a comprehensive review of employee values and motives, theories of work motivation, work-related attitudes, and the importance of demographic representation and diversity in organizations. Chapter Eleven examines leadership theories, approaches, and strategies and the role of organizational culture. Chapter Twelve covers the topics of communication, conflict, and teamwork. Chapter Thirteen discusses the challenges of undertaking organizational change and what managers can do to implement change successfully in organizations. Finally, Chapter Fourteen covers new ground, including recent research on collaboration and what organizations have learned from their collaboration experiences, such as contracting, collaborative relations, partnerships, and other forms. It also includes guiding principles for drafting and implementing conventional and formal relational contracts, key factors in long-term strategic partnerships for organizations of all sectors.

Acknowledgments

We owe thanks to all the people mentioned in the first five editions, and the list has grown even longer. Despite our concern about leaving out anyone, we must leave out a great many people anyway. We offer thanks to all those who have discussed this edition with us and made suggestions, including Professors Gene Brewer, Delmer Dunn, Ed Kellough, George Krause, Michelle Lofton, Ken Meier, Sanjay Pandey, Sandra Van Thiel, Carolyn Heinrich, and many others. As in the previous editions, Hal Rainey dedicates this one to his son, Willis, his daughter, Nancy, and his wife, Lucy. Professor Fernandez would like to thank all of his graduate students who used the book and offered helpful feedback over the years, and his wife, Elena, for her loving support and patience. He dedicates this book to his family. Professor Malatesta offers special acknowledgment to Sung Chung, a graduate student in Indiana University's O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs, who spent many hours synthesizing research, to Sandra van Thiel, Professor in the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, on whose expertise she relied to guide her through the topic of hybrids and quangos, and to Carolyn Heinrich, the Patricia and Rodes Hart Professor of Public Policy, Education, and Economics at Vanderbilt University, who provided valuable guidance on the topics of performance management and relational contracting. She dedicates this book to Alaina, Niko, and Francesca, and to her husband, Russ.

All three authors owe gratitude to representatives of publisher Wiley, who have helped and supported the work on this and previous editions. For this edition, it has been a pleasure to work with them. Each edition of this book acknowledges the contributions of numerous authors, both those we have cited and those we were unable to incorporate due to time and space limitations. Their work supports the conclusion that public organizations are important institutions that provide crucial services. They face public skepticism, but at the same time, increasing demands to provide an elaborate array of functions and services. These pressures are aggravated by misunderstandings and myths about the nature and performance of public organizations and employees in the United States and many other countries. Public organizations are often highly effective and well-managed, with hardworking, high-performing employees. The review of insights and concepts provided in this book supports those who advance the effective management of public organizations. The book thus acknowledges all those who strive with sincerity to provide public, social, and altruistic service.

For many reasons, the authors agree upon the order of authorship indicated below. The authors agree that each author contributed equally to the revisions and improvements in this sixth edition, and deserve equal credit for this edition.

Hal G. Rainey, University of Georgia
Sergio Fernandez, Indiana University and University of Pretoria
Deanna Malatesta, Indiana University

THE AUTHORS

***Understanding and Managing Public Organizations*, sixth edition**

Sergio Fernandez is Professor at Indiana University O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs and Affiliate Faculty in Indiana University African Studies Program. He also serves as Extraordinary Professor in University of Pretoria School of Public Management and Administration. He earned his PhD in Public Administration from the University of Georgia. His research focuses on organizational behavior in the public sector, public sector leadership, representative bureaucracy, and government outsourcing. His work has appeared in leading policy and management journals, including *Public Administration Review*, *Governance*, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *American Review of Public Administration*, *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, *Leadership Quarterly*, *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, and *Journal of Modern African Studies*. He is author of *Representative Bureaucracy and Performance: Public Service Transformation in South Africa* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). He has served on seven journal editorial boards and is an editor for *Africa Today*.

Deanna Malatesta is an Associate Professor at the Paul O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, Bloomington. Her research foci include public sector management and governance, collaboration, and contracts. Professor Malatesta teaches several courses at Indiana University: Public Policy Problems and Solutions (undergraduate-level), Public Management, Public Program Performance and Contracting (graduate-level) and Public Organizations (doctoral seminar). She currently serves as associate editor of the *International Journal of Public Sector Management* (*IJPSM*).

She authored much of the *Instructor's Guide* for the fifth edition and for the current sixth edition of *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations*.

Malatesta received a BA/MPA from Rutgers University–Camden, New Jersey, and a doctorate from the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia. Her research appears in the field's top journals, including *Public Administration Review*, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *The American Review of Public Administration*, *Public Administration*, *State and Local Government Studies*, and the *International Journal of Public Sector Management*. In 2010, she received the William E. Mosher and Frederick C. Mosher Award for the Best Article by an Academician in *Public Administration Review*, awarded by the American Society for Public Administration. She has served on the editorial boards for *Public Administration Review, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation* (*JSCAN*), and the *Journal of Public Affairs and Education*.

Malatesta has served as a consultant to federal, state, and local governments, and on various task forces for government agencies. In 2002, she was a technology consultant for the City of Philadelphia, Cable Television Franchise Renewal Contract Committee. In 2008, she was appointed by the Indianapolis City-County Council of Indianapolis and served on Mayor Greg Ballard's High Performance Governance Team. In 2012, she consulted with the Regulated Occupations Evaluation Committee (ROEC) for the State of Indiana. In 2013 and 2014, she consulted with the US Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) on the administration of the agency's Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs.

Hal G. Rainey is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Public Administration and Policy, in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia. He conducts research on management in the public sector, with an emphasis on leadership, incentives, organizational change, and organizational performance, and the comparison of organization and management in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors.

The first edition of *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations* won the Best Book Award of the Public and Nonprofit Sectors Division of the Academy of Management in 1992. The book has been published in Chinese- and Russian-language editions, and in other languages.

In 1995 Rainey received the Charles H. Levine Award for Excellence in Research, Teaching, and Service, conferred jointly by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. In 2003 he was elected as a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. Rainey received the 2009 Dwight Waldo Award for excellence in scholarship in public administration across an extended career. In 2011 he received the John Gaus Award and lecture invitation from the American Political Science Association. The Gaus Award honors “the recipient's lifetime of exemplary scholarship in the joint tradition of political science and public administration.” In 2016, Rainey received the Frederickson Award from the National Public Management Research Association for “lifetime contributions to research on public management and to the intellectual development of the field.” In 2018, he received the Provan Award for Contributions to Empirical Theory from the Public and Nonprofit Division of the Academy of Management. He has served as chair of the Public and Nonprofit Sectors Division of the Academy of Management and as chair of the Public Administration Section of the American Political Science Association. He received his BA (1968) in English from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and his MA (1973) in psychology and PhD (1977) in public administration from the Ohio State University.

Rainey has served on governmental commissions and task forces and in applied research and teaching roles at the three levels of government in the United States, and in service to governments in other nations. Before entering university teaching and research, Rainey served as an officer in the US Navy and as a VISTA volunteer.

PART ONE
THE DYNAMIC CONTEXT OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

CHAPTER ONE
THE CHALLENGE OF EFFECTIVE PUBLIC ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

As work on this sixth edition began, the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted nations around the world, ultimately infecting and killing millions of people. Leaders of nations affected by the virus relied on workers and organizations in the administrative branch of their governments for responses to the pandemic. In the United States, the president, governors of states, and local government officials called upon administrators for policies and procedures to contain the virus and to explain them to the citizenry. The US president, along with political supporters, had expressed disdain for "the deep state," which allegedly involved officials in the federal administrative branch who opposed the president. During this crisis, however, the president held public briefings in which administrative officials played leading roles. The White House coordinator for the response to the crisis and the head of a unit of the National Institutes of Health came forward in the briefings to explain decisions, and to answer questions from the press.

In public statements, the President and other elected officials at all levels referred to the crucial roles that administrative officials and organizations played. The administrators represented an alphabet soup of organizations and positions – the Surgeon General of the United States, the White House coordinator, CDC, FDA, HHS, NIH, Homeland Security, Departments of Public Health at state and local levels and the commissioners of those departments, and other officials and organizations. As leaders asked citizens to comply with recommendations and directives, government employees at all levels implemented these procedures. In many countries, citizens applauded healthcare workers, many of whom were government employees, for their heroic efforts.

Government officials closed many businesses and halted other activities. Economic dislocation caused by the pandemic raised another massive challenge. In the US and other nations, chief executives and legislative bodies sought to meet that challenge with payments to individuals and loans for businesses. The agencies involved in such policies added additional names to the roster of government agencies and personnel with major roles: the Departments of Treasury and of Labor, the Social Security Administration, and other organizations at all levels of government.

The responses to the pandemic also involved essential roles for nongovernmental organizations, including business and nonprofit organizations. Among their major contributions, manufacturing firms shifted their activities to the production of medical supplies such as masks and face shields. Pharmaceutical and medical companies concentrated on speeding the development of vaccines tests to detect the virus, and other defenses against it. The activities of such organizations illustrated a reality of contemporary political economy – government, nonprofit, and private business entities blend together in many ways in the provision of goods and services. This reality of collaboration, networking, partnerships, and contractual relations will receive more attention in this edition than in previous editions.

More generally, the effort to control and defeat the coronavirus illustrates another obvious reality. Organizations and the people in them often provide crucial goods and services; the analysis of how they can do so effectively and the dissemination of that knowledge can enhance the discharge of these crucial functions. The pandemic crisis illustrates an important characteristic of public or governmental organizations and the people in them. They are heavily influenced by developments in the political and governmental context in which they operate. Even government employees who never encounter an elected official in their daily activities have their working lives influenced by the political system in which they work. Government organizations, which this book will usually call public organizations, deliver crucial services. Inadequate organization and management of those functions create severe problems for citizens. The organizations and the people in them have to carry out their services and functions under the auspices and influence of other governmental authorities. Hence they operate directly or indirectly in what David Aberbach and Bert Rockman (2002) call "the web of politics." The examples apply as well to governments in other nations and the organizations within those governments. Nations around the world have followed a pattern of organizing, reorganizing, reforming, and striving to improve government agencies' management and performance (Kettl, 2002; Light, 2008; National Academy of Public Administration, 2020; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Walker and Boyne, 2006).

Toward Improved Understanding and Management of Public Organizations

All nations face decisions about the roles of government and private institutions in their society. In recent decades, the reforms mentioned previously included a movement in many countries either to curtail government authority and replace it with greater private activity or to make government operations more like those of private business firms (Pollitt and Bouckeart, 2011; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). This skepticism about government implies sharp differences between government and privately owned organizations. During this same period, however, numerous writers argued that we had too little sound analysis of such differences and too little attention to management in the public sector. This critique elicited a wave of research and writing on public management and public organization theory, in which experts and researchers have been working to provide more careful analyses of organizational and managerial issues in government.

This chapter elaborates on these points to develop another central theme of this book. We face a dilemma in combining our legitimate concerns about the performance of public organizations with the recognition that they play indispensable roles. We need to improve their effectiveness. We can profit by studying major topics from general management and organization theory and examining evidence of their application in the public sector. That evidence indicates that the governmental context influences organization, management and performance. Often, governmental organizations and people in them perform better than is commonly acknowledged. These examples usually reflect the efforts of managers in government who combine managerial skill with effective knowledge of the public sector context. Experts continue to research and debate the nature of this combination, however, as more evidence appears rapidly and in diverse places. This book seeks to base its analysis of public management and organizations on a careful review of this evidence.

General Management and Public Management

A review and explanation of the literature on organizations and their management, integrated with a review of the research on public organizations and public bureaucracy, supports improved management and performance of public organizations. These two bodies of research and thought are related but separate. Their integration imposes a major challenge for those interested in public management. The character of these fields and of their separation needs clarification. We can begin that process by noting that scholars in sociology, psychology, and business administration have developed an elaborate body of knowledge in the fields of organizational behavior and organization theory.

Organizational Behavior, Organization Theory, and Management

The study of organizational behavior originated in industrial and social psychology. Organizational behavior researchers concentrate on individual and group behaviors in organizations. They analyze motivation, work satisfaction, leadership, work group dynamics, and the attitudes and behaviors of the members of organizations. Organization theory is based more in sociology. It focuses on topics that concern the organization as a whole, such as organizational environments, goals and effectiveness, strategy and decision making, change and innovation, and structure and design. Some writers treat organizational behavior as a subfield of organization theory. The distinction is primarily a matter of specialization among researchers; it is reflected in the relative emphasis each topic receives in specific textbooks and professional journals.

Organization theory and organizational behavior are covered in high-quality programs in business administration, public administration, educational administration, or other forms of administration, because they are relevant to management. The term *management* is used in diverse ways, but we can think of this topic as involving the analysis and practice of such functions as leading, organizing, motivating, planning and strategy making, evaluating effectiveness, and communicating.

A strong tradition, hereafter called the “generic tradition,” pervades organization theory and organizational behavior. Chapters Two and Three discuss major contributors to this field who apply their theories and insights to all types of organizations. They have worked to build a general body of knowledge about organizations and management. Many current texts on organization theory and management contain applications to public, private, and nonprofit organizations (e.g., Daft, 2020). In addition, management researchers and consultants frequently work with public organizations and use the same concepts and techniques they use with private businesses. They argue that people working in government, nonprofit, and private business settings face similar challenges and follow generally similar patterns.

Public Administration, Economics, and Political Science

The generic tradition offers valuable concepts, as this book will illustrate. Nevertheless, we do have a body of knowledge specific to public organizations and management. Governments around the world involve immense amounts of managerial activity. City managers, e.g., have become highly professionalized. We have a body of knowledge about public administration. Economists have developed theories of public bureaucracy (Downs, 1967). Political scientists have written extensively about it (Meier and Bothe, 2007). They usually depict the public bureaucracy as significantly different from private business. Political scientists concentrate on the political role of public organizations and their relationships with legislators, courts, chief executives, and interest groups (e.g., Krause, 1999). Economists analyzing the public bureaucracy emphasize the absence of economic markets for its outputs. In past decades, they often concluded that this absence of markets makes public organizations more bureaucratic, inefficient, change-resistant, and susceptible to political influence than private firms (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1965).

In the 1970s, authors began to point out the divergence between the generic management literature and that on the public bureaucracy and to call for better integration of these topics.[1] These authors noted that organization theory and behavior literature offers concepts for analyzing organizational structure, change, decisions, strategy, environments, motivation, leadership, and other important topics. In addition, researchers have tested these ideas in empirical research. Because of their generic approach, however, they paid little attention to the issues raised by political scientists and economists concerning public organizations. For instance, they usually ignored the internationally significant issue of whether government ownership and economic market exposure make a difference for management and organization.

Critics also faulted the writings in political science and public administration for too much anecdotal description and too little theory and systematic research (Perry and Kraemer, 1983; Pitt and Smith, 1981). Scholars in public administration pointed to the limitations of the research and theory in that field (McCurdy and Cleary, 1984; White and Adams, 1994). In a national survey of research projects on public management, Garson and Overman (1981; 1982) found relatively little funded research on general public management and concluded that the research that did exist was highly fragmented.

Neither the political science nor the economics literature on public bureaucracy paid as much attention to internal management – designing the structure of the organization, motivating and leading employees, developing internal communications and teamwork – as did the organization theory and general management literature.

Issues in Education and Research

Concerns about educating people for public management also fueled debate. In the wake of an upsurge in government activity during the 1960s, graduate programs in public administration spread among universities around the country. The National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (later renamed as the Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration) began to accredit these programs. Among other criteria, this process required master of public administration (MPA) programs to emphasize management skills. This implied the importance of identifying how MPA programs compare to master of business administration (MBA) programs in preparing people for management positions. At the same time, it raised the question of how public management differs from business management.

These developments coincided with expressions of concern about the adequacy of our knowledge of public management. In 1979, the US Office of Personnel Management (1980) organized a prestigious conference at the Brookings Institution. The conference featured statements by prominent academics and government officials about the need for research on public management. It addressed a widespread concern among practitioners and researchers about “the lack of depth of knowledge in this field” (p. 7). At around the same time, various authors produced a stream of articles and books arguing that public sector management involves distinct issues (e.g. Allison, 1983; Lynn 1981). They also complained that too little research and theory directly addressed the practice of active, effective public management. More recently, this concern with building research and theory on public management developed into a movement, as more researchers have converged on the topic.

Beginning in 1990, a network of scholars have come together for a series of Public Management Research Conferences. These conferences led to books containing research reported at the conferences (Bozeman, 1993; Brudney, O'Toole, and Rainey, 2000; Frederickson and Johnston, 1999; Kettl and Milward, 1996) and to many professional journal articles. In 2000, the group formed the Public Management Research Association to promote research on the topic. Since then, researchers have continued to call attention to unresolved issues and controversies (e.g. Amsler, 2019; Christensen et al., 2020; Moulton, 2019; Nabatchi and Carboni, 2019). Literature has burgeoned so much that a comprehensive review is virtually impossible. Later chapters will cover many of the products and results of this research. We adhere to this process of reviewing research and expert writing even though some users of previous editions have commented that practicing managers and practice-oriented MPA students do not need this much detail about research. We stay with the approach in line with current advocacy of evidence-based management, when such evidence is effective and credible (e.g., Amirkhanyan, 2011; Barends and Rousseau, 2018; Heinrich, 2012). Students, researchers, and practicing managers and professionals can benefit from seeing the nature and the quality of the research on which recommendations and insights are based.

Ineffective Public Management?

On a less positive note, complaints about inadequacies in the practice of public management have also fueled interest in the field. Large bureaucracies have a pervasive influence on our lives. Interactions with government can be burdensome and costly (Herd and Moynihan, 2018). They often blunder, and they can harm and oppress people, both inside the organizations and beyond their boundaries (Adams and Balfour, 2009). We face severe challenges in ensuring both their effective operation and our control over them through democratic processes. Some analysts contended that our efforts to maintain this balance of effective operation and democratic control create disincentives and constraints that impede public administrators from embracing the managerial roles that managers in business typically play (Lynn, 1981; Warwick, 1975). Some of these authors have argued that too many public managers fail to accept the challenges of motivating their subordinates and effectively designing their organizations. Many elected and politically appointed officials face short terms in office, complex laws and rules that constrain their authority to take action, and intense political pressures. Many concentrate on pressing public policy issues and pay too little attention to the internal management of agencies and programs under their authority. Middle managers and career civil servants, constrained by central rules, have little authority or incentive to manage.

Effective Public Management

In contrast with criticisms of government agencies and employees, other authors have contended that public bureaucracies perform better than is commonly acknowledged (Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Downs and Larkey, 1986; Goodsell, 2014; Milward and Rainey, 1983; Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999; Wamsley and Colleagues, 1990). Others describe successful governmental innovations and policies (Borins, 2008; Holzer and Callahan, 1998). Many of these authors pointed to evidence of effective performance by government organizations and officials and to the difficulty of proving that the private sector performs better.

In response to this concern about the need for better analysis about effective public management, the literature has continued to burgeon during the current century. As later chapters will show, a genre has developed that includes numerous books and articles about effective leadership, management, and organizational practices in government. These contributions tend to assert that government organizations can and do perform well, and that we need continued inquiry into when they do, and why.[2]

These controversies reflect fundamental complexities of the American political and economic systems that resemble conditions in other nations. Those systems have always subjected the administrative branch of government to conflicting pressures over who should control it and how, whose interests should be served, and what values should predominate (Waldo, [1947] 1984). Management involves paradoxes that require organizations and managers to balance conflicting priorities. Public management often involves particularly complex objectives and especially difficult conflicts among them. In the debate over the performance of the public bureaucracy and whether the public sector represents a unique or a generic management context, both sides are correct, in a sense. General management and organizational concepts can have valuable applications in government. Unique aspects of the government context, however, must often be taken into account. In fact, the examples of effective public management given in later chapters show the need for both. Managers in public agencies can effectively apply generic management procedures, but they must also skillfully negotiate external political pressures and administrative constraints to create a context in which they can manage effectively.

Organizations: A Definition and a Conceptual Framework

For analysis of research relevant to public organizations and their management, it becomes useful to clarify the meaning of basic concepts about organizations. We also provide a framework to guide the analysis this book will provide. Figure 1.1 presents a framework for this purpose. Figure 1.2 elaborates on some of the basic components of this framework, providing more detail about organizational structures, processes, and people.

Writers on organization theory and management have debated over how best to define *organization*. Here, we offer a perspective that employs elements of Figure 1.1:



FIGURE 1.1 A FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

> An organization is a group of people who work together to pursue g*oals*. To do so, they must attain resources from the organization's *environment*. In negotiating the environment, people in the organization may engage in partnerships, collaborations, networks, contractual relationships, and other forms of engagement with other organizations. The people in the organization must transform the resources by accomplishing *tasks* and applying *technologies* to *perform effectively*, thereby attaining additional resources. They perform by effectively *organizing* their activities. Organizing involves *leadership* processes, through which leaders guide the development of *strategies* for achieving goals and the establishment of structures and processes to support those strategies. *Structures* are relatively stable, observable assignments and divisions of responsibility, achieved through such means as hierarchies of authority, rules

and regulations, and specialization of individuals and subunits. The division of responsibility determined by the structure divides the organization’s goals into components on which groups and individuals can concentrate—hence the term *organization*, referring to the set of organs that make up the whole. This division of responsibility requires that the activities and units be coordinated. Structures such as rules and regulations and hierarchies of authority aid coordination. *Processes* are less physically observable, more dynamic activities that address this imperative for coordination. They include such activities as power relationships, decision making, evaluation, communication, conflict resolution, and change and innovation. Within these structures and processes, *groups* and *individuals* respond to *incentives* presented to them, making the contributions and producing the products and services that ultimately result in effective performance.



FIGURE 1.2 A FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (ELABORATION OF FIGURE 1.1)

This perspective on organizations and the framework depicted in the figures have serious implications that could be debated at length. Mainly, however, they set forth the topics that the chapters of this book cover and indicate their importance as components of an effective organization. Management consultants and experts claim that frameworks as general as this one have great value, as ways of guiding decision makers through important topics and issues. Leaders, managers, and participants in organizations need to develop a sense of what it means to organize effectively. They should develop a sense of the most important aspects of an organization that they should think about in trying to improve the organization. The framework offers one of many approaches to organizing one's thinking about organizing, and the chapters to come elaborate its components.

As this chapter has discussed, this book proceeds on certain assertions and assumptions. Government organizations perform crucial functions. We can improve public management and the performance of public agencies by learning about the literature on organization theory, organizational behavior, and general management and applying it to government agencies and activities. This book integrates research and thought on the public sector context with the more general organizational and management theories and research. This integration has important implications for the debates over whether public management is basically ineffective. or often excellent, and over how to reform and improve public management and education for people who pursue it. Careful analysis, drawing on available concepts, theories, and research, and organized around the general framework presented here, can contribute usefully to advancing our knowledge of these topics.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter One

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Study: Moving the Maisenbacher House

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

Notes

1. Authors who have addressed the divergence between the generic management literature and that on the public bureaucracy and public management, many of whom call for better integration of these topics, include Allison, 1983; Bozeman, 1987; Christensen, Lægreid., and Røvik, 2020; Hood and Dunsire, 1981; Lynn, 1981; Meyer, 1979; Perry and Kraemer, 1983; Pitt and Smith, 1981; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine, 1976; Wamsley and Zald, 1973; Warwick, 1975.

2. Books and articles about effective leadership, organization, and management in government include Barzelay, 1992; Behn, 1994; Borins, 2008; Cohen and Eimicke, 1998; Cooper and Wright, 1992; Denhardt, Denhardt, Aristigueta and Rawlings, 2019; Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Hargrove and Glidewell, 1990; Holzer and Callahan, 1998; Ingraham, Thompson, and Sanders, 1998; Jones and Thompson, 1999; Lewis, 2019; Light, 1998; Linden, 1994; Meier and O'Toole, 2006; Newell, Reeher, and Ronayne, 2012; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; O'Toole and Meier, 2011; Popovich, 1998; Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999; Riccucci, 1995, 2005; Thompson and Jones, 1994; Wolf, 1997. Books that defend the value and performance of government include Esman, 2000; Glazer and Rothenberg, 2001; Neiman, 2000; Goodsell 2011, 2014.

CHAPTER TWO
UNDERSTANDING THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS: A HISTORICAL REVIEW

Large, complex organizations have existed for many centuries, but within the past two centuries they have proliferated tremendously. This chapter reviews major developments in the research and theory about organizations and management. This book's analysis of public organizations begins with this chapter's review that illustrates the generic theme mentioned in the previous chapter. Major contributors to this field have usually treated organizations and management as generally similar in all contexts, with little distinction between the public and private sectors. This generic emphasis has great value, and this book draws upon it. Later chapters present evidence supporting the claim that public organizations are distinct. Leaders and analysts need to be aware of the historical developments summarized in this chapter. The review covers terms, ideas, and names that serve as part of the vocabulary of management. Leaders in organizations often refer to Theory X and Theory Y, span of control, and other concepts that the review covers.

Theoretical perspectives on how to organize and manage have strongly influenced, and have been influenced by, the way managers and organizations behave. Some of the general trends involve profoundly important beliefs about the nature of human motivation and of successful organizations. The review shows that management theory and practice have evolved over the past two centuries. Theories about the motives, values, and capacities of people in organizations have evolved, and this evolution has in turn prompted additional theories about how organizations must look and behave in response to the increasing complexity of the contexts in which they operate. Theories and practice have moved away from emphasis on organizations with strong chains of command, very specific job responsibilities, and strong controls over the people in them. While such topics remain important, the field has moved toward emphasis on more flexible, adaptive organizations; horizontal communications; and more participation, empowerment, and teamwork.

The Systems Metaphor

Figures 1.1 and 1.2 and the accompanying definition of organization in Chapter One reflect one major theme for the past century's major developments in the field: how the field has moved from early approaches (now considered “classical” views) that emphasized a single appropriate form of organization and management, toward more recent approaches that reject this “one best way” concept. Recent perspectives emphasize the variety of organizational forms that can be effective under the different conditions that organizations face. This trend in organizational analysis draws on general systems theory. This body of theory developed the idea that there are various types of systems in nature that have much in common. Analyzing these systems, according to systems theorists, can provide insights about diverse entities (Daft, 2020; Katz and Kahn, 1966, pp. 19–29).

A system is an ongoing process that transforms inputs into outputs. The outputs in turn influence subsequent inputs into the system in a way that supports the continuing operation of the process. One can think of an organization as a system that takes in various resources and transforms them in ways that lead to attaining additional supplies of resources (the definition in Chapter One includes this idea). Systems have subsystems, such as communications systems or production systems within organizations, and throughput processes, which are sets of internal linkages in the transformation process. The outputs of the system lead to feedback – that is, the influences that the outputs have on subsequent inputs. The systems theorists, then, deserve credit (or blame) for making terms such as *input* and *feedback* part of our everyday jargon. Management analysts have used systems concepts – usually elaborated far beyond the simple description given here – to examine management systems.

A major trend among organizational theorists in the past century has been to distinguish between closed systems and open or adaptive systems. Some systems are closed to their environment; the internal processes remain the same regardless of environmental changes. A thermostat is part of a closed system that transforms inputs, in the form of room temperature, into outputs, in the form of responses from heating or air-conditioning units. These outputs feed back into the system by changing the room temperature. The system's processes are stable and machinelike. They respond consistently in a programmed pattern. One can think of a human being as an open or adaptive system. Humans transform their behaviors to adapt to their environment when there are environmental changes for which the system is not programmed. Thus, the human being's internal processes are open to the environment and able to adapt to shifts in it. Some organization theorists found the systems approach helpful as a metaphor for describing how organization theory has evolved during the past century. These theorists say that the earliest, "classical" theories treated organizations and employees as if they were closed systems.

Classical Approaches to Understanding Organizations

The earliest classical theories, and the advice they gave to managers, emphasized stable, clearly defined structures and processes, as if organizational goals were clear and managers' main challenge was to design the most efficient, machine-like procedures to maximize attainment of the organization's goals. Some organization theorists have also characterized this as the "one best way" approach to organization.

Frederick Taylor and Scientific Management

Frederick Taylor (1919) is usually cited as one of the pioneers of managerial analysis and as the major figure in the scientific management school. In Taylor's own words scientific management involved the systematic analysis of “every little act” in tasks to be performed by workers. Taylor asserted that the role of management was to gather detailed information on work processes, analyze it, and derive rules and guidelines for the most efficient way to perform the required tasks. Workers were then to be selected and trained in these procedures so they could maximize their output and their own earnings.

Procedures similar to those that Taylor and others developed for analyzing and designing tasks are still in use today. They conducted time–motion studies, which involved the detailed measurement and analysis of physical characteristics of the workplace, such as the placement of tools and machinery in relation to the worker and the movements and time that the worker had to devote to using them. The objective was to achieve the most efficient physical layout for the performance of a specified task. Analytical procedures of this sort are still used in government and industry.

Taylor's determination to find the “one best way” to perform a task was such that he even devoted himself to finding the best way to design golf greens and golf clubs. He designed a putter that the golfer could stabilize by cradling the club in his or her elbows. The putter proved so accurate that the US Golf Association banned it (Hansen, 1999).

Taylor's emphasis on the efficient programming of tasks and of workers' activities provoked controversy. Critics attacked his work for its apparent inhumanity and its underestimation of psychological and social influences on worker morale and productivity. Taylor contended that his methods would benefit workers by helping them to increase their earnings and the quality of their work. In his own accounts of his work he said that he became interested in ways of encouraging workers without supervisors' having to place pressure on them. As a manager, he had been involved in a very unpleasant dispute with workers, which he attributed to the obligation to put them under pressure (Burrell and Morgan, 1980, p. 126). He wanted to find alternatives to such situations.

Yet, Taylor did emphasize pay as the primary reward for work. He stressed specialization of worker activities, as if the worker were a rather mindless component of a mechanistic process. He did not improve his image with later organizational analysts when he illustrated his techniques with a description of his efforts to train a Scandinavian worker, whom he described as “dumb as an ox,” in the most efficient procedures for shoveling pig iron. While contemporary organizations still use variations of scientific management in valuable ways, as a guiding conception of analyzing organizations it too often oversimplified the complexity of human needs and motives in the workplace.

Max Weber: Bureaucracy as an Ideal Construct

In the early decades of the twentieth century, Max Weber's writings became influential, in a related but distinct way. Organization theorists often treat Weber as one of the founders of organizational sociology – the analysis of complex organizations. His investigations of bureaucracy as a social phenomenon provided the most influential early analysis of the topic (Gerth and Mills, 1946).

The proliferation of organizations with authority formally distributed among bureaus or subunits is a recent development in human history. Weber undertook to specify the defining characteristics of the bureaucratic form of organization, which he saw as a relatively new and desirable form in society. He saw the spread of such organizations as part of a movement toward more legal and rational forms of authority and away from authority based on tradition (such as inherited monarchical power) or charisma (such as that possessed by a ruler like Napoleon). In traditional feudal or aristocratic systems, Weber said, people's functions were assigned by personal trustees or appointees of the ruler. Further, their offices were more like avocations than modern-day jobs; authority was discharged as a matter of privilege and the bestowing of a favor.

The bureaucratic form was distinct in its legalistic specification of the authorities and obligations of office. Weber wrote that the fully developed version of bureaucracy had the following characteristics:

1. Fixed, official jurisdictional areas are established by means of rules. The rules distribute the regular activities required by the organization among these fixed positions or offices, prescribing official duties for each. The rules distribute the authority to discharge the duties, and they also establish specified qualifications required for each office.
2. There is a hierarchy of authority, involving supervision of lower offices by higher ones.
3. Administrative positions in the bureaucracy usually require expert training and the full working capacity of the official.
4. Management of subunits follows relatively stable and exhaustive rules, and knowledge of these rules is the special expertise of the official.
5. The management position serves as a full-time vocation, or career, for the official.

Weber regarded this bureaucratic form of organization as having technical advantages compared with administrative systems in which the officials regarded their service as an avocation, often gained by birthright or through the favor of a ruler, to be discharged at the official's personal discretion. In Weber's view, qualified career officials, a structured hierarchy, and clear, rule-based specifications of duties made for precision, speed, clarity, and consistency. In addition, the strict delimiting of the authority of career officials and the specification of organizational duty meant that duties would be performed consistently, and clients would be treated without favoritism. With officials placed in positions on the basis of merit rather than birthright or political favoritism, constrained by rules defining their duties, and serving as career experts, bureaucracies represented the most efficient organizational form yet developed, from Weber's perspective.

Weber did express concern that bureaucratic routines could oppress individual freedom (Fry, 1989) and that problems could arise from placing bureaucratic experts in control of major societal functions. Nevertheless, he described bureaucracy as a desirable form of organization, especially for efficiency and the fair treatment of clients and employees. He thus emphasized a model of organization involving consistent rules and hierarchy of authority. For this reason, Weber is often grouped with the other classic figures as a proponent of what later analysts would characterize as the closed-system view of organizations.

The Administrative Management School: Principles of Administration

Analysts also began to develop the first management theories that encompassed a broad range of administrative functions and the proper means of discharging those functions. They sought to develop principles of administration to guide managers in such functions as planning, organizing, supervising, controlling, and delegating authority. This group became known as the administrative management school (March and Simon, 1958).

The proponents of this school of thought advanced principles that focused on providing effective organization. The flavor of their work and their principles are illustrated in prominent papers by two of the leading figures in this group, Luther Gulick and James Mooney. In “Notes on the Theory of Organization,” Gulick (1937) discussed two fundamental functions of management: the division of work and the coordination of work. Concerning the division of work, he discussed the need to create clearly defined specializations. Specialization, he said, allows the matching of skills to tasks and the clear, consistent assignment of tasks.

Once tasks have been divided, coordinating the work becomes imperative. On this matter, Gulick proposed principles that were clearer than his general points about specialization. Coordination should be guided by several principles. First is the span of control – the number of subordinates reporting to one supervisor. The span of control should be kept narrow, limited to between six and ten subordinates per supervisor. The supervisor's attention should not be divided among too many subordinates. The principle of one master stated that each subordinate should have only one superior. There should be no confusion about who the supervisor is. A third principle, technical efficiency through the principle of homogeneity, required that tasks must be grouped into units on the basis of their homogeneity. Dissimilar tasks should not be grouped together.

In the same paper, Gulick sought to define the job of management through what became one of the most influential acronyms in general management and public administration: POSDCORB. The letters stand for planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting. These are the functions, he said, for which principles needed to be developed in subsequent work.

In "The Scalar Principle," Mooney (1930) presented a generally similar picture of the effort to develop principles. He said that an organization must be like a scale, a graded series of steps, in levels of authority and corresponding responsibilities. The principle involved several component principles, including leadership. Under this principle, Mooney said, a "supreme coordinating authority" at the top must project itself through the "scalar chain" to coordinate the entire structure. The scalar chain relied on the principle of delegation, under which higher levels assign responsibility to lower levels. These processes accomplished the third principle of functional definition, under which each person is assigned a specific task.

These two examples illustrate the nature of the administrative management school. These two authors emphasize formal structure in the organization and the hierarchical authority of administrators. Although some of the principles are only vaguely discussed, others are quite clear. Tasks should be highly specialized. Lines of hierarchical authority must be very clear, with clear delegation down from the top. Span of control should be narrow. A subordinate should be directly accountable to one superior. Like Weber and Taylor, these authors tended to emphasize consistency, rationality, and machine-like efficiency. Critics would later contend that they wrote about organizations as if they could operate most effectively as closed systems, designed according to one proper form of organization.

The historical contribution of this group is undeniable; the tables of contents of many contemporary management texts reflect the influence of these theorists' early efforts to conceive the role of management and administration. In some highly successful corporations, top executives have made this literature required reading for subordinates (Perrow, 1970b).

Gulick identified very strongly with public administration. He and other members of the administrative management school played important roles in the work of various committees and commissions on reorganizing the federal government, such as the Brownlow Committee in 1937 and the Hoover Commission in 1947. The reforms these groups proposed reflected the views of the administrative management school. They aimed at such objectives as grouping federal agencies according to similar functions, strengthening the hierarchical authority of the chief executive, and narrowing the executive's span of control.

The immediate influence of these proposals on the structure of the federal government was complicated by political conflicts between the president and Congress (Arnold, 1995). They had a strong influence, however, especially on the development of an orthodox view of how administrative management should be designed in government. Some scholars have argued that structural developments in public agencies and the attitudes of government officials about such issues still reflect an orthodox administrative management school perspective (Knott and Miller, 1987; Warwick, 1975, pp. 69–71). The influence of the administrative management school on these reform efforts can be considered the most significant direct influence on practical events in government that organization theorists have ever had. Nevertheless, critics later attacked the views of the administrative management theorists as too limited for organizational analysis. As described later, researchers began to find that many successful contemporary organizations violate the school's principles drastically and enthusiastically.

The administrative management theorists' work was related to a broad progressive reform movement (Knott and Miller, 1987). Those reformers sought to eradicate corruption in government, especially on the part of urban political machines and their leaders. They sought to institute more professional forms of administration through such means as establishing the role of the city manager. In addition, the growth of government over the earlier part of the century had led to disorganization among the agencies and programs of government; there was a need for better organization. In this context, the administrative management theorists' emphasis on basic organizational principles appears not only well justified but absolutely necessary.

It is also important to acknowledge that these early theorists did not advance their ideas as simplemindedly as some later critics depict it. Although Luther Gulick came to be characterized in many organization theory texts as one of the foremost proponents of highly bureaucratized organizations, he wrote a reflection on administrative issues from World War II in which he drew conclusions about the efficiency of democracy. He argued that the democratic system of the United States actually gave it advantages over the more authoritarian axis powers. The more democratic process required more participation and cooperation in problem solving and thus led to better planning and implementation of plans than in the authoritarian regimes (Van Riper, 1998). Gulick thus suggested that more democratic processes may look less efficient than more authoritarian ones, even though they can produce more efficient and effective results.

Another very original thinker, Mary Parker Follett, wrote approvingly of administrative principles, and scholars sometimes classify her as a member of this school. She wrote, however, a classic essay on “the giving of orders” (Follett, [1926] 1989) that had very original and forward-looking implications. In the essay, she proposed a cooperative, participative process for giving orders, in which superiors and subordinates develop a shared understanding of the particular situation and what it requires. They then follow the “law” of the situation rather than having a superior impose an order on a subordinate. Follett's perspective both foreshadowed later movements and influenced them in the direction of participatory management that received more and more emphasis among organizational analysts and in organizational practice. It also foreshadowed contemporary developments in feminist organization theory (Guy, 1995; Harquail, 2020; Hult, 1995; Morton and Lindquist, 1997).

Still, these contributions concentrated on a limited portion of the framework for organizational analysis given in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. They emphasized the middle and lower parts of the framework, particularly organizational structure. They paid attention to tasks and to incentives and motivation, but they were limited in comparison with the work of later authors. Additional developments rapidly began to expand the analysis of organizations, with increasing attention to the other components in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.

Reactions, Critiques, and Subsequent Developments in Analysis of Organizations and the People in Them

Developments in the emerging field of industrial psychology led to dramatic changes in the way organizational and managerial analysts viewed organizations and the people in them. Researchers studying behavior in industry began to develop more insight into psychological factors in work settings. They analyzed the relationships among such factors as fatigue, monotony, and worker productivity. They studied working conditions, analyzing variables such as rest periods, hours of work, methods of payment, routineness of work, and the influence of social groups in the workplace (Burrell and Morgan, 1980, p. 129).

The Hawthorne Studies: Elaborating the Nature of People in the Workplace

A series of experiments beginning in the mid-1920s at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company provided a more subtle view of the psychology of the workplace than previous analysts had produced. The Hawthorne studies involved experiments and academic and popular reports over a number of years. Controversies ensued over the interpretation of these studies (Burrell and Morgan, 1980, pp. 120–143); however, organizational analysts consider them pathbreaking illustrations of the influence of social and psychological factors on work behavior. An employee's work-group experiences, a sense of the importance of the work, and concern on the part of supervisors are among the important social and psychological influences on workers.

The leaders of the project identified several experiments as particularly significant (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939). In one experiment, the researchers lowered the level of illumination in the workplace and found that productivity nevertheless increased, because the workers responded to the attention that the researchers paid to them and their work. In another study, they improved the working conditions in a small unit through numerous alterations in rest periods and working hours. Increases in output were at first taken as evidence that the changes were influencing productivity. When the researchers tested that conclusion by withdrawing the improved conditions, however, they found that, rather than falling off, output remained high. In the course of the experiment, the researchers had consulted the workers about their opinions and reactions and displayed concern for their physical well-being. Their experiment on the physical conditions of the workplace had actually altered the social situation in the workplace, and that appeared to account for the continued high output.

In observing another work group, the researchers found that it enforced strict norms regarding group members' productivity. To be a socially accepted member of the group, a worker had to avoid being a “rate buster,” who turns out too much work; a “chiseler,” who turns out too little; or a “squealer,” who says something to a supervisor that could be detrimental to another worker. This suggested a distinction between the formal organization, as it is officially presented in organization charts and rules, and the informal organization. The informal organization develops through unofficial social processes within the organization, but can involve norms and standards as influential on the worker as formal requirements.

The Hawthorne studies provided a significant demonstration of the importance of social and psychological factors in the workplace up to that time, and they contributed to a major shift in research on management and organizations. The emphasis on social influences, informal processes, and the motivating power of attention from others and a sense of significance for one's work constituted a major counterpoint against the principles of administrative management and scientific management.

Chester Barnard and Herbert Simon: The Inducements–Contributions Equilibrium, The Limits of Rationality, and Behavioral Theory of Organizations

Chester Barnard, a successful business executive turned organization theorist, and Herbert Simon, an academic who would become a Nobel laureate, provided major contributions that moved research in new directions. These contributions added substantially to the attention that organization theorists paid to organizational processes (especially decision making), people, environments, leadership, and goals and values.

Encouraged by the members of the Harvard group who were responsible for the Hawthorne studies and related work (Burrell and Morgan, 1980, p. 148), Chester Barnard wrote *The Functions of the Executive* (1938). It became one of the most influential books in the history of the field. Barnard's definition of an organization – "a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons" (1938, p. 73) – illustrates the sharp difference between his perspective and that of the classical theorists. Rather than emphasizing the formal authority of executive leaders, Barnard focused on how leaders induce the cooperative activities fundamental to an organization. He characterized an organization as an "economy of incentives," in which individuals contribute their participation and effort in exchange for incentives that the organization provides. The executive must keep the economy in equilibrium by providing incentives to induce contributions from members; those contributions in turn earn the resources for continuing incentives. (Notice that the definition of organization in Chapter One speaks of leaders and organizations seeking to gain resources from the environment to translate into incentives. This reflects the influence of Barnard's perspective.) Barnard offered a rich typology of incentives, including not just money but also power, prestige, fulfillment of ideals and altruistic motives, participation in valuable work, and many others. (Table 10.2 in Chapter Ten describes the incentives that he named.)

Barnard also saw the economy of incentives as interrelated with other key functions of the executive, including communication and persuasion. The executive must use communication and persuasion to influence workers' valuations of incentives. The executive can, e.g., emphasize major organizational values. The persuasion process thus requires an effective communication process. He discussed the communication and persuasion processes as essential to the "informal organization" which fosters the cooperative activity essential for effective organization. Some authors now cite Barnard's ideas on these topics as an early recognition of the importance of organizational culture, a topic that has received extensive attention in organizational analysis and practice in recent decades (and which is covered in more depth in Chapter 11).

Barnard's divergence from the classical approaches is obvious. Rather than stating prescriptive principles, he sought to describe the empirical reality of organizations. He treated the role of the executive as central, but he placed less emphasis on formal authority and formal organizational structures. Barnard's analysis drew interest from many researchers, including one preeminent social scientist, Herbert Simon. Simon attacked the administrative management school much more directly than Barnard had. In an article titled "The Proverbs of Administration" in *Public Administration Review* (1946), he criticized the administrative management school's principles of administration as vague and contradictory. He compared them to proverbs because he saw them as prescriptive platitudes. The principle of specialization, e.g., never specified whether one should specialize by function, clientele, or place. The principle of span of control conflicts with the principle of unity of command. In a large organization, narrow spans of control require small work units, with a supervisor for each. Then there must be many supervisors above those supervisors to keep the span of control narrow at that level, and so on up. This makes communication up, down, and across the organization very cumbersome, and it makes it difficult to maintain clear, direct hierarchical lines of authority.

Simon called for a more systematic examination of administrative processes to develop concepts and study their relationships. Researchers, he said, should determine when individuals in administrative settings should choose one or the other of the alternatives represented by the principles. As indicated by his critique, such choices are seldom clear. Such limits on the ability of organizational members to be completely rational are major determinants of organizational processes and their effects. Simon argued that these limits on rationality must be more carefully analyzed through a more empirical approach, with decision making as the primary focus.

Simon's critique of Gulick and others in the administrative management school underestimated strengths of that approach (Hammond 1990). The administrative management school did address challenges that managers constantly face, such as decisions about the appropriate span of control, that have a continuing influence on organizational structures in government. Still, most organization theorists agree that Simon's rejection of the school's principles had the stronger influence on subsequent work in the field and changed its direction.

Simon pursued his ideas further in *Administrative Behavior* (1948). As the title indicates, he emphasized analysis of actual behavior rather than prescribing principles. He drew on Barnard's idea of an equilibrium of inducements and contributions and extended it into a more elaborate discussion of an organization's need to provide sufficient inducements to members, external constituencies, and supporters. (The definition and framework in Chapter One also reflect the influence of Simon's perspective.)

Like Barnard, Simon was concerned with the process of inducement and persuasion and with abstract incentives such as prestige, power, and altruistic service in addition to material incentives. He emphasized the uncertainties that administrative decision makers face. Faced with uncertainty and complexity, how do administrators make choices and decisions? The classical principles of administration were based on the assumption that administrators could be rational in their choice of the most efficient mode of organization. Much of economic theory assumed that firms and individuals are strictly rational in maximizing profits and personal gain. Simon observed that in administrative settings, there are usually uncertainties that impose cognitive limits on rationality. Strictly rational decisions are impossible in complex situations, because information and time for making decisions are limited, and human cognitive capacity is too limited to process all the information and to consider all of the alternatives. Whereas most economic theory assumed maximizing behavior in decision making, Simon coined a new concept. Rather than maximize, administrators “satisfice.” Satisficing involves choosing the best of a limited set of alternatives so as to optimize the decision within the constraints of limited information and time. Administrators often cannot make maximally rational decisions. The administrator makes the best possible decision within the constraints imposed by the available time, resources, and cognitive capacity.

This conception of the decision-making process challenged a fundamental tenet of economic theory. It influenced subsequent research on decision making in business firms, as amplified by *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* by Richard Cyert and James March (1963). It provided a major step toward more recent approaches to organizational decision making. Chapters Six and Seven describe Cyert and March's conclusions and why prominent organizational analysts consider this book one of the most influential in the history of the field. With James March, Simon published another influential book, *Organizations* (March and Simon, 1958), in which they elaborated the theory of an equilibrium between inducements and worker contributions. They presented an extensive set of propositions about factors influencing a person's decision to join and stay with an organization and, once in it, to produce. In these and other works, Simon's insights about decision making in administrative settings appears to be one of the main reasons that he was later awarded the Nobel Prize in economics.

Social Psychology, Group Dynamics, and Human Relationships

In the 1930s Kurt Lewin, a psychologist, arrived in the United States as a refugee from Nazism, to continue his very influential research. He developed field theory and topological psychology, which sought to explain human actions as functions of both the characteristics of the individual and forces impinging on the individual at a given time. These ideas differed from other prominent approaches of the time, such as Freudian psychology, which emphasized unconscious motives and past experiences.

Lewin's emphasis on the field of forces influencing an individual's actions drew on his interest in group behaviors and change processes in groups (Back, 1972, p. 98). He studied power, communication, influence, and “cohesion” within groups, and he developed a conception of change that analysts of group and organizational change still find valuable.

Lewin argued that groups and individuals maintain a “quasi-stationary equilibrium” in their attitudes and behaviors. This equilibrium results from a balance between forces pressing for change and those pressing against change. To change people, you must change these forces. Groups exert pressures and influences on the individuals within them. One must alter the total field of group pressures, through a three-phase process. The first phase is “unfreezing,” or weakening the forces against change and strengthening the forces for change. Next, the “changing” phase moves the group to a new equilibrium point. Finally, the “refreezing” phase firmly sets the new equilibrium through such processes as expressions of group consensus.

One of Lewin's experiments in group dynamics illustrates his meaning. Lewin conducted research on social processes such as race relations and group leadership. During World War II, Lewin sought to aid the war effort by conducting research on methods of encouraging consumption of underutilized foods as a way of conserving resources. He conducted an experiment about getting housewives to decide that they should use more beef hearts in preparing meals. He assembled the housewives in groups and presented them with information favoring the change. They then discussed the matter, aired and resolved their concerns about the change (“unfreezing”), and came to a consensus that they should use more beef hearts (change). In groups in which the housewives made a public commitment to do so, more of them adopted the new behavior than in groups in which the members made no such public commitment. The group commitment and its effect provide an example of “refreezing,” or setting group forces at a new equilibrium point.

As the intellectual leader of a group of social scientists interested in research on group processes, Lewin was instrumental in establishing the Research Center for Group Dynamics at MIT and the first National Training Laboratory, which served for years as a leading center for training in group processes. These activities produced an interesting set of diverse, sometimes opposing influences on later work in the field.

Lewin's efforts were among the first to apply experimental methods (such as using control groups) to the analysis of human behavior. The work of Lewin and his colleagues set in motion the development of experimental social psychology, which led to extensive experimentation on group processes. In an influential experiment conducted by members of this group, Lester Coch and John R. P. French (1948) compared different factory work groups faced with a change in their work procedures. One group participated fully in the decision to make the change, another group had limited participation, and a third group was simply instructed to make the change. The participative groups made the change more readily and more effectively, with the most participative group doing the best. These findings contributed to making participative decision making (PDM) a widely utilized technique in management theory and practice. Numerous experiments of this sort contributed to the growing literature on industrial psychology and organizational behavior.

Interestingly, Lewin's influence also led to an opposing trend in applied group dynamics. The National Training Laboratory conducted training in group processes for governmental and industrial organizations. After Lewin's death, the group dynamics movement split into two movements. In addition to the researchers who emphasized rigorous experimental research on group concepts, a large group continued to emphasize industrial applications and training in group processes. This work contributed to the development of the field of organization development (described in Chapter Thirteen). It also led to the widespread use of T-groups, sensitivity sessions, and encounter-group techniques during the 1960s and 1970s (Back, 1972, p. 99). The work of Lewin and his colleagues (Lewin, 1947; 1948; Lewin and Lippitt, 1938; Lewin, Lippitt, and White, 1939) substantially influenced analysts' conceptions of the components of Figures 1.1 and 1.2, especially those concerned with change, decision making, and groups.

The Human Relations School

The Hawthorne experiments and related work and the research on group dynamics were producing insights about social and psychological factors in the workplace. They emphasized the value of participative management, enhancing employee self-esteem, and improving human relations in organizations.

The psychologist Abraham Maslow developed a theory of human needs that became one of the most influential theories ever developed by a social scientist. Maslow argued that human needs fall into a set of major categories, arranged in a "hierarchy of prepotency." The needs in the lowest category dominate a person's motives until they are sufficiently fulfilled, then those in the next-highest category dominate, and so on. The categories, in order of prepotency, were physiological needs, safety needs, love needs, self-esteem needs, and self-actualization needs. The self-actualization category referred to the need for self-fulfillment, for reaching one's potential and becoming all that one is capable of becoming. Thus, once a person fulfills his or her basic physiological needs, such as the need for food, and then fulfills the needs at the higher levels on the hierarchy, he or she ultimately becomes concerned with self-actualization. This idea of making a distinction between lower and higher-order needs was particularly attractive to writers emphasizing human relations in organizations (for more detail on Maslow's formulation, see Chapters Nine and Ten).

Douglas McGregor, e.g., published a book whose title foretells its message: *The Human Side of Enterprise* (1960). McGregor had been instrumental in bringing Kurt Lewin to MIT, and the influence of both Lewin and Maslow was apparent in his conceptions of "Theory X" and "Theory Y." He argued that management practices in American industry were dominated by a view of human behavior that he labeled Theory X. This theory held that employees were basically lazy, passive, and resistant to change and responsibility. Hence management must direct, control, and motivate employees. McGregor felt that Theory X guided organizational practices in most industrial organizations and was at the heart of classic approaches to management, such as scientific management.

Theory Y involved a diametrically different view of employees. Drawing on Maslow's conception of higher-level needs for self-esteem and self-actualization, McGregor defined Theory Y as the view that employees are capable of self-direction and self-motivation. Underutilized though this theory was at the time, management based on this approach would be more effective, because individual self-discipline is a more effective form of control than authoritarian supervision. McGregor advocated management approaches that would allow more worker participation and self-control, such as decentralization of authority, management by objectives, and job enlargement.

Theory Y rejected the classical approach to organization. Other major authors of the time placed a similar value on releasing human potential in the workplace. Argyris (1957), e.g., argued that there were inherent conflicts between the needs of the mature human personality and the needs of organizations. When management applies the classical principles of administration, healthy individuals will experience frustration and conflict. Healthy individuals desire independence, activeness, and use of their abilities. These motives clash with the classical principles, such as those that call for hierarchical authority and narrow specialization. These principles foster dependence on superiors and organizational rules, promote passiveness due to reduced individual discretion, and limit workers' opportunities to use their abilities. Argyris, too, called for further development of such techniques as participative leadership and job enlargement to counter this problem.

Like the classical theorists before them, the proponents of human relations theories in turn became the targets of criticism. Critics complained that they concentrated too narrowly on one dimension of organizations – the human dimension – with too little attention to other dimensions, such as organizational structure and environmental pressures. They argued that the human relations theorists were repeating the mistake of proposing one best way of approaching organizational analysis, because they always treated interpersonal and psychological factors as the crucial issues. Critics also complained that the human relations approach lacked empirical support due to weak evidence that improved human relations would lead to improved organizational performance (Perrow, 1970b). Research in the 1950s and 1960s produced evidence of considerable conflict in some very successful organizations. Research also produced little evidence of a strong relationship between individual job satisfaction and productivity (see Chapter Ten).

Like the criticisms of the classical approaches, these criticisms often overlooked the historical perspective of the writers, underestimating the significance of what they were trying to do at the time. The insights that these human relations theorists provided remain valuable – and dangerous to ignore. Examples still abound of management practices that cause damage because of inattention to the factors emphasized by the human relations theorists. E.g., when improperly implemented, scientific management techniques have created situations in which workers slow down or disguise their normal behaviors when management analysts try to observe them.

Open-Systems Approaches and Contingency Theory

Concerns over the limitation of the earlier approaches intensified as researchers found increasing evidence that organizations successfully adopt different forms under different circumstances. Organizational analysts became convinced that different forms of organization can be effective under certain contingencies of tasks and technology, organizational size, and operating environment. The analysis of these contingencies and their influence on organizations made “contingency theory” the dominant approach in organizational analysis in the 1960s and 1970s and organizational analysts still find it useful (Daft, 2020, pp. 28–34).

Around the middle of the twentieth century, researchers associated with the Tavistock Institute in Great Britain analyzed “sociotechnical systems,” emphasizing the relationships among technical factors and social dimensions in the workplace (Burrell and Morgan, 1980, pp. 146–147). E.g., Trist and Bamforth (1951) published an analysis of a change in work processes in a coal-mining operation that found that the technical changes in the work process changed the social relationships within the work group. They depicted the organization as a system with interdependent social and technical subsystems. In response to disturbances, the system moves to a new point of equilibrium – a new pattern of interrelated social and technical processes. Additional studies by the Tavistock researchers further developed this view that organizations are systems with group and individual characteristics, task requirements, and interrelations among them that must be properly accommodated in the design of the organization.

Tavistock researchers also devoted attention to the external environments of organizations. In a widely influential article titled “The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments,” Emery and Trist (1965) noted the increasing flux and uncertainty in the political, social, economic, and technological settings in which organizations operate. They discussed the influence on the internal operations of organizations of the degree of “turbulence” in their environment. Thus the emphasis moved toward analysis of organizations as open systems facing the need to adapt to environmental variations. (The case of “The Funeral in the Public Service Center” available in the Instructor's Guide describes a situation in a government agency in which a manager made a change in work group assignments. He intended for the change to improve technical operations and efficiency. The change disrupted social relations in the group affected, however, and invoked sharp resistance to the change. The manager had not taken into account the seemingly simple insight of sociotechnical systems theory: the important relationship between technical and social factors in organizations.)

In the United States, the most explicit systems approach to organizational analysis appeared in a very prominent text by Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn (1966), *The Social Psychology of Organizations*. They applied the systems language of inputs, throughputs, outputs, and feedback to organizations. In analyzing throughput processes, e.g., they differentiated various major subsystems, including maintenance subsystems, adaptive subsystems, and managerial subsystems. Scholars regard Katz and Kahn's effort as a classic in the organizational literature (Burrell and Morgan, 1980, p. 158), but it also provides an example of the very general nature of the systems approach. Because of its very general concepts, organizational researchers increasingly treated systems theory as a broad framework for organizing information (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1973, p. 16), but not as a clearly articulated theory. The metaphor of organizations as open, adaptive systems remained powerful, however, as an expression of the view of organizations as social entities that adapt to a variety of influences and imperatives.

Besides the efforts to apply systems concepts to organizations, research results indicated that organizations adopt different forms in response to contingencies. (Chapter Eight provides further discussion of contingency theories.) In England, Joan Woodward (1965) conducted a pathbreaking study of British industrial firms. She found that the firms fell into three categories on the basis of the production process or "technology" they employed: small-batch or unit production systems were used by such organizations as shipbuilding and aircraft manufacturing firms; large-batch or mass-production systems were operated by typical mass manufacturing firms; and continuous production systems were used by petroleum refiners and chemical producers. Most importantly, she concluded that the successful firms within each category showed similar management-structure profiles, but those profiles differed among the three categories. The successful firms within a category were similar on such dimensions as the number of managerial levels and the spans of control, yet they differed on these measures from the successful firms in the other two categories. This indicated that the firms within a category had achieved a successful fit between their structure and the requirements of the particular production process or technology with which they had to deal. The firms appeared to be effectively adapting structure to technology.

Burns and Stalker (1961) in *The Management of Innovation*, further contributed to the conclusion that effective organizations adapt their structures to contingencies. Burns and Stalker analyzed firms in the electronics industry in Great Britain. The industry was undergoing rapid change, with new products being developed, markets for the products shifting, and new technology becoming available. The firms faced considerable flux and uncertainty in their operating environments. Burns and Stalker classified the firms into two categories on the basis of their managerial structures and practices: organic and mechanistic organizations. Their descriptions of the characteristics of these two groups depict mechanistic organizations as bureaucratic organizations designed along the lines of the classical approaches. The name of the category also has obvious implications: these were organizations designed to operate in machine-like fashion. Burns and Stalker concluded that the organic type, named to underscore an analogy with living, flexible organisms, performed more successfully in the rapidly changing electronics industry. In these organizations there was less emphasis on communicating up and down the chain of command, on the superior controlling subordinates' behavior, and on strict adherence to job descriptions. There was more emphasis on networking and lateral communication, on the supervisor as facilitator, and on flexible and changing work assignments. Such organizations adapted and innovated more effectively under changing and uncertain conditions because they had more flexible structures, communication, supervision, and role definition. The mechanistic form can be more successful under stable environmental and technological conditions, however, where its emphasis on consistency and specificity makes it more efficient than a more loosely structured organization. Thus, Burns and Stalker also emphasized the need for a proper adaptation of the organization to contingencies.

Another important research project heavily emphasized organizations' environment as a determinant of effective structure. Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch (1967) studied US firms in three separate industries that confronted varying degrees of uncertainty, complexity, and change. The researchers concluded that the firms that were successfully operating in uncertain, complex, changing environments had more highly differentiated internal structures. By differentiated structures, they meant that the subunits differed a great deal among themselves, in their goals, time frames, and internal work climates. Yet these highly differentiated firms also had elaborate structures and procedures for integrating the diverse units in the organization. The integrating structures included task forces, liaison officers, and committees. Successful firms in more stable, certain environments, on the other hand, showed less differentiation and integration. Lawrence and Lorsch concluded that successful firms must have internal structures as complex as the environments in which they operate.

Other researchers continued to develop the general contingency perspective and to analyze specific contingencies. Perrow (1973) published an important analysis of organizational technology. He proposed two basic dimensions for the concepts of technology: the predictability of the task (the number of exceptions and variations encountered) and the analyzability of the problems encountered (the degree to which, when one encounters a new problem or exception, one can follow a clear program for solving it). Routine tasks are more predictable (there are fewer exceptions or variations) and more analyzable (exceptions or variations can be resolved through an established program or procedures). Organizations with routine tasks have more formal, centralized structures. They use more rules, formal procedures, and plans. Organizations with nonroutine tasks, where tasks have more exceptions and are harder to predict and where exceptions are harder to analyze and resolve, must have more flexible structures. They use more formal and informal meetings than rules and plans. (Chapter Eight describes a study confirming these relationships in public organizations.)

During this period, James Thompson (1967) published *Organizations in Action*, a very influential book that further developed the contingency perspective. Drawing on Herbert Simon's ideas about bounded rationality and satisficing, Thompson depicted organizations as reflecting their members' striving for rationality and consistency in the face of pressures against those orientations. He advanced propositions about how organizations use hierarchy, structure, units designed to buffer the environment, and other arrangements to try to “isolate the technical core” – that is, to create stable conditions for the units doing the basic work of the organization. Thompson suggested that organizations will try to group subunits on the basis of their technological interdependence – that is, their needs for information and exchange with each other in the work process (see Chapter Eight). Organizations, he proposed, will also adapt their structures to their environment. Where environments are shifting and unstable, organizations will adopt decentralized structures, with few formal rules and procedures, to provide flexibility for adapting to the environment (Chapter Four provides further description). One of Thompson's important achievements was to provide a driving logic for contingency and open-systems perspectives by drawing on Simon's ideas. Organizations respond to complexity and uncertainty in their technologies and their environments by adopting more complex and flexible structures. They do so because the greater demands for information processing strain the bounded rationality of managers and the information processing capacity of more formal bureaucratic structures. Clear chains of command, vertical communication, and strict rules and task assignments can be too slow and inflexible in adapting to complex information and rapid change.

Through the 1960s and 1970s, an upsurge in empirical research on organizations extended and tested the open-systems and contingency theory approaches. Many of these studies took place in public and nonprofit organizations. Peter Blau and his colleagues (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971) reported studies of government agencies that showed relationships between organizational size and structure. These and other studies added size to the standard set of contingencies. Hage and Aiken (1969) reported on a series of studies of social welfare agencies that provided evidence that routineness of tasks, joint programs among organizations, and other factors were related to organizational structure and change. In England, a team of researchers (Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings, 1969) conducted what became known as the Aston studies – a major effort at empirical measurement of organizations – and developed an empirical taxonomy, grouping organizations into types based on the measured characteristics. They interpreted differences in their taxonomic categories as the results of differences in age, size, technology, and external auspices and control. (Chapter Eight discusses important implications of these studies for theories about public organizations.) Child (1972) pointed out that in addition to the other contingencies that contingency theorists emphasized, managers' strategic choices play an important role in adapting organizational structure. These and numerous other efforts had by the mid-1970s established the contingency approach – the argument that organizational structures and processes are shaped by contingencies of technology, size, environment, and strategic choice – as a central topic in organization theory. Authors began to translate the contingency observations into prescriptive statements for use in “organizational design” (Daft, 2020; Galbraith, 1977; Mintzberg, 1989; Starbuck and Nystrom, 1981).

Like the other theories covered in this review and in later chapters, contingency theory soon encountered criticisms and controversies. Researchers disputed how the key concepts should be defined and measured. Some studies found a relationship between technology and structure; some did not (Tolbert and Hall, 2009). The basic idea that organizations must adapt to conditions they face, through such responses as adopting more flexible structures as they contend with more environmental uncertainty, still serves as a central theme in organization theory (Daft, 2020; Donaldson, 2001; Scott and Davis, 2015) and management practice (Peters, 1987). The developments in organizational research reviewed here have produced an elaborate field, with numerous professional journals carrying articles reporting analyses of a wide array of organizational topics. These journals and a profusion of books cover organizational structure, environment, effectiveness, change, conflict, communication, strategy, technology, interorganizational relations, and related variables.

More Recent Developments in Organization Theory and Research

In the past two decades, the field has moved in new directions, many of which represent extensions of contingency and open-systems theories, with increased emphasis on organizations' relations with their contexts (Scott and Davis, 2015). Later chapters describe how organization theorists have developed natural selection and population ecology models for analysis of how certain organizational forms survive and evolve in certain environmental settings (Aldrich, Ruef, and Lippmann, 2020; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Scott and Davis, 2015; Tolbert and Hall, 2009). Other theorists have analyzed external controls on organizations, with emphasis on organizations' dependence on their environments for crucial resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Principal-agent perspectives have been used to understand how actors use information to their advantage in relationships (Heinrich and Marschke, 2010). Political scientists have found this perspective useful in analyzing relations between government agencies and the political authorities seeking to control them (e.g., Wood and Waterman, 1994). Political scientists, however, have also emphasized that the relationships involve mutual influences that work both ways, rather than simply involving control by the political authorities (Krause, 1999; Waterman and Meier, 1998). Transaction cost theory emphasizes the costs involved when organizations provide a good or service for themselves, as opposed to attaining it from an internal source – a topic that has obvious relevance to the major trend toward outsourcing by government organizations. Institutional theory concerns the processes by which organizational characteristics become institutionalized – accepted as legitimate and enduring – in the organization, often due to influences of external institutions (Scott and Davis, 2015). The many perspectives create a sprawling theoretical landscape, but the various theoretical orientations provide insights for researchers and administrators who seek to understand public organizations. Later chapters discuss the relevance of those theories.

The research and theory on people and groups in work settings described earlier have similarly led to a proliferation of closely related work in organizational behavior and organizational psychology, including a similar trend toward elaborate empirical studies and conceptual development during the 1960s and 1970s. Thousands of articles and books have reported work on employee motivation and satisfaction, work involvement, role conflict and ambiguity, organizational identification and commitment, professionalism, leadership behavior and effectiveness, task design, and managerial procedures such as management by objectives and flextime.

As the different fields have progressed, new topics have emerged. Among many examples, the topic of organizational culture has received attention and is emphasized in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Advances in technology – especially computer, information, and communications technology – have presented organizations and managers with dramatic new challenges and opportunities, and researchers have been pressing to develop the theoretical and research grounding needed to manage these developments. The increasing presence of women and other underrepresented groups in the workforce has given rise to literature focusing on representation and diversity in organizations (Fernandez, 2020; Riccucci, 2018) and feminist organization theory (Harquail, 2020). Subsequent chapters discuss these and other rapidly developing topics.

The Role of Public and Nonprofit Organizations and Their Management in Organization Theory

The rich field of organization theory provides many valuable concepts and insights on which this book draws. It also raises an important issue for those interested in public and nonprofit organizations and management: Have the characteristics of public and nonprofit organizations and their members been adequately analyzed in this voluminous literature? As mentioned in Chapter One and further described in later chapters, there has been a literature on public bureaucracies for many years (e.g., Downs 1962; Niskanen 1971), but the historical review provided here illustrates how little attention has been devoted to this literature by most of the organization theorists. Implicitly, many organization theorists convey the message that the distinction lacks importance.

The analysts discussed in the preceding historical review have either concentrated on industrial organizations or sought to develop generic concepts and theories that apply across all types of organizations. E.g., even though Peter Blau, a prominent organization theorist, published an organizational typology that included a category of “commonweal organizations” very similar to what this book calls *public organizations*, he published empirical studies that downplayed such distinctiveness of organizational categories (Blau and Scott, 1962). Blau and Schoenherr (1971) examined government agencies for their studies of organizational size, but they drew their conclusions as if they applied to all organizations. So have replications of Blau's study (Beyer and Trice, 1979), even though Argyris (1972, p. 10) suggested that Blau may have found the particular relationship he discovered because he was studying organizations governed by civil service systems. Such organizations might respond to differences in size in different ways than do other organizations, such as business firms. When the contingency theorists analyzed environments, they typically concentrated on environmental uncertainty, especially as a characteristic of business firms' market environments, and placed little emphasis on political or governmental dynamics in organizational environments.

Providing a more classical example of this tendency, Weber argued that his conception of bureaucracy applied to government agencies and private businesses alike (Meyer, 1979). Major figures such as James Thompson (1962) and Herbert Simon (Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson, 1950) have stressed the commonalities among organizations and have suggested that public agencies and private firms are more alike than different. The contributions to organization theory and behavior described in this review were aimed at developing theory that would apply generally to all organizations. With exceptions (Blau and Scott, 1962; Scott, 2003, pp. 341–344), the theorists repeatedly implied or aggressively asserted that distinctions such as public and private, market and nonmarket, and governmental and nongovernmental offered little value for developing theory or understanding practice. Herbert Simon continued to offer such observations until the end of his life. He contended that public, private, and nonprofit organizations are essentially identical on the dimension that receives more attention than virtually any other in discussions of the unique aspects of public organizations – the capacities of leaders to reward employees (Simon, 1995, p. 283, n. 3). He also bluntly asserted that it is false to claim "that public and nonprofit organizations cannot, and on average do not, operate as efficiently as private businesses" (Simon, 1998, p. 11). So one of the foremost social scientists of the twentieth century attached little importance to the distinction we seek to develop in the next chapter.

Even so, research and writing about public organizations had been appearing for many decades, which were related to organizational sociology and psychology in various ways. Political scientists analyzing public "bureaucracies" usually emphasized the relationship between the bureaucracy and other elements of the political system. Economists emphasized the absence of economic markets for the outputs of public bureaucracies (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971).

Authors interested in the management of public organizations began to point to this gap between the two literatures (Rainey, 1983). Authors cited in this book mounted a critique of the literature on organization theory, saying that it offered an incomplete analysis of public organizations and their political and institutional environments

(Hood and Dunsire, 1981; Meyer, 1979; Perry and Kraemer, 1983; Pitt and Smith, 1981; Wamsley and Zald, 1973; Warwick, 1975). Yet many of these also criticized the writings on public bureaucracy as too anecdotal and lacking in the empirical and conceptual analyses common in organization theory. Also, the literature on government organizations showed too little concern with internal structures, behavior, and management, topics that had received extensive attention from researchers on organization theory. Researchers began to provide more explicit organizational analyses of public organizations, of the sort described in this book. As Chapter One mentioned, books and articles have since then provided many additional contributions. This activity has not fully resolved whether we can clarify the meaning of public organizations and public management and show evidence that such categories have significance for theory and practice. The next chapter turns to the challenge of formulating a definition and drawing distinctions.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Two

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Study: Moving the Maisenbacher House

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

CHAPTER THREE
WHAT MAKES PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS DISTINCT

The overview of organization theory in Chapter Two brings us to a controversy about what makes public organizations distinct. Leading experts on management and organizations have downplayed the distinction between public and private organizations as either a crude oversimplification or as unimportant (Fayol, 1917; Gulick and Urwick, 1937). In contrast, very knowledgeable people called for the development of a field that recognizes the distinctive nature of public organizations and public management.

This disagreement has major implications. A main rationale for privatization is that private organizations perform better. Privatization accounts for a significant portion of the world economy. On the other hand, its advantages over direct government provision are far from decided (Megginson and Netter, 2001). The absence of clear evidence in support of privatization has not dissuaded some representatives of the US Congress from wanting to privatize the National Park Service (NPS) to turn around the agency's budget deficit (Solomon, 2020).

Government officials around the world often consider questions about what should belong to the public and what is better off in the hands of business. President Donald Trump, e.g., pondered whether to auction off drilling rights in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Government officials in China are confronted with similar questions with regard to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In general, SOEs are a type of hybrid organization; they carry out public tasks and have business-like characteristics, but they also have a greater level of autonomy from political principals, compared to what we think of as traditional government (Pollitt et al., 2004; van Thiel, 2012). SOEs are reportedly about 20% of the world's total stock market value (Musacchio et al., 2015).

This chapter discusses important theoretical and practical issues that fuel this controversy and develops conclusions about the distinction between public and private organizations. First, it examines the problems with this distinction. It then describes the overlapping of the public, private, and nonprofit sectors in the United States, which precludes simple distinctions among them. The discussion then turns to the meaning and importance of the distinction. If they are not distinct from other organizations, such as businesses, why do public organizations exist? Answers to this question point to the need for public organizations and their distinct attributes. How can we define public organizations and managers? This chapter discusses some of the debates over the meaning of public organizations and then describes the best-developed ways of defining the category and conducting research to clarify it. After analyzing problems that arise in conducting such research, the chapter concludes with a description of the most frequent observations about the nature of public organizations and managers.

The Generic Tradition in Organization Theory

A distinguished intellectual tradition bolsters the generic perspective on organizations, the position that organization and management theorists should emphasize the commonalities among organizations. They should develop knowledge applicable to all organizations, avoiding such popular distinctions as public versus private and profit versus nonprofit. As analysis of organizations and management burgeoned early in the twentieth century, leading figures argued that their insights applied across commonly differentiated types of organizations. Max Weber (1919) claimed that his analysis of bureaucratic organizations applied to both government agencies and business firms; however, he also considered the state as an entity that successfully claims "a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Water and Waters, 2015, pp. 129 et seq.). Frederick Taylor applied his scientific management procedures in government arsenals and other public organizations. Similarly, the emphasis on social and psychological factors in the workplace in the Hawthorne studies, McGregor's Theory Y, and Kurt Lewin's research pervades the organizational development procedures that consultants apply in government agencies today. James Thompson (1962), a leading figure among the contingency theorists, echoed the generic refrain – that public and private organizations have more similarities than differences. Herbert Simon, a leading intellectual figure of organization theory, assigned relative unimportance to the distinctiveness of public organizations. Simon's leading text in public administration contains a sophisticated discussion of the political context of public organizations (Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson, 1950). It also argues, however, that there are more similarities than differences between public and private organizations. His major work treated organizational processes as applicable to all organizations (e.g., Simon, 1948; March and Simon, 1958).

Findings from Research

Objections to distinguishing between public and private organizations draw on more than theorists' claims. Studies of variables such as size, task, and technology in government agencies show that these variables may influence public organizations more than anything related to their status as a governmental entity. These findings are consistent with the observation that an organization becomes bureaucratic, not because it is in government or business, but because of its large size.

As research on organizations burgeoned in the twentieth century, studies sought to identify organizational dimensions (typologies). However, efforts to produce measurable evidence (taxonomies) of distinctions were inconclusive. Haas, Hall, and Johnson (1966) measured characteristics of a large sample of organizations and used statistical techniques to categorize them according to the characteristics they shared. A number of the resulting categories included both public and private organizations. This finding is not surprising, because organizations' tasks and functions can have more influence on their characteristics than their status as public or private. A government-owned hospital, e.g., resembles a private hospital more than it resembles a government-owned utility. Consultants and researchers frequently find, in both the public and the private sectors, organizations with highly motivated employees as well as severely troubled organizations. They often find that factors such as leadership practices influence employee motivation and job satisfaction more than whether the employing organization is public, private, or nonprofit.

Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings (1969) classified fifty-eight organizations into categories based on their structural characteristics; they had predicted that government organizations in the sample would show more bureaucratic features, such as more rules and procedures, but they found no such differences. However, the government organizations did show higher degrees of control by external authorities, especially over personnel procedures. The study included only eight government organizations, all of them local government units with functions similar to those of business organizations. Consequently, the researchers interpreted as inconclusive their findings regarding whether government agencies differ from private organizations in their structural characteristics. Studies such as these have consistently found the public–private distinction inadequate for a general typology of organizations (McKelvey, 1982).

Sector Blurring: Hybrids, Agencies, and Quangos

The public sector is operated by the government and funded through tax dollars, and the private sector is run by individuals and business organizations for profit. As for the nonprofit sector (the voluntary sector), these organizations have a special status (often involving tax exemption) because they further a social cause.

At the same time, there are a number of challenges in drawing distinctions. Public and private sectors overlap and interrelate in a number of ways, and this blurring of sectors has advanced even further in recent years (Christensen and Lægreid, 2003; Heinrich, Lynn, and Milward, 2009; Verkuil, 2007), due to the increasing number of “hybrid” organizations in many nations.

Hybrid organizations are partially public and partially private. Authors refer to them with many different labels (Koppell, 2003). E.g., Greve (1999) notes that hybrid organizations collectively comprise *the gray sector,* while Van Thiel and van de Wal (2010) use the term *parapublic sector*. Other labels used in the literature include *semi-autonomous agencies*, *statutory bodies*, *statutory companies*, *statutory authorities*, *independent regulatory authorities*, *executive agencies*, and *bureaus*, as well as various nation-specific labels. The label “agencies” is used more in nations other than the US, while “hybrids” is more prominent in US-based scholarship, in which “governmental agencies” is the term used to describe traditional governmental units, especially at the federal level.

Hybrids make up a substantial portion of the population of organizations and conduct much of the government's business in developed and emerging economies. Although precise estimates are difficult to make, some experts indicate the sector is equal to or larger than the core government bureaucracy both in terms of personnel and budget (e.g., van Thiel, 2020). Governments rely on these organizations to carry out important public services, such as financing mortgages and student loans. Hybrids have come to dominate some markets, such as federal housing market, in the case of Freddie Mac, and student loans in the case of Fannie Mae in the United States. When they face a crisis, the effects can be very wide reaching (Labaton and Andrews, 2008).

Definitions and Characteristics. To untangle these concepts, one can look to a definition by an expert. Sandra van Thiel defines *agencies* as “organizations that carry out public tasks at arms' length of the government in a relatively autonomous way” (van Thiel and Yesilkagit, 2014, p. 319; see also van Thiel, 2012). Yet, the labels and definitions also vary by sector, discipline, and country. Minkoff's (2002) study of nonprofits refers to the emergence of hybrid organizational forms that combine service and political action. In the tradition of economics, Menard (2004) refers to the “collection of weirdos” that are neither markets nor hierarchies (p. 3). In the US context, Koppell (2003) defines a *hybrid organization* as “an entity created by government to address a specific public policy purpose, which is owned in whole or in part by private individuals or corporations and/or generates revenue to cover its operating costs” (p.12). Skelcher and Smith (2015) suggest hybridization arises from a plurality of rationalities and different institutional logics, which has held back theory development (p. 434).

Another approach to understanding semi-autonomous agencies/hybrids is to compare them to government bureaucracies. The following list is adapted from literature on comparing agencies to government bureaucracies (Pollitt, 2004; Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; van Thiel, 2012; van Thiel et al., 2012; Verhoest et al., 2012):

- Agencies carry out many of the same tasks as government bureaucracies, such as implementing policy and monitoring regulatory compliance.
- Agencies are subject to a less political influence compared to government bureaucracies.
- Agencies have a greater autonomy in policy-making and management decisions compared to government bureaucracies.
- Agencies are structurally disaggregated from their parent unit of government, as in the case of a “ministry,” but are still under some formal control of the parent

unit. In other words, they operate at “arm's length.”

- Agencies vary in their permanence but generally are more permanent than an advisory committee and less permanent than government bureaucracies.

Origins. Many Nordic countries have used hybrid agencies to carry out public tasks for centuries (Greve, Flinders, and van Thiel, 1999; Wettenhall, 2005). These organizations were further emphasized in New Public Management reforms (Christensen and Lægreid, 2003; van Thiel, 2006). NPM doctrine considered traditional government bureaucracies inefficient and bogged down with red tape. NPM advocates called for a more businesslike government, more responsive to “customers,” more innovative, and more driven by outcome and performance. Advocates believed government would improve by relying more on the private sector, e.g., by outsourcing public services or by decoupling agents from principals (Boukaert, Peters, and Verhoest, 2010) and unbundling government (Pollitt and Talbott, 2004).

Hybrids and agencies also vary in purpose. Table 3.1 provides a few examples of the many motivations for the formation of hybrids and agencies.

TABLE 3.1 EXPLANATIONS FOR HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS

Motivations for Creating a Hybrid. Use as a policy tool…	**Example**
To save company too big or too strategic to fail	New Zealand rescue of Air New Zealand to support tourism industry
To maintain jobs or to aid a company in distress, that if left to fail will have negative consequences on the larger economy	The US bailout of General Motors, Chrysler in 2008 to avoid loss of over one million jobs and save auto industry National Coal Board in UK and comparable rescue operations in West Germany, Belgium, and Japan
To jumpstart investment and compensate for lack of private investment	Singapore investments in government-linked corporations to jumpstart the economy after the country gained its independence (1965)
To leverage state powers to provide public goods to benefit all individuals	Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) created in 1933 as a federally owned corporation to supply electricity and other services to rural areas. TVA was authorized by US government to take private property and justly compensate in order to provide service (eminent domain).
To increase access to public	Cambodia Phnom Penh Water uses government

services by requiring reduced prices to targeted groups as a means of making certain services more affordable for the public's cross-subsidization	cross-subsidies to distribute water below production costs to domestic households.

Researchers have attempted to further classify semi-autonomous agencies to understand their differences. E.g., van Thiel and her colleagues have developed a classification based on a 30-country comparison of formal legal features, based on level of autonomy and level of control (Table 3.2).

When services are assigned to semi-autonomous organizations, the accountability relationships shift; there is a tendency to shift away from a relationship between elected politicians and citizens to a relationship between politicians and managers (Romzek, 2000; Grossi and Thomasson, 2015). Semi-autonomous organizations are sometimes the subject of controversy because they do not operate in a sufficiently businesslike fashion while showing sufficient public accountability. The United States Post Office (USPS) is one such example.

TABLE 3.2 AGENCIFICATION TYPES

Type	Description	Examples
Type 0	Unit or directory of national central or federal government (not state or local government)	Ministry, Department, Ministerial Directorate, Directorate General (DG), state institution
Type 1	A semi-autonomous unit within the government, without legal independence but some managerial autonomy	Next Steps Agencies (UK); contract executive agencies (NL, B, AUS, IRL) most Scandinavian 'agencies'; the German indirect administration, Italian Agenzia Service Agency (A); central bureaus (Hungary); state institutions (EST)
Type 2	A statutory body, with legal independence, based on statutes, legal autonomy based on public or private law	Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPB; UK); ZBOs (NL); public establishments (IT, POR); parastatal bodies (B); statutory bodies or authorities (not corporations; A, EST, AUS, ILR, POR); indirect agencies (GER)
Type 3	Private or private-law-based organizations established by or on behalf of the government; government owns majority or all stock, otherwise category 5	Commercial companies, state-owned companies (SOC), state-owned enterprises (SOE), government foundations

Type 4	Execution of tasks by regional or local bodies, and or governments (county, province, region, municipality) created through decentralization delegation or devolution	Lander (GER), regions (B, I, UK), states (AUS), cantons (CH)
Type 5	Other, not listed above	Contracting out, privatization with government owning minority or no stock

Adapted from typology developed by van Thiel (2012) and from Verhoest, Van Thiel, Bouckaert, and Lægreid

In August 2020, the United States Post Office (USPS) was thrust into the headlines when President Donald Trump opposed providing it with any further government funding. The USPS was at the same time criticized for not generating enough revenue (an expectation of business) and not prioritizing the delivery of mail-in ballots to voters (an expectation of the public). According to the *Washington Post*, without additional funding, the USPS would be unable to deliver millions of mail-in ballots in time for the election (Cox et al., Aug 14, 2020). Headlines from the *Atlanta-Journal Constitution* and the *Los Angeles Times* suggested that Trump wanted to block Postal Service funding to undercut mail-in voting (August 13, 2020). The alleged effort to make it harder for millions of voters to vote is a serious concern. Even more important is the question of whether the USPS should be subject to the political influence of politicians. The USPS is constituted as a government corporation. Should the US government be required to fund the USPS? Or, should the USPS be required to make a profit and therefore not rely on government funding? These questions are typical for hybridized corporations.

Answers to these questions are not clear. As a hybrid organization, the USPS faces the obligations of both a business and a public organization. Some analysts point out that USPS lacks a transparent ownership structure and is not subject to standard policies that apply to corporations. Like a commercial enterprise, the USPS has sources of revenue, including sales of stamps, money orders, and shipping supplies. Yet USPS is also required to provide universal service. This requires delivery to rural and sparsely populated areas, which is not cost-effective and profitable. USPS faces competition from private carriers such as FedEx and UPS, but none of its competitors are legally obligated to deliver mail to all parts of the US. The USPS cannot raise rates without the express approval of the Postal Regulatory Commission, a government commission that oversees postal rates and that can approve or deny them. Meanwhile, FedEx and UPS are powerful political donors, alleged to have “worked to keep the postal services offerings in the parcel and express delivery markets as noncompetitive as possible” (Shaw, 2006, pp. 112–113). At the same time the USPS has many special privileges, including sovereign immunity, eminent domain powers, an exclusive legal right to deliver first-class and third-class mail, and a statutory monopoly on access to letter boxes. It is also not subject to antitrust violations. The USPS illustrates the complex status of hybrid organizations, and the advantages and disadvantages that status can convey.

While not usually considered "hybrids" in their ownership and legal status, many nonprofit or third sector organizations, like government agencies, have no profit indicators and often pursue social or public service missions, at times under contract with the government. To further complicate the picture, experts on nonprofit organizations express concerns about their "commercialization," by which nonprofits try to make money in businesslike ways. This may jeopardize their public service mission. Finally, many private for-profit organizations work under contracts or partnerships with governments in ways that blur the distinction between them (Zhang and Guo, 2020). Some corporations, such as defense contractors, for decades have received so much funding and direction from government that some analysts equate them with government organizations (Weidenbaum, 1969).

Functional Analogies: Doing the Same Thing. Obviously, many people and organizations in the public and private sectors perform virtually the same functions. General managers, secretaries, computer programmers, auditors, personnel officers, maintenance workers, and many other specialists perform similar tasks in public, private, and hybrid organizations. Organizations located in the different sectors – e.g., hospitals, schools, and electric utilities – also perform the same general functions. The New Public Management movement that spread through many nations in recent decades proposed that governments should use procedures similar to those purportedly used in business (Ferlie, Pettigrew, Ashburner, and Fitzgerald, 1996; Kettl, 2002; Lapuente and Van de Walle, 2020; Li and Chung, 2020; Hood, 1995; Hood and Peters, 2004).

Complex Interrelations. Government, business, and nonprofit organizations relate in elaborate ways (Kettl, 1993, 2002; Weisbrod, 1997; Cheng 2019). Governments buy products and services from nongovernmental organizations. Through contracts, grants, vouchers, subsidies, and franchises, governments arrange for the delivery of healthcare, sanitation services, research services, and other services by private organizations. These relations complicate the question of where government and the private sector begin and end (Jung, Malatesta, LaLonde, 2018). Banks process loans provided by the Veterans Administration and receive Social Security deposits electronically for Social Security recipients. Private corporations handle portions of the administration of Medicare by means of government contracts, and private physicians render most Medicare services. Private nonprofit corporations and religious organizations operate facilities for the elderly or for delinquent youths, using funds provided through government contracts and operating under extensive government regulation. Private businesses and nonprofit organizations become part of the service delivery process for government programs and blur the public–private distinction. Chapters Four, Five, and Fourteen provide more detail on these situations and their implications for organizations and management.

Analogies from Social Roles and Contexts. Government uses laws, regulations, and fiscal policies to influence private organizations. Environmental protection regulations, tax laws, and equal employment opportunity regulations either impose direct requirements on private organizations or establish incentives to get them to act in accordance with government policies. Here again, nongovernmental organizations share in the implementation of public policies. They become part of government and an extension of it. Even working independently of government, business organizations affect the quality of life in the nation and the public interest. Members of the most profit-oriented firms argue that their organizations serve their communities and the well-being of the nation as much as governmental organizations do. According to some critics, government agencies also sometimes behave too much like private organizations. Some critics of government laments the influence that interest groups wield over public agencies and programs. According to the critics, these groups use the agencies to serve their own interests rather than the public interest.

The Importance of Avoiding Oversimplification

Theory, research, and the realities of the contemporary political economy show the inadequacy of simple distinctions. Theory and practice must avoid oversimplifying distinctions between public and private.

That advice may sound obvious enough, but violations of it abound. During the intense debate about establishing the Department of Homeland Security, a *Wall Street Journal* editorial warned that the federal bureaucracy would be a major obstacle to effective homeland security policies. The editorial repeated simplistic stereotypes about federal agencies that have prevailed for years. The author claimed that federal agencies steadfastly resist change and aggrandize themselves by adding more and more employees. E.g., the increase in privatization and contracting has led to increasing controversy over whether privatization proponents have made oversimplified claims about the benefits of privatization, with proponents claiming great successes (Savas, 2000) and skeptics raising doubts (Verkuil, 2007; Megginson and Netter, 2001).

Clear demarcations between the public and private sectors are impossible, and oversimplified distinctions between public and private organizations are misleading. We still face a paradox, however, because scholars and officials make the distinction repeatedly in relation to important issues, and public and private organizations do differ in some obvious ways. Can we clarify the similarities and differences?

Public Organizations: An Essential Organization/Distinction

If there is no real difference between public and private organizations, can we nationalize all industrial firms or privatize all government agencies? Private executives in the US earn massively higher pay than their government counterparts. The financial press regularly lambasts corporate executive compensation practices as absurd, claiming they squander billions of dollars. Can we simply put these business executives on the federal executive compensation schedule and save money for these corporations and their customers? Such questions make it clear that there are some important differences in the administration of public and private organizations. Scholars have provided useful insights about the distinction, and researchers and managers have reported more evidence of the distinct features of public organizations.

The Purpose of Public Organizations

Why do public organizations exist? We can draw answers to this question from both political and economic theory. Even some economists who strongly favor free markets regard government agencies as inevitable components of free-market economies (e.g., Downs, 1967).

Politics and Markets. Decades ago, Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom (1953) provided a useful analysis of the raison d'être for public organizations. They analyzed the alternatives available to nations for controlling their political economies. Two alternatives are political hierarchies and economic markets. In advanced industrial democracies, the political process involves a complex array of contending groups and institutions that produce a complex, hydra-headed hierarchy. Dahl and Lindblom called this a “polyarchy.” Such a politically established hierarchy can direct economic activities. Alternatively, the price system in free economic markets can control economic production and allocation decisions. All nations use some mixture of markets and polyarchies.

Polyarchy draws on political authority and can serve as a means of social control. It is cheaper to have people willingly stop at red lights than to work out a system of compensating them for doing so. Markets have the advantage of operating through voluntary exchanges. Producers must induce consumers to engage willingly in exchanges with them. They have the incentive to produce what consumers want, as efficiently as possible. This allows freedom and flexibility, provides incentives for efficient use of resources, steers production in the direction of consumer demands, and avoids the problems of central planning inherent in a polyarchy. The term *invisible hand* refers to a well-functioning market, when consumer demand equals the supply of a good or service (*equilibrium*). However, imperfections in the exchange process between buyers and sellers arise under certain conditions, leading to *market failures*, wherein markets allocate resources inefficiently and government intervention may be required to improve social welfare (Lindblom, 1977; Downs, 1967).

Limited number of buyers and sellers. In the ideal competitive market, sellers have an incentive to produce goods and services of acceptable quality at a cost that consumers will pay. If the seller fails to do so, buyers find a different source. However, a limited number of sellers or buyers prevents the equilibrium between supply price and demand price. When competition among sellers is limited, as was once the case of the single seller of telephone service – the AT&T monopoly, prices are unconstrained. Similarly, when there is a dominant buyer in the exchange relationship, that buyer, called a *monopsony* (often a large employer) can control the market. Studies have shown the unrestrained market power of several school districts in Missouri. Teachers had little mobility across districts and the district could dictate employment terms (Ransom and Sims, 2010). There is a growing body of evidence on the ways that dominant employers can suppress wages and benefits, and even compromise workplace safety (Azar et al., 2017; Jamieson, 2014; Kruegar and Ashenfelter, 2017). Employers in the meatpacking industry have been subject to this criticism due to the disproportionate effect of COVID-19 virus on its workers (Dorning, 2020).

Public goods and free riders. A public good is *nonrival* and *nonexcludable*. Nonrival means that consumption of a good or service by one party does not prohibit consumption of the same good or service by another party. When one person uses the internet, other parties are not prohibited from visiting the same website at the same time. In contrast, a candy bar is a rival good; when one person consumes a candy bar, other persons cannot consume the same candy bar. Nonexcludable means nonpaying consumers cannot be prevented from accessing a good or service. Certain services, such as national defense, have this *public good* characteristic. Once provided, national defense benefits everyone, even free riders. In contrast, a good is excludable if suppliers can prevent consumers from accessing it. E.g., subscription services are intended to make magazines excludable to nonpayers. Private companies will not be able to make a profit if many people can get their goods or services for free. In that case government might require payment by taxpayers and either subsidize production or provide the good or service itself.

Information asymmetry. When one party in the exchange has an information advantage, exploitation can occur. People often lack sufficient information to make wise individual choices in some areas, so government regulates these activities. E.g., most people would not be able to determine the safety of particular medicines, so the Food and Drug Administration regulates the distribution of pharmaceuticals. The *lemon problem* refers to the classic problem of information asymmetry in the market for used cars. In such a situation the sellers know more about the car than the buyers. As a result, buyers may unknowingly purchase defective cars (lemons) at a higher price than they would otherwise pay if they had complete information on the car's condition. To correct this problem, government may require full transparency on the part of the seller or require the seller to provide a warranty.

Externalities or spillovers. Some costs may spill over onto people who are not parties to a market exchange. Externalities can be negative or positive. Externalities cause market inefficiency because the price of the good or service does not reflect the total societal costs or benefits. As a result, organizations will overproduce or underproduce, depending on the nature of the externality. The classic example of a negative externality is pollution. A manufacturer polluting the air imposes costs on others that the price of the product does not cover. In the case of negative externalities, the government role may be able to regulate pollution or to tax or fine companies who pollute. The Environmental Protection Agency regulates environmental externalities of this sort. Education is considered a positive externality because its benefits are shared. Vaccines are also a positive externality because each vaccine has a spillover advantage for even those not vaccinated. In the case of positive externalities, the role for government may be to offer tax breaks or other incentives to encourage production to provide positive effects for a community.

Because of market failures, private sector solutions are not always the most efficient alternatives, although advocates of outsourcing and privatization assume they are. We cannot expect markets to deliver goods efficiently if competition is limited, if consumers do not have information necessary to make wise choices, if services can be obtained without paying, or if costs affect those outside of a transaction. At the same time, it becomes clear that government can play an important role in influencing markets to improve efficiency.

Government may act to correct problems that markets themselves create or are unable to address – monopolies, the need for income redistribution, and instability due to market fluctuations – and to provide crucial services that are too risky or expensive for private competitors to provide. Critics also complain that market systems produce too many frivolous and trivial products, foster crassness and greed, confer too much power on corporations and their executives, and allow extensive bungling and corruption. Public concern over such matters bolsters support for a strong and active government (Lipset and Schneider, 1987). Conservative economists, however, argue that markets eventually resolve many of these problems and that government interventions simply make matters worse. Advocates of privatization claim that government does not have to perform many of the functions it does and that government provides many services that private organizations can provide more efficiently. Ongoing controversies over such decisions play out in virtually all nations.

Political Rationales for Government. A purely economic rationale ignores the many political and social justifications for government. Government in the United States and many other nations exists to maintain systems of law, justice, and social organization; to maintain individual rights and freedoms; to provide national security and stability; to promote general prosperity; and to provide direction for the nation and its communities. In spite of the blurring of the distinction between the public and private sectors, government organizations in the United States and many other nations provide services that are not exchanged on economic markets but are justified on the basis of general social values, the public interest, and the politically imposed demands of groups.

Government Organizations as Distinct Actors

In the United States there is an interesting concept called the State Action Doctrine, which draws a line between public and private conduct. The State Action Doctrine also has important implications for public managers, government employees, and citizens, as well as for outsourcing and privatization.

Understanding the State Action Doctrine requires us to think about the purpose of the US Constitution. As introduced, the US Constitution sought to create a government that did not infringe on the rights of private individuals. It restricted the reach of government, not of private organizations (and individuals), in order to protect individual freedom. The Founders believed that other laws, including statutes and case law, would constrain private organizations; this was not the job of the US Constitution. Later, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to ensure that states (an arm of government) would not deprive individuals of due process or deny people equal protection. But again, the restriction applied to government. Thus, the State Action Doctrine, which ensures certain protections of the Constitution, such as the First and Fourteenth Amendment, only applies to the coercive power of the government against the individual, rather than the coercive power of the individual against the individual (Verkuil, 2007).

The concept is important to research and practice for several reasons. Consider the choice between government and a private company for the delivery of public service. Employees of these organizations perform similar tasks. Yet, government employees who might be terminated have recourse, in the form of due process. Employees of private organizations, including nonprofits, usually do not. There are many examples of such rights being applied differentially. For example, a person terminated for her sexual orientation is not automatically guaranteed due process if he or she works for a nonprofit organization. Rosenbloom and Piotroski (2005) discuss the case of the firing of a nonprofit's employee because she wore a T-shirt that proclaimed her sexual orientation. The government had contracted with a nonprofit to provide youth services. The same person could not be fired from a public organization without due process. The burden of proof would be quite high if a government had terminated the employee; the state would have to establish that the employee's sexual orientation interfered with her ability to perform her job.

A similar rights differential arises between citizens who receive public services from a public organization and customers who receive the same service from a private organization. In a case before the US Supreme Court, *Jackson v Metropolitan Edison*, a customer sued a private utility company when the company terminated her service without notice. The US Supreme Court ruled against the woman and in favor of the utility. According to the Court, running a utility is not an activity that has been traditionally and exclusively in the province of government. Thus, if there is no state action, due process is not required. Some utility companies are run by cities. For many years, the city of Vineland, New Jersey, operated Vineland Electric Company. Before a city-run electric company can terminate service, it must provide notice and a hearing.

Other examples abound. If a mayor or other elected official or a public manager discriminate on the basis of race, such conduct denies equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution. But if a private company discriminates on the basis of race, equal protection does not apply as the source of protection against discrimination. Similarly, employees who work for a public university cannot be terminated for their speech so long as that speech is protected by the First Amendment; however, absent other applicable law, this same protection does not apply for the same speech at a private university. This does not mean that legislatures cannot adopt statutes that regulate private behavior; they often do. It only means the Constitution does not establish the boundaries of some behavior. E.g., Congress adopted the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which says that private employers cannot discriminate on the basis of race. States and local governments have also passed various anti-discrimination laws regulating private behavior. These laws prohibit private employers from discriminating, not the Constitution.

The Court has applied narrow exceptions, but all were prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Notably, these exceptions have a historical context that involves what might be considered instances when public values were at stake. One exception involves a public functions test. Specifically, if a private entity is performing a task that has been traditionally and exclusively performed by government, the Court has broadened the scope of the State Action Doctrine, thus extending constitutional guarantees in private instances of state action. The often cited case is *Marsh v Alabama*, which involved a company that literally owned an entire town. Jehovah's Witnesses wanted to distribute their literature in the town but the company prohibited it, taking the position that the First Amendment does not apply to private property. The Supreme Court ruled against the company, reasoning that the act was a state action because running a town is a public function, that is, a function that has been traditionally and exclusively done by the government. Another example involves Texas voting laws. In the early part of the twentieth century, Texas refused to allow African Americans to vote. When the state was ordered to allow African Americans voting rights, Texas did not comply but instead decided political parties, not the state, would hold political primary elections, essentially arguing that political parties could not be required to enfranchise African American voters. The Supreme Court held that elections, including primary elections, are functions traditionally and exclusively performed by the government. Therefore, a private organization performing the function is state action and constitutional guarantees apply.

To make informed decisions on outsourcing, public managers should understand the rights and responsibilities afforded to state actors and non-state actors. Government frequently contracts with private companies to run many jails and prisons, as well as for prison transport and even work release programs. In general, private companies do not have to comply with the Constitution, which has obvious implications for the potential violations of inmates' rights or the rights of a recent parolee.

A number of significant contemporary debates also could turn on applications of the State Action Doctrine. E.g., citizens have expressed increasing concern about the disenfranchisement of voters. The State Action Doctrine raises questions about which aspects of an election are subject to state action and which aspects are not subject to state action. As another example, consider the recent controversy that social media giant Twitter ignited when the company removed President Trump's account from its platform. President Trump viewed Twitter's decision as a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. On the other hand, Twitter defended its action, in part, by maintaining that as a private company it does not have to provide the rights afforded by the US Constitution.

Inherently Governmental Policy

Inherently governmental policy is another way in which public–private distinctions can influence public management research and practice. Federal law (The Federal Activities Inventory Reform or “FAIR Act of 1998”) and federal policy (Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 or “OMB A-76”) require certain functions to be performed by government personnel and not by private nongovernmental employees. E.g., only government personnel are authorized to establish policy; a nongovernmental employee or contractor can implement policy but not establish it. Similarly, there is a difference between providing advice and recommendations, often done by contractors, and deciding what advice to accept or to reject, which is left to government. Other examples of activities reserved for government include conducting foreign relations, directing the military, controlling prosecutions, and directing criminal investigations. The OMB considers such activities so intimately related to the public interest that they require performance by government employees.

As a US federal agency, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) must follow OMB-76. According to Dan Gordon, former administrator of the OFPP under President Obama, determining what is inherently governmental is not always clear-cut. Gordon devised criteria used by US agencies officials to test questionable cases. One such test concerns the unauthorized delegation of control. A contractor, for instance, cannot be authorized to exercise sovereign powers of the United States, as in entering into a treaty with another country on behalf of the US. The use of *Acquisition Letters* is another way federal agencies provide guidance on what is inherently governmental. Acquisition Letters are issued under the authority of the agency's senior procurement executives and go a step further than OMB Circular A-76; they provide illustrative lists of functions considered to be "inherently governmental" and lists of functions "closely associated with the performance of inherently governmental." E.g., Policy Letter 11–01 explained what agencies must do when work is closely associated with inherently governmental functions. It required agencies to identify critical functions and to ensure they had sufficient internal capabilities to sustain the agency's mission. It also outlined agency management responsibilities to strengthen accountability for effective implementation of these policies. E.g., the agency is advised to limit or guide contractors' exercise of discretion by contractually establishing specified ranges of acceptable decisions and conduct.

Public Value and Public Values

In intellectual activity related to analyzing public organizations, authors have developed two related but distinct concepts: *public value* and *public values* (Fukumoto and Bozeman, 2019, p. 635). Both concepts receive scholarly attention and are now part of the curriculum at top universities, including the Kennedy School at Harvard.

Public value is an approach to public management that grew out of the work of Mark Moore, and what has become known as Harvard's Kennedy Project (Moore and Khagram, 2004). Moore's book, *Creating Public Value* (1995), is the publication most frequently cited by other authors. Moore "lay[s] out a structure of practical reasoning to guide managers of public enterprises … [in creating] real material value" (p. 1). The concepts of value and authority are key in Moore's concept of governance. Public managers who understand value and authority can be confident in and active in achieving the public interest (Prebble, 2018, p. 104). Moore contends that public managers create public value when they produce outputs for which citizens express a desire. Specifically,

> "value is rooted in the desires and perceptions of individuals—not necessarily in physical transformations, and not in abstractions called societies…. Citizens' aspirations, expressed through representative government, are the central concerns of public management…." (p. 52)

Since public value depends on public authority, public managers need more than the skills taught in business schools; public managers need the know-how to interact with the authorizing environment. Moore further suggests that the legitimacy of government authority depends on whether management actually meets citizens' expectations. Specifically,

> "… Every time the organization deploys public authority directly to oblige individuals to contribute to the public good, or uses money raised through the coercive power of taxation to pursue a purpose that has been authorized by citizens and representative government, the value of that enterprise must be

judged against citizens' expectations for justice and fairness as well as efficiency and effectiveness.” (p. 52)

In 2003, Moore introduced a *public value scorecard*, an adaptation of the well-regarded *Balanced Scorecard* (BSC) by Kaplan and Norton (1992). In general, the BSC is a tool used by company managers to track staff activities and their consequences. The BSC is also considered a performance management orientation that focuses managers on a set of measures to monitor performance against objectives. Moore's version makes the BSC relevant to nonprofit managers by providing a three-pronged focus called a strategic triangle. Some thirteen years later, Mark Moore elaborates on the strategic triangle in *Recognizing Public Value* (2013). More specifically, the strategic triangle is used as a heuristic to guide practical reasoning on the part of public and nonprofit managers. The triangle urges managers to *manage up* to the formal authorizing environment. Managers accomplish this by identifying the sources of legitimacy and support that authorize the organization to sustain action needed to create value. Managers are encouraged to *manage outward* by involving the public and other stakeholders. They *manage down* to secure the operational capabilities the organization will rely on, or have to develop, to achieve the desired results.

Kelly et al. (2002) apply Moore's concept outside the US setting. Drawing on surveys from the United Kingdom and Canada about what citizens expect from their government, they propose a model that more explicitly includes a role for politicians. These authors conceive of public value as created by government through services, laws, regulations, and other activities. According to Kelly et al., citizens' preferences are not fully informed, so political officials shape citizens' preferences. In other words, citizens' preferences are expressed and mediated by elected politicians. Kelly et al. acknowledge the gaps in understanding how to create value, but they still emphasize the ongoing dynamic between citizens' conceptions of public value and government policy, which in turn creates outcomes that reflect public value.

Bozeman proposes the concept of “public value failure” in *Public Value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do* (2002). Bozeman defines a public value failure as the gap between citizens' preferences and public policy. E.g., public opinion strongly favors gun control but no such policies are enacted, so the disjunction between public opinion and policy outcomes fails to maximize public values about democratic representation. As another example, the public and private sectors may produce a situation involving threats to human dignity and subsistence, such as an international market for internal human organs leading impoverished individuals to sell their internal organs merely to survive.

Jupp's and Younger's *Accenture Public Sector Value Model* (2004) explains that public value emerges from the production of outcomes of governmental activities, considered together with the cost-effectiveness of producing those outcomes. According to this model, “outcomes” are a weighted basket of social achievements.

And, “cost-effectiveness” is defined as annual expenditure minus capital expenditure, plus capital charge (p. 18). In 2006 Accenture began the Institute for Public Service Value (IPSV) to explore how public value is created in government organizations. Among many other studies, IPSV conducted the Global Cities Forum in 2007–2009, which facilitated citizens' deliberations on their experiences and expectations of public value in 17 cities around the world.

As Moore's work gained prominence, some authors have given the concept of public value the status of a paradigm, while others have noted theoretical shortcomings. Stoker (2006) describes “public value management” as a paradigm that has emerged to solve the dilemma of balancing democracy and efficiency. Likewise, Christensen and Lægreid (2007) suggest that public value is a reaction to businesslike practices and strategies associated with NPM that have taken hold in Britain and New Zealand. Kelly and his colleagues (2002) offer a different description, yet one that also acknowledges an often-heard criticism of NPM, about its insufficient emphasis on democratic values. They regard public value as a performance measurement framework that includes additional dimensions of government's impact to add to the dimension of efficiency (Kelly et al., 2002, p. 35).

Some scholars acknowledge the gaps in public value theory and suggest corrective paths. Prebble (2019) describes the state of research this way: “Just as it matters that physicians have a workable theory of the chemistry of the human body, so it is important that public managers can assess a coherent philosophy about the use of public authority.” Prebble suggests a problem in Moore's treatment of “the public” as a concept. Moore's approach does not accommodate multiple and contrasting views of the public but rather treats the public as a whole. Prebble claims one cannot investigate the dynamic interactions between the use of public authority and public preferences if what the public values is ambiguous. This creates a practical problem for practitioners who aim to create public value and holds back theory development (p. 104). Fukumoto and Bozeman (2019) also assess the current state of public value theory and what obstacles need to be overcome for the theory to advance. They note, among other issues, that scholars have not converged on one theoretical framework. The literature includes multiple theoretical frameworks that differ in their interpretations and expressed ends. Similarly, in an assessment of managerial perceptions, Merritt (2019) notes that work on public values does not resolve tensions in the system – the push and pull from regulators, courts, and the public regarding what public organizations should actually be doing.

Public Values, Identification, and Measurement Approaches

A separate but related stream of research aims to identify and classify what qualifies as *public values* (e.g., Bozeman, 2007; Beck, Jorgensen & Bozeman, 2007), or to identify the mechanisms by which *public values* are promoted and maintained in the public sector (see Nabatchi, 2018, for a careful distinction between private and public values). Studies in this tradition aim to discover the preferences of public employees or citizens, or more broadly, preferences of an organization or society (Bozeman, 2007; Nabatachi, 2018). Jorgensen's and Bozeman's (2007) inventory of public values derived from political science and public administration literature is an example of this stream of research.

In *Public Values and Public Interest* (2007), Bozeman distinguishes public values at the societal level from public values at the individual level. Specifically, in societies one can discern patterns of consensus about what everyone should get, what they owe back to society, and how government should work, whereas individuals have their own values in relation to such matters, and the patterns of consensus consist of aggregations of those individuals who agree with each other about such matters:

> "A society's 'public values' are those providing normative consensus about (a) the rights, benefits, and prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (b) the obligations of citizens to society, the state, and one another; and (c) the principles on which governments and policies should be based." (p. 13)
>
> An individual's public values are "the content-specific preferences of individuals concerning, on the one hand, the rights, obligations, and benefits to which citizens are entitled and, on the other hand, the obligations expected of citizens and their designated representatives," (pp. 13–14)

Public administration scholars who examine public values take a variety of approaches. One approach is to posit public values. Alternatively, one can conduct public opinion polls, survey public managers, or locate public values statements in government agencies' strategic planning documents and mission statements and sometimes in their budget justification documents. Another approach (Jørgensen and Bozeman, 2007) involves developing an inventory of public values from public administration and political science literature. When Jørgensen and Bozeman undertook to develop such an inventory, the list of public values became complex, multileveled, and sometimes mutually conflicting. The inventory includes seven major "value constellations" (Jørgensen and Bozeman, 2007) or "value categories" (Bozeman, 2007, pp. 140–141), each containing a set of values.

The complex results of the inventory should come as no surprise. As many authors have pointed out many times, the values that organizations pursue are diverse, multiple, and conflicting, and the values that government organizations pursue are usually more so. Bozeman (2007, p. 143) contends that lack of complete consensus about public values should not prevent progress in analyzing public interest considerations. He proposes a public value mapping model that includes criteria for use in analyzing public values and public value failure.

Public Values: Advancing the Research and Filling the Voids

Scholars consider Moore's normative approach to creating public value by way of the strategic triangle a significant contribution to public management theory and practice (e.g., Bryson, Crosby, and Bloomberg, 2015; cf. Dahl and Soss, 2014). Yet, it has not garnered much empirical support for its descriptive accuracy or practical efficacy (Bryson, Crosby, and Bloomberg, 2015; Hartley et al., 2016). Also, the limited empirical research on public values tends to focus on managers' conceptions of public values rather than on the views of citizens (e.g., Van der Wal, De Graaf, and Lasthuizen, 2008; Witesman and Walters, 2014). Bozeman (2018) provides an exception. He elicits citizens' views on what does and does not count as public values. Using a list of 14 candidate values and the definition of public values cited previously, Bozeman reports responses that indicate a high level (above 90%) of consensus among citizens regarding what constitutes public values, including freedom of speech; liberty; civil rights; equal pay; freedom of religion; and safety and security. Additionally, a majority (between 62% and 86%) agree that public values include the protection of minority interests, access to health care, economic opportunity, and rights of privacy.

Fukumoto and Bozeman (2019) consider what is missing in the research and acknowledge and note an “identification problem.” In other words, we still do not know what public values are when we see them (p. 638). They contend that part of the problem is the complex nature of values themselves. They advocate advancing public values research by assuming reasonable definitions to examine larger questions. E.g., how do managers and politicians interact to create value? Fukumoto and Bozeman (2019) also encourage a focus on historical perspectives to advance research, similar to that of Moynihan (2009). Moynihan addresses the importance of a historical approach, but primarily to study administrative values, with laws as the primary focus of inquiry.[1] Another identification problem concerns the source of public values. Should public values be distilled from the Constitution or other official documents and records (Rosenbloom, 2014), from core values statements (Waerras, 2014), from surveys (Whitesman and Walters, 2015), or from deliberative processes (Nabatchi, 2012)?

In perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of what's missing in public value research, Bryson, Sancino, Benington, and Sorensen (2017) suggest adaptations of Moore's strategic triangle to a contemporary policy environment, where multiple actors confront complex or “wicked” problems (Rittel and Webber, 1973). More specifically, Bryson and his colleagues argue that public value research must take into account fundamental changes in the way public value is defined, produced, and sustained while maintaining a commitment to strengthening democracy (p. 642). They also suggest a new conceptualization for the triangle. E.g., Moore's model places public management at the center of the triangle, whereas Bryson and colleagues not only suggest other actors may be at the center, but they also conceptualize functions, such as organizing effective actor engagement, at the center. They also suggest the model needs extensions to accommodate multiple, often conflicting organizations, interests, and agendas. Bryson et al. (2017) contend that, “Progress in theory, research and practice will depend in part on the operationalization of the different categories of actors, processes, practices, … spheres of action, … along with the new elements … relating to legitimacy and authority, capabilities, public value, and the public sphere” (p. 648).

Research on ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the private sector may also offer avenues to advance research on public values. The focal idea in CSR is the role that businesses play in contributing beneficially to society. Importantly, not all agree that business *should* address societal problems. Nobel laureate Milton Friedman (1962), e.g., argued that the pursuit of economic benefits should be the only role for firms in a capitalist system. Still, a number of themes in this literature parallel issues in the public values literature. Examples include conceptions of CSR as a decision process (Jones, 1980) or as a systems model of the link between an organization and its social responsibility (Strand, 1983). Others call for CSR as part of an organization's strategy because it offers a competitive advantage (Porter and Kramer, 2006), contributes to long-term success (Porter and Kramer, 2011; Chandler, 2016), or provides new opportunities (Husted and Allen, 2007). Burke and Logsdon (1996) report evidence of a positive association between CSR and businesses' financial performance. CSR researchers have operationalized constructs such as “social return on investment” that may be adaptable to public value research. CSR researchers also track academic interest in CSR in relation to social and economic events, adopting a historical perspective also called for in public values research (e.g., Agudelo et al., 2019).

The Meaning and Nature of Public Organizations and Public Management

Although the idea of a public domain within society is an ancient one, beliefs about what is appropriately public and what is private, in both personal affairs and social organization, have varied among societies and over time. The word *public* comes from the Latin for “people,” and *Webster's New World Dictionary* defines it as pertaining to the people of a community, nation, or state. The word *private* comes from the Latin word that means to be deprived of public office or set apart from government. In contemporary definitions, the distinction between public and private often involves three major factors (Benn and Gaus, 1983): interests affected (whether benefits or losses are communal or restricted to individuals); access to facilities, resources, or information; and agency (whether a person or organization acts as an individual or for the community as a whole). These dimensions can be independent of one another and even contradictory. E.g., a military base may purportedly operate in the public interest, acting as an agent for the nation, but deny public access to its facilities.

Approaches to Defining Public Organizations and Public Managers. The multiple dimensions along which the concepts of public and private vary make for many ways to define public organizations. E.g., one time-honored approach defines public organizations as those that have a great impact on the public interest (Dewey, 1927). Decisions about whether government should regulate have turned on judgments about the public interest (Mitnick, 1980). In a prominent typology of organizations, Blau and Scott (1962) distinguished between commonweal organizations, which benefit the public in general, and business organizations, which benefit their owners. The public interest, however, has proved notoriously hard to define and measure (Mitnick, 1980). Some definitions directly conflict with others: e.g., defining the public interest as what a philosopher king or benevolent dictator decides versus what the majority of people prefer. Most organizations, including business firms, affect the public interest in some sense. Manufacturers of computers, pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and many other products clearly have influence on the well-being of many nations.

Alternatively, researchers and managers often refer to auspices or ownership – an implicit use of the agency factor mentioned earlier. Public organizations are governmental organizations, and private organizations are nongovernmental, usually business firms. The blurring of the boundaries between the sectors, however, shows that we need further analysis of what this dichotomy means.

Agencies and Enterprises as Points on a Continuum. Observations about the blurring of the sectors are hardly original. Half a century ago, in their analysis of markets and polyarchies, Dahl and Lindblom (1953) described a complex continuum of types of organizations, ranging from enterprises (organizations controlled primarily by markets) to agencies (government-owned organizations). For enterprises, they argued, the pricing system automatically links revenues to products and services sold. This creates stronger incentives for cost reduction in enterprises than in agencies. Agencies, conversely, have more trouble integrating cost reduction into their goals and coordinating spending and revenue-raising decisions, because legislatures assign their tasks and funds separately. Their funding allocations usually depend on past levels, and if they achieve improvements in efficiency, their appropriations are likely to be cut. Agencies also pursue more intangible, diverse objectives, making their efficiency harder to measure. The difficulty in specifying and measuring objectives causes officials to try to control agencies through enforcement of rigid procedures rather than through evaluations of products and services. Agencies also have more problems related to hierarchical control – such as red tape, buck passing, rigidity, and timidity – than do enterprises.

More important than these assertions in Dahl's and Lindblom's comparison of agencies and enterprises is their conception of a continuum of various forms of agencies and enterprises, ranging from the most public of organizations to the most private (see Figure 3.1). Dahl and Lindblom did not explain how their assertions about the different characteristics of agencies and enterprises apply to organizations on different points of the continuum. Implicitly, however, they suggested that agency characteristics apply less and less as one moves away from that.

Ownership and Funding. Wamsley and Zald (1973) pointed out that an organization's place along the public–private continuum depends on at least two major elements: ownership and funding. Organizations can be owned by the government or privately owned. They can receive most of their funding from government sources, such as budget allocations from legislative bodies, or they can receive most of it from private sources, such as donations or sales within economic markets. Putting these two dichotomies together results in the four categories illustrated in Figure 3.2: publicly owned and funded organizations, such as most government agencies; publicly owned but privately funded organizations, such as the US Postal Service and government-owned utilities; privately owned but governmentally funded organizations, such as certain defense firms funded primarily through government contracts; and privately owned and funded organizations, such as supermarket chains and IBM.

The figure displays the continuum between government ownership and private owner
Below the line are arrangements colloquially referred to as public, government-owned
nationalized. Above the line are organizational forms usually referred to as private en
or free enterprise. On the line are arrangements popularly considered neither public r
private.

	Private nonprofit organizations totally reliant on government contracts and grants (Atomic Energy Commission, Manpower Development Research Corporation)	Private corporations reliant on government contracts for most revenues (some defense contractors, such as General Dynamics, Grumman)	Heavily regulated private firms (heavily regulated private utilities)	Private corporations with significant funding from government contracts but with the majority of revenues from private sources	Private corporations subject to general government regulations such as affirmative action, Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations	Pr en
Government ownership of part of a private corporation						

Government agency	State-owned enterprise or public corporation (Postal Service, TVA, Port Authority of NY)	Government-sponsored enterprise, established by government but with shares traded on the stock market (Federal National Mortgage Association)		Government program or agency operated largely through purchases from private vendors or producers (Medicare, public housing)	

Source: Adapted and revised from Dahl and Lindblom, 1953.

FIGURE 3.1 AGENCIES, ENTERPRISES, AND HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS

	Public Ownership	**Private Ownership**
Public Funding (taxes, government contracts)	Department of Defense Social Security Administration Police departments	Defense contractors Rand Corporation Manpower Development Research Corporation Oak Ridge National Laboratories
Private Funding (sales, private donations)	U.S. Postal Service Government-owned utilities Federal Home Loan Bank Board	Apple Corporationa[a] Microsoft General Electric Grocery store chains YMCA

[a] These large corporations have large government contracts and sales, but attain most of their revenues from private sales and have relative autonomy to withdraw from dealing with government.

Source: Adapted and revised from Wamsley and Zald, 1973.

FIGURE 3.2 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND FUNDING

This scheme does have limitations; it makes no mention of regulation, e.g. Many corporations, such as IBM, receive funding from government contracts but operate so autonomously that they clearly belong in the private category. Nevertheless, the approach provides a fairly clear way of identifying core categories of public and private organizations.

Economic Authority, Public Authority, and "Publicness." Bozeman (1987) drew on a number of the preceding points to conceive the complex variations across the public–private continuum. All organizations have some degree of political influence and are subject to some level of external governmental control. Hence, they all have some level of "publicness," although that level varies widely. Like Wamsley and Zald, Bozeman used two subdimensions – political authority and economic authority – but treated them as continua rather than dichotomies. Economic authority increases as owners and managers gain more control over the use of their organization's revenues and assets, and it decreases as external government authorities gain more control over their finances.

Political authority is granted by other elements of the political system, such as the citizenry or governmental institutions. It enables the organization to act on behalf of those elements and to make binding decisions for them. Private firms have relatively little of this authority. They operate on their own behalf and only for as long as they support themselves through voluntary exchanges with citizens. Government agencies have high levels of authority to act for the community or country, and citizens are compelled to support their activities through taxes and other requirements.

The publicness of an organization depends on the combination of these two dimensions. Figure 3.3 illustrates Bozeman's depiction of possible combinations. As in previous approaches, the owner-managed private firm occupies one extreme (high on economic authority, low on political authority), and the traditional government bureau occupies the other (low on economic authority, high on political authority). A more complex array of organizations represents various combinations of the two dimensions. Bozeman and his colleagues have used this approach to design research on public, private, and intermediate forms of research and development laboratories and other organizations. Later chapters describe the important differences they found between the public and private categories, with the intermediate forms falling in between (Bozeman and Loveless, 1987; Coursey and Rainey, 1990; Crow and Bozeman, 1987; Emmert and Crow, 1988). Also employing a concept of publicness, Antonsen and Jorgensen (1997) compared sets of Danish government agencies high on criteria of publicness, such as the number of reasons their executives gave for being part of the public sector (as opposed to being in the public sector as a matter of tradition or for economies of scale). The agencies scoring high on publicness showed a number of differences from those low on this measure, such as higher levels of goal complexity and of external oversight.



FIGURE 3.3 "PUBLICNESS": POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AUTHORITY

Even these more complex efforts to clarify the public–private dimension do not capture its full complexity. Government and political processes influence organizations in many ways: through laws, regulations, grants, contracts, charters, franchises, direct ownership (with many variations in oversight), and numerous other ways. Private market influences also involve many variations. Perry and Rainey (1988) suggested that future research could continue to compare organizations in different categories, such as those in Table 3.3.

Although this topic needs further refinement, these analyses of the public–private dimension of organizations clarify important points. Simply stating that the public and private sectors are not distinct does little good. The challenge involves conceiving and analyzing the differences, variations, and similarities. In starting to do so, we can think with reasonable clarity about a distinction between public and private organizations, although we must always realize the complications. We can think of assertions about public organizations that apply primarily to organizations owned and funded by government, such as typical government agencies. At least by definition, they differ from privately owned firms, which get most of their resources from private sources and are not subject to extensive government regulations. We can then seek evidence comparing these two groups, and in fact such research often shows differences, although we need much more evidence. The population of hybrid and third-sector organizations raises complications about whether and how differences between these core public and private categories apply to those hybrid categories. Yet we have increasing evidence that organizations in this intermediate group – even within the same function or industry – differ in important ways on the basis of how public or private they are.

TABLE 3.3 TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS CREATED BY CROSS-CLASSIFYING OWNERSHIP, FUNDING, AND MODEL OF SOCIAL CONTROL

Source: Adapted and revised from Perry and Rainey, 1988

	Ownership	Funding	Mode of Social Control	Representative Study	Example
Bureau	Public	Public	Polyarchy	Meier and Bohte (2007)	Bureau of Labor Statistics
Government corporation	Public	Private	Polyarchy	Walsh (1978)	Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Government-sponsored enterprise	Private	Public	Polyarchy	Musolf and Seidman (1980)	Corporation for Public Broadcasting
Regulated enterprise	Private	Private	Polyarchy	Mitnick (1980)	Private electric utilities
Government enterprise	Public	Public	Market	Barzelay (1992)	Government printing office

					that must sell services to government agencies
State-owned enterprise	Public	Private	Market	Aharoni (1986)	Airbus
Government contractor	Private	Public	Market	Bozeman (1987)	Grumman
Private enterprise	Private	Private	Market	Williamson (1975)	IBM

Problems and Approaches in Public–Private Comparisons

Defining a distinction between public and private organizations does not prove that important differences between them actually exist. We need to consider the alleged differences and the evidence for or against them. First, however, we must consider challenges in research on public–private comparisons.

The discussion of the generic approach to organizational analysis and contingency theory introduced some of these challenges. Many factors, such as size, task or function, and industry characteristics, can influence an organization more than its status as a governmental entity. Research needs to show that these alternative factors do not confuse analysis of differences between public organizations and other types. Obviously, e.g., if you compare large public agencies to small private firms and find the agencies more bureaucratic, size may be the real explanation. Also, one would not compare a set of public hospitals to private utilities as a way of assessing the nature of public organizations. Ideally, an analysis of the public–private dimension requires a convincing sample, with a good model that accounts for other variables besides the public–private dimension. Ideally, studies would also have huge, well-designed samples of organizations and employees, representing many functions and controlling for many variables. Such studies require a lot of resources and have been virtually nonexistent, with the exception of the example of the National Organizations Study (which found differences among public, nonprofit, and private organizations, as described in Chapter Eight; see Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden, 2001; Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, and Spaeth, 1996). Instead, researchers and practitioners have adopted a variety of less comprehensive approaches.

Some writers theorized on the basis of assumptions, previous literature, and their own experiences (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Downs, 1967; Gawthorp, 1969; Mainzer, 1973; Wilson, 1989). Other researchers have measured or observed public bureaucracies and draw conclusions about their differences from private organizations. Some concentrated on one agency (Warwick, 1975), some on many agencies (Meyer, 1979). Although valuable, these studies examined no private organizations directly.

Many executives and managers who have served in both public agencies and private business firms have offered observations about the differences between the two settings (Blumenthal, 1983; Hunt, 1999; IBM Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002; Rumsfeld, 1983; Weiss, 1983). These testimonials apply primarily to the executive and managerial levels. Differences might fade at lower levels. Other researchers compared sets of public and private organizations or managers. Some compared the managers in small sets of government and business organizations (Buchanan, 1974, 1975; Kurland and Egan, 1999; Porter and Lawler, 1968; Rainey, 1979, 1983). Questions remain about how well the small samples represented the full populations and how well they accounted for important factors such as tasks. More recent studies with larger samples of organizations still leave questions about representing the full populations. They add more convincing evidence of distinctive aspects of public management (Hickson and others, 1986; Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden, 2001; Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, and Spaeth, 1996; Pandey and Kingsley, 2000).

To analyze public versus private delivery of a particular service, many researchers compare public and private organizations within functional categories. They compare hospitals (Savas, 2000, p. 190), utilities (Atkinson and Halversen, 1986), schools (Chubb and Moe, 1988), airlines (Backx, Carney, and Gedajlovic, 2002), nursing homes (Amirkanyan, 2012) and other types of organizations. Similarly, other studies compare a function, such as management of computers or the innovativeness of information technology, in government and business organizations (Bretschneider, 1990; Moon and Bretschneider, 2002). Still others compare state-owned enterprises to private firms (Hickson and others, 1986; MacAvoy and McIssac, 1989; Mascarenhas, 1989). They find differences and show that the public–private distinction appears meaningful even within the same functional types of organizations. Studies of one functional type, however, may not apply to other functional types. The public–private distinction apparently has some different implications in one industry or market environment, such as hospitals, compared with another industry or market, such as refuse collection (Hodge, 2000). Yet another complication is that public and private organizations within a functional category may not actually do the same thing or operate in the same way (Kelman, 1985). E.g., private and public nursing homes may serve different types of clients (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright, 2008).

In some cases, organizational researchers who study other topics have used a public–private distinction in the process and have found that it makes a difference (Chubb and Moe, 1988; Hickson et al., 1986; Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, and Spaeth, 1996; Kurke and Aldrich, 1983; Mintzberg, 1972; Tolbert, 1985). These researchers had no particular concern with the success or failure of the distinction, yet they found it meaningful.

A few studies compare public and private samples from census data, large-scale social surveys, or national studies (Brewer and Selden, 1998; Bullock, Stritch, and Rainey, 2015; Houston, 2000; Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, and Spaeth, 1996; Light, 2002a; Smith and Nock, 1980; US Office of Personnel Management, 2000). These have great value, but such aggregated findings often prove difficult to relate to the characteristics of specific organizations and the people in them. In the absence of huge, conclusive studies, we have to piece together evidence from more limited analyses such as these. Many issues remain debatable, but we can learn a great deal from doing so.

Common Assertions About Public Organizations and Public Management

In spite of the difficulties described in the preceding section, the stream of research findings continues. During the 1970s and 1980s, various reviews compiled the most frequent arguments and evidence about the distinction between public and private (Fottler, 1981; Meyer, 1982; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine, 1976). There has been progress in research, but the basic points of contention have not changed substantially. Table 3.4 shows a recent summary and introduces many of the issues that later chapters examine. The table and the discussion of it that follows pull together theoretical statements, expert observations, and research findings. It presents a depiction of issues and views about the nature of public organizations and management that amounts to a theory of public organizations.

TABLE 3.4 DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS: A SUMMARY OF COMMON ASSERTIONS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS

Source: Adapted from Rainey, Backoff, and Levine, 1976, and Rainey, 1989.

I. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
I.1. Public organizations are characterized by an absence of economic markets for outputs and a reliance on governmental appropriations for financial resources. I.1.a. There is less incentive to achieve cost reduction, operating efficiency, and effective performance. I.1.b. There is lower efficiency in allocating resources (weaker reflection of consumer preferences, less proportioning of supply to demand). I.1.c. There is less availability of relatively clear market indicators and information (prices, profits, market share) for use in managerial decisions.
I.2. Public organizations are subject to particularly elaborate and intensive formal legal constraints as a result of oversight by legislative branch, executive branch

hierarchy and oversight agencies, and courts.

I.2.a. There are more constraints on domains of operation and on procedures (and therefore less autonomy for managers in making such choices).

I.2.b. There is a greater tendency toward proliferation of formal administrative controls.

I.2.c. There is a larger number of external sources of formal authority and influence, with greater fragmentation among them.

I.3. Public organizations are subject to more intensive external political influences.

I.3.a. There is greater diversity in and intensity of external informal political influences on decisions (including political bargaining and lobbying; public opinion; interest-group, client, and constituent pressures).

I.3.b. There is a greater need for political support from client groups, constituencies, and formal authorities in order to obtain appropriations and authorization for actions.

II. ORGANIZATION–ENVIRONMENT TRANSACTIONS

II.1. Public organizations and managers are often involved in production of public goods or handling of significant externalities. Outputs are not readily transferable to economic markets at a market price.
II.2. Government activities are often coercive, monopolistic, or unavoidable. Government has unique sanctioning and coercion power and is often the sole provider. Participation in consumption and financing of activities is often mandatory.
II.3. Government activities often have a broader impact and greater symbolic significance. There is a broader scope of concern, such as for general public interest criteria.
II.4. There is greater public scrutiny of public managers.
II.5. There are unique expectations for fairness, responsiveness, honesty, openness, and accountability.

III. ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES

The following distinctive characteristics of organizational roles, structures, and processes have been frequently asserted to result from the distinctions cited under I and II. More recently, distinctions of this nature have been analyzed in research with varying results.

III.1. *Greater Goal Ambiguity, Multiplicity, and Conflict*

III.1.a. There is greater vagueness, intangibility, or difficulty in measuring goals and performance criteria; the goals are more debatable and value-laden (e.g., defense readiness, public safety, a clean environment, better living standards for the poor and unemployed).

III.1.b. There is a greater multiplicity of goals and criteria (efficiency, public accountability and openness, political responsiveness, fairness and due process, social equity and distributional criteria, moral correctness of behavior).

III.1.c. There is a greater tendency of the goals to be conflicting, to involve more trade-offs (efficiency versus openness to public scrutiny, efficiency versus due process and social equity, conflicting demands of diverse constituencies and political authorities).

III.2. *Distinctive Features of General Managerial Roles*

III.2.a. Recent studies have found that public managers' general roles involve many of the same functions and role categories as those of managers in other settings but with some distinctive features: a more political, expository role, involving more meetings with and interventions by external interest groups and political authorities; more crisis management and “fire drills”; greater challenge to balance external political relations with internal management functions.

III.3. *Administrative Authority and Leadership Practices*

III.3.a. Public managers have less decision-making autonomy and flexibility because of elaborate institutional constraints and external political influences. There are more external interventions, interruptions, and constraints.

III.3.b. Public managers have weaker authority over subordinates and lower levels as a result of institutional constraints (e.g., civil service personnel systems, purchasing and procurement systems) and external political alliances of subunits and subordinates (with interest groups, legislators).

III.3.c. Higher-level public managers show greater reluctance to delegate authority and a tendency to establish more levels of review and approval and to make greater use of formal regulations to control lower levels.

III.3.d. More frequent turnover of top leaders due to elections and political appointments causes more difficulty in implementing plans and innovations.

III.3.e. Recent counterpoint studies describe entrepreneurial behaviors and managerial excellence by public managers.

III.4. *Organizational Structure*

III.4.a. There are numerous assertions that public organizations are subject to more red tape and more elaborate bureaucratic structures.

III.4.b. Empirical studies report mixed results, some supporting the assertions about red tape, some not supporting them. Numerous studies find some structural distinctions for public forms of organizations, although not necessarily more bureaucratic structuring.

III.5. *Strategic Decision-Making Processes*

III.5.a. Recent studies show that strategic decision-making processes in public organizations can be generally similar to those in other settings but are more likely to be subject to interventions, interruptions, and greater involvement of external authorities and interest groups.

III.6. *Incentives and Incentive Structures*

III.6.a. Numerous studies show that public managers and employees perceive greater administrative constraints on the administration of extrinsic incentives such as pay, promotion, and disciplinary action than do their counterparts in private organizations.

III.6.b. Recent studies indicate that public managers and employees perceive weaker relations between performance and extrinsic rewards such as pay, promotion, and job security. The studies indicate that there may be some compensating effect of service and other intrinsic incentives for public employees and show no clear relationship between employee performance and perceived differences in the relationship between rewards and performance.

III.7. *Individual Characteristics, Work-Related Attitudes, and Behaviors*

III.7.a. A number of studies have found different work-related values on the part of public managers and employees, such as lower valuation of monetary incentives and higher levels of public service motivation.

III.7.b. Numerous highly diverse studies have found lower levels of work satisfaction and organizational commitment among public managers and employees than among those in the private sector. The level of satisfaction among public sector samples is generally high but tends consistently to be somewhat lower than that among private comparison groups.

III.8. *Organizational and Individual Performance*

III.8.a. There are numerous assertions that public organizations and employees are cautious and not innovative. The evidence for this is mixed.

III.8.b. Numerous studies indicate that public forms of various types of organizations tend to be less efficient in providing services than their private counterparts, although results tend to be mixed for hospitals and utilities. (Public utilities have been found to be efficient somewhat more often.) Yet other authors strongly defend the efficiency and general performance of public organizations, citing various forms of evidence.

Unlike private organizations, most public organizations do not sell their outputs in economic markets. Hence, the information and incentives provided by economic markets are weaker for them or absent altogether. Some scholars theorize (and many citizens believe) that this reduces incentives for cost reduction, operating efficiency, and effective performance. In the absence of markets, other governmental institutions (courts, legislatures, the executive branch) use legal and formal constraints to impose greater external governmental control of procedures, spheres of operations, and strategic objectives. Interest groups, the media, public opinion, and informal bargaining and pressure by governmental authorities exert an array of less formal, more political influences. These differences arise from the distinct nature of transactions with the external environment. Government is more monopolistic, coercive, and unavoidable than the private sector, with a greater breadth of impact, and it requires more constraint. Therefore, government organizations operate under greater public scrutiny and are subject to unique public expectations for fairness, openness, accountability, and honesty. Internal structures and processes in government organizations reflect these influences, according to the typical analysis. Also, characteristics unique to the public sector – the absence of the market, the production of goods and services not readily valued at a market price, and value-laden expectations for accountability, fairness, openness, and honesty as well as performance – complicate the goals and evaluation criteria of public organizations. Goals and performance criteria are more diverse, they conflict more often (and entail more difficult trade-offs), and they are more intangible and harder to measure. The external controls of government, combined with the vague and multiple objectives of public organizations, generate more elaborate internal rules and reporting requirements. They cause more rigid hierarchical arrangements, including highly structured and centralized rules for personnel procedures, budgeting, and procurement.

Greater constraints and diffuse objectives allow managers less decision- making autonomy and flexibility than their private counterparts have. Subordinates and subunits may have external political alliances and merit-system protections that give them relative autonomy from higher levels. Striving for control, because of the political pressures on them, but lacking clear performance measures, executives in public organizations avoid delegation of authority and impose more levels of review and more formal regulations.

Some observers contend that these conditions, aggravated by rapid turnover of political executives, push top executives toward a more external, political role with less attention to internal management. Middle managers and rank-and-file employees respond to the constraints and pressures with caution and rigidity. Critics and managers alike complain about weak incentive structures in government, lament the absence of flexibility in bestowing financial rewards, and point to other problems with governmental personnel systems. Complaints about difficulty in firing, disciplining, and financially rewarding employees generated major civil service reforms in the late 1970s at the federal level and in states around the country and have continued ever since.

In turn, expert observers assert, and some research indicates, that public employees' personality traits, values, needs, and work-related attitudes differ from those of private sector employees. Some research finds that public employees place lower value on financial incentives, show somewhat lower levels of satisfaction with certain aspects of their work, and differ from their private sector counterparts in some other work attitudes. Along these lines, as Chapter Nine describes, a growing body of research on public service motivation over the past decade suggests special patterns of motivation in public and nonprofit organizations that can produce levels of motivation and effort comparable to or higher than those among private sector employees (Francois, 2000; Houston, 2000; Perry, 1996, 2000).

The comparative performance of public and nonpublic organizations and employees figures as the most significant issue of all and the most difficult one to resolve. As noted earlier, the general view has been that government organizations operate less efficiently and effectively than private organizations because of the constraints and characteristics mentioned previously. Many studies have compared public and private delivery of the same services, mostly finding the private form more efficient. Efficiency studies raise many questions, however, and a number of authors defend government performance strongly. They cite client satisfaction surveys, evidence of poor performance by private organizations, and many other forms of evidence to argue that government performs much better than generally supposed. As Chapters Six and Fourteen elaborate, in recent years numerous authors have claimed that public and nonprofit organizations frequently perform very well and very innovatively, and they offer evidence or observations about when and why they do.

This countertrend in research and thinking about public organizations actually creates a divergence in the theory about them. One orientation treats government agencies as inherently dysfunctional and inferior to business firms; another perspective emphasizes the capacity of public and nonprofit organizations to perform well and innovate successfully. Both perspectives tend to agree on propositions and observations about many characteristics of public and nonprofit organizations, such as the political influences on public agencies.

This discussion and Table 3.1 provide a summary characterization of the prevailing view of public organizations that one would attain from an overview of the literature and research. Yet for all the reasons given earlier, it is best for now to regard this as an oversimplified and unconfirmed set of assertions. The challenge now is to bring together the evidence from the literature and research to work toward a better understanding and assessment of these assertions.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Three

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Studies: A Job for Laurie

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

Note

1. The claim that historical perspectives are needed to advance research is part of a general trend in public administration (e.g., Moynihan, 2009; Raadschelders, 2010). Some scholars have articulated the utility of history and a longitudinal approach. Thompson (2016) examines the historical transition of public values between 1881 and 2010, focusing on the values of civil service through content analysis of Congressional Record documents. Other studies focus on administrative values of public administration and employees based on formal documents and records (Moynihan, 2009; Raadschelders, 2000, 2010).

CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYZING THE ENVIRONMENT OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

The historical overview in Chapter Two explained why the organizational environment became an important concept in the study of organizations. The early contributors to the study of organizations concentrated on the middle parts of the framework in Figure 1.1. They placed little emphasis on an organization's environment. Contemporary researchers and experts now regard an organizational environment, and its dimensions, as crucial to analyzing and leading organizations. Public organizations are generally subject to more direction and intervention from political actors and authorities. Many public organizations serve the public directly; service organizations have high levels of permeability given their close proximity between frontline employees and citizens (Subramony, 2017). Community influences, such as demographic composition, education levels, crime levels, and socioeconomic factors, affect organization–citizen relationships (Subramony and Pugh, 2015, p. 360). Management experts exhort managers to monitor and analyze their environments, and consultants regularly lead executives and task forces through such analyses as part of strategic planning sessions (described further in Chapter Seven).

Public organizations are often embedded in larger governmental structures. The Food and Drug Administration, e.g., operates as a subunit of the US Department of Health and Human Services, which in turn is a component of the US federal government. The larger units of government impose system-wide rules on all agencies in the government, covering such administrative processes as human resources management, purchasing and procurement, and the budgeting process. In many agencies, different subunits operate in very different policy areas and often have stronger alliances with legislators and interest groups than with the agency director (Kaufman, 1979; Radin, 2002, p. 35; Seidman and Gilmour, 1986). All this can make it hard to say where an agency's environment begins and ends.

In addition, members of an organization often enact its environment (Scott, 2003, p. 141; Weick, 1979, p. 169). They choose the external matters to which they pay attention. They make choices about the organization's domain, or field of operations, including the geographic areas, markets, clients, products, and services on which the organization will focus. Decisions about an organization's domain determine the nature of its environment. For example, some years ago leaders of the Ohio Bureau of Mental Retardation adopted a “deinstitutionalization” policy, moving patients out of the large treatment facilities operated by the agency and into smaller, private sector facilities. This changed the boundaries of the agency, its relations with clients, and the set of organizations with which the agency worked. Organizations can sometimes create or shape their environments as much as they simply react to them. Recent research treats organization–environment relations as a two-way influence process. For example, Subramony and Pugh (2015) discuss community effects on service organizations and Lusch and Vargo (2014) suggest that customers and communities act as resource integrators by combining an organization's services with the social context within which they are embedded. All of this complicates the analysis of environments, while making it all the more important.

These complications about the amorphous nature of an organization's environment may explain why some authors who developed the concept have more recently produced books that mention the concept sparingly (e.g. Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich, Ruef, and Lippman, 2020). Contemporary analyses of organizations, however, still employ concepts relevant to organizations' relations with their operating contexts or environments (Schneider et al., 2017). Authors may increasingly feel that new concepts – such as networks, and stakeholders – discussed in this chapter have more value than the concept of an organizational environment. In addition, some prominent authors continue to employ the concept of an organizational environment in important ways (Daft, 2020; Tolbert and Hall, 2009; Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, and Spaeth, 1996, chapter 6; Scott, 2014).

General Dimensions of Organizational Environments

One typical approach to environmental analysis simply lists the general sectors or clusters of conditions, such as those in Table 4.1, which an organization encounters. Consultants and experts often use such frameworks to lead groups in organizations through an environmental scan (described in Chapter Seven) as part of a strategic planning project or in a general assessment of the organization. For example, the US Social Security Administration (2000) used an environmental scan in their efforts to develop a major vision statement.

Anyone can provide examples of ways in which such conditions influence organizations. Technological and scientific developments gave birth to many government agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Technological developments continually influence the operation of government agencies; these agencies must struggle to keep up with advances in computer technology, communications, and other areas. Congress passed legislation mandating vast changes at the US Internal Revenue Service largely as a result of difficulties the agency had in developing and adapting to new information technologies for processing tax returns (Bozeman, 2002b). Demographic trends currently receive much attention due to increasing percentages of women and minorities in government employment. This raises the challenge of managing diversity in the workplace (Ospina, 1996; Riccucci, 2018; Selden, 1997). The Social Security Administration (SSA) analyzes developments in its environment, such as the increasing size of the retired population, to project increases in the number of beneficiaries of its programs and the resulting increases in the agency's workload (US Social Security Administration, 2000, p. 6). Public administrators attend to legal developments, such as changes in public officials' legal liability for their decisions (Cooper, 2000; Koenig and O'Leary, 1996; Rosenbloom, Kravchuck, and Rosenbloom, 2001; Rosenbloom and O'Leary, 1997).

TABLE 4.1 GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

- Technological conditions: The general level of knowledge and capability in science, engineering, medicine, and other substantive areas; general capacities for communication, transportation, information processing, medical services, military weaponry, environmental analysis, production and manufacturing processes, and agricultural production
- Legal conditions: Laws, regulations, legal procedures, court decisions; characteristics of legal institutions and values, such as provisions for individual rights and jury trials as well as general institutionalization and stability of legal processes
- Political conditions: Characteristics of the political processes and institutions in a society, such as the general form of government (socialism, communism, capitalism, and so on, or the degree of centralization, fragmentation, or federalism); the degree of political stability (Carroll, Delacroix, and Goodstein, 1988); and more direct and specific conditions such as electoral outcomes, political party alignments and success, and policy initiatives within regimes
- Economic conditions: Levels of prosperity, inflation, interest rates, and tax rates; characteristics of labor, capital, and economic markets within and between nations
- Demographic conditions: Characteristics of the population such as age, gender, race, religion, and ethnic categories
- Ecological conditions: Characteristics of the physical environment, including climate, geographic characteristics, pollution, natural resources, and the nature and density of organizational populations
- Cultural conditions: Predominant values, attitudes, beliefs, social customs, and socialization processes concerning such things as sex roles, family structure, work orientation, and religious and political practices

Another common approach to analyzing environments is to list its specific elements such as important stakeholders, or organizations and groups that have an important interest in the organization (Harrison and Freeman, 1999). A typical depiction of such elements of the environment might include competitors, customers, suppliers, regulators, unions, and associates. Similarly, Porter (1998) analyzed the major influences on competition within an industry: competitors, buyers, suppliers, new entrants, and substitutes. Consultants working with organizations on strategy formulation sometimes use such frameworks in a stakeholder analysis to identify key stakeholders of the organization and their particular claims and roles (Bryson, 2018).

Research on Environmental Variations

Organizational researchers have also produced more specific evidence about the effects of environments. Selznick (1966; see also Tolbert and Hall, 2009) helped lead this trend with a study of a government corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). He found that environmental influences play a crucial role in institutionalization processes in organizations. Values, goals, and procedures become strongly established, not necessarily because managers choose them as the most efficient means of production, but in large part as a result of environmental influences. The TVA, e.g., engaged in co-optation, absorbing new elements into its leadership to avert threats to its viability. The US government established the TVA during the New Deal years to develop electric power and foster economic development along the Tennessee River. TVA officials involved local organizations and groups in decisions. This gained support for the TVA, but it also brought in these groups as strong influences on the organization's values and priorities. In some cases, these groups shut out rival groups, putting the TVA in conflict with other New Deal programs with which it should have been allied. Thus an organization's needs for external support and its consequent exchanges with outside entities can heavily influence its primary values and goals.

Later research made the importance of the external environment increasingly clear. Prominent studies that led to the emergence of contingency theory found more and more evidence of the impact of environmental uncertainty and complexity (Donaldson, 2001). Chapter Two explained that Burns and Stalker (1961) studied a set of English firms and classified them into the two categories of mechanistic firms and organic firms. The mechanistic firms succeeded in stable environments – those with relative stability in products, technology, and competitors. In such a setting, they could take advantage of the efficiencies of their more traditional structures. Other firms, such as electronics manufacturers, faced less stable environmental conditions, with rapid fluctuations in technology, products, competitors, and demand. The more organic firms, which were more flexible and adaptive, succeeded in this setting. Kessler et al. (2017) summarize the substantial influence of Burns' and Stalker's work over the past several decades. They conclude that original observations regarding organic structures still hold. Overall, the evidence suggests a positive association between organic structures and various performance measures, including task performance, unit effectiveness, and project performance.

Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) studied firms in three industries whose environments exhibited different degrees of uncertainty as a result of more or less rapid changes and greater or lesser complexity. The most successful firms had structures with a degree of complexity matching that of the environment. Firms in more stable environments could manage with relatively traditional, hierarchical structures. Firms in more unstable, uncertain environments could not.

In addition, different subunits of these firms faced different environments. As these different environments imposed more uncertainty on the subunits' managers, the successful firms became more differentiated; that is, the subunits differed more and more from one another in their goals, the time frames for their work, and the formality of their structure. However, this increased the potential for conflict and disorganization. Successful firms in more uncertain environments responded with higher levels of integration. They had more methods for coordinating the highly differentiated units, such as liaison positions, coordinating teams, and conflict resolution processes. This combination of differentiation and integration made the successful firms in more uncertain environments more internally complex. The authors' general conclusion advanced one of the prominent components of the contingency idea: organizations must adopt structures that are as complex as the environments they confront.

As many studies of this sort accumulated, James Thompson (1967) synthesized the growing body of research in a way that provided additional insights. Organizations, he said, must contend with the demands of their tasks and their environments. They do so by trying to isolate the technical core – their primary work processes – so that their work can proceed smoothly. They use buffering methods to try to provide stable conditions for the technical core. For example, they use boundary-spanning units, such as inventory, personnel recruitment, and research and development, to try to create smooth flows of information and resources. Yet environmental conditions can strain this process. In more complex environments – with more geographical areas, product markets, and competitors – organizations must become more internally complex. They do so by establishing different subunits to attend to the different environmental segments. More unstable environments create a need for greater decentralization of authority to these subunits and a less formal structure. The shifting environment requires rapid decisions and changes, and it takes too long for information and decisions to travel up and down a strict hierarchy.

Researchers have debated the adequacy of contingency theory (Tolbert and Hall, 2009). Yet authors still emphasize the importance of contingency theory perspectives on organizational environments (Daft, 2020; Donaldson, 2001). An organization's structure must be adapted to environmental contingencies as well as other contingencies. In simple, homogeneous, stable environments, organizations can successfully adopt mechanistic and centralized structures. In more complex and unstable environments, successful organizations must be organic and decentralized, partitioned into departments, but with integrating processes for managing the organization's relation with the environment.

Scholars have also further developed contingency-theory concepts into carefully conceived environmental dimensions. Table 4.2 illustrates prominent examples that researchers still use (e.g., Schneider et al., 2017). Clearly these dimensions apply to public organizations. Tax resentment and pressures to cut government spending in recent decades show the importance of environmental capacity (munificence or resource scarcity) for public organizations. The federal government has a regionalized structure, reflecting the influence of environmental heterogeneity and dispersion. Many organization theorists agree that public organizations face particular complications in domain consensus and choice (Tolbert and Hall,, 2009; Meyer, 1979; Miles, 1980; Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980). Jurisdictional boundaries and numerous authorities, laws, and political interests complicate decisions about where, when, and how a public organization operates. Research strongly supports the observation that public status influences strategic domain choices (Mascarenhas, 1989), although later chapters show how public managers often gain considerable leeway to maneuver.

TABLE 4.2 DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTICAL DIMENSIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

- Capacity: The extent to which the environment affords a rich or lean supply of necessary resources
- Homogeneity–heterogeneity: the degree to which important components of the environment are similar or dissimilar
- Stability–instability: the degree and rapidity of change in the important components or processes in the environment
- Concentration–dispersion: the degree to which important components of the environment are separated or close together, geographically or in terms of communication or logistics
- Domain consensus–dissensus: the degree to which the organization's domain (its operating locations, major functions and activities, and clients and customers served) is generally accepted or disputed and contested

Source: Aldrich, 1979

- Munificence: the availability of needed resources
- Complexity: the homogeneity and concentration of the environment
- Dynamism: the stability and turbulence of the environment

Source: Dess and Beard, 1984

Analyzing the Environment of Public Organizations

Turbulence and interconnectedness characterize the environments of most public organizations. Studies of public policy implementation provide numerous accounts of policy initiatives that had many unanticipated consequences and implications for other groups. Public managers commonly encounter situations in which a decision touches off a furor, arousing opposition from groups that they would never have anticipated reacting (Cohen, Eimicke, and Heikkila, 2013). Similarly, environmental stability, dynamism, and change rates have major implications for public organizations. Rapid turnover of political appointees at the tops of agencies and rapid external shifts in political priorities have major influences on public organizations and the people in them. For example, researchers find evidence that turbulence and instability in the environments of public agencies affect the morale of their managers and influence their acceptance of reforms (Golden, 2000; Rubin, 1985).

These environmental concepts are useful for enhancing our understanding of public organizations. To understand public organizations, however, we need to add more specific content to the environmental dimensions. There is a body of useful research and writing on public organizations that can help in this task, to which this discussion will turn after a review of recent trends in research by organizational theorists relevant to the analysis of organizational environments.

Recent Trends in Research on Organizational Environments

Some of the prominent recent research in organization theory involves ideas pertaining to organizational environments (e.g., Tolbert and Hall, 2009, chapters 8 and 9). Population ecology theorists, e.g., analyze the origin, development, and decline of populations of organizations using biological concepts (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Aldrich et al., 2020). Just as biologists analyze how certain populations of organisms develop to take advantage of a particular ecological niche, population ecologists analyze the development of populations of organizations within certain niches (characterized by their unique combinations of available resources and constraints).

Some population ecology theorists reject the contingency-theory depiction of organizations as rational, speedy adapters to environmental change. Indeed, they see environments as selecting organizational populations in a Darwinian fashion (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). The population ecology perspective analyzes how populations of organizations go through processes of variation, selection, and retention. Variation involves the continuing appearance of new forms of organization, both planned and unplanned. Then the selection process determines which forms of organization will survive and prosper, on the basis of their fit with the environment or their capacity to fill an environmental niche. A niche is a distinct combination of resources and constraints that supports the particular form of organization.

Retention processes serve to continue the form through such environmental influences as pressures on the organizations to maintain past practices, and through such internal processes as employees developing common outlooks. Critics have raised questions about this perspective, arguing, e.g., that its broad biological analogies devote no attention to human strategic decisions and motives in organizations (Van de Ven, 1979), and that its proponents have applied it mostly to populations of small organizations, leaving open questions about how it applies to huge government agencies and business firms.

Aldrich, Ruef, and Lippman (2020) advance an evolutionary perspective on populations of organizations that involves a more general and overarching perspective than population ecology theory. It includes the processes of variation, selection, and retention, with elaborations. All three of these processes can operate on organizations from external or internal sources. Variations in routines, procedures, and organizational forms can be intentional, as individuals seek solutions to problems. In a fourth process, struggle, individuals, organizations, and populations of organizations contend with each other over scarce resources and conflicting incentives and goals.

This perspective provides insights about ways in which organizational populations (1) are integral to processes of social change; (2) show much more diversity of form than some research, such as the contingency approaches recognized; and (3) continually emerge and evolve. Both the population-ecology and the evolutionary perspectives, however, offer insights about historical and environmental forces that influence organizational change and survival. Observers of very innovative public executives have argued that these executives appeared to engage in an “uncommon rationality,” in which they “see new possibilities offered by an evolving historical situation” and take advantage of political and technological developments that offer such possibilities (Doig and Hargrove, 1990, pp. 10–11).

Resource-dependence theories analyze how organizational managers try to obtain crucial resources from their environment, such as materials, money, people, support services, and technological knowledge. Organizations can adapt their structures in response to their environment, or they can change their niches. They can try to change the environment by creating demand or seeking government actions that can help them. In these and other ways, they can pursue essential resources. These theorists stress the importance of internal and external political processes in the quest for resources.

Transaction-cost theories analyze managerial decisions to purchase a needed good or service from outside, as opposed to producing it within the organization (Williamson, 1975, 1981). Transactions with other organizations and people become more costly as contracts become harder to write and supervise. The organization may need a service particular to itself, or it may have problems supervising contractors. Managers may try to hold down such costs under certain conditions by merging with another organization or permanently hiring a person with whom they had been contracting. These theories, which are much more elaborate than summarized here, have received much attention in business management research and have implications for government contracting and other governmental issues. Yet they usually assume that managers in firms strive to hold down costs to maximize profits. Governmental contracting involves more political criteria and accountability, and different or nonexistent profit motives, to the point that Williamson (1981) expressed uncertainty as to whether transaction-cost economics applies to nonmarket organizations. Later, however, he examined public bureaucracy from the perspective of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1999). He concluded that the public bureaucracy, like other alternative modes of governance (such as markets, firms, and hybrids), is well suited to some transactions and poorly suited to others. Williamson argued that public bureaucracy handles "sovereign transactions," such as foreign affairs, more effectively and efficiently than other modes, such as firms and markets.

Studies of institutionalization processes can be traced to Selznick (1966). Recent research may feature many new terms, such as *institutional logic*, yet it builds on old foundations (e.g. Pahnke et al., 2015; Yan et al., 2019). They analyze how certain values, structures, and procedures become institutionalized (that is, widely accepted) and the implications for institutionalization. Tolbert and Zucker (1983) showed that many local governments reformed their civil service systems by adopting merit systems, because merit systems had become widely accepted as the proper form of personnel system for such governments. In addition, the federal government applied pressures for the adoption of merit systems. Meyer and Rowan (1983) argued that organizations such as schools often adopt structures on the basis of "myth and ceremony." They do things according to prevailing beliefs and not because the practices are clearly the means to efficiency or effectiveness. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) showed that organizations in the same field come to look like one another as a result of shared ideas about how that type of organization should look. Dobbin and his colleagues (1988) found that public organizations have more provisions for due process, such as affirmative action programs, than do private organizations. These studies have obvious relevance for public organizations. Pfeffer (1982) suggested that this approach is particularly applicable to the public sector, where performance criteria are often less clear. There, beliefs about proper procedures may be more readily substituted for firmly validated procedures linked to clear outcomes and objectives. Public and nonprofit managers encounter many instances in which new procedures or schemes, such as a new budgeting technique, become widely implemented as the latest, best approach – whether or not anyone can prove that they are. In addition, some of the research mentioned earlier shows how external institutions such as government impose structures and procedures on organizations.

Partly to resolve such divergence in concepts of institutionalism, researchers drew distinctions between types of institutionalization processes that lead to institutional isomorphism, which refers to organizations of the same functional type becoming similar or identical to each other in form (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott and Davus 2015). This institutionalization of similar forms can come from coercive isomorphism, which stems from political influence and organizational legitimacy and is often conveyed through laws, regulations, or outside agency requirements. Normative isomorphism is associated with professional values and moral norms. Mimetic isomorphism occurs when organizations and other entities imitate each other, on the basis of a prevailing orthodoxy or culturally supported beliefs about the proper structures and procedures.

Relying on these logics, Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004) used the data from the National Organizations Survey, a nationally representative sample of organizations, to examine whether public, private, and nonprofit organizations tended to differ in the incidence of these types of institutionalization processes. They found that coercive, normative, and mimetic effects were stronger for government establishments than for business establishments. George et al. (2019) draw on normative isomorphism and contingency theory to investigate the determinants of organization-oriented and client-oriented management tools used by senior public management; they find the use of management tools is explained more by contingency theory than normative isomorphism. That is, public managers working in larger organizations with clear goals and acknowledged executive status are more likely to use management tools. The only normative pressure that had a positive impact on the use of management tools is whether public sector executives have a top hierarchical position. George et al. (2020) focus on politicians' use of performance information in organizations. The use of performance information was popularized as part of the New Public Management movement and can be influenced by coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures. They find normative pressures had a positive impact on the actual use of performance information while coercive pressure positively affected the potential use of performance information.

The Political and Institutional Environments of Public Organizations

The work on organizational environments provides insights that are applicable to public organizations. The preceding review of the literature also shows, however, why people interested in public organizations call for more attention to public sector environments. The contingency-theory researchers pay little attention to whether government ownership makes a difference or whether it matters if an organization sells its outputs in economic markets. They depict organizations, usually business firms, as autonomously adapting to environmental contingencies. Political scientists, however, considered it obvious that external political authorities often directly mandate the structures of public agencies, regardless of environmental uncertainty (Warwick, 1975). Likewise, public management researchers have long been aware that public organizational effectiveness often depends on the support of various political actors (Moynihan and Pandey, 2005). A key difference between public and private sector organizations is that public organizations operate in an environment of multiple principals, including elected officials at different levels of government, courts, and chief executives, among others (Pandey and Wright, 2006). Not surprisingly, a stream of public management research explores connections between the political environment, organizational tasks, processes, and outcomes. For example, Pandey and Wright (2006) show that political commitment, as perceived by public managers, has a significant impact on managerial practice and normative commitment to the organization. Yang and Pandey (2009) show that elected officials' support is positively associated with effective citizen participation, an important input to public management decisions.

Public executives commenting on public management and political scientists and economists writing about public organizations typically depict organizational environments in ways similar to the conceptual framework shown in Table 4.3 (Brudney, Hebert, and Wright, 1999; Downs, 1967; Dunn, 1997; Dunn and Legge, 2002; Hood and Dunsire, 1981; Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill, 2000; Meier and Bothe, 2007; Stillman, 2004; Wamsley and Zald, 1973; Warwick, 1975; Wilson, 1989). One also needs to recognize that the environmental pressures on public organizations, as with all organizations, are becoming more global in nature (Welch and Wong, 2001a, 2001b). The rest of this chapter discusses the top part of the table, concerned with general values and institutions. The next chapter covers the bottom portion, dealing with institutions, entities, and actors.

General Institutions and Values of the Political Economy

Chapter Two defined public agencies as organizations owned and funded by government. They operate under political authority and without economic markets for their outputs. The political system of a nation and its traditions, institutions, and values heavily influence the exercise of this political authority. The US Constitution formally states some of these values and establishes some of the nation's primary public institutions and rules of governance. Legislation and court cases have further defined and applied them. Rosenbloom and O'Leary (1997) observed that the personnel systems in government are “law-bound.” That observation applies to many other aspects of management and organization in government agencies as well.

Other values and rules receive less formal codification but still have great influence. For example, Americans traditionally have demanded that government agencies operate with businesslike standards of efficiency, although the Constitution nowhere explicitly expresses this criterion (Waldo, [1947] 1984). Relatedly, the nation maintains a free-enterprise system that affords considerable autonomy to businesses and considerable respect for business values (Waldo, [1947] 1984; Lindblom, 1977). These values are not clearly and specifically codified in the Constitution. According to MacDonald (1987), the Constitution actually lacks some of the provisions necessary for a free-enterprise system, in part because some of the framers considered certain economic activities, such as trading debt instruments, to be immoral. Full development of the necessary governmental basis for a free-enterprise system required the actions of Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury. Among other steps, he established provisions for the use of government debt as a source of capital for corporations. Ironically, this indicates that the private enterprise system in the United States was created largely through the efforts of a government bureaucrat, using government funding. More generally, however, these examples illustrate the existence, through formally codified instruments and less formally codified conditions, of general values and institutional arrangements that shape the operation of public authority.

TABLE 4.3 MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL COMPONENTS FOR PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

General Values and Institutions of the Political Economy

- Political and economic traditions
- Constitutional provisions and their legislative and judicial development
    - Due process
    - Equal protection of the laws
    - Democratic elections and representation (republican form)
    - Federal system
    - Separation of powers
- Free enterprise system (economic markets relatively free of government control)

Values and Performance Criteria for Government Organizations

- Competence
    - Efficiency
    - Effectiveness
    - Timeliness
    - Reliability
    - Reasonableness
- Responsiveness
    - Accountability, legality, responsiveness to rule of law and governmental authorities, responsiveness to public demands
    - Adherence to ethical standards

Fairness, equal treatment, impartiality
Openness to external scrutiny and criticism
Institutions, Entities, and Actors with Political Authority and Influence
Chief executives
Executive staff and staff offices
Legislatures
Individual legislators
Legislative staff
Courts
Other government entities
Oversight and management agencies (GAO, OMB, OPM, GSA)
Competitors
Allies
Agencies or governmental units with joint programs
Other levels of government
“Higher” and “lower” levels
Intergovernmental agreements and districts
Interest groups
Client groups
Constituencies
Professional associations
Policy subsystems
Issue networks
Interorganizational policy networks
Implementation structures
News media
General public opinion
Individual citizens with requests for services, complaints, and other contacts

These general values and institutional arrangements in turn influence the values, constraints, and performance criteria of public organizations. They sound abstract, but they link directly to practical challenges and responsibilities for public organizations and managers.

Constitutional Provisions

The Constitution places limits on the government and guarantees certain rights to citizens. These include provisions for freedom of expression and the press, equal protection under the law, and protections against the denial of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The provisions for freedom of association and expression and freedom of the press empower media representatives, political parties, and interest groups to assess, criticize, and seek to influence the performance of government agencies, in ways discussed in the next chapter.

Such provisions as those for equal protection and due process also have major implications for the operations of public organizations. The equal protection provisions, e.g., provided some of the underlying principles and precedents for affirmative action requirements. The requirement for legal due process requires administrative due process as well and acts as one major form of control over public bureaucracies and bureaucrats (West, 1995, chapter 2). Agencies are often required to give notice of certain actions and to adhere to disclosure rules, to hold open hearings about their decisions, and to establish procedures for appealing agency decisions. For example, the Administrative Procedures Act requires federal agencies to adhere to certain procedures in rule making (and other legislation has established similar requirements at other levels of government). When the Department of Education makes rules about student loans or the SSA makes rules about claims for coverage under its disability programs, the agencies have to adhere to such rule-making procedures. If the SSA denies or revokes an applicant's disability coverage, the applicant has the right to adjudication procedures, which may involve a hearing conducted by an administrative law judge. These requirements strongly influence the agency's management of disability cases and the work of individual case workers. In general, the requirement for all the appeals and hearings conflicts with the agency's goal of minimizing costs and maximizing efficiency of operations. It raises questions about how efficiency relates to the fair handling of individual cases by individual caseworkers (Mashaw, 1983). Chapters Eight and Ten show evidence that rules and procedures for disciplining and firing employees in the public service, based in part on due process principles, create one of the sharpest differences between public and private organizations confirmed by research. These examples illustrate how general constitutional principles that seem abstract actually translate into a set of immediate challenges in organizational behavior and management.

Democratic elections are another feature of the political system in the United States and other countries that has direct implications for organization and management. The electoral process produces regular, or at least frequent, changes in chief executives, legislative officials, and the political appointees who come and go with them. These changes in leadership often mean frequent changes in the top-level leadership of public agencies and often bring with them shifts in priorities that mean changes in agencies' focus and sometimes in their power, their influence, and the resources available for their people and subunits.

The Constitution also establishes a federal system that allocates authority to different levels of government in ways that influence the organization and management of public agencies. State governments require that local governments establish certain offices and officers, such as sheriffs and judges, thereby specifying major features of the organizational structure of those governments. State legislation may mandate a formula to be used in setting the salaries of those officials. Many federal programs operate by granting or channeling funds to states and localities, often with various specifications about the structure and operations of the programs at those levels.

A particularly dramatic example of the way societal values and institutions can influence public organizations comes from the provision in the Constitution for separation of powers. As indicated in Table 4.3 and discussed briefly, government agencies face various pressures to provide efficient, effective operations. Separation of powers, however, represents a system that is explicitly designed with less emphasis on efficiency than on constraining the power of government authorities (Wilson, 1989). In *The Federalist Papers*, James Madison discussed the constitutional provision for dividing power among the branches of government as a way of constraining power. He pointed out that a strong central executive authority might be the most efficient organizational arrangement. But the government of the United States, he wrote, was instead being purposefully designed to constrain authority by dividing it among institutions. In one of the great exercises of applied psychology in history, he pointed out that if humans were angels, no such arrangements would be necessary. But because they are not, and because power can corrupt some people and oppress others, the new government would set ambition against ambition, dividing authority among the branches of government so that they would keep one another in check. Lower levels of government in the United States are designed with similar patterns of divided authority. For the organization and management of agencies, these arrangements have dramatic implications, because they subject the organizations and their managers to multiple authorities and sources of direction that are in part designed to conflict with one another. From its inception, the American political system has thus embodied a dynamic tension among conflicting values, principles, and authorities.

The controversy over whether this system works as intended never ends. Nevertheless, the political authorities and actors representing these broader values and principles impose on public organizations numerous performance criteria, such as those listed in Table 4.3. Authors use various terms to express the diversity of these criteria. Fried (1976), e.g., referred to democracy, efficiency, and legality as the major performance criteria for the public bureaucracy in the United States. Rosenbloom, Kravchuck, and Clerkin (2001) consider law, management, and politics to be the three dominant sources of administrative criteria. Putnam (1993) sought to evaluate the performance of government according to its responsiveness to its constituents and its efficiency in conducting the public's business. Table 4.3 uses Meier's and Bothe's (2007) distinction between competence and responsiveness criteria.

Competence Values

Public organizations operate under pressure to perform competently. Demands for efficiency come from all corners. Newspapers and television news departments doggedly pursue indications of wasteful uses of public funds at all levels of government. Political candidates and elected officials attack examples of waste, such as apparently excessive costs for components of military weaponry. The US General Accounting Office (GAO), auditors general at the state and local levels, and other oversight agencies conduct audits of government programs, with an emphasis on efficiency. Special commissions, such as the Grace Commission (organized under the Reagan administration), investigate wasteful or inefficient practices in government. Similar commissions have been appointed in many states to examine state government operations and attack inefficiency. The Clinton administration conducted a National Performance Review (NPR) aimed at streamlining federal operations. Among other actions, the NPR reduced federal employment by over 324,000 jobs. Inefficiency in federal operations served as one of the justifications for the NPR.

Efficiency, however, is not necessarily the highest priority in the design of the U.S. government. External authorities, the media, interest groups, and citizens also demand effectiveness, timeliness, reliability, and reasonableness, even though these criteria may conflict with efficiency. Efficiency means producing a good or service at the lowest cost possible while maintaining a constant level of quality. These additional criteria are concerned with whether a function is performed well, on time, dependably, and in a logical, sensible way. Government often performs services crucial to individuals or to an entire jurisdiction. People want the job done; efficiency is often a secondary concern. Also, in government the connection between a service and the cost of providing it is often difficult to see and analyze. Evidence that police, firefighters, emergency medical personnel, and the military lack effectiveness or reliability draws sharp responses that may relegate efficiency to a lesser status. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, federal spending for military action in Afghanistan and Iraq and for homeland security increased sharply even though a federal budget surplus turned into a deficit during this period. Clearly the imperative of security against terrorism outweighed considerations of frugality and efficiency.

Sometimes one element of the political system stresses some of these criteria more vigorously than others (Pitt and Smith, 1981). This can increase conflicts for public managers, because different authorities emphasize different criteria. For example, the judiciary often appears to emphasize effectiveness over administrative efficiency because of its responsibility to uphold legal standards and constitutional rights. Judges rule that certain criteria must be met in a timely, effective way, regardless of cost and efficiency. The courts have ordered that prisons and jails and affirmative action programs must meet certain standards by certain dates. They protect the right to due process guaranteed to clients of public programs in decisions about whether they can be denied benefits. This increases the burden on public agencies, forcing them to conduct costly hearings and reviews and to maintain extensive documentation. The courts in effect leave the agencies to worry about efficiency and cost considerations. The press and legislators, meanwhile, criticize agencies for slow procedures and expensive operations.

Casework by members of Congress, state legislators, and city council members can also exert pressure for results other than efficiency. (In this context, casework means action by an elected official to plead the case of an individual citizen or group who makes a demand of an agency.) A congressional representative or staff member may call about a constituent's late Social Security check. A city council member may call a city agency about a complaint from a citizen about garbage collection services. Although these requests can promote effective, reasonable responses by an agency, responding to sporadic, unpredictable demands of this sort can tax both the agency's efficiency and its effectiveness.

Responsiveness Values

The responsiveness criteria in Table 4.3 often conflict sharply with competence criteria and also with each other. Public managers and organizations remain accountable to various authorities and interests and to the rule of law in general (Radin, 2002; Rosen, 1998; West, 1995). They must comply with laws, rules, and directives issued by government authorities and provide accounts of their compliance as required. Rosen (1998) described a long list of different mechanisms, procedures, and institutions for accountability. In addition, Romzek and Dubnick (1987; also Romzek, 2000) pointed out that public managers and organizations are subject to different types of accountability that have different sources and that exert different levels of direct control over administrators. Hierarchical and legal accountability exert high degrees of control. The hierarchical form involves imposition of rules, procedures, scrutiny, and other controls from within an agency. Legal accountability, in Romzek's and Dubnick's definitions, involves high levels of control from external sources, in the form of oversight and monitoring by external authority. Professional and political accountability involve lower degrees of direct control over individual administrators. Professional accountability involves internal controls in an organization by granting administrators considerable discretion and expecting them to be guided by the norms of their profession. Political accountability also involves a lot of individual leeway to decide how to respond, that is, to external political sources such as legislators or other political stakeholders. The administrator decides whether to respond to an influence attempt by such a person or group. Obviously these forms of accountability can overlap and work in combinations, and the relative emphasis they receive can have dramatic consequences. Romzek and Dubnick attributed one of the worst disasters to befall the US space program, the Challenger explosion, to a shift away from professional accountability in NASA to more emphasis on political and hierarchical accountability.

Public organizations and their managers are often expected to remain open and responsive in various ways. Saltzstein (1992) pointed out that bureaucratic responsiveness can be defined in at least two ways—as responsiveness to the public's wishes or as responsiveness to the interests of the government—and that much of the discourse on the topic takes one or the other of these perspectives. These conflicting pressures sometimes coincide with accountability, in the sense of responding to directives and requests for information from government authorities. Yet public agencies also receive requests for helpful, reasonable, and flexible responses to the needs of clients, interest groups, and the general public. Because they are public organizations, their activities are public business, and citizens and the media demand relative openness to scrutiny (IBM Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002; Wamsley and Zald, 1973). For some programs, the enabling legislation requires citizen advisory panels or commissions to represent community groups, interest groups, and citizens. Administrative procedures at different levels of government require public notice of proposed changes in government agencies' rules and policies, often with provisions for public hearings at which citizens can attempt to influence the changes. The courts, legislatures, and legal precedent also require that agencies treat citizens fairly and impartially by adhering to principles of due process through appeals and hearings. The Freedom of Information Act and similar legislation at all levels of government require public agencies to make records and information available on request under certain circumstances. Other legislation mandates the privacy of clients' records under certain circumstances.

A related criterion, representativeness, pertains to various ways in which officials should represent the people and to another means of making government bureaucracy responsive to the needs of citizens. Representativeness is a classic issue in government and public administration, with discourse about the topic dating back centuries (see Chapter 10). The topic has taken on even more momentum recently, because of the rise of such issues as equal employment opportunity, affirmative action, and diversity. One view of representativeness holds that identifiable ethnic and demographic groups should be represented in government roughly in proportion to their presence in the population. The advisory groups mentioned previously also reflect representativeness criteria in another sense. One important and currently lively line of inquiry pursues the distinction between passive representation, which simply refers to whether members of different groups are present in governmental entities and agencies, and active representation. Active representation occurs when the members of a group actually serve as advocates for the group in decisions about programs and policies. Selden (1997, p. 139; see also Selden, Brudney, and Kellough, 1998) reported evidence that where districts of the Farmers Home Administration had higher percentages of minority supervisors, more rural housing loans went to minorities. Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, and Holland (2002) point out that passive representation has been found to lead to active representation for race but not for gender. They then report evidence of conditions under which passive representation will lead to active representation for gender in educational contexts. For example, in schools with more female administrators, female teachers were associated with more educational success for girls. Similarly, Dolan (2000) reports evidence that female federal executives express attitudes more supportive of women's issues when they work in agencies with high percentages of women in leadership positions. Brudney, Hebert, and Wright (2000) report evidence that among agency heads in the fifty states, the administrators' values and perceived organizational roles influence their tendency to display active representation. Other researchers examined representativeness issues at local government levels as well (Miller, Kerr, and Reid, 1999; Schumann and Fox, 1999). These criteria add to the complex set of objectives and values that public managers and organizations must pursue and seek to balance. In federal agencies and many state and local government organizations, support for diversity is a criterion in the performance evaluations of many executives and managers, so representativeness in this sense joins the list of values and goals they need to pursue.

Later chapters describe additional examples and evidence of how conflicting values and criteria such as those just discussed influence public organizations and pose very practical challenges for public managers. External authorities and political actors intervene in management decisions in pursuit of responsiveness and accountability, and they impose structures and constraints in pursuit of equity, efficiency, and effectiveness. Sharp conflicts over which values should predominate – professional effectiveness or political accountability, for example – lead to major transformations of organizational operations and culture (Maynard-Moody, Stull, and Mitchell, 1986; Romzek, 2000). Before examining these effects on major dimensions of organization and management, however, Chapter Five considers in more depth the elements in the lower portion of Table 4.3: the institutions, entities, and actors that seek to impose these values and criteria, and their exchanges of influence with public organizations.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Four

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Study: Habitat for Humanity of Medina: Confronting the Changing Times; Family Social Service Administration: Assessing the Agency's Vision, Mission, and Goals.

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY

For a research project, a college professor interviewed the secretary of the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) of a large state in the United States. The DCA manages programs for housing and community development, planning for growth, and ecological protection. The programs often include grants for local governments. This gives DCA great influence on the constituencies of many political officials and gets a lot of attention from those officials. During the interview, the DCA secretary's administrative assistant came in and handed her a note. The secretary told the interviewer that even though she had agreed to take no phone calls during the interview, she would have to interrupt the interview to return a phone call. She showed the interviewer the note. It was a message from one of the most powerful state senators. It said, “This is my SECOND phone call to you and you have not returned my call.” The administrative assistant explained that the senator had told her to write the note that way, to put “second” in all capitals and underline it. The director felt that she should return the call right away. Government executives often have to be very responsive to elected officials.

Chapter Two defined public organizations as those the government owns and funds and therefore has authority to direct and control. Chapter Four reviewed organization theorists' ideas about the crucial relationship between organizations and their environments. Public organizations' environments impose a distinctive set of values and criteria through influence of government institutions and entities. This chapter describes the sources of authority and influence – the power – of these entities over public organizations.

The complex literature that analyzes these topics is impossible to cover in a brief chapter. Nevertheless, for the analysis of public organizations we need to cover insights gained from studies of public organizations in order to integrate them with the topics in general management and organization theory covered in later chapters. In addition, public managers need to understand the political entities discussed here.

Power and influence relationships are seldom simple, unidirectional, or entirely clear. Analyses of public organizations illustrate these complexities. For example, in *A Two Way Street: The Institutional Dynamics of the Modern Administrative State*, Krause (1999) details the bidirectional influence between politicians and agencies and the sources of such mutual influence. Wood and Waterman (1994, pp. 18–22) pointed out that for years, scholars analyzing public organizations often characterized them as being out of the control of their political masters, and then showed evidence that that is not always the case. Nevertheless, some scholars have depicted regulatory agencies as "captured" by the interests they are supposed to regulate. Others have concluded that "iron triangles" – tight alliances of agencies, interest groups, and congressional committees – dominate agency policies and activities and close out other authorities and actors. These accounts describe bureaucracies as operating relatively independently of presidents, courts, and legislative bodies.

A popular myth about government agencies sees them as existing either for no reason and against everyone's better judgment or for only the selfish interests of the bureaucrats. In fact, a public agency that no one wants or that only the bureaucrats want is the easiest target for elimination. Still, such popular views persist, and they correspond to important political developments. Recent US presidents, governors, and mayors have launched efforts to control bureaucracies, seeking to wrest from them their allegedly excessive power or to streamline and reduce them (Arnold, 1995; Durant, 1992; Drezner, 2019; Pfiffner and Brook, 2000; US Office of Management and Budget, 2002; West, 2002). During the Trump administration, critics of government decried the "deep state." The deep state allegedly includes administrators entrenched in federal agencies who pursue their own policy preferences and resist the influence of the president and other elected officials. Illustrating this view of the federal administrative branch, in their final months in office Trump administration officials sought unsuccessfully to enact a major reform that would have transferred many federal career civil servants to a new status where they could be more easily dismissed.

Writers on public management often emphasize an opposing view, however. As mentioned in Chapter One, some experts on public management worry that elaborate controls on public managers deprive them of authority to carry out their jobs and frustrate them professionally (National Academy of Public Administration, 1986). Thus, the discussion on bureaucratic power has often fallen into two conflicting perspectives, one in which bureaus and bureaucrats are seen as independent and influential, and one in which they are regarded as impotent (Kingdon, 1995; Wood and Waterman, 1994). "One of the most important research questions at the nexus of political administration and political institutions is whether politicians control the bureaucracy or the bureaucracy possesses independent authority from democratic institutions of governance" (Krause, 1999, p.1; Moe, 1996).

More recently, evidence has mounted that both of these views have some merit; that bureaucratic power can be described as a dynamic mixture of both of these conditions. Researchers and government executives report numerous cases in which federal agencies have shown marked responsiveness to the authority of the president, the Congress, and the courts (Golden, 2000; IBM Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002; Rubin, 1985; Wood and Waterman, 1994); conversely, Wood and Waterman (1994) also show evidence of bottom-up processes in which federal agencies initiate policy relatively independently. Similarly, there are studies of public management and leadership that provide accounts of proactive behaviors by leaders of public agencies (Behn, 1994; Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Hargrove and Glidewell, 1990; Riccucci, 1995), including the influence of bureaucratic leadership on policy outcomes (Berkowitz and Krause, 2020).

Dunn (1997) described respectful relations between government executives and their political superiors, and Dunn and Legge (2002) found that many local government managers espouse a partnership model for their relations with elected officials. The relative power of public organizations, their leaders, and the governmental institutions to which they are formally accountable is dynamic and depends on various conditions, such as the salience of a particular issue, agency structure, agency expertise, and public attitudes and support (Haveman et al. 2017). This chapter reviews many of the powers of the external actors that influence public organizations, and as many of these dynamic factors as possible, because of their essential role in the fundamental organizational process of gaining financial resources, grants of authority, and other resources from the environment. (Table 5.1 summarizes many of these formal powers and other bases of influence.) As Norton Long (1949, p. 257) declared in a classic essay, "The lifeblood of administration is power."

TABLE 5.1 SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS, ENTITIES, AND ACTORS IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

CHIEF EXECUTIVES Appointing agency heads and other officials Overseeing executive staff and staff offices (e.g., budget office) Initiating legislation and policy directions Vetoing legislation Giving executive orders and directives
LEGISLATIVE BODIES Holding the power of the purse: final approval of the budget Authorizing legislation for agency formation and operations Giving approval of executive appointments of officials Overseeing hearings, investigations Holding authority over legislative committees Initiating legislation
COURTS Reviewing agency decisionsHolding authority to render decisions that strongly influence agency operations Giving direct orders to agencies
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Exerting oversight and management authority (GAO, OMB, OPM, GSA) over other agencies Acting as competitors for resources or authorization

Acting as allies in seeking resources or authorization Carrying out joint programs with other agencies
OTHER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT Exerting influence from “higher” and “lower” levels Engaging in intergovernmental agreements and districts
INTEREST GROUPS Lobbying and influencing attempts by client groups, constituency groups, and professional associations
POLICY SUBSYSTEMS AND POLICY COMMUNITIES Engaging with issue networksEngaging with interorganizational policy networks
NEWS MEDIA Reporting on government agency activities and problems Acting under constitutional protections of freedom of the press
GENERAL PUBLIC OPINION Providing (or refusing to provide) popular support
INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS Requesting services, complaints, other contacts

Public Organizations and the Public

Public organizations need support from what political scientists call *mass publics* (broad, diffuse populations) and especially from *attentive publics* (more organized groups that are interested in specific agencies).

Public Opinion and Mass Publics

General public opinion influences the management of public organizations. Two types of mass opinion figure importantly: attitudes toward government in general and attitudes toward particular policies and agencies. Elected officials have often sought to reform government bureaucracies in ways that appealed to public opinion, especially among many citizens who regard the federal government and its employees as inefficient and in need of reform. For example, at a March 2020 press briefing, President Trump defended his cuts to public health agencies by telling reporters, “I don't like having thousands of people around when you don't need them” (Friedersdorf, 2020).

Public opinion also played a significant role when President Jimmy Carter's administration reformed the US civil service system in 1979, changing pay and disciplinary procedures and provisions for appointing senior executives. The Carter administration promoted the reform as a means of motivating federal workers to work harder and of making it easier to fire lazy ones. The administration took this approach because it drew more media coverage than an approach simply emphasizing improvements to management in government. Media representatives apparently felt that emphasis on firing lazy bureaucrats would appeal to the public (Kettl, 1989). President Reagan more aggressively attacked the federal bureaucracy by cutting agency budgets and staffing, and by seeking to diminish the authority of career federal administrators (Aberbach and Rockman, 2000; Durant, 1992; Golden, 2000; Rubin, 1985). Surveys indicated that morale in the federal service suffered. A general climate of unfavorable public opinion about the public bureaucracy thus had significant effects on the morale of government employees.

Congress has a long history of voting down pay raises for itself because there is a public backlash when increases are proposed. According to the Congressional Institute, the last time Congress accepted a pay increase was 2009 when it accepted a 2.8% increase. In 1989, a public outcry against a proposed pay raise for members of Congress, federal judges, and federal executives provided another good example of the effects of general public opinion on government employees and organizations. In opinion polls, more than 80% of the public opposed the increase. Ralph Nader and the National Taxpayers' Union fought the raise aggressively, exhorting voters to contact their representatives to object to it. Congress overwhelmingly voted down the raise. After its defeat, stories in the *New York Times* and elsewhere reported that many federal managers expressed sharp disappointment over the symbolic rejection of their value to the nation.

In state and local governments across this country and in other nations, unfavorable public attitudes about government have provided support for various reforms (Peters and Savoie, 1994). Some reforms have targeted government pay systems, seeking changes that would tie a government employee's pay more closely to his or her performance. The reforms have been justified as a way to remedy allegedly weak motivation and performance on the part of public employees (Ingraham, 1993; Kellough and Lu, 1993). In Georgia and Florida, e.g., during the 1990s the governors proposed that merit system protections for state employees be abolished, in part so it would be easier to fire them (Kellough and Nigro, 2002; West, 2002). Walters (2002) points out that Governor Miller in Georgia promoted the reforms to the public by connecting them to the stereotype of inefficient bureaucrats who could not be fired. These sorts of reforms have been undertaken in various nations (Kettl, 2002; Peters and Savoie, 1994; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).

Ambivalence and Paradoxes in Public Opinion

While often negative, public attitudes about government at times exhibit marked ambivalence (Lipset and Schneider, 1987). Surveys have found that respondents say they would like lower taxes but do not want public spending reduced for most types of services (Pew Research, 2020; Beck, Rainey, and Traut, 1990; Ladd, 1983). Surveys have also found that when respondents are asked how they feel about federal agencies in general, they give unfavorable responses. When asked, however, for a specific evaluation of how they were treated by a particular agency in a specific instance, they give much more favorable responses (Katz, Gutek, Kahn, and Barton, 1975). Recent surveys also find highly favorable public opinion about some federal agencies (Pew Research, 2020). Nations cycle in and out of periods of antigovernment sentiment (Hirschman, 1982).

Ambivalent public attitudes contribute to the challenges of public management. In the absence of economic markets as mechanisms for measuring need and performance, public officials and public organizations often struggle with difficult questions about what the public wants. In recent decades, elected officials have often responded with reforms that directly influence structures, behavior, and management in public organizations. These developments show that public opinion influences public management.

Public Opinion and Agencies, Policies, and Officials

The general level of public support for a particular agency's programs affects the agency's ability to maintain a base of political support. Certain agencies hold a more central place than others in the country's values (Meier and Bothe, 2007; Pew, 2020; Wamsley and Zald, 1973), and the public regards their work as more crucial. The Department of Defense, police departments, and fire departments typically retain strong general public support because of the importance people attach to national defense and personal security. Some social programs, such as those perceived to involve welfare payments to the poor, receive weaker support in public opinion polls.

Hargrove and Glidewell (1990) have proposed a classification of public agencies and managerial jobs that places a heavy emphasis on public opinion. They classify public management jobs on the basis of how the public perceives the agency's clientele (e.g., public sentiment toward prisoners and welfare dependents is usually negative), the level of respect the public has for the professional authority of the agency and its head (e.g., a scientific or medical professional usually gets more respect), and the public's general level of support for the mission and purpose of the agency. This chapter returns to such factors later when discussing the sources of authority for public agencies and managers.

Media Power: Obvious and Mysterious

In recent years the use of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter has changed the political landscape. Politicians frequently use Twitter to influence other government officials, bureaucrats, and the public (e.g., Parmelee et al. 2011; Bode et al., 2016). Mounting evidence indicates social media's effects on political actors and on citizens' opinions. In fact, the use of social media for purposes of political communication and political influence is now a necessary element of any political strategy designed to attract more followers and maximize impact.

Members of the public can also initiate a conversation on social media and political leaders and bureaucrats can react. Although users of social media platforms may not represent the general population, they are more politically engaged than others in the population. They can achieve influence by initial postings that then reverberate when other users react, e.g., by "liking" posts and retweeting.

Citizens also use social media to engage directly with government. They can, e.g., apply for zoning permits and look up property values. At least one study shows how accessing government for such purposes and being informed about what government is doing shapes citizens' perceptions of government, which in turn affects their trust in government (Song et al., 2016).

Social media have also become a source of information for citizens' evaluation of government's performance. The accuracy of such information often depends on who is doing the communicating. This is important for several reasons. Citizens' ability to evaluate government performance is fundamental to democracy (Achen and Bartels, 2017) and the preferences they express at the ballot box (Downs, 1967). Information distortion is a form of politicization, which broadly refers to the substitution of neutral, objective, and technical criteria with political or personal biases (e.g., Meyer-Sahling, 2006). Biases may negatively affect perceptions about government performance (Meier, Johnson, Seung-Ho, 2019). In addition, citizens' perceptions about government performance have influenced reform initiatives and the push for various performance management programs (Moynihan, 2008).

The importance of public opinion also bolsters the power of the news media. Congressional committees or state legislative committees summon agency executives before them to explain the events surrounding an embarrassing news story about an agency. Whistle blowers who go public with news about agency misconduct or incompetence have often received such harsh treatment that the federal government has made special provisions to protect them (Rosen, 1998). Bad press can discredit an agency or an official and damage budgets, programs, and careers. A survey of persons who served as high-level executives in various presidential administrations found that the vast majority of them regarded media coverage as having a significant impact on public policy. Most of them had tried to get media coverage for their agency, and three-quarters of them reported spending at least five hours a week on matters pertaining to the press and media coverage (Graber, 2003, p. 245).

Close media scrutiny of government plays an indispensable role in governance. The news media also report aggressively on scandals in private business, yet they appear to place more emphasis on scrutiny of government. Government is often more accessible, and it is more appropriate to watch it carefully, because government spends the taxpayers' money. Soon after Congress passed a $2 trillion-dollar coronavirus relief bill in March 2020, The Cares Act, the press began to ask questions about where money was going. The GAO complained that the administration was refusing to provide critical data on bailouts. In the business section of the *Washington Post* one headline complained, "The Trump administration won't say who got $511 billion in taxpayer-backed coronavirus loans” (Gregg, 2020).

In cities around the country, local news reporters regularly publish stories about governmental waste or abuse. Among many examples, in some cities reporters have searched the parking lots of bars and restaurants during normal working hours to take pictures of the license tags of any government vehicles parked there. In one city a television station carried stories about the high costs of the furniture in the office of one of the county commissioners. Major television networks have news segments and special series that regularly broadcast allegations of government waste.

News reporters usually take a strong adversarial stance. They need to focus on serious problems and controversial issues, but also to attract an audience by reporting on provocative topics. The Volcker Commission (1989) report described how Carter administration officials had trouble attracting interest in their proposals for civil service reforms until they developed a twenty-six-foot chart illustrating the tortuous steps it took to fire a bad federal employee. The news media immediately focused on this issue and provided more coverage. This attention led to emphasis on the negative, punitive aspects of the reforms in trying to build support for them. The media coverage influenced the tenor of reforms that shaped the personnel practices of the federal government and influenced the morale of employees throughout the public sector.

Some studies suggest that news coverage of government is increasingly negative. Patterson (2001) carefully documents that since 1960 news coverage has become much less descriptive (reporters no longer present only the facts) and much more interpretive of developments. During the same period, coverage of candidates during presidential elections has become much more negative. Recent surveys further show that opinions about news coverage are based in part on partisanship, with Republicans reporting news as much more negative and less accurate compared to Democrats (Pew, 2019).

Instances in which unfavorable press coverage damages a person, program, or agency make concern about media coverage part of the lore of government (Linsky, 1986). Officials speak of managing in a “goldfish bowl” (Allison, 1983; Cohen and Eimicke, 1995; IBM Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002), with media attention playing a stronger role in government than it does in business management (Blumenthal, 1983). For years observers have worried that some federal executives devote more time to developing a favorable image in the media than to performing well as managers (Lynn, 1981). Many public employees appear to feel that they will not get into much trouble for poor performance but will get into a lot of trouble for creating bad publicity (Downs, 1967; Lynn, 1981; Warwick, 1975).

This apparent power of the media has mysterious qualities. The potential damage from bad coverage is often unclear. Ronald Reagan earned a reputation as the “Teflon president” by maintaining popularity in spite of sharp criticism in the media. Much of the worry over press coverage amounts to worrying over an entity in which the general public expresses little confidence. Public opinion polls find that public confidence in journalists and the news media is lower than public confidence in many other institutions and has been declining in recent decades (Patterson, 2001). Some experts on the news media argue that the media exert a powerful influence on public attitudes, but in a diffuse way. Media coverage develops a climate that pervades the informational environment, and this in turn influences public opinion (Lichter, Rothman, and Lichter, 1986; Murray, Schwartz, and Lichter, 2001). In addition, some experts conclude that journalists develop a shared view of what constitutes news, and this leads to a version of the news that different news organizations generally share (Patterson, 2001).

Media attention also varies. Some agencies regularly get more media attention than others. Hood and Dunsire (1981) found that the foreign affairs office and the treasury get particularly high levels of press coverage in Britain, whereas other central government departments get relatively little attention. The media often seriously neglect administrative issues.

Yet public officials also know that media attention can shift unpredictably. In one large state, where the department of administration ordinarily received little public attention, the director decided to change the set of private health insurance plans from which the state's employees chose their coverage. Many employees disliked the new set of plans. An outburst of complaints from state employees caused a sudden wave of coverage in the newspapers and television news around the state. A legislative committee soon called the director before special hearings about the changes.

Officials at higher levels and in political centers (capitals and large cities) often pay a great deal of attention to media strategies. Many city governments issue newsletters, televise city council meetings, and use other methods of public communication. Some federal and state agencies invest heavily in issuing public information. Even so, many public managers resist suggestions that they should devote time to media relations, regarding themselves as professionals rather than as “politicians.” More active approaches, however, usually prove to be the most effective (Graber, 2003). Various experts have offered advice on how to deal with the media. Table 5.2 summarizes typical recommendations.

Interest Groups, Clients, and Constituencies

The support of organized groups also determines the political well-being of public agencies. The role of organized interests in American politics generates continuing controversy. Special-interest politics poses the danger that the system will become (or has already become) too fragmented into self-interested groups, making it resistant to central coordination (Lowi, 1979). Critics say that the system favors more powerful groups and allows private interests to control major domains of public policy.

TABLE 5.2 GUIDELINES FOR MANAGING RELATIONS WITH THE NEWS MEDIA

Source: First half adapted from Chase and Reveal, 1983; Cohen and Eimicke, 1995; and Garnett, 1992. Second half adapted from Larkin, 1992

Experts on managing relations between government agencies and the news media propose such guidelines as the following:

- Understand the perspective of the media – their skepticism, their need for information and interesting stories, their time pressures.
- Organize media relations carefully – spend time and resources on them and link them with agency operations.
- Get out readable press releases providing good news about the agency; be patient if the media respond slowly.
- Respond to bad news and embarrassing incidents rapidly, with clear statements of the agency's side of the story.
- Seek corrections of inaccurate reporting.
- Use the media to help boost the agency's image, to implement programs, and to communicate with employees.
- To carry all this off effectively, make sure that the agency performs well, and be honest.

The Community Relations Office of the City of Claremont, California, published the following guidelines for managing relations with reporters:

- Prepare an agenda on each subject the media may be interested in. Include a list of three to five points you want to “sell” the reporter.
- Write or verbally deliver “quotable quotes” of ten words or less.
- Listen carefully to the question. The reporter may have made incorrect assumptions, and you will need to give clearer background information before answering the question.
- Avoid an argument with the reporter.
- If interrupted in mid-thought, proceed with your original answer before answering the new question.
- Challenge any effort to put words into your mouth.
- Don't just answer the question; use the question as a springboard to “sell” your agenda.
- If you do not know the answer, say so. Do not speculate.

- If you cannot divulge information, state why in a matter-of-fact way.
- Be positive, not defensive.
- Always tell the truth.

Yet public managers also recognize that interest-group activities are not all bad. They play an important role in the current system and provide government with important information. Legislation requires that public managers consult with interest groups and their representatives. Often these groups voice reasonable demands such as helping an industry to avoid layoffs, stimulating economic development, supporting education, and aiding the disadvantaged. Sometimes administrators face challenges because they have to deal with legitimate or worthy demands from different groups, whose demands sharply conflict with those of other groups.

Many public managers have to cultivate group support. Public agencies need political support for their funding and for authorization to act, so their leaders have to nurture political constituencies (Chase and Reveal, 1983; Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Graber, 2003; Hargrove and Glidewell, 1990; Meier and Bothe, 2007; Radin, 2002; Rourke, 1984; Wildavsky, 1988). Strong support from constituencies helps an agency defend itself against budget cuts or secure budget increases from legislative bodies. It can also help agencies defend themselves against unwanted directives from legislators and chief executives. Interest groups can block an agency's actions, sometimes popping up unexpectedly as a manager tries to act.

What kind of group support bolsters an agency? Well-organized, cohesive groups that are strongly committed to the agency and its programs can provide effective support. Conversely, capture of an agency by a constituency can bias it toward the self-interested priorities of that group (Meier and Bothe, 2007; Rourke, 1984; Wilson, 1989). Critics have accused some regulatory agencies of being captives of the industries or professions they supposedly regulate, or by the clientele who receive their services. Agencies have the most flexibility when they have the support of multiple groups; they can then satisfy some groups, if not all, and even have them confront one another about their conflicting demands (Meier and Bothe, 2007; Rourke, 1984).

Studies over past decades have reported that managers in state and local government agencies often see interest-group involvement with their agency as appropriate. State and local agency managers regard interest groups as having less influence on the operations of their agency than the chief executive (the governor or mayor) or the legislature. When groups do exert influence, they often provide useful information about policy issues and group positions (Abney and Lauth, 1986; Brudney and Hebert, 1987; Elling, 1983). Abney and Lauth (1986) found additional evidence that agency managers at the urban level see interest-group involvement as appropriate when it focuses directly on the agency and inappropriate when it is channeled through the city council or the mayor. The managers may be too forgiving of interest-group influences, but the findings also suggest a more positive or at least necessary side of interest groups. Experienced public managers see maintaining relations with these groups as a necessary part of their work. Public managers have to be accessible to such groups, seriously attentive to what they have to say, patient and self-controlled when the groups are harshly critical, and honest (Chase and Reveal, 1983; Cohen and Eimicke, 1995).

Legislative Bodies

Congress, state legislatures, city councils, and county commissions exercise as much formal, legal authority over public organizations as do any other entities. Formal authority always operates in a political context, which may weaken it or bolster it in practical terms.

Formal Authority. Legislative bodies have substantial formal powers, including authority to control agency budgets, to pass legislation that authorizes and directs agency actions, and to oversee agency activities through hearings, investigations, and other means.

Power of the Purse. Legislative bodies provide the money needed to operate public agencies. They exercise the final power of approval over budget allocations to agencies. They can fund new initiatives or cut and curtail agency activities aggressively.

Legislation. Government agencies are established by legislation. Such legislation states the basic missions and duties of the agencies and authorizes their activities. Additional legislation can give an agency some new duties. Its policies and programs can be extended, given to some other agency, reformed, or abolished.

Legislation often transmits vague, idealized directives to agencies. For example, legislation directs various regulatory agencies to promote “just” and “reasonable” practices in the public interest and for the common welfare (Woll, 1977). According to Lowi's (1979) prominent argument, these broad grants of authority give the agencies considerable discretion, and hinder central, purposeful control of the agencies and the public policy process. Diffuse directives also add to the influences that impose vague, multiple, often conflicting goals on government agencies.

Conversely, legislatures sometimes do the opposite, delving into the precise details of agency management and procedures and engaging in micromanagement. They sometimes reform the general structure of the executive branch, combining certain departments and splitting others apart. They sometimes dictate the organizational structure of major agencies, including what subunits they establish. They produce legislation governing the details of personnel procedures for the agencies within their jurisdiction, or they precisely dictate other administrative procedures. For example, state legislatures sometimes include in legislation detailed specifications about the types of computer records a state regulatory agency must maintain. The US Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA98) specified many of the main features of the agency's structure and procedures, such as its new operating divisions, flexibilities in personnel administration, and sanctions for specific forms of misconduct by IRS employees. This example, however, actually illustrates a complex interplay between the legislative and administrative branches (Krause, 1999). In actuality, some of the provisions of RRA98, such as the agency's new structure and its provisions for personnel administration, were proposed by task forces and executives in the agency and then written into the legislation.

Oversight. Legislative bodies regularly conduct hearings, audits, and investigations into agency activities (Rosen, 1998). Hearings are a normal part of the appropriations process and of the process of developing legislation. Investigatory and oversight agencies are established under the authority of the legislative branch to carry out inquiries into agency activities and performance. The General Accounting Office at the federal level and auditors general or similar offices in the states conduct audits to support legislative oversight.

Congressional oversight at the federal level has intensified in recent decades and has increasingly focused on administrative processes, apparently in response to presidents' efforts to control the bureaucracy (West, 1995). Wood and Waterman (1994) reported evidence that congressional oversight can significantly influence the outputs and actions of federal agencies. They showed, e.g., that it led to a sharp increase in enforcement actions by the Environmental Protection Agency's hazardous waste compliance division during one period in the 1980s.

Committees. Particular legislative committees oversee particular agencies by conducting hearings about them, examining their operations, and developing legislation pertaining to them. Names of some committees correspond almost exactly to the names of major federal and state agencies. City councils often have a committee structure as well, with committees corresponding to the major departments and functions of the city government. Harold Seidman, one of the leading experts on federal administrative reforms, argues that if one wants to reform the federal bureaucracy, one must first reform Congress. Congressional committees jealously guard their authority over agencies (Seidman and Gilmour, 1986). An appropriations committee chair once objected to extending the president's power to veto legislation, saying, “We don't want the agencies taking orders from the president. We want them to take orders from us” (Miller, 1990).

Informal Influence. Legislative influences can be relatively informal as well, rather than codified into law (Weissert and Uttermark, 2017). For example, legislators call administrators on the phone to press them for information or to ask for certain actions. State and federal administrators trying to relocate their agencies' offices or facilities to save money or to reorganize their operations frequently hear from outraged legislators whose districts will lose facilities and jobs. During the

1960s, the US Department of Labor sought to better organize diverse work-training programs run by various bureaus by bringing them under the authority of the newly created Manpower Administration. In committee hearings, powerful members of Congress told the head of this new agency that he should leave the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Trades (BAT) alone and not bring it into the new structure (Ruttenberg and Gutchess, 1970). Labor unions wanted to maintain a strong influence on BAT and had lobbied members of Congress to oppose moving BAT into the new structure. Similarly, legislators press for the hiring of political friends and allies in agencies or argue against their firing (Warwick, 1975). None of these actions is necessarily formally authorized, and some are quite improper. They illustrate an additional dimension of legislative influence on the bureaucracy and show why legislators strive to defend their alliances and influences with the bureaucracy.

Limits on Legislative Power. Some experts insist that, even armed with all these powers, legislative bodies exert little real control over administrative agencies (Woll, 1977). The agencies are specialized and staffed with experts who know much more about their functions than do legislators and their staffs. Legislators often have little incentive to be aggressive in supervising agency performance (Meier and Bothe, 2007; Ripley and Franklin, 1984). Such “good government” activities offer little political advantage, because constituents often cannot see the results. In addition, tough oversight of agencies could jeopardize relationships with them, removing them as potential sources of favors for constituents. Agencies also have independent sources of support from interest groups and from parts of the legislative bodies and executive branches that they can play off against other parts. As mentioned previously, however, recent evidence suggests that although legislative influence is a complicated subject, it is clear that legislative bodies significantly influence agencies in many instances (Wood and Waterman, 1994).

Legislative authority also varies across jurisdictions. Certain states, such as Florida, have relatively powerful legislatures that are based on the state's legal and institutional arrangements. The authority and power of city councils and county commissions vary from place to place, depending, e.g., on whether there is a “strong mayor” or “weak mayor” type of government in a city.

The Chief Executive

Presidents, governors, and mayors rival the legislative branch for the status of strongest political influence on agencies. Presumably, chief executives have the greatest formal power over the public bureaucracies in their jurisdictions. Yet, as with legislative bodies, the influence patterns are in taming the complex unwieldy bureaucracy.

Appointments. Chief executives appoint heads of executive agencies and usually an additional array of patronage positions within those agencies. Wood and Waterman (1994) found that the appointment of a new agency head was often strongly related to a change in agency actions and outputs in the direction of the president's preferences. The chief executive's ability to influence agencies through these appointments, however, varies by agency, jurisdiction, and political climate. President Reagan mounted an aggressive effort to influence federal agencies through appointments. He filled the top positions of some major agencies with executives committed to reducing the regulatory role, size, and influence of the federal bureaucracy. As a result, certain agencies sharply curtailed their staff and activities (Golden, 2000; Rubin, 1985). Administration officials also added new levels of political appointees at the top of agencies. This added layers between the top executives and the highest-level career civil servants, effectively demoting career service managers. These steps had so much impact that the Volcker Commission (1989) called for reductions in the number of appointments the president can make. This example illustrates the potential power given to a chief executive by the authority to make appointments. In certain states and localities, many major or cabinet-level agency executives are independently elected and thus not beholden to the chief executive. Jurisdictions also vary in the degree to which they have patronage appointments within agencies.

Executive Staff Offices. The executive offices of the US president and of governors and mayors around the country give chief executives various resources that can bolster their influence. Units within an executive office can represent special constituencies and functions. A governor might have an office of minority affairs or veterans' affairs as a way of demonstrating concern for that constituency. Other subunits might concentrate on press relations or relations with the legislature. Some governors and local executives have inspectors general in their executive offices to conduct investigations into allegations of improprieties in agencies.

Budgeting Authority. The most significant of the staff offices are those that wrestle with budgets – the Office of Management and Budget in the executive office of the president and similar offices on the staffs of mayors and governors. The legislative branch ultimately approves the budget, but the chief executive assembles agency budget requests and submits them to the legislature for approval. The chief executive tries to hammer his or her priorities into the budget by proposing extensions or cuts in funding for programs. The executive's influence over the budget depends on many factors – anticipated tax revenues, programs needing attention, developments in the political climate (such as strong midterm election results for the chief executive's party or strong popularity ratings). The legislative body may fight back, of course, putting money back into programs that the chief executive tries to cut, and vice versa. Agency officials engage in various ploys to maintain their funding and avoid cuts (Wildavsky, 1988). Their ability to do so depends on factors already described, such as group support. Yet through this process the chief executives have significant potential influence on public policy and public agencies.

Policy Initiatives and Executive Orders. Chief executives have certain formal powers to tell agencies what to do through directives and executive orders (Cooper, 1996). For example, some of the original equal employment opportunity (EEO) initiatives were implemented through executive orders from President Eisenhower and later presidents. They directed federal agencies and private companies holding federal contracts to establish EEO programs. Chief executives can also prompt agencies to develop programs and policies that the executive will support through the budgeting process.

Many of the proposals developed by the Clinton administration's National Performance Review were implemented through presidential executive orders. The president ordered agencies to reduce rules and red tape, to develop customer service standards, and to establish "reinvention laboratories" to develop innovative new processes, among other actions. Cooper (1996) argued that executive orders can be very useful to presidents, and some of these actions illustrate their effects. Agencies responded rapidly in carrying out some of the actions the president directed as part of the National Performance Review. Cooper also noted, however, that executive orders can complicate the roles of agency executives, because they sometimes conflict with other legal mandates for the agency. They become part of the complex, often conflicting influences on agencies and their leaders. In one virtually comical instance, President Clinton issued an executive order directing all federal agencies to reduce their rules by 50%.

The Courts

As with the other institutions surrounding public organizations, some experts say that the courts exert powerful controls over the public bureaucracy, while others see them as ineffectual. Various experts point to the courts as the strongest ultimate check on the power of the public bureaucracy; others see bureaucratic power overwhelming the courts.

The federal and state courts operate under fairly conservative principles (Cooper, 2000, pp. 63–67; Lowande and Proctor, 2020). Courts overrule the actions of agencies for two main reasons. They can stop an agency from going beyond the intent of the legislation that created it. They can also prevent an agency from violating correct procedures, such as those required under the due process of law provisions of the Constitution and related legal precedents. These standards actually focus the courts on preventing agency actions rather than on proactively directing policies and programs. In addition, a number of relatively conservative legal principles strengthen the position of public agencies in disputes with citizens or groups. Examples of these include provisions that make public officials immune to many types of liability or require citizens with complaints against agencies to exhaust all possible remedies that they can seek through the agency before a court will hear their complaint. Also, for the courts to settle a dispute, someone has to initiate a lawsuit; this is expensive and can take a long time. Agencies win a lot of suits because they have highly specialized personnel and legal expertise at their disposal (Meier and Bothe, 2007).

In a sweeping critique of contemporary governmental processes in the United States, Lowi (1979) cited vague legislation as a major problem in weakening judicial oversight of the bureaucracy. To achieve compromise among diverse interests in the legislative process, Congress and other legislative units give diffuse grants of authority to agencies, passing legislation that communicates only very general objectives and standards. Courts then have difficulty enforcing adherence to congressional intent. The sheer size and complexity of the administrative branch of government, the wide range of specializations it encompasses, and the technical complexity of many of the policy issues that come before the courts make it extremely difficult for the courts to exercise strong control over bureaucratic actions (Stewart, 1975).

Yet under the right circumstances, the courts wield immense authority and can be very aggressive in the oversight of administrative agencies (O'Leary and Straussman, 1993; Rosenbloom and O'Leary, 1997). Through injunctions they can force or block an agency's actions. They can direct an agency to pay damages, thus making administrators very careful about assessing the legal implications of their rules and procedures. Limitations on judicial interventions concerning, e.g., citizens' ability to sue government officials and exhaustion of administrative remedies have relaxed over time (Meier and Bothe, 2007). A ruling making it easier for citizens to sue social workers when children under their supervision suffer child abuse has changed the procedures and expenses of agencies across the country. In surveys, administrators report that court decisions influence the allocation of funds at state and local levels for education, prisons, hospitals, and other services (Meier and Bothe, 2007).

Congress has moved toward including more specific standards in some legislation (Wilson, 1989), and court rulings sometimes focus powerfully on one particular aspect of an agency's operations. Courts sometimes intervene in particular agency activities, often due to some constitutional principle such as due process of law or equal protection of the law. On occasion, courts have in effect taken over schools and prisons in certain jurisdictions. Lawsuits to force agencies to comply with legislation requiring environmental impact statements prior to any major building project have delayed many projects in many agencies. The courts wait in the background, in a sense, seldom directly intervening in day-to-day operations of public organizations. Yet they pose an ominous background presence. Administrators frequently take actions and establish procedures expressly because of what a court has done or might do.

Research has strengthened the position that courts have a significant influence on agency operations (O'Leary, 1994; Wood and Waterman, 1994). O'Leary (1994) cited numerous examples of a “new partnership” between judges and public managers that entails significant judicial influence over agencies and their operations as well as extensive interaction with agencies' managers and staff. She reviewed research on these developments in relation to personnel administration in agencies and found evidence of such interaction. Her research provided evidence that the courts sometimes dictate which issues an agency must attend to. Courts can diminish the authority of administrators, in part by dictating where they must devote agency resources. This can decrease the budgetary discretion of administrators (and can involve a judge's refusal to defer to an administrator's expertise). Court orders can also influence staff morale, sometimes demoralizing people in the agency and sometimes boosting their enthusiasm about their work. These examples and findings provide the beginnings of a body of research that needs much more development. The material from organization theory and organizational development reviewed in other parts of this book shows that the legal and judicial environments have not received much attention from organizational researchers (O'Leary and Straussman, 1993). These examples, however, show how the governmental and legal institutions surrounding public organizations can directly influence organizational design and effectiveness and the behavior of the people within organizations. They also reveal that most public managers and employees need a sound knowledge of the judicial environment (Cooper, 1996, 2000; Rosenbloom and O'Leary, 1997), and they raise a number of important research questions for scholars.

Other Government Agencies as Overseers, Allies, and Competitors

Public organizations both work together and fight with one another. The participants in this contest represent all the different levels of government, the various agencies, and certain oversight bodies concerned with personnel administration, budgeting, and central purchasing. Later chapters describe many examples of ways in which this affects management within public organizations.

In the US federal system of government, higher levels of government direct and regulate the lower levels in various ways. Some federal programs, such as Social Security, are actually carried out by state personnel following federal guidelines. Behind this generally cooperative structure, however, patterns of mutual influence operate.

Grants from higher levels of government exert some of this influence. Merit systems have been disseminated throughout the personnel departments of state and local governments in the United States, in part because federal grants were made available to set up such systems. Federal laws can mandate that federal money for programs be matched in certain ways by states and localities. For example, states must contribute to Medicare payments for individuals, adding to the amounts paid by the federal government. With these funding arrangements come influences on state and local governments' structures and procedures.

Laws and regulations, whether or not they are attached to grants or other funding instruments, also exert such influences. State and federal environmental protection regulations and growth and economic development mandates dictate how programs must be managed by lower levels of government. Federal legislation sometimes directs a federal agency to do certain things in every state unless the states do them in a way that meets certain minimum standards established by the federal government. An example of this is the federal government's policy regarding mine safety regulations, under which it must oversee mine safety within a state unless the state can finance and manage the program itself, at least at the level required by federal standards.

The relationships between the different levels of government may be very smooth in many instances, but the lower levels do not necessarily accept higher-level influences and requirements lying down. During the Reagan administration, some state governments refused to carry out directives from the Social Security Administration requiring them to review the cases of many disability payment recipients and deny payments to some of them under more stringent rules. During a later administration, many states were slow to comply with federal laws requiring that they increase their share of Medicare payments (Tolchin, 1989). Localities also work hard to influence state and federal legislation that may bear significantly on their activities. Associations such as the League of Cities lobby at the state and federal levels for legislation that they feel they need.

Organizations at a given level of government also cooperate and compete in many ways. Johnson (1989) described how, as of the late 1980s, the “intelligence community” of the U.S. government involved more than forty federal agencies with responsibilities for intelligence operations. The delivery of many local services in the United States often involves a complex network of joint agreements and contracts among localities. State and federal agencies typically have overlapping responsibilities and engage in joint planning and activity. The EEO Coordinating Commission was established to coordinate the various agencies at the federal level that had responsibilities for carrying out affirmative action and EEO policies. Agencies also compete with each other for the time and attention of higher-level executives (Chase and Reveal, 1983) and over turf, seeking to block other agencies and authorities from gaining control over their programs (Wilson, 1989).

Public Managers' Perceptions of the Political Environment

Later chapters describe a variety of studies that pertain to how public managers respond to the components of their political environments and how those environments influence public organizations. Some studies mentioned earlier, however, provided evidence of how public managers perceive various aspects of the political context, such as the relative influence of chief executives, legislatures, and interest groups (Abney and Lauth, 1986; Brudney and Hebert, 1987; Elling, 1983). These studies indicated that state agency managers see their legislatures as the most influential, with the governor coming second (although there are variations among the states in the relative power of the governor and the legislature). Local managers see the chief executive – the mayor – as the most influential actor. State and local agency managers rate interest groups as much less influential than legislatures and chief executives but often see them as valuable contributors to decision making.

Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981; see also Aberbach and Rockman, 2000) provided a similar account of the strong influence of the legislative branch at the federal level. They analyzed contacts between administrative officials and other actors in the federal systems of the United States and in five other industrial democracies. In the United States they found much higher levels of contact between civil service administrators in agencies and congressional committee members than either of these two groups had with the executive heads of the agencies. However, the civil service managers had even more contacts with constituent groups than with Congress. Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman referred to this pattern as the "end run" model, because it involves civil servants and legislators going around executive agency heads, and they discovered that it occurs more often in the United States than in any of the other countries they studied.

Studies identifying how public managers perceive the nature of their own political activities are rare, but Olshfski (1990) identified three conceptions of politics that emerge in state agency executives' descriptions of their political activities: political astuteness – the understanding of the political system and the processes of government and their own departments; issue politics – the political activities, such as bargaining and coalition building, necessary to advance an issue or achieve an objective; and electoral politics – the knowledge and activity related to gaining general political support for themselves, an elected official, or their departments.

The Public Policy Process

Analyses of public policy have burgeoned over the past several decades, and so has the recognition that public organizations play an essential role in the formation and implementation of public policy. The policymaking and policy implementation processes are an extremely important aspect of the environment of public organizations and public managers.

Many Arenas, Actors, Levels, and Instruments

Government activity at all levels encompasses a diverse array of functions and policy domains. Without any standard nomenclature, scholars and government officials refer to policy categories such as defense, health, science and technology, social welfare and poverty, environmental protection, energy, economic and fiscal policy (including tax policy), agricultural policy, industrial development policy, educational policy, and regulatory policy. Government activities at state and local levels include a similarly diverse list: industrial development, zoning and land use, police and firefighting services, transportation (including streets and roads), garbage collection, prisons and jails, parks and recreation, and many others. As mentioned earlier, state and local governments are also part of the policymaking process for major federal policies. Within these policy areas and spanning them, many specific programs operate at various levels of scope, size, and complexity. All these institutions, levels, authorities, and groups play a part in shaping policy and carrying it out, making the influences on policy implementation numerous and complex (O'Toole, 2000). Governmental policies draw many private for-profit and nonprofit organizations into the processes of carrying out public policy. Many government programs operate through grants, purchases, and contracts with nongovernmental organizations, such as weapons manufacturers or private nonprofit organizations that seek, e.g., to help troubled youths. Besides contracts and grants, governments utilize many additional instruments or “tools” of government action, such as loan programs, regulations, insurance programs, vouchers, user charges, permits, and tax policies (Salamon and Elliot, 2002).

Policy Subsystems

For a long time, political scientists have observed that within this complex public policy system areas are domains of policy. Also for a long time, political scientists described these domains as being dominated by “iron triangles,” which are alliances of congressional committees, administrative agencies, and interest groups that control major policy areas such as defense and environmental policy. Key people in the committees, agencies, and interest groups in the triangle exchange political favors and support. Authorities outside the triangle, even the president, can wield little influence over it. This situation has long been lamented as one of the fundamental problems of government in the United States. Ronald Reagan complained about iron triangles in one of his last public statements as president.

Although the iron triangle analogy refers to a very significant problem, political scientists now point out that it oversimplifies the nature of these coalitions. Competition and conflict among groups and agencies may flare within the triangles, making them much less solid than the analogy implies. Lawyers may fight doctors over a change in legislation on malpractice suits. One group of large corporations may line up on the other side of an issue from another group of equally large corporations. In addition, as problems change, different groups, organizations, and individuals move in and out of the policy arena. The iron triangle analogy fails to depict these dynamics of the process (Kingdon, 1995).

To better characterize the situation, scholars began to coin new terms. Heclo (1978) referred to “issue networks” of experts, officials, and interests that form around particular issues and that can shift rapidly. Milward and Wamsley (1982) described what they call “policy networks”: complex and shifting aggregations of groups, experts, public and private organizations, governmental authorities, and others whose interplay shapes the formation and implementation of policy. Others referred to “subgovernments' implementation structures” (Hjern and Porter, 1981), “public service industries” and “policy subsystems” (Rainey and Milward, 1983), and “policy communities” (Kingdon, 1995). These subsystems or networks prove resistant to external control or coordination with other networks. Yet the depiction of the problem as one of staunch control by self-serving bureaucrats, politicians, and private interests oversimplifies the situation. Often the difficulties in coordination and control result largely from the flux and complexity of the issues, interests, and participants involved in the process.

Government agencies at all levels have increasingly contracted out portions of their functions and used the tools or instruments just described. Government now delivers more programs and services through organizations that are not formally owned or operated by government. These developments involve increased sharing of power with these nongovernmental organizations, with government providing a proxy to private organizations to carry out its programs and policies (Kettl, 1993, 2002). Privatization has continued to expand in many policy areas, such as human and social service programs (Smith and Lipsky, 1993), environmental and energy programs, and prisons.

These developments complicate the lines of accountability and make public managers responsible for organizational activities they can control indirectly, through contracts and grants or other mechanisms. In some cases, private and nonprofit contractors and grant recipients, instead of providing a competitive private sector alternative, become part of the political lobby for the programs with which they are involved (Smith and Lipsky, 1993). In other cases, government officials use private contractors to justify the pursuit of certain political and social objectives that they might not be able to justify through the normal legislative process. Moe (1996) argued that in these ways, privatization may involve more of a “governmentalization” of the private sector than a privatization of government.

In some policy areas, privatization has extended so far that government has become “hollow,” with private contractors taking over most or all of its authority and activity (Milward and Provan, 2000; Milward, Provan, and Else, 1993; Provan and Milward, 2001). Mental health programs, e.g., may be provided by networks of private or nonprofit organizations, with government funding but virtually no involvement by government employees. Government policies and programs are increasingly carried out by networks of government agencies, private firms, and nonprofit organizations that are supposed to collaborate in the delivery of the program or policy (Kettl, 2002). Obviously they make contract management and the management of other network or third-party arrangements more important skills for many public managers. Chapter Fourteen covers the management of privatization in considering managerial excellence in the public sector.

The Agenda-Setting Process and the Agenda Garbage Can

Public policy researchers also help characterize the context of public management by analyzing how certain matters gain prominence on the public agenda while others languish outside of public notice. Kingdon (1995) said that this process resembles the "garbage can model" of decision making developed by March and his colleagues (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972). As described in more detail in Chapter Seven, the garbage can model depicts decision making in organizations as being much less systematic and rational than is commonly supposed. People are not sure about their preferences or about how their organization works. Streams of problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities flow along through time, sometimes coming together in combinations that shape decisions. (An example of a choice opportunity is a salient problem that has to be addressed by a newly formed committee with sufficient authority to have a chance at getting something done.) The process is more topsy-turvy than the organizational chart might suggest. Sometimes solutions actually chase problems, as when someone has a pet idea that he or she wants to find a chance to apply. Sometimes administrators simply look for work to do. Choice opportunities are like garbage cans in which problems, solutions, and participants come together in a jumbled fashion.

Kingdon revised this view when he applied it to public policy, referring to streams of problems, policies, and politics flowing alongside one another and sometimes coming together at key points to shape the policy agenda. Problems come to the attention of policymakers in various ways: through indicators, such as unemployment figures or figures on budget deficits; through events, such as crises that focus the policymakers' attention on them; and through feedback, such as citizen complaints and reports on the operation of programs. Policies develop within the policy community as various ideas and alternatives emerge from the "policy primeval soup." Like microorganisms in a biological primeval soup, they originate, compete, evolve, and prosper or perish. They are evaluated in think tanks, conferences, staff meetings in legislative bodies and government agencies, and interest-group activities. They may be partially tried out in programs or legislation, and a long period of "softening up" often follows the original proposal, in which the alternative becomes more and more acceptable. Some alternatives have a long history of implementation, shelving, alteration, and retrial. For example, various versions of public works and job training camps have appeared at different levels of government since the days of the Civilian Conservation Corps during the New Deal and the Job Corps during the Johnson administration's War on Poverty. At times, events in these streams converge to open windows of opportunity in which political forces align in support of a policy alternative for a particular problem, moving this combination to a central place on the public agenda.

In Kingdon's portrayal, the agenda-setting process appears difficult to predict and understand, but not wildly out of control. The processes of gestation and evaluation focus considerable scrutiny on ideas and alternatives and their workability. Still, this analysis illustrates the dynamism of the policymaking environment in which public managers must operate. In later chapters, the idea of identifying windows of opportunity will figure usefully in the discussion of managing change in public organizations. Many of the challenges facing a public manager turn on effective assessment of the political feasibility of particular actions and alternatives and of the array of political forces shaping or curtailing various opportunities.

Public managers, especially at higher levels, must skillfully manage their relationship with the external authorities, actors, networks, and policy processes. They also have to operate effectively within the pattern of interventions and constraints from their environments. The following chapters examine major dimensions in organizing and managing in the public sector. At many points, the discussion illustrates and shows evidence of how the political and institutional environments of public organizations affect their characteristics and the behaviors of the people who work in them.

Networks and Collaboration in Public Management and the Public Policy Process

As the COVID-19 pandemic began to spread across the US and many other nations, a major newspaper article profiled Dr. Francis Collins, the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (Bobrow, 2020). Responding to the pandemic required the participation of an array of organizations in all sectors. These included federal agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration, and the Centers for Disease Control, as well as state and local departments of public health. Nonprofit organizations and private firms also played important roles, including the pharmaceutical firms that began, with unprecedented speed, to develop vaccines that would provide the greatest hope for defending against the virus. Dr. Collins mentioned in the interview for the article that one of his important responsibilities involved facilitating effective relationships among government professionals in this complex of organizations with professionals from nongovernment organizations. Many government programs and policies have always involved clusters of individuals, groups, and organizations. Johnson (1989), e.g., pointed out that for decades the US "intelligence community" included the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Council, the intelligence activities of the branches of the armed forces, and many other agencies. A diagram of the organizations and their relationships resembled a wiring diagram for a piece of electrical equipment. Sets of organizations and people, who in various senses work together, become a "network." Networks and networking have a major influence on the nature of the environments of the organizations involved, and how those organizations interact with their environments.

While they have existed for a long time, networks have become even more prevalent in recent decades (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004; Vigoda, 2002). Developments that have fueled this trend include increased privatization and contracting out of public services, greater involvement of nonprofit and business organizations in public service delivery, and complex problems that exceed the capacity of any one organization. This growing significance of networks has raised challenges, including defining and identifying networks and different types of networks, analyzing how they operate, and assessing their effectiveness and accountability (Agranoff, 2007).

What Is a Network? O'Toole (1997, p. 44) defined networks as “structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement.” Such situations do not involve typical or traditional chains of command and hierarchical authority. For managers in networks, the lines of accountability and authority are loosened, and the management of a network requires more reliance on trust and collaboration than programs operated within the hierarchy of one organization (O'Toole, 1997).

Managers also face varying degrees of responsibility to activate, mobilize, and synthesize networks. In his recent intensive study of networks, Agranoff (2007) characterizes their structures as involving “collaborarchy” rather than hierarchy, and “soft guidance” rather than hierarchical authority.

The Nature of Networks. Researchers have analyzed the operations, structures, and effectiveness of networks. In the most widely cited empirical study of networks, Provan and Milward (1995) analyzed the mental health services of four urban areas in the United States. They found that networks of different organizations provided these services, with each organization providing part of the package of mental health services available in the area. Significantly, none of the organizations was a government organization. The federal government provided most of the funding for the mental health services in these areas, but networks of private and nonprofit organizations provided the services.

Provan and Milward pointed out that for such networks of organizations, a real measure of effectiveness should not be focused on any individual organization. Instead, one must think in terms of the effectiveness of the entire network. Provan and Milward focused on clients in measuring the network's effectiveness, using responses from clients, their families, and caseworkers concerning the clients' quality of life and their satisfaction with the services of the network. They then examined the characteristics of the network in relation to these measures of effectiveness. They found that the most effective of the four mental health service networks was centralized and concentrated around a primary organization. The government funds for the system went directly to that agency, which played a central role in coordinating the other organizations in delivering services.

Milward and Provan (1998, 2000) developed the findings of their study into principles about the governance of networks. A network will most likely be effective when a core agency integrates the network, when the government's mechanisms for fiscal control are direct and not fragmented, when resources are plentiful, and when the network is stable. In addition, assessing the effectiveness of networks requires evaluation on multiple levels, including the community level, the level of the network itself, and the level of the organizations participating in the network.

In another analysis of the internal characteristics of networks and of different types of networks, Agranoff (2007) studied fourteen “public management networks” (PMNs). Operating in Indiana, Nebraska, Iowa, and Kentucky, the networks deal with such policies as metropolitan planning, economic and rural development, river restoration, environmental infrastructure, and geographic information systems. Agranoff found important variations among the networks. Informational networks share program and policy information, while development networks do such sharing but also help their members develop capacities that they want to improve. Outreach networks go beyond these first two functions to include the development of interagency strategies for such purposes as assisting local governments in identifying and attaining resources they need; e.g., they help the governments to maintain their water and wastewater systems. Finally, action networks, including four of the fourteen, are the only networks with the capacity to take actions that direct interagency policies and programs.

Agranoff (2007, p. 44) shows that the four types differ in their attributes and activities, including their internal power and authority, communication and external promotion, strategic planning and implementation. Many observers characterize networks as co-equal collaborative activities, but his evidence shows that power figures importantly. All the networks depend on influential members with political and administrative authority in the organizations from which they come and on influential technical staff. These power configurations figure more importantly in the action networks than in the others. Agranoff also analyzed the networks' performance by asking the network participants about the “value added” to their organization by the network. For many of the networks, the perceived added value comes in the form of communication processes and informational inputs, as opposed to ultimate impacts and results. For action-oriented networks, however, the added value involves more tangible results such as enhanced funding, funding allocations, and establishment of policies and plans. For all the networks, cohesion is essential, and the cohesion must be based on trust and mutual respect and consensus building around a common purpose. Agranoff also points out that while networks have characteristics distinct from those of more formally structured organizations, topics such as formalization and centralization, incentives, communication, and decision making apply to them.

Network Governance and Effectiveness. Provan and Kenis (2008) examine network effectiveness, which they define as the attainment of positive network-level outcomes that individual organizational participants cannot achieve by acting independently. They identify three forms of network governance that relate to effectiveness. These include shared governance networks that are participant-governed and decentralized, with network members on an equal basis in the governance process. A lead organization form has a single vertical power holder, but with high decentralization. Networks with network administrative organizations (NAOs) have a separate entity established specifically to govern the network and activities. These forms of network governance and the management of related tensions have a major influence on network effectiveness (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

Leadership Networking and Organizational Effectiveness. O'Toole and Meier (2004) analyzed all the school districts in Texas over a multiyear period to show how structural features of intergovernmental networks and school district administrators' networking behavior influence performance. Using a model of public management described later in Chapter Six, they found that when top administrators show higher levels of networking behaviors, these behaviors show positive relations to students' performance in their districts on standardized tests required of all students in the state. They also found that stability in a district relates to more effective networking activity. It provides a "platform for risk-taking, entrepreneurial action in networks …" (O'Toole and Meier, 2004, pp. 491–492). Additional research employing the Meier and O'Toole (2001; O'Toole and Meier, 2011) public management model has found positive relations between networking behaviors and proactive management, organizational performance, management tenure, time in a given network, and gains for a given organization (Goerdel, 2006; Hicklin, O'Toole, and Meier, 2008, Juenke, 2005).

Negative Networks? Other studies have examined potential difficulties and negative implications of networks. Van Bueren, Klijn, and Koppenjan (2003) examined cognitive uncertainty, strategic uncertainty, and institutional uncertainty in the context of wicked policy problems faced by policy networks. These factors lead the networked actors to become dependent on each other to solve policy problems through joint action. The joint action, however, faces difficulties due to institutional barriers, cognitive differences, and other dynamics of interaction (van Bueren, Klijn, and Koppenjan, 2003). Raab and Milward (2003) analyzed "dark networks," or how network structures and governance are used for criminal or immoral ends.

Collaboration in Public Management

Networks and other methods by which public, private, and nonprofit organizations work increasingly involve collaboration among diverse actors and organizations. Organizations of all types engage in collaborative arrangements rather than competitive or go-it-alone modes (e.g., Acar, Guo, and Yang, 2008; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, 2006; O'Leary and Bingham, 2009). Among other topics, researchers have analyzed bargaining and negotiation in collaborative situations (Agranoff and McGuire, 2004); leadership frameworks (Crosby and Bryson, 2005); resource sharing, dependency or interdependency (Guo and Acar, 2005; Huang and Provan, 2007; Lundin, 2007; Tschirhart, Amezcua, and Anker, 2009); information sharing and human services (Page, 2008; Ryu and Rainey, 2009); tensions among collaborators and client confidentiality (Bellamy, Raab, Warren, and Heeney, 2007); and collaboration in disaster response and emergency management (Hicklin, O'Toole, Meier, and Robinson, 2009; McGuire, 2009; Waugh, 2009). Analysts have sought to define collaboration to show how it differs from other concepts such as partnership, and to specify how to manage collaboration effectively (Smith, 2009; Thomson, Perry, and Miller, 2009).

What Is Collaboration? Page (2003), in his examination of efforts to foster community collaboration to improve children and family services in Georgia and Vermont, identified five principal elements of collaboration. They are (1) agreeing to work together, (2) planning, (3) assessing progress, (4) improving performance, and (5) allocating and mobilizing resources. He found that managers can use participatory, inclusive processes to make and implement decisions in collaborative environments. These collaborative managers may also need to use depersonalized leadership techniques that are not aligned too closely with a particular organization in order to avoid alienating partners in the collaboration (Page, 2003). Thomson, Perry, and Miller (2009) offer another definition of collaboration: a process in which autonomous or semi-autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions (Thomson, Perry, and Miller, 2009, p. 25).

The authors further contend that collaboration is a multidimensional, variable construct composed of five key dimensions: governance and administration, which are both structural in nature; mutuality and norms, which are considered social capital dimensions; and organizational autonomy, which is a dimension of agency (Thomson, Perry, and Miller, 2009). Thomson and her colleagues measured these dimensions of collaboration by using data from a survey administered to directors of organizations that participated in the large national service program, AmeriCorps. The evidence supported this conceptualization of collaboration and the five dimensions.

Ansell and Gash (2008) have developed the concept of "collaborative governance" as a system that "brings multiple stakeholders together in common forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision-making" (p. 543). They define collaboration as a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p. 544).

Their definition of collaborative governance includes six criteria (pp. 544–545):

1. The forum is initiated by public agencies or institutions.
2. Participants in the forum include non-state actors.

3. Participants engage directly in decision making.
4. The forum is formally organized and meets collectively.
5. The forum aims to make decisions by consensus (even if consensus is not achieved in practice).
6. The focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management.

While these six criteria may characterize collaborative relationships, Smith (2009) points out that collaborative forums are not always initiated by public agencies or institutions.

Different Forms of Collaboration. Sowa (2008) identified variations in interagency collaborations used to deliver services. She examined twenty cases of interagency collaborations in child care and education. She observed three different models of collaboration: shallow collaboration involving collaborative contracts, medium collaboration involving capacity building, and deep collaboration that involved community building. Shallow collaboration mostly involves the sharing of financial resources with relatively little interaction among agencies beyond the fiscal partnership. Medium collaboration, in addition to jointly receiving and sharing financial resources, involves sharing human and professional development resources that build the capacity of the organizations delivering the service and produce tangible benefits with the possibility of improving services. Deep collaboration encompasses the facets of both shallow and medium collaboration, but also provides for additional benefits, including a greater understanding of the service provided and an enhanced vision of the collaboration's role that potentially produces larger rewards that extend beyond the immediate organization boundaries.

Collaboration and Related Concepts. Does collaboration differ from other cooperative forms such as policy networks and partnerships? Ansell and Gash (2008) contend that policy networks and collaborative governance are similar, but that collaborative governance places more emphasis on formal strategy for developing multilateral consensus-oriented decision-making processes. Cooperation in policy networks is usually more informal and less explicitly acknowledged.

Rethemeyer and Hatmaker (2008) distinguish between policy networks and collaborative networks. Policy networks involve a set of public sector agencies, legislative offices, and private sector organizations that include interest groups, nonprofits, and other groups that share interests in the decision making in a specific area of policy. These organizations constitute networks “because they communicate intensively about issues they care about and must exchange money, political support, and other ‘resources’ to influence public decisions and – most basically – to survive” (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker, 2008, p. 619). Collaborative networks, on the other hand, are collections of government agencies, nonprofits, and for-profits that work in concert to provide public services, goods, or “value” when a single agency is unable to create the good on its own and the private sector is unwilling to do so (Agranoff and

McGuire, 1998, 2001; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Herranz, 2008; O'Toole, 1997; Rethemeyer and Hatmaker, 2008).

Public managers and policymakers need the skills to engage effectively in networks and collaborative situations. Researchers need to continue to build understanding of these processes. Chapter 14 continues the discussion of networks, collaborative and cooperative activities, outsourcing, and other forms of governance involving multiple organizations and actors involved in joint activities.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Five

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Study: Enron, Crossing the Ethics Line

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

PART TWO
KEY DIMENSIONS OF ORGANIZING AND MANAGING

CHAPTER SIX
ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS, EFFECTIVENESS, AND PERFORMANCE

Organizations are goal-directed, purposive entities, and their effectiveness in pursuing goals influences the quality of our lives and even our ability to survive. All research and theory on management and organizations concerns, at least implicitly, how an organization and the people in it can perform well by pursuing goals. This chapter presents major issues about goals and addresses the challenges people in organizations face in linking goals to performance. The discussion then turns to diverse and conflicting performance criteria that all organizations must pursue, but especially public organizations. Then the chapter describes models that researchers have developed to assess the effectiveness of organizations and reviews an extensive body of literature on strategies and practices that managers use to achieve high levels of performance.

In recent decades elected officials and reformers in many nations have concentrated on improving government agencies' pursuit of goals. Governments around the world have invested heavily in reforms that require government agencies to state goals and performance measures. The Governmental Performance and Results Act (GPRA) in the United States in 1993 mandated that federal agencies publish strategic plans that include goals and performance measures; the legislation was renewed in 2010. Starting in the 1980s and continuing today, officials in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and many other nations adopted reforms in a movement called New Public Management (NPM) (Barzelay, 2001; Kettl, 2002; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Many NPM reforms required government agencies to specify goals and performance measures and to monitor performance against them. These efforts became so prevalent that scholars coined terms such as “performance regime” to capture “the embedded nature of these practices in almost all aspects of contemporary governance” (Moynihan, 2008; Moynihan et al., 2011, p.141). Others referred to “performance frameworks.” These observations emphasized the importance not just of goal statements, but also of the provisions for managing and using goals and performance measures to evaluate, improve, and reward performance. More generally, aside from reform initiatives, prominent authors call for more effective goal-setting in government activities and organizations (e.g., Metzenbaum, 1998).

These themes about public organizations' goals coincide with research and discussion in general management and organizational analysis. Chapter 10 will describe Edwin Locke's and Gary Latham's (1990a) theory of goal-setting. A survey of researchers on organizational behavior found that the survey respondents considered this theory the most successful ever developed about organizational behaviors (Miner, 2005). Researchers found again and again that when given clear, challenging, but acceptable goals, individuals and groups perform tasks more productively than when they do not have such goals. Similarly, numerous non-academic sources emphatically stress the importance of goal-setting. Doerr's (2018) best selling book, *Measure What Matters*, extols the goal-setting system of specifying “Objectives and Key Results” that Doerr describes as having led to success at many corporations. A search on the web for “goal-setting” leads to many sources offering consultation and training in how to set “SMART” goals. SMART goals are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and timely. These and many other sources of ideas and advice about goal-setting apply to all organizations.

Advocates for goal-setting contend that organizations perform better if the people in them clarify goals and measure progress toward them. Advocates for goal-setting in government often link this assumption to the claim that government agencies need to perform a lot better. They can do so by becoming more like business firms, which the reformers assume to have clearer goals and performance measures. Many analysts of such reforms, however, agree that these initiatives have produced mixed results (e.g., Radin, 2006; Moynihan, 2008; Heinrich, 2012; Thompson, 2006). Many approaches to goal-setting, such as the Locke-Latham theory and the calls for SMART goals, apply to individual and group goals for specific tasks. Goals for complex organizations raise more challenges for goal-setters. Organizational sociologist W. Richard Scott (Scott and Davis, 2003, p. 183) declares that “the concept of organizational goals is among the most slippery and treacherous of all those employed by organizational analysts.” Nevertheless, organizational analysts have developed valuable insights about organizational goals.

General Organizational Goals

An organizational goal is a condition that members of an organization seek to attain. Organizations state goals in mission statements, strategic plans, and in other ways because goals serve valuable functions. Goals communicate an organization's purpose and encourage recognition of the organization's legitimacy. Organizational goals can express the organization's values and identify the clientele whom the organization claims to serve. Goals can motivate individuals to participate in an organization's activities (Goodsell, 2011) and serve as premises that guide decisions (Simon, 1945, p. 151–152).

Concepts related to organizational purpose, however, such as goals, motives, incentives, vision, objectives, values, “metrics” and key performance indicators (KPI's), overlap in various ways. Some organizations publish statements of key values and also state goals, objectives, and performance indicators, making it difficult to identify the organization's priorities among these statements of purpose. Goals and similar concepts of purpose exist in hierarchies and chains in which we pursue a goal not as an end in itself, but because it leads to a later goal or a higher-level goal. For example, people may pursue one goal (increased efficiency in responding to client requests for services) in pursuit of another goal (enhancing the well-being of clients). Organizations have multiple authorities and stakeholders who can influence goals and who often disagree about them.

For such reasons, organizations pursue multiple goals (Rainey and Jung, 2015). Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon (1973) pointed out years ago that a goal almost always represents one of a set of multiple goals. Decision makers have to deal with balancing among the various goals in a goal set. This balance can be particularly challenging in public organizations. For example, advocacy groups press leaders in prison systems to emphasize rehabilitation of prisoners; other groups call for firm control and punitive measures for prisoners (Hargrove and Glidewell, 1990). As this chapter is written, nationwide strife embroils the United States over police killings of African-Americans during arrests. African-American leaders and demonstrators demand that police officials do more to prevent such deaths, and want the police to protect and respect them during peaceful protests. At the same time, governmental and police leaders also face pressure to prevent looting and property damage by some of the people involved in the demonstrations. Prison wardens and police chiefs have to deal with these pressures that represent conflicting goals. Other common examples include conflicts among goals for short-term and long-term profits and service performance, community and public relations, employee and management development, and social responsibility (such as compliance with affirmative action and environmental protection laws).

In spite of these complications, in one of the most influential books in the history of organizational analysis, Chester Barnard (1938, p. 21) pointed out that any formal system of cooperation requires objectives, purposes, and aims. Goals provide a unifying element and a vital aspect of an organization (p. 21). The importance of goals has led organizational analysts to develop insights about the types of goals and functions of goals as well as the challenges involved with setting goals. Organizational mission statements have become ubiquitous in recent decades; one has difficulty finding a large organization that does not publish a mission statement. The statements typically list very general goals that organization theorists call *official goals* (Perrow, 1961). Official goals express formal goals that present an organization's major values and purposes. For example, the Veteran's Administration (VA), a US federal agency, states that its mission is “to fulfill President Lincoln's promise [and] to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan” – by serving and honoring the men and women who are America's veterans. The mission of the Animal Welfare Institute, a Washington, DC–based nonprofit, is “to alleviate the suffering of animals caused by people.” Obviously, these organizations communicate their general purpose by stating these official goals in mission statements to enhance legitimacy, increase motivation, and guide their decisions. Goodsell (2011) provides evidence that the missions of government organizations can enhance motivation and engagement in the organization when people feel that they are contributing to a valuable public mission.

Obviously, the official goals do not specify how the organization will achieve the ideal-sounding purposes. *Operative goals* provide more specific objectives that an organization seeks through actual operations and procedures. For example, the statutory role of New Zealand's State Services Commission (SSC) is to provide leadership and oversight of state services to government agencies. Part of the SSC's mission is "to unleash the service potential of New Zealand." The agency's operative goals – how the agency plans to achieve its broad mission – can be found by searching deeper into the agency website, where one finds plans to eliminate the gender pay gap, among other efforts. The SSC example is typical of how agencies seek to link broad statements of purpose in mission statements to operative goals. Yet this example also underscores the challenge of clearly linking the more general goals to more specific operative goals. What priority should this goal receive in relation to other operative goals? What metrics will be used to measure agency progress in reducing the gap?

Goals of Public Organizations

While all organizations face the challenges of stating and analyzing organizational goals, prominent political scientists and economists have asserted that public organizations and public policies have distinctively multiple, vague, and conflicting goals.[1] The list of authors expressing such observations includes major scholars from decades past (e.g., Allison, 1983; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Downs, 1967; Drucker, 1980; Lipsky, 1980; Lowi, 1979; Lynn, 1981; Wildavsky, 1979; Wilson, 1989) and more recently (e.g., Heinrich, 1999; Lewis, 2008; Moynihan, 2008, 142–45).

As discussed in the preceding chapters, in the US and other nations, characteristics of government systems influence the formulation of goals in public organizations to make them distinctive. Authorizing legislation often assigns vague missions to government agencies and provides vague guidance for public programs (Meier and Bothe, 2006; Seidman and Gilmour, 1986). The need for compromise leads to vague statutory language because more precise statements of goals can intensify disagreements among factions whose votes are needed to pass the legislation (Lowi, 1979). In sharp contrast to the recent reforms that emphasize goal-setting, major experts on public policy and governmental systems have advised that public officials need to avoid specifying agency goals and policy goals to avoid controversies over them (Lindblom, 1959; Wildavsky, 1988). Vague mandates provide agency personnel with the flexibility to define how to carry out the mandate; this can occur when elected officials and their staff members do not have the expert knowledge to do so. For example, in various nations, laws authorize their environmental protection agencies to control human and environmental exposures to hazardous substances. However, people in the legislative branch do not have the expert knowledge to identify and control such substances. As the subsequent discussion of goal clarity and ambiguity explains, the legislative branch often provides a very general mandate. The agency spells out the details in regulations. In addition, the formal rulemaking process entails hearing from stakeholder groups with varied and often competing interests (Chun and Rainey, 2006; Rainey and Jung, 2015). Consequently, agency managers feel pressured to balance conflicting, idealized goals.

Many observers assert that these goal complexities have major implications for public organizations and their management. Boyatzis (1982), in a study of the competencies of a broad sample of managers, found that public managers displayed weaker "goal and action" competencies – those concerned with formulating and emphasizing means and ends. He concluded that the difference must result from the absence in the public sector of clear goals and performance measures such as sales and profits (c.f. Buchanan, 1974, 1975). Blumenthal (1983), reflecting on his experiences as a top federal and business executive, began his account of the differences between these roles with an often-repeated observation that there is "no bottom line" (i.e., no profit information) to clarify performance measurement in government. Allison (1983) provided an account of the similar observations of experienced public officials about the absence of a bottom line and of accepted and readily measurable performance indicators in public agencies. Parhizagari and Gilbert (2004) identify statistically significant differences in the performance measures used in public and private organizations and in employees' ratings of organizational performance.

Others contend that public organizations' vague goals, coupled with external pressures for accountability, can lead to performance evaluation on the basis of adherence to proper procedure and compliance with rules (Barton, 1980; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Lynn, 1981; Meyer, 1979). The absence of clear, measurable, well-accepted performance criteria thus induces a vicious cycle of "inevitable bureaucracy" (Lynn, 1981), in which the demand for increased accountability increases the emphasis on rule adherence and hierarchical control. Similarly, in an important book about an unsuccessful organization change initiative in the US Department of State, Warwick (1975, p. 85; also quoted in Jung, 2018, p. 27) wrote:

> Goal ambiguity and the absence of firm performance criteria favor the development of rules and fixed operating procedures … compliance with rules remains the most direct and reassuring sign of a job well done.

Defining and Measuring Goal Ambiguity and Goal Clarity

In spite of these repeated assertions that government organizations and public policies have particularly multiple, vague, and conflicting goals, there remains a need to clarify what such observations mean. There have been few efforts to define and measure the difference between a clear organizational goal and a more ambiguous one. In their research, the goal-setting theorists (Locke and Latham, 1990a) usually compare one group's performance against a specific goal to the performance of a second group that receives the instruction to “do your best.” This stream of research provides valuable insights, but does not show how to measure goals along a dimension of clarity or ambiguity.

How can we “measure” the clarity or ambiguity of an organizational goal? The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), described earlier, provided an opportunity to try. GPRA mandated that each federal agency publish a strategic plan that includes statements of performance goals and indicators, following a similar format for all the agencies. This raised the possibility of developing definitions and measures of the clarity or ambiguity of those goals and performance indicators, comparing the agencies on these measures, and analyzing other variables that might influence the levels of ambiguity. Chun and Rainey (2005a) undertook such an effort. They began with a general definition of organizational goal ambiguity: the extent to which an organizational goal allows leeway for interpretation. Feldman (1989, 5), in her analysis of decision making in government agencies, defined ambiguity as “the state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena.” An organizational goal becomes more ambiguous when it is subject to differing interpretations (DiMaggio, 1987; Kelemen, 2000; Locke et al., 1989). Chun and Rainey noted that goal clarity or ambiguity can vary along at least three dimensions: directing organizational activities, evaluating organizational performance, and making decisions about organizational priorities.

Directive Goal Ambiguity. This refers to the amount of interpretive leeway available in translating an organization's mission or formal goals into directives for specific actions to accomplish the mission (Ginger, 1998; Lerner and Wanat, 1983; Lowi, 1979; Miller and Dess, 1993; Moore, 1995; Scott, 2003). The measure of directive goal ambiguity uses a “rules to law” (R/L) ratio developed by Kenneth Meier (1980) as a measure of the power of bureaucratic agencies. This measure is the ratio of the number of pages of administrative rules for an agency written in the Code of Federal Regulations to the number of pages of legislation that apply to the agency. When legislation provides vague, general mandates, agencies must clarify the meaning of the statute by issuing administrative rules. The fewer the pages of legislation and the greater the number of pages of rules clarifying the legislation, the higher the R/L ratio. This indicates that Congress gave the agency a broad, general directive that provided agency personnel more leeway to interpret the directive with rules and regulations.

Evaluative Goal Ambiguity. For performance evaluation, an organizational mission should be transformed into performance indicators (Lee, 2020). Organizations vary in the extent to which performance objectives can be precisely described and to which objective performance indicators are available. For some organizations performance targets can be expressed in an objective, measurable manner. In other organizations, performance targets are described in a subjective manner, and workload indicators are used rather than results or outcome indicators

(Bohte and Meier, 2000).

For the measure of evaluative goal ambiguity, multiple raters coded the agency's goal statements presented in the agency's strategic plan as required by GPRA. The raters coded whether the goal statements were “objective” (e.g., archival performance data) as opposed to “subjective” (e.g., stakeholder perceptions) and “results-oriented” (e.g., number of railroad-related fatalities in the fiscal year) as opposed to “workload-oriented” (e.g., number of inspections conducted). Then the number of subjective and workload-oriented indicators was expressed as a percentage of the total number of performance indicators. The higher this percentage, the higher was the evaluative goal ambiguity.

This measure draws on an observation that analysts of organizations and decisions have often made. When we have clear evidence about the results of an activity, we use the evidence to evaluate performance. When we lack such evidence, we often turn to inputs and work activities to evaluate the activity. For example, a university president may refer to the high SAT scores of the incoming freshman class as an indicator of the university's quality, because providing clear indicators of the results of the university's educational processes is very difficult.

Priority Goal Ambiguity. This refers to ambiguity about priorities among multiple goals. The presence of multiple goals without any hierarchical arrangement and prioritization leaves much room for interpretation about which goals take precedence (Weiss and Piderit, 1999; Lee, Locke, and Latham, 1989). The measure of priority ambiguity, or the degree of imprecision in priorities among multiple goals and performance targets, counted (a) the number of long-term strategic goals and (b) the number of annual performance targets (Franklin, 1999; Weiss and Piderit, 1999).

Chun and Rainey (2005a) provided evidence of concurrent validation of these three concepts against other similar concepts and measures.[2] In addition, agencies' ratings on these goal ambiguity measures provide face validity – they appear to be accurate measures. For example, agencies that scored highest on all three measures of goal ambiguity included research agencies such as the Agricultural Research Service. Regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency scored high on directive and evaluative goal ambiguity. Agencies with low scores on the three goal ambiguity measures – indicating higher goal clarity – include the US Mint, which makes and distributes coins, and the Bureau of the Census, which collects and disseminates census data. These agencies and many other examples show rankings on the goal ambiguity measures that make sense and suggest their face validity.

Analyzing Antecedents of Agency Goal Ambiguity

With the three measures of different types of goal ambiguity developed, the next step analyzes antecedents that should influence or relate to the level of organizational goal ambiguity. The term “antecedents” avoids the more assertive term “causes” because the causal directions and linkages are complex, and the antecedents may not serve as direct, immediate causes. This analysis examines the relationship of the following variables to the goal ambiguity measures:

Type of Policy Responsibility (Regulatory, Nonregulatory, or Hybrid). Many authors have observed that regulatory agencies have vague general mandates such as maintaining clean water and air supplies and stable economic markets (e.g., Meier and Bothe, 2007; Ripley and Franklin, 1986).

Complexity of the Policy Problem and Work Routineness. Some agencies handle more routine tasks and policy issues while others must carry out more non-routine, complex policies (Lee, Rainey, and Chun, 2010, p. 293).

Financial “Publicness.” Most government agencies attain their financial resources through budget allocations from legislative bodies. Some government organizations, such as government corporations and public authorities, attain financial resources from sales of products or services or user fees. The more of its financial resources the organization gets from governmental sources such as budget allocations, the higher the “financial publicness” of the organization (Bozeman, 1987).

Political Salience. External political entities can increase goal ambiguity in government agencies (Meier and Bothe, 2007; Wamsley and Zald, 1973). Political salience refers to “the level of attention that an external entity (or entities) with political authority or influence devotes to the agency” (Lee, Rainey, and Chun, 2009, 463).

Competing Demands from Constituencies. Different groups and authorities often exert multiple, conflicting influences that can make an agency's goals more ambiguous (e.g., Ring and Perry, 1985; Wilson, 1980).

Managerial Capacity. Government agencies vary in managerial capacity to clarify organizational goals through such activities as strategic planning and performance measurement (Lee, Rainey, and Chun, 2009; Perrin, 2006).

These antecedents show relations to the goal ambiguity measures. Directive goal ambiguity was positively related to financial publicness, to policy problem complexity, and to status as a regulatory agency. The more of the agency's financial resources that came from government allocations and the more complex its policy problems (as indicated by a higher proportion of professionals), the higher the R/L ratio, indicating higher directive goal ambiguity. Regulatory agencies had higher levels of directive goal ambiguity than other types of agencies.

Evaluative goal ambiguity was very strongly and positively related to financial publicness and to policy problem complexity. A higher proportion of government funding and more complex policy problems related positively to the agencies' stating goals in terms of workload measures (as opposed to results) and of subjective measures (as opposed to more "objective" measures). Status as a regulatory agency had a similar positive relationship to evaluative goal ambiguity. The more the president, the Congress, and major newspapers pay attention to an agency – political salience, the higher the evaluative goal ambiguity.

Priority goal ambiguity showed a different pattern of results. Competing demands of constituencies showed the strongest positive relationship to priority goal ambiguity of any relationship in this analysis. More competing demands from constituencies increases the number of goals and performance indicators. Contrary to the patterns for the other two types of goal ambiguity, however, regulatory agencies had significantly *lower* levels of priority goal ambiguity. This makes sense in that regulatory agencies often do not have a greater variety of goals than other types of agencies; they simply have goals – formal mandates – that are more vague. Financial publicness was significantly and positively related to priority goal ambiguity but not nearly as strongly as it related to the other two types of goal ambiguity. More public funding increases directive and evaluative ambiguity but does not expand an agency's goal set. Political salience relates to higher priority goal ambiguity, suggesting that attention from political actors expands the set of goals.

These results show that the measures of goal ambiguity related meaningfully to other variables in ways that political scientists and public administration scholars predict. More recent research has extended the analysis of goal ambiguity to federal programs, as distinguished from federal agencies. Jung (2014) used evidence from the Program Assessment and Rating Tool (PART) evaluations of hundreds of federal programs to show that higher goal ambiguity relates to lower work satisfaction, lower program performance scores, and higher levels of intent to turnover. During the first George W. Bush presidential administration, the PART was initiated as a process in which federal programs in agencies specified their goals and performance measures to be used in evaluating the programs. Jung used these goal statements to carry out analyses of the relations of these goals and the variables mentioned earlier. More recently, Jung (2014, 2018) developed research on goal ambiguity and clarity using similar but original concepts. He used data from the PART. Federal officials in the US Office of Management and Budget developed PART to assess the performance of hundreds of federal government programs. Program representatives responded to batteries of questions about how the program's goals were expressed and measured and about evidence of progress in achieving the goals. Experts debated PART's validity – whether it actually measured program performance accurately (Heinrich, 2012). Jung used PART information, however, for evidence about the clarity of the programs' goals, and the relation of goal clarity (or ambiguity) to other factors.

Jung developed a concept of "target ambiguity" based on whether the program provided clear targets for levels of improvement in pursuing program goals. "Timeline ambiguity" refers to whether the program provided timelines for when a level of improvement would be obtained. "Evaluation ambiguity" indicates the proportion of program goals that are expressed as objective results, as opposed to more subjective and workload evidence (such as levels of activity rather than results). Jung then found evidence that program characteristics such as the management capacity of the programs related to lower levels of these three types of goal ambiguity – that is, more goal clarity. If the program involved a third party outside the program that participated in delivery of the program's services, as opposed to the program directly delivering the services (Frederickson and Frederickson, 2007), goal ambiguity was higher. Greater complexity of the program's work – the more professionalized employees involved, the more different activities or subprograms involved – related to higher levels of goal ambiguity. As discussed next, it would oversimplify the evidence to conclude that ambiguous goals reduce performance and clear goals increase performance. The general consistency of the findings, however, suggests the possibility of meaningful analyses of goal characteristics of public organizations.

Later, Jung (2018) conducted similar analyses of evidence from Korea and from Great Britain. The Korean government conducts performance assessments of all Korean government agencies. Jung analyzed these assessments using indicators of goal ambiguity similar to those in his earlier studies of PART evidence. Jung found that factors such as management capacity reduced goal ambiguity and related to higher performance, but other factors such as political insulation (insulation from external political influence and intervention) and the complexity of the organization's work related to more goal ambiguity and to lower performance. The English government has authority over 386 local governments, providing guidance and a substantial portion of their funding. An Audit Commission assessed the local governments (during 2002–2004) and gave them Core Service Performance (CSP) scores. Jung constructed a measure of goal ambiguity from a survey of leaders and managers of the local governments, and developed variables similar to those in the analyses of PART and of Korean government agencies. Analysis of the English evidence showed results similar to the previous studies. For example, the goal ambiguity measure related negatively to organizational performance (based on the CSP scores).

The research on goal ambiguity indicates that one can develop indicators of the levels of goal clarity and ambiguity for organizations and organizational subunits (e.g., "programs"). These levels of goal ambiguity show relations to variables such as management capacity, complexity of tasks and policy issues, and external political influence.

Among many examples of recent research, Carrigan (2018) presents a formal model using priority goal ambiguity to show that when agencies must balance competing missions, the ambiguity has detrimental effects. It can still be beneficial, however, to assign the missions to one organization, because one agency can better coordinate tasks that the competing conditions require. Davis and Stazyk (2015) develop a taxonomy that combines agency goal ambiguity or goal clarity, with external political support or lack of support for the agency. The taxonomy predicts that a politically supportive environment combined with clear organizational goals leads to the highest levels of role clarity for people in the agency (i.e., clear job goals). An unsupportive environment combined with ambiguous organizational goals leads to the lowest role clarity. Stazyk and Davis found support for the taxonomy's predictions in an analysis of a large national sample of local government administrators. Stazyk and Davis (2020) also found that goal ambiguity influences the relationship between transformational leadership and perceptions of public value enhancement. Studies also indicate important effects of goal clarity and goal ambiguity in many different organizational settings. Among many examples, Song, Meier, and Amirkhanyan (2020) find that in nursing homes in the US, management can have positive effects on service quality, but these effects decrease when administrators report high levels of goal ambiguity and multiple goal priorities.

The research on goal ambiguity or clarity shows that these goal characteristics can vary across many dimensions. Even so, research generally indicates that appropriate levels of goal clarification tend to enhance organizational and individual performance. Appropriate levels of clarification refer to the point that organizational missions need to be as clear and meaningful as possible, but that excessive specification can be detrimental. Goal clarification at other levels of organizations, such as task and individual levels, can be more challenging in organizations with more ambiguous missions, and in settings involving complex, technically "non-routine" tasks. In such situations, undue or inappropriate goal specification can raise challenges of potential surrogation and goal displacement. For all situations, researchers and administrators need to develop methods for avoiding dysfunctional goal specification. Such methods can include participation in goal development by multiple stakeholders, including those who will be assigned the goals; procedures for identifying potential dysfunctions in advance of goal implementation; identification of sources of inappropriate goals, such as pressures from stakeholders for rapid specification of performance measures; and "quality control" procedures for reviewing goal implementation over time to detect dysfunctional patterns. A central challenge in goal setting and goal clarification involves the pursuit of what can be called *goal validity*, or the pursuit of *good goals* that effectively represent valuable, intended results and avoid dysfunctions.

Behavioral Theories of Organizational Decision Making: Changing Perspectives on Organizational Goals

While all organizations must pursue multiple, conflicting, and ambiguous goals to some degree, public and nonprofit organizations often face particularly high levels of goal multiplicity, conflict, and ambiguity. Nevertheless, what we have called the "generic" approach to the study of management provides insights applicable to challenges in goal-setting and performance assessment in public and nonprofit organizations.

A major book by organizational analysts presented important insights about decision-making and the pursuit of goals in organizations that have had a lasting influence. Developments in research and theory leading to and following from a book entitled *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Cyert and March, 1963) led prominent organizational theorists to refer to the book as one of the most significant management books of all time (Argote and Greve, 2007; Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, and Ocasio, 2012). The book exerted a major influence on how organizational researchers analyze decision processes in organizations, including pursuit of goals. Many economists and other analysts assumed that decision makers proceed rationally in seeking to maximize important goals such as making profit. A simple version of such rationality assumptions holds that decision makers know the goals they are pursuing and can place a value on them. Then they consistently review a large set of alternatives for achieving those goals and consistently choose the alternative that will maximize achievement of the goals at the least expenditure of resources.

In his book *Administrative Behavior* (Simon, 1947) and later work (March and Simon, 1958), Herbert Simon, who would later win the Nobel Prize in economics, wrote that decision makers seek to proceed rationally. Often, however, they must make decisions under conditions of “bounded rationality.” They often face limits on time, resources, information, and analytical capacity to review many alternatives. They have difficulty specifying goals and how to achieve goals. Instead of rationally maximizing goal accomplishment, Simon wrote, decision makers often engage in “satisficing” behavior (Simon, 1947, p. 47). They make the most satisfactory decision they can make within the limits on their ability to decide rationally. Colin Powell, who served as US Secretary of State after a career as the highest-ranking military officer in the nation, provided an example of such a decision process when he described his “70% rule.” He would select an alternative when he felt 70% sure that it was the best choice.

Simon's colleagues, Richard Cyert and James March (1963), conducted a study of decision makers in business firms and found that they displayed satisficing behaviors. The satisficing behaviors influenced the establishment of goals and assessments of their achievement. For example, decision makers may establish a benchmark for performance based on an “aspiration level” rather than on conclusive evidence about the performance that the firm could achieve. They might base the aspiration level (“increase profits by 5%”) on the organization's past performance (“we have increased profit by nearly that much for the past several years, so 5% is a reasonable goal”) (Greve, 2003).

Cyert and March observed, even in these profit-oriented private firms, political processes in which competing coalitions disagree about goals. A “winning coalition” may exert the most influence on decisions.

Decision makers may also engage in "quasi-resolution of conflict." Resolving conflicts can require high costs and time. Coalitions negotiate and compromise to resolve conflicts well enough so that decision making can proceed.

Decision makers may also employ a "problemistic search" process. Rather than searching through an elaborate set of alternatives, the decision makers may focus on a problem, such as a gap between the aspiration level and actual performance. Focusing on a problem such as a performance deficit, and on alternatives available in the vicinity of the problem, reduces the costs of a more elaborate search for alternatives. An example from government occurs when decision makers in a state agency respond to a problem by examining how similar agencies in other states have dealt with the problem.

Decision makers may also practice "uncertainty avoidance" by relying on standard operating procedures, routines, and short-term decision rules rather than long-term rules. These procedures reduce the costs of searching and reduce the complexities of decisions. At the same time, Cyert and March observed that organizations engaged in "organizational learning" processes to reduce uncertainty.

These observations about how people actually behave in making decisions in business firms had major influences on how many organizational analysts study organizations (Greve, 2017, p. 2). Theorists and researchers advanced analysis of organizational learning processes. Others study "institutional" processes in which organizations may, e.g., make decisions by doing what other similar organizations are doing, or by doing what a regulatory authority requires them to do. That is, the decision makers avoid extensive searches among alternatives by adopting alternatives from available sources.

March and other colleagues would later develop a "garbage can model" of decision making that they described as particularly applicable to public organizations (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972). According to this perspective, many important decisions, especially in public organizations, involve substantial uncertainty. These decisions do not proceed in well-planned, systematic patterns. The decisions become like garbage cans, where various factors come into the decision process in unplanned ways. Streams of problems move through time, as do streams of alternatives that might apply to solving the problems. Participants move in and out of the decision process. Some major decisions occur when a certain alternative comes together in a situation where a particular set of participants attach it to a problem that they are trying to solve. Chapter Seven will further explain this perspective. As this perspective shows, analysts of decision making in organizations increasingly recognized the importance of processes that do not involve rational, systematic pursuit of clear goals.

Adding to this perspective on decisions and goals, researchers studying human judgment and decision making advanced understanding of how individuals interpret information. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1980) developed "prospect theory" that ultimately led to a Nobel Prize for Kahneman. (Tversky had passed away before he was selected.) This research also draws on Herbert Simon's ideas about bounded rationality (Simon, 1947). Descriptions of prospect theory emphasize that it, too, challenged “expected utility theory” that was widely accepted among economists. Expected utility theory depicts decision makers as consistently pursuing goals by choosing the alternative that leads to maximizing “utility” or the desirable aspects of the goal.

Khaneman's and Tversky's research led them to conclude that decisions often depend on how individuals assess the potential outcomes of a decision. Decision makers often assess the prospects of a decision by referring to their own subjective perception of possible results. These perceptions are influenced by the way information is presented, or “framed.” For example, if information emphasizes possible losses, this can frame the decision differently from information that emphasizes gains. Then, decision makers interpret the information on the basis of their subjective attitudes toward the outcomes presented, such as different reactions to the prospects of gains versus losses. Kahneman and Tversky found that most people tend to be loss-averse. They are more concerned about a loss than a gain.

These ideas have major implications for goals and performance of all organizations, but especially to public and nonprofit activities. Prospect theory helps to explain a process of “surrogation” in performance measurement. Surrogation refers to the tendency for performance measures to take the place of the actual goal that managers intended to pursue (Harris and Tayler, 2019). For example, teachers may receive higher rewards when their students score higher on standardized achievement tests and lose rewards for lower scores. The teachers may then focus on test scores as a primary goal. They may spend more time teaching students how to do well on a test rather than helping students actually learn.

The “theory of attribute substitution” can explain why such surrogation occurs. According to the theory, individuals rely on a mental shortcut when making a judgment about complex, intangible goals that are difficult to access. They may focus on an attribute or target that represents a more general goal, but is more easily accessible. This leads to a focus on “making the metrics” and not on the end goal. This tendency can occur where first, the target attribute is relatively abstract or inaccessible. Second, a related, available “shortcut” attribute is concrete or highly accessible. Third, individuals substitute the shortcut attribute for the target attribute (Harris and Tayler, 2019; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002).

Surrogation and attribute substitution are similar to the concept of “goal displacement” that the major sociologist Robert Merton (1940; March and Simon, 1958, p. 57) advanced many decades ago. One pattern of goal displacement occurs when employees adhere to organizational rules as ends in themselves. Ideally, the rules in an organization represent means to achieve the overall goals of the organization. Where there is heavy emphasis on rule adherence, individuals in organizations may concentrate on following a rule because it supposedly represents an organizational goal, even when it is a very incomplete representation of the goal. Following the rule provides the individual with guidance about what to do, but may lead to behaviors that do not achieve organizational goals and may be detrimental to them.

Problems due to bounded rationality, satisficing behaviors, and surrogation do not negate the value of goal-setting in organizations. These topics, however, show why it is vital to recognize the potential pitfalls of stating goals and selecting performance measures. Performance measures can have unintended, undesirable consequences for behavior. Economists, psychologists, and others still differ over the role of rationality in human decision making (Krause, 1999), with some still adhering to a “theory of rational expectations” instead of theoretical perspectives that emphasize bounded rationality or prospect theory. The theory of rational expectations, however, can also predict substitution of rules or subgoals for goals. When individuals become aware of a system of rewards and punishments, they will behave consistently with that system. For example, an employee rewarded for the number of persons trained may aim to optimize efforts with respect to the measure – train more people – whether or not the training achieves its intended effect.

Psychologist and research methodologist Donald Campbell (1979) explains the phenomenon: “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor.” This adage, which has been coined “Campbell's law,” reflects a significant problem with measuring performance. Campbell's law can explain “the cobra effect,” an unintended consequence that occurs when the attempted solution makes the problem worse. The cobra effect gets its name from an effort in India to reduce the number of cobras in the nation. Officials offered financial incentives based on the number of cobras eliminated. Later they found that the incentives were leading enterprising citizens to breed more cobras so that they could eliminate them and get paid for it.

The problems discussed here can occur in all kinds of organizations. The United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change set goals aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In 2005, the UN decided to issue carbon credits to reward organizations that reduced dangerous pollutants. A company received credits that allowed it to produce a certain amount of a pollutant; companies producing more of a pollutant would receive more credits to produce it. The credits could be bought and sold. The idea was that companies producing more of a pollutant would receive more credits for producing it but could sell the credits if they reduced production of the pollutant. If a company reduced its pollution, it could sell credits to another company that needed to buy credits to avoid a government fine for producing more pollution than allowed by the credits it had. The value of the credits was determined by the seriousness of the pollutant. The chemical HFC-23, a byproduct of a common coolant used in air conditioners, topped the list of damaging pollutants.

Credits for producing it were very valuable. This meant that organizations that produced more HFC-23 would receive more credits for producing it, which they could sell if they reduced production of it. Some companies would increase production of HFC-23 to get more credits for producing it, and then reduce production so that they could sell credits to companies that needed them. On balance, this led to increased production of the pollutant. The European Union eventually realized the problem and suspended the program of awarding credits.

These problems may be more likely in public and nonprofit organizations, but the private sector is also vulnerable to the problem of perverse incentives. Harris and Tayler (2019) recount the problems that led Wells Fargo Bank into a widely publicized and very expensive scandal. Bank executives established incentive systems that rewarded employees for increasing the types of accounts an individual customer had with the bank – checking accounts, saving accounts, loans, and others. More accounts made more money for the bank and rewarded employees for adding customer accounts. In addition, bank leaders assigned employees with quotas for the addition of new accounts. This led many employees to create fake accounts. To meet their quotas and to get financial rewards, bank employees would create new accounts for customers without telling the customers. Employees ultimately created millions of such accounts. The new account sales quota created a perverse incentive and ultimately cost Wells Fargo, the nations' fourth-largest bank, a fine of $3 billion and damaging loss of reputation. Harris and Tayler trace the problem to the "surrogation" processes previously described.

Toward Diverse, Conflicting Criteria

Considering the complications and challenges in setting goals, managers often use multiple criteria or measures of performance to determine whether organizations are effective at achieving their objectives. Campbell (1977) and his colleagues, e.g., reviewed various approaches to organizational effectiveness and developed a comprehensive list of criteria (see Table 6.1). People in all organizations face similar challenges of multiple and sometimes conflicting goals.

Cameron (1978) illustrated this point in his study of educational institutions. He drew on a variety of criteria, both objective and perceptual, including student, faculty, and administrator satisfaction; student and faculty development; and organizational criteria like openness, ability to acquire resources, and health. Cameron developed profiles of different educational institutions according to the nine general criteria and found them to be diverse. One institution scored high on student academic and personal development but quite low on student career development. Another had the opposite profile – low on the first two criteria, high on the third. One institution scored high on community involvement; the others scored relatively low. These variations show that even organizations in the same industry or service sector often follow different patterns of effectiveness. They may choose different strategies, involving somewhat different clients, approaches, and products or services. In addition, these differences show that effectiveness criteria can weigh against one another. A university aiming at distinction in faculty research may pay less attention to the personal development of undergraduates than a liberal arts college more devoted to educating undergraduates.

Research by public management scholars has also shed light on the variety of criteria that public managers use to assess the effectiveness of their organizations. One common set of criteria includes economy, or the cost of obtaining inputs; efficiency, or the cost per unit of output; effectiveness, referring to the achievement of formal objectives; responsiveness, denoting customer and employee satisfaction; and democratic outcomes like probity and accountability (Boyne, 2002). Walker and Andrews (2015) undertook a comprehensive analysis of empirical studies of the relationship between management and performance. Their review of nearly 90 studies identified eight types of performance measures representing various performance criteria: cost effectiveness, effectiveness, efficiency, equity, quality, quantity, user or customer satisfaction, and aggregated performance indexes. They found that indicators of effectiveness are by far the most commonly used performance measures in public management research, with nearly 46% of tests using effectiveness measures as the dependent variable, followed by measures of equity (15%), aggregated performance indices (13%), efficiency (8%), service quality (7%), customer or user satisfaction (6%), cost effectiveness (3%), and output quantity (2%) (See Table 6.1.).

TABLE 6.1 ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: CRITERIA AND MEASURES

Campbell (1977)	Boyne (2002)	Walker and Andrews (2015)
• Overall effectiveness • Productivity • Efficiency • Profit • Quality • Accidents • Growth • Absenteeism • Turnover	• Internalization of organizational goals • Role and norm congruence • Managerial interpersonal skills • Managerial task skills • Information management and communication • Readiness • Utilization of environment • Evaluation by external	• Cost effectiveness • Effectiveness • Efficiency • Equity • Quality • Quantity • User or customer satisfaction • Aggregated performance indexes

• Job satisfaction • Motivation • Morale • Control • Conflict/cohesion • Flexibility and adaptation • Planning and goal setting • Goal consensus	entities • Stability • Value of human resources • Participation and shared influence • Achievement emphasis	

The foregoing discussion supports two broad conclusions. First, organizational effectiveness is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon, requiring the use of diverse criteria and measures to describe it. As the following discussion of approaches to organizational effectiveness will reveal, managers often combine various performance criteria and corresponding measures to obtain a more holistic picture of how well an organization is performing. Second, consideration of diverse performance measures can result in conflict and trade-offs between two or more criteria as organizations try to satisfy or reconcile the diverging expectations of external stakeholders, prompting managers to make choices when rank ordering or prioritizing competing criteria (Cameron, 1978; Radin, 2006; Andersen et al., 2016).

Approaches to Organizational Effectiveness

While the preceding discussion focused on how to set goals and what criteria to use to assess the effectiveness of organizations, other scholars have tried to develop a more systematic approach to dealing with the issue of organizational effectiveness, referring to the extent to which the organization achieves its goals (Cameron and Whetten, 1983). Over the years, they have developed various approaches or models aimed at defining organizational effectiveness and analyzing if organizations are achieving their objectives. Experts have failed to reach consensus, and as a result, we are left with a variety of approaches and models that provide unique insight into organizational effectiveness and that can be useful under different circumstances (Daft, 2020; Tolbert and Hall, 2009) (see Table 6.2). Because of the importance of assessing performance in the public sector, many public sector reforms of the last few decades are a reflection of some of these approaches to organizational effectiveness.

As researchers began analyzing organizational effectiveness, the *Goal Approach* obviously offered a first place to start. It defines effectiveness as the extent to which the organization achieves its goals (Etzioni, 1964). The complications with organizational goals elaborated earlier – difficulties in specification and measurement, goal conflicts, multiple stakeholders with differing goals – made this a difficult and costly approach in many circumstances. Yet, as emphasized earlier, goals and assessment of their achievement remain very important, including in the public sector. Indeed, prominent public sector reforms throughout the world that have been inspired by the New Public Management have emphasized achievement of formal goals. In the US, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 mandated for the first time in the country's history that federal agencies formulate strategic plans and annual performance plans that outline performance goals and report performance information to Congress and the general public (US Congress, 1993). In 2010, GPRA was modernized and streamlined, compelling agencies to focus on a smaller number of high-priority goals and to analyze factors inhibiting achievement of goals (US Congress, 2010). A similar act was passed by the South African Parliament, the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) of 1999, to ensure and hold public officials accountable for efficient and effective management of all revenue, expenditure, assets, and liabilities of national departments. As a result of this act, national departments now produce annual performance plans with performance objectives and corresponding metrics for the coming year and data on performance objectives from the previous year. Both GPRA and PFMA allow public managers to set goals and develop performance measures that are suitable to the mission and function of their organizations.

Reacting in part to these concerns about the goal model, Yuchtman and Seashore (1967) proposed a *Systems-Resource Approach*. They defined effectiveness based on the ability of the organization to attract and maintain valued resources. In the midst of the national protests and demonstrations in 2020 that demanded reforms due to police killings of African-Americans, a former New York City police commissioner, the longest-serving person in that position, implicitly drew on this model (*WSJ*, 2020). He proposed attracting more highly educated police officers – with college degrees – as one way to improve police effectiveness.[3] When college presidents point to the excellent records of the incoming class of freshmen, they implicitly apply this model. Analysts in public and nonprofit organizations can use this model in assessing their ability to attract human resources and other important resources.

The *Participant Satisfaction Model* focuses on the organization's multiple stakeholders and their satisfaction with the organization (Connolly, Conlon, and Deutsch's, 1980). Organizations of all types survey their stakeholders in various ways. Customer and client satisfaction surveys, employee surveys, and other assessments provide examples of this form of effectiveness evaluation. More elaborate applications can provide valuable information about an array of organizational stakeholders to evaluate the organization. Limitations of the model include the problem of how to evaluate overall organizational effectiveness when participants disagree in their evaluations and the fact that the model does not directly assess effectiveness in achieving various goals.

The *Internal Process* and *Human Resource Models* determine effectiveness by looking at whether the organization's processes function well and treat employees as a key component of effectiveness (Bennis, 1966; Likert, 1967). The internal process model assesses organizational effectiveness by referring to such factors as organizational capabilities and capacities, communication and information flow, leadership style, motivation, interpersonal trust, and other internal states assumed to be desirable. During the early 2000s, scholars in public administration and journalists participated in a Government Performance Project (GPP) that evaluated the effectiveness of government organizations at federal, state, and local levels (Ingraham, 2007). The project evaluated the management capacity of subsystems for financial, human resources, capital, and information technology, with leadership and information as integrating mechanisms. The model for this project thus represents an internal process model that focuses on how well internal activities and structures function. Analyses using this model can provide valuable information, but they do not directly assess achievement of organizational goals. In fact, the GPP analysts employed this model in part because across the various diverse government agencies in a nation, there are no standard performance measures like those found in private business firms, such as sales and profits. In a similar vein, the Management Performance Assessment Tool (MPAT) in South Africa assesses the management practices, processes, and capacity in national departments, focusing on four key performance areas: strategic management, governance and accountability, human resource and systems management, and financial management (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, 2013). The MPAT, however, does not assess actual outcomes or results.

The human resource model resembles the internal process model, but concentrates on the evaluation of human and social experiences in the organization. The evaluations ask about such factors as the effectiveness of leadership and team processes, and individual perceptions about communication, work satisfaction, rewards and incentives, individual performance assessments, adequacy of resources, support, and training, and engagement with the organization. The human resource model, however, does not directly evaluate achievement of organizational goals. This model assumes that when employees report positive attitudes and perceptions about organizational processes, work conditions, and the quality of work life, the organization will function effectively.

In the United States, the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the US Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) for decades have conducted employee attitude surveys of very large samples of federal employees that ask about such conditions as those mentioned previously. OPM's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) (previously known as the Federal Human Capital Survey) was introduced in 2002 to measure employee attitudes about their jobs, working conditions, organizational policies, coworkers, leaders, and performance. The survey is used to produce information that managers can use to improve managerial capacity and performance and increase recruitment and retention of talented managers and employees in government (Fernandez, Resh, Moldogaziev, and Oberfield, 2015). Recently, a report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2017) indicated that a large majority of member nations were using employee surveys like FEVS to assess organizational effectiveness. Finally, the Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit organization devoted to enhancement and support for public service in the United States, draws from the federal survey results to designate some agencies as “best places to work” in the federal government. Agency leaders often post these results on agency websites, praise their employees for good results, and use the results for recruitment and retention purposes.

The *Competing Values Approach* (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983) is based on the idea that effective organizations must balance and manage four major aspects of organizational performance. Accordingly, the model combines and integrates elements of many of the approaches and models that were just described. The competing values model is based on two major dimensions of organizational effectiveness. The first is organizational focus, which ranges from an internal emphasis on the well-being of the organization's members to an external focus on the success of the entire organization. The second dimension is concerned with preference for structure and represents the contrast between control and flexibility. The dimensions combine to create four models of organizational effectiveness.

The human relations model emphasizes flexibility in internal processes and improving cohesion and morale as a means of developing the people in an organization. The internal process model also has an internal focus, but it emphasizes control – through maintaining sound information, auditing, and review systems – as a means to achieving stability. At the external end, the open-systems model emphasizes responsiveness to the environment, with flexibility in structure and process as a means to achieving growth and acquiring resources. The rational goal model emphasizes careful planning to maximize efficiency. Importantly, which model an organization chooses, or how they combine them, depends on the personal values of managers and what aspects of organizational effectiveness they wish to emphasize.

Quinn and Rohrbaugh recognized the contradictions between the different models and values. They argued, however, that a comprehensive model must retain all of these contradictions because organizations constantly face such competition among values. Organizations have to stay open to external opportunities yet have sound internal controls. They must be ready to change but maintain reasonable stability. Hence, managers may develop an approach to organizational effectiveness that emphasizes internal factors more than external ones, or control more than flexibility. However, most approaches to organizational effectiveness reflect each of the four values, at least to some extent.

Like the Competing Values Model, the *Balanced Scorecard* requires managers to consider and balance multiple perspectives on organizational effectiveness. Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2000) developed this approach to prevent a narrow concentration on financial measures in business auditing and control systems. Devised for use by business firms, this model has been used by government organizations in innovative ways, including the cities of Sunnyvale, California and Charlotte, North Carolina; the Texas Office of the Auditor; and the US Internal Revenue Service.

The Balanced Scorecard requires an organization to develop goals, measures, and initiatives for four perspectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, p. 44):

- The financial perspective, in which typical measures include return on investment and economic value added
- The customer perspective, involving such measures as customer satisfaction and retention
- The internal perspective, involving measures of quality, response time, cost, and new product introductions
- The learning and growth perspective, in which goals and measures focus on such matters as employee satisfaction and information system availability

The Balanced Scorecard raises plenty of issues that can be debated. For example, an emphasis on serving "customers" has grown in the field of public administration over the past decade. This trend has sparked some debate and controversy over whether government employees should think of citizens and clients as customers or as owners. The Balanced Scorecard does, however, emphasize the important point that people in public organizations need to develop well-rounded and balanced measures of effectiveness that combine attention to results and impacts, internal capacity and development, and the perspectives of external stakeholders.

In an often-cited article appearing in *Management Science*, Kim Cameron (1986) reviewed the different models of effectiveness and discussed when each is most useful. In addition, Cameron adds three other models to the list above: the *Legitimacy Model*, which defines effectiveness as the extent to which the organization engages in legitimate activity by focusing on the survival or demise among a set of organizations; the *Fault-Driven Model*, which considers effectiveness as the absence of faults; and the *High-Performing Systems Model*, which judges excellence in relation to other similar organizations. In the article, Cameron (1986) suggests when a particular approach to organizational effectiveness may be most useful. The models and the conditions under which managers should consider adopting one of these approaches are summarize in Table 6.2.

TABLE 6.2 COMMONLY USED MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

Model	Model Definition: The organization is effective	When Useful

	to the extent ...	
Goal Model	It accomplishes its stated goals.	Goals are clear, consensual, time-bound, measurable.
System Resource	It acquires needed resources.	A clear connection exists between inputs and performance.
Internal Processes	It has an absence of internal strain with smooth internal functioning.	A clear connection exists between processes and performance.
Constituencies Model	All strategic constituencies are at least minimally satisfied.	Constituencies have powerful influence and organization has to respond to their demands.
Competing Values	The emphasis on criteria in the model meets constituency preferences.	The organization is unclear about its own criteria or change in criteria over time.
Balanced Score Card	Strikes a balance between competing and equally important aspects of performance.	Managers seek a more holistic understanding of how an organization is functioning.
Legitimacy Model	It survives as a result of engaging in legitimate activity.	The survival or demise among organizations is of interest.
Fault-Driven Model	It has an absence of faults.	Criteria of effectiveness or traits of ineffectiveness are unclear, or strategies for improvement are needed.
High-Performing	It is judged excellent relative to other similar organizations.	Comparisons among similar organizations are desired.

Adapted From: K. S. Cameron, "The Effectiveness of Ineffectiveness," In B. M. Staw and L. L. Cummings, *Research in Organizational Behavior,* Vol. 6, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT., 1984, 276.

Effectiveness in Organizational Networks

The transformation away from the direct provision of government services is well documented (Heinrich, Lynn, and Milward, 2010). Scholars have described this transformation with various phrases such as "new governance," "hollowed-out government," and "networked governance." The general observation is that organizations are becoming more complex in their structure, and becoming more and more involved in "networks" that bring together sets of organizations. This new form often extends or even replaces centralized, unified authority with networks characterized by fragmented and dispersed control (Galbraith, 1967). Formal connections within a single organization, as between units or departments, are replaced by lateral, often loose connections among partner organizations. As for government more specifically, the evolution of more complex governance forms is often attributed to trends such as privatization and outsourcing of public services, greater involvement of the nonprofit sector in public service delivery, and the need to address complex problems that exceed the capacity of any one organization (O'Toole, 1997). In the public management literature, networks have been defined as “structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement” (O'Toole, 1997, p. 44). There is much to say about the varieties of networks, the key concepts in the literature on networks, and the state of the research on the topic. Here we will narrow the focus to implications for goals and performance.

Certain characteristics of networks have implications for organizational goals and performance. Networks incorporate affiliations with parties more diverse in interests and motives than those under a more traditional organizational setting. On the one hand, such diversity can stimulate innovation. On the other hand, goals are often the result of a negotiation process among competing groups (Cyert and March, 1963, pp. 27–32). As a result, it may be more difficult to reach an agreement on a broad mission or set of values, or on what goals to pursue, how to order goal priorities, and what actions should be undertaken to achieve those goals. The more diversity in motives, the more likely that the broader narrative of the organization is inconsistent with priorities of some of the alliance partners. It may then be harder to gain their cooperation. Free riding is always a concern in multi-party alliances but more so as the motives of individual partners diverge from the organizational-level goals.

As for network success, researchers have examined the role of trust in networks (O'Toole, 1997) and mechanisms of control, as well as the connection between locus of authority and the effectiveness of the overall network (Provan and Milward, 1995; Milward and Provan, 1998, 2000). Public management research on networks suggests that a degree of centralized authority can be a key factor for effectiveness. This finding runs counter to the organic–mechanistic distinction discussed in earlier chapters, which suggests that decentralized, highly flexible arrangements are most appropriate (Provan and Milward, 1995, pp. 25–26) but would not have surprised Herbert Simon (1952), who noted that complex architectures frequently take the form of hierarchies.

With regard to underperformance of networks, topics of concern include the general instability of collaboration networks (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke, 2014; Das and Teng, 2000), the role of partner rivalries (Park and Ungson, 2001) and partners' reasons for friction and withdrawal (Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, and Rowley, 2010).

Managing for High Performance

In the last decades of the twentieth century, numerous organizational and management analysts began to approach the topic of organizational effectiveness and performance by studying organizations that displayed excellent performance (e.g., Peters and Waterman, 1982). The discussion in this chapter has emphasized the complexities of organizational goals and organizational effectiveness. This section turns to empirical research on characteristics of organizations and managerial processes that are related to high performance, a topic that has garnered a significant amount of interest in recent years.

In a sense, this has meant a return to an earlier period in management, outlined in Chapter 2, when experts believed management mattered. During that time, experts like Towne (1905) urged combining the technical abilities of an engineer with the administrative abilities of a chief executive to achieve ultimate results, while Taylor (1911) and associates employed scientific methods to analyze a task and discover the most efficient way of performing it. Focusing more on organizational design, proponents of Administrative Management sought to develop principles for organizing that could be widely applied to all sorts of organizations to improve coordination and efficiency (Fayol, 1919; Gulick, 1937). By the 1970s, however, interest in management and performance began to wane among organization theorists. Many downplayed the role and impact of management on organizations (Donaldson, 1995). Many of the approaches discussed in the later sections of Chapter Two, such as institutional theory and population ecology, depicted organizations as shaped and directed by external forces, with little influence by the executives and managers in organizations. Scott and Davis (2007) explain that management experts became “dismayed to see American ‘anti-management’ theorists respond with paradigms,” viewing managers as “Machiavellian” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), “lemming-like” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), “perverse” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), or “unable to overcome inertia in order to make sensible organizational changes” (Hannan, and Freeman, 1977). During that time, attention shifted to the environment, its tremendous impact on managers and organizations, and even its power to make the difference between effective organizations and ineffective ones, including those that perish. Similarly, public management scholars such as Kaufman (1985) attributed the success and survival of organizations to factors over which managers had little or no influence. The groundbreaking book *In Search of Excellence* by Peters and Waterman (1982) stemmed the tide of “anti-management” thinking that was influential during the 1970s (Scott and Davis, 2007). The book introduced a new genre of management research that empirically identifies aspects of organizations and management that appear to lead to high performance and success.

In Search of Excellence : Ideas that Remain Influential

Peters and Waterman (1982) forged beyond complicated debates about organizational effectiveness and put forth stimulating observations about management in excellent firms. The firms they observed placed a heavy emphasis on “productivity through people” (p. 14). They “live their commitment to people” (p. 16), “achieve extraordinary results with ordinary people” (p. xxv), and emphasize both autonomy and teamwork.

The firms that Peters and Waterman studied devoted careful attention to managing their organizational culture. They developed philosophies about product quality, business integrity, and fair treatment of employees and customers. Communicated by stories and slogans that flourished in these companies, these philosophies emphasized the shared values that guided major decisions and motivated performance. The firms nurtured the philosophies through heavy investments in training and socialization. The firms also behaved as if they accepted the principle that “soft is hard,” that is, that the intangible issues of culture, values, human relations – matters that many managers regard as fuzzy and unmanageable – must be skillfully managed.

The successful firms sought coherence in their approach to management, with the shared values of the culture guiding the relationships between staff characteristics, skills, strategies, structure, and management systems. In so doing, they accepted that organizing involves paradoxes wherein one tries to do conflicting things at the same time under conditions that often provide little clarity. The paradoxical aspects are evident in some of these companies' approaches to management, which Peters and Waterman describe in these terms:

- *A bias for action*: These companies tended toward an approach that one executive described as “ready, fire, aim.” They avoided “analyzing decisions to death” and took action aggressively.
- *Staying close to the customer*: Deeply concerned about the quality of their products and services, people in these companies sought to stay in close touch with their customers and to be aware of their reactions.
- *Valuing autonomy and entrepreneurship*: Many of these companies provided autonomy in work and encouraged people to engage in entrepreneurial behaviors. They often tolerated the failure of well-intended, aggressive initiatives.
- *Enhancing productivity through people*: As noted earlier, the companies emphasized motivating and stimulating their people through respect, participation, and encouragement. They often used imagery, language, symbols, events, and ceremonies to do this.
- *A hands-on, value-driven approach*: The people in these firms devoted much attention to clarifying and stating the primary beliefs and values that guided the organization, what the company “stands for.”

- *Sticking to the knitting*: The companies stayed focused on the things they did well and avoided ill-advised forays into activities that diluted their efforts and goals.
- *A simple form and lean staff*: The companies often had relatively simple structures and small central staffs. Some massive corporations achieved this by decentralizing into fairly autonomous business units, each like a smaller company in itself.
- *Simultaneous loose and tight properties*: The companies balanced the need for direction and control with the need for flexibility and initiative. They might have had “tight” general guidelines and commitments to certain values, but they allowed considerable flexibility within those general values and guidelines.

At about the same time as *In Search of Excellence* appeared, Americans became increasingly interested in the success of Japanese firms, which had been competing so effectively against American companies in many key industries. Observations of these firms revealed similarities to the particularly successful American companies. In one prominent book on the topic, Ouchi (1981) observed that many Japanese firms offered lifetime employment and avoided layoffs in hard times. They expressed a holistic concern for their employees by moving slowly in evaluating and promoting personnel; they practiced collective decision making and responsibility. The Japanese companies sought to develop trust on the part of their employees so they would have the confidence to contribute to the organization in many ways. Ouchi noted that some successful American corporations, such as IBM and Hewlett Packard, had orientations similar to some of these aspects of Japanese management.

In Search of Excellence and several sequels contributed to a movement in management circles, with numerous similar books appearing and many corporations taking steps to emulate the purported patterns of excellence. Predictably, controversy followed this material on corporate excellence. It is not always clear how one carries out some of the prescriptions the books offer. Peters and Waterman themselves noted that some managers told them that culture is one of many important aspects of an organization. Other features, such as sound technical and production systems, figure just as crucially. Nevertheless, many of their ideas still echo in the management literature and in research and practice of managing for high performance.

Research on High-Performance Management Practices in Firms

The success of *In Search of Excellence* stimulated a stream of very successful books and articles about well-performing business firms. With titles such as *Good to Great* (Collins, 2001) and *Built to Last* (Collins and Porras, 1994), they describe business firms that successfully managed for high levels of performance and draw conclusions about their achievements. Rather than reviewing the many books in this genre, we will focus on two prominent and illustrative contributions to this movement. Lawler and his colleagues at the University of Southern California's Center for Effective Organizations undertook one of the first large-scale studies of management and performance (Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford 1992, 1995, 1998; Lawler, Mohrman, and Benson, 2001; see also Bowen and Lawler, 1995). For over a decade starting in the mid-1980s, these researchers tracked management practices in the top 1000 firms listed by *Fortune* magazine in order to establish their relationship to financial performance. The research involved five rounds of surveys conducted in 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, and 1999. The findings pointed to a set of management practices and approaches related to high performance, including job involvement practices, total quality management (TQM), process reengineering, and knowledge management.

As an approach to managing employees, job involvement entails giving frontline employees and teams more authority over work processes; it also necessitates involving them more in decision making, along with providing them with performance-related information in the form of goal setting and feedback on an ongoing basis, which enables them to identify areas for improvement and provide suggestions of how to effect positive change in work processes and outputs (Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford, 1992, 1995, 1998; Lawler, Mohrman, and Benson, 2001). Another critical job involvement practice is providing ample training and development opportunities for employees to acquire a range of technical, decision making, planning, and leadership skills to perform at a high level. Finally, job involvement entails rewarding employees for developing new competencies, devising innovative solutions to problems, and seeking ways to improve performance.

In addition to job involvement, Lawler and associates found three other key management practices associated with high-performing organizations (Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford, 1992, 1995, 1998; Lawler, Mohrman, and Benson, 2001), starting with Total Quality Management (TQM). TQM refers more to a movement or philosophy of management than to a specific set of management procedures. Different authors take different approaches to TQM. W. Edwards Deming, one of the founders of this movement who developed many of the original ideas behind it, did not refer to his approach as Total Quality Management and in fact disapproved of this label. An industrial statistician, he advocated using statistical measures of the quality of a product during all the phases of its production. Deming called for this approach to replace the quality-control procedures often used in industry, which assessed the product only at the end of the production process. He included this commitment to statistical quality control in his general philosophy of management. Well-developed TQM programs tend to involve such conditions and principles as the following (Cohen and Brand, 1993; Dean and Evans, 1994):

- An emphasis on defining quality in terms of customer needs and responses
- Working with suppliers to improve their relationship to the quality of the organization's production processes and products

- Measurement and assessment of quality at all phases of production, with commitment to continuous improvement in quality; benchmarking quality measures against similar measures for similar organizations as a way of assessing improvement and general level of performance
- Teamwork, trust, and communication in improving quality; use of decision making and quality-improvement teams with participants from many areas and levels of the organization that are involved in the production process
- Well-developed training programs to support teamwork and quality assessment and improvement
- A broad organizational commitment to the process, from the top-executive ranks on down, that encompasses strategy, cultural development, communication, and other major aspects of the organization

Another practice identified by Lawler and associates is process reengineering. Process reengineering seeks to analyze business processes systematically to discover ways to radically transform them to achieve improvements in cost, quality, timeliness, and other aspects of performance. It also aims to identify and eliminate inefficient, outmoded, and redundant work processes. Finally, their research revealed the importance of knowledge management, referring to practices that harness advances in information technologies to enable decision makers to efficiently collect, retrieve, analyze, and share information pertinent to work.

At roughly the same time that Lawler and his colleagues at the University of Southern California were studying aspects of structure and management that were related to organizational success, Jeffrey Pfeffer (1998; Pfeffer and Veiga 1999) was at work just up the California coast at Stanford University trying to identify high-performance management practices in American firms. In his book *The Human Equation* (Pfeffer, 1998), Pfeffer argued that effective management of people can create a competitive advantage that leads to high levels of performance. After reviewing a series of empirical studies and case studies about the link between people management and performance, Pfeffer identified a set of management practices that managers in the most successful organizations tend to engage in. The first of these practices is providing job security and the prospect of continued employment, even during lean years, as an investment in human capital that contributes to long-term success. Managers should also be highly selective in their hiring to ensure that employees have the right skills and knowledge, but more importantly, that their attitudes and values fit the prevailing organizational culture. Third, Pfeffer urges making greater use of self-managed teams with plenty of resources and enough autonomy to solve problems quickly and effectively and improve work outcomes. In a similar vein, organizations should provide frontline employees with ample opportunities to develop skills and abilities and to obtain broad knowledge through extensive training.

The remaining three high-performance management practices identified by Pfeffer pertain to compensation, power, and access to information. First, increases in compensation should be contingent on organizational performance to both attract and retain talented and driven employees across all levels of the organization, from senior management down to the frontlines. In addition, measures should be taken to minimize status differences throughout the organization in order to encourage sharing of ideas, knowledge, and expertise and promote communication and innovativeness. Finally, sharing performance-related information with lower-level employees increases trust, commitment, and involvement in decision making, which can improve the quality of decisions.

Research on High Performance and Excellence of Public Organizations

Research on managing for high performance in the private sector appears to have sparked similar interest among public management researchers. Several lines of research emerged to analyze how managers can achieve high levels of performance in the public sector. This stream of research showed an interesting similarity to the developments in observations of private firms. The work on public organizations was influenced by *In Search of Excellence*, developments in Total Quality Management, and other general management research and activity. Importantly, it was also influenced by a very influential book of observations and descriptions of very successful practices in government, Osborne's and Gaebler's *Reinventing Government*. The book became a best seller during the early 1990s and influenced many government reforms in the US (Brudney and Wright, 2002; Brudney, Hebert, and Wright, 1999; Gore, 1993; Hennessey, 1998; Kearney, Feldman, and Scavo, 2000). Its approach and its success resembled those of *In Search of Excellence*, by providing ideas about achieving excellence in public management and government services. The authors began the book with the claim that government often fails, yet plays a crucial role and must be carried out well – hence, the need for reinvention. The authors wrote that an old-fashioned, centralized, bureaucratic model dominated government agencies and programs. They proposed more “entrepreneurial” activities to supplant that approach. To support this new approach in government, they described government practices that they observed around the country that were already quite effective. They proposed decentralizing government, encouraging privatization, encouraging control of programs at the community level, treating citizens as “customers” of government programs, finding ways for government to make money on its operations (“enterprising government”), and increasing competition among programs and between government and the private sector.

The book gained a wide readership among academics and government leaders and administrators, leading to a trend known as Reinventing Government (REGO). Governments throughout the US attempted reforms based on the book's ideas. The most significant initiative, the National Performance Review (NPR) during the

Clinton Administration, included proposals influenced by the book. Vice President Al Gore served as the leader of the NPR, with a staff in the White House and from federal agencies. The NPR initiatives included the establishment of “reinvention labs” in federal agencies to develop innovative and more effective operating procedures. The initiatives sought to “cut red tape” by “streamlining” budgeting, procurement, and personnel procedures and empowering state and local governments. They proposed “putting customers first” by treating citizens as customers with choices among services, by making agencies compete against each other, and by using other market-like arrangements. The NPR sought to “empower employees to get results” by decentralizing decision making and holding employees accountable for results. These examples show the influence of REGO ideas about entrepreneurial, market-oriented, decentralized, results-oriented, and customer-oriented government.

Prominent experts in governmental administration characterized NPR as a highly significant, unprecedented reform initiative (Kettl, 1993). NPR leaders claimed significant results, including cost savings and improved administrative procedures. Analysts examining the REGO reforms around the nation found evidence of important effects (Thompson, 2000). Others found mixed evidence of results of the REGO reforms (Brudney and Wright, 2002; Brudney, Hebert, and Wright, 1999; Hennessey, 1998; Kearney, Feldman, and Scavo, 2000). Ultimately, when the Clinton Administration ended, the NPR disappeared, although some ideas from the reforms remained influential. The REGO and NPR stories illustrate points about government reforms, including the influence of business-oriented publications and ideas that influence government publications. These ideas in turn influence practical initiatives.

In the following section, we present the findings of three prominent streams of research focusing on managing for high performance in public organizations.

Galloping Elephants and the Quest for Effective Public Organizations. Rainey and Steinbauer bluntly asserted that public organizations can be very successful and effective, by reasonable standards, and as effective as business firms. They pointed to various examples of effective performance of government agencies, such as the low administrative expenses of the Social Security Administration (SSA), which represent only about 0.8% of the total benefits that the SSA disburses (Eisner, 1998).

Rainey and Steinbauer reviewed studies of high-performance and excellent government organizations to look for common patterns and generalizations (see Table 6.3). Based on their assessment of these studies, they developed propositions regarding effective public organizations. First, they assert that effective public organizations have supportive and favorable relationships with external stakeholders (e.g., oversight authorities, clients, and partners), who are a vital source of resources, support, and autonomy, the last of which is likely to relate to effectiveness in a curvilinear fashion. Effective public organizations also have high mission valence and a strong organizational culture to attract employees, motivate them to raise effort and performance, and increase their commitment to the organization to promote retention. Third, effective and stable leadership is essential for organizational success, especially leaders who are effective at shaping and demonstrating a strong commitment to the mission and culture of the organization, involving others in decision making, and overcoming political and administrative constraints. In addition, public managers should strive to design tasks that are intrinsically rewarding along with offering attractive extrinsic rewards, including pay, benefits, and promotions. Relatedly, effective public organizations effectively recruit and select employees and provide them with appropriate training and developmental opportunities. Finally, such organizations exhibit high levels of professionalism and the specialized knowledge and skills, training, and performance norms associated with it. Brewer and Selden's (2000) study of federal agencies tested many of Rainey and Steinbauer's propositions and found empirical support for most of them.

Meier's and O'Toole's Model of Public Management and Performance. A very interesting and original approach to analyzing public sector management and performance was developed by Kenneth Meier and Laurence O'Toole (O'Toole and Meier, 1999, 2011). One of their focal questions – namely, whether or not “management matters” – has garnered much attention over the years. O'Toole and Meier put forth the first explicit and formal model of the influence of public management, and they have tested it using data from Texas public school districts, among other sources. Although not easily summarized and possibly difficult for some readers, the model represents an unprecedented effort to develop such a model and test it with empirical evidence. This model needs attention from people seriously interested in public management.

The model employs concepts and initial assumptions about stabilizing factors and networks in the contexts of public managers:

- The authors posit the presence of stabilizing factors such as hierarchy and formal authority that provide stability and act as a buffer against external shocks and improve coordination.
- They also posit that public managers must deal with networks of other authorities and groups, particularly those in formation or in flux, which increase complexity and instability in the managerial environment.
- *Management* refers to “the set of conscious efforts to connect actors and resources to carry out established collective purposes” (O'Toole and Meier, 1999, p. 510). It involves motivating, coordinating, and providing stability, but also changing structure and exploiting opportunities in the environment in order to improve performance. Multiple actors can share the management task, so management includes the sum of all managerial efforts.

The authors then specify their model of management's impact on public sector performance. They begin with a basic system:

$$O_t = \beta_0 O_{t-1} + \varepsilon,$$

where current performance (O_t) is the result of past performance (Ot – 1) weighted by a rate of stability (β0) and a series of shocks to the system (ε). Shocks (ε) can come from either inside or outside the system. β0 can range from 0 to 1. A set of stabilizing features, S, such as hierarchical structure, can be distinguished from other sources of stability in B0, so that B0 becomes B1 and the equation becomes:

$$O_t = \beta_1 S O_{t-1} + \varepsilon.$$

The authors also point out that a shock (symbolized by Xt) can get through the organization's buffering system:

$$O_t = \beta_0 O_{t-1} + \beta_2 X_t + \varepsilon_t.$$

Thus, the authors divide ε into some shock (Xt) that gets through the organization's buffering system with initial impact (β2) and a random component (εt).

They treat management as another input to the system:

$$O_t = \beta_0 O_{t-1} + \beta_2 X_t + \beta_3 M + \varepsilon_t,$$

with M representing management and β3 its impact. A management coefficient (β3) significantly greater than zero would indicate that management matters. In other words, organizational performance at a given time is a function of performance at an earlier point multiplied by a stability factor, plus a shock to the system multiplied by a factor representing its influence, plus management times its impact, plus the random set of shocks around the system.

O'Toole and Meier then elaborate the model in various ways. For example, management can adopt a strategy of buffering the system by adding to stabilizing features by setting goals, establishing incentives, buttressing the structure, and negotiating contributions from members. Management can also actively exploit the environment for the benefit of the system. If the decision is to buffer the system from the environment, management interacts with the buffering process so that

$$O_t = \beta_1 (S + M_1) O_{t-1} + \beta_2 X_t + \varepsilon_t,$$

where M1 is a maintenance function of management, the manager's efforts to add to stabilizing factors, M2 is the management strategy for interacting with the environment, and S is the extent of hierarchical stability. Organizational performance depends on previous performance and the degree to which stabilizing factors such as hierarchy and the manager's maintenance behaviors affect performance.

Alternatively, if the manager's strategy is to exploit the environment (that is, not to buffer the system but to try to magnify some of the environmental influences), then

$$O_t = \beta_1 (S + M_1) O_{t-1} + \beta_2 X_t (M_2 / S) + \varepsilon_t.$$

The first element in this equation, as in the previous one, means that as stabilizing features and the manager's system maintenance actions increase, organizational performance tends to be consistent over time. M2 is the management strategy for interacting with the environment. When M2 increases, the amount that is multiplied by the shock factor β2Xt increases, meaning that the manager's efforts to exploit the shock have increased its influence on organizational performance. So more stabilizing factors and more managerial efforts to maintain the system can enhance performance, and more managerial efforts to exploit an external shock to the system cause that shock to have increased impact on performance.

Studies using Meier's and O'Toole's model have demonstrated empirically the significance of management in the public sector, including management practices and approaches associated with high performance (O'Toole and Meier, 1999, 2011; Meier and O'Toole, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007). Across multiple studies, Meier and O'Toole have found that managerial networking has a direct and positive effect on performance; it also interacts with other factors related to performance by enhancing the effects of financial resources and human capital and minimizing constraints. Managerial networking improves performance by buffering or protecting employees from shocks and other negative forces from the external environment, acting as a conduit for innovations, and generating support and autonomy for the organization (O'Toole and Meier, 2011).

In addition to managerial networking, Meier's and O'Toole's research also found that an increase in internal management leads to higher performance (O'Toole and Meier, 2011). Internal management entails an array of practices, and activities, including hiring, training, coordinating, and motivating employees. Their empirical research focused on several internal management functions and found that three, in particular, have positive direct impacts on performance. These include efforts by managers to promote internal stability (e.g., in personnel, mission, and operating procedures) in order to build commitment, reduce turnover, and foster improvements in work processes; personnel practices aimed at recruiting, training, and developing talented human capital; and effective decision making about the allocation of resources during times of scarcity and uncertainty.

Research on Management and Performance in Local Governments. As Richard Walker and Rhys Andrews (2015) note, over the last few decades many researchers have explored how management impacts the performance of local governments throughout the world. Quite a number of these studies were conducted by the authors along with George Boyne and associates at Cardiff University. Walker and Andrews set out to systematically analyze nearly ninety such studies, most examining American and British local governments, to assess the effects of various management practices and approaches on local government performance. Their analysis focused on seven management factors that have been widely studied, including organization size, strategy content, planning, managerial networking, staff quality, personnel stability, and representative bureaucracy. All of these factors, except organization size, are found to have moderate to strong positive effects on local government performance.

Many of the empirical studies focused on the effect of strategic management, including strategy content – the prospector, defender, and reactor strategic postures described by Miles and Snow (1978) – and processes. Walker and Andrews found that a prospector strategy characterized by proactive innovativeness seems to work well for improving performance. Rational planning involving environmental scanning, goal setting, and monitoring was positively related to local government performance. Like O'Toole and Meier, Walker and Andrews found that managerial networking leads to higher performance by enabling managers to secure vital resources, enhance legitimacy, gain knowledge and feedback from the external environment, and buffer the organization from external shocks. Their review also echoed previously cited research on managing for high performance in the public sector, concluding that efforts to recruit, select, and retain talent and reduce turnover are linked to high performance. Finally, Walker's and Andrews' analysis produced evidence of how having a workforce that is representative of the population improves responsiveness and performance. The empirical evidence regarding representative bureaucracy is presented in greater detail in Chapter 10.

Synthesizing Research on High-Performance Management

Fernandez and Kim (2018) reviewed the various streams of research on managing for high performance in search of commonalities and points of divergence. They noted that the research findings coalesce around three general facets of management that are critical for achieving high levels of performance, regardless of sector: (1) selecting, developing, and retaining high-quality employees; (2) sharing power, authority, and information with employees; and (3) offering intrinsic and extrinsic rewards to motivate employees (see Table 6.3). High-performing organizations tend to carefully and selectively hire employees with values, attitudes, skills, and abilities that are consistent with organizational needs and job requirements. They also invest in human capital by providing extensive opportunities for learning and growth. This not only enables employees to achieve at high levels, it helps with employee retention and promotes personnel stability within the organization. Another important set of practices entails sharing power and authority with lower-level employees, granting them autonomy in decision making, and ensuring that they have ready access to relevant information about goals and performance that can be used to innovate and make organizational improvements. Finally, high-performing organizations strive to motivate employees, both intrinsically and extrinsically, by redesigning jobs to be more interesting and satisfying and by providing tangible, high-powered rewards and compensation.

TABLE 6.3 RESEARCH PROGRAMS FOCUSING ON MANAGING FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE

Research Program	Management Practices and Approaches Related to High Performance
Lawler's Organizing for High Performance	• Sharing of power and employee involvement in decision making • Sharing performance-related information (e.g., goals, plans, feedback) • Employee training and development • Rewards for self-improvement and performance • Practicing Total Quality Management • Process reengineering • Knowledge management
Pfeffer's High-Performance Management Practices	• Job security • Selective recruitment • Self-managed work teams • Compensating good performance • Training and development • Reducing status distinctions • Sharing performance-related information (goals, strategy and feedback)
Rainey's and Steinbauer's Theory of Effective Government Organizations	• Favorable and supportive external relationships • Employee autonomy • High mission valence • Strong organizational culture linked to mission • Leadership to promote stability and commitment, set effective goals and strategies,

	and cope with administrative and political constraints • Job design • Information technology • Effective recruitment, selection, placement, training, and development • Professionalization of workforce • Motivating employees intrinsically and extrinsically
Meier and O'Toole's Model of Public Management and Performance	• Managerial networking with external actors • Mission, personnel, technological, and procedural stability • Recruitment, training, and development of human capital • Effective allocation of resources during times of uncertainty and scarcity
Management and Performance in Local Governments	• More proactive strategic stance (e.g., prospecting or defending strategy) • Rational planning, including strategic management, benchmarking, and performance management • Managerial networking with external actors • Employee attraction and retention • Personnel stability, including low turnover • Fostering representative bureaucracy

Despite these similarities, Fernandez and Kim (2018) find that studies of managing for high performance diverge in several respects, most of all in regard to the importance of managing the external environment in the public sector. Studies of managing for high performance in public organizations highlight the need to network in order to build supportive relationships with external stakeholders, as well as to adopt proactive strategies to foresee and address threats and capitalize on opportunities in the external environment. This is consistent with findings presented in Chapter 3 about the higher levels of environmental uncertainty and turbulence encountered by public managers. Studies focusing primarily on private sector firms, on the other hand, place less emphasis on networking and managing external relationships and focus more on internal management, like redesigning and improving processes, psychologically empowering employees, and fostering a safe and supportive work environment.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Six

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Studies: See Something Say Something; Confusing Performance Metrics with Strategy

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

Notes

1. Decades ago, Rainey, Backoff, and Levine (1976) cited a dozen authors who advanced such observations.

2. For example, the rules-to-law ratio correlated with a similar ratio of agency budget size to number of pages for the agency budget size in the *Budget of the United States Government*. The evaluative goal ambiguity indicator correlated with goal clarity assessments by the Government Accountability Office and the Mercatus Center. The priority goal ambiguity measure correlated with the number of subunits that directly report to the agency head.

3. Note that attracting more highly educated police officers would almost certainly require higher salaries, which would require higher expenditures for police departments. Protestors during this period were calling for reforms that included "defunding the police." City officials would be faced with the challenge of funding such reforms, among many other funding needs.

CHAPTER SEVEN
FORMULATING AND ACHIEVING PURPOSE: POWER, DECISION MAKING, AND STRATEGY

During the administration of President George H. Bush, major newspapers carried reports about a controversial aide to the secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), who had gained power in the department. The reports claimed that the aide had little background in housing policy and had received her appointment because she came from a prominent family. According to the reports, the secretary of HUD had inattentively allowed her to make heavy use of his autopen – an apparatus that automatically signs the secretary's name – to influence major decisions on funding and agency policies. She garnered support from members of Congress by channeling projects and grants to their constituencies. She also allegedly used the authority of the secretary to move trusted associates into key positions in the agency, where they could give her early information about the unit heads' plans so she could devise ways to overrule them and channel their projects toward her supporters. In spite of her maneuvering, however, when she was nominated for the position of assistant secretary of HUD, Congress would not confirm her appointment because of her lack of credentials and qualifications. Ultimately, her influence on spending decisions in a housing rehabilitation program received intense scrutiny from federal auditors and news reporters and brought a deluge of bad publicity and legal problems (Maitland, 1989; Waldman, Cohn, and Thomas, 1989).

In a less serious episode years later, the Inspector General (IG) of the US Department of Health and Human Services drew criticism over allegations that she had driven many experienced, long-term career civil servants out of the IG office into retirement or into positions in other agencies. Critics claimed that she had treated career officials abrasively. Defenders claimed that the IG was simply ensuring the loyalty of her staff. Authority and power have also been used by various US presidents to ensure loyalty of IGs. The coverage of these criticisms, even in the *Wall Street Journal* – an often-conservative periodical – indicates the care that governmental executives need to exercise in using their power and authority (Lueck, 2002; Lucey and Lubold, 2020).

In 1997–1998, Congress was developing legislation mandating major reform and restructuring of the Internal Revenue Service. A Senate committee held hearings in which taxpayers testified about serious abuses by IRS revenue agents. The hearings received extensive coverage in the media. Senators used the hearings to justify writing into the IRS legislation requirements for immediate termination of any IRS agent who committed any of a set of specified abuses of taxpayers. An investigation by the US General Accounting Office would later find that most of the allegations about abuses were exaggerated or inaccurate. Nevertheless, IRS employees referred to the set of termination provisions as the “deadly sins,” and uncertainty over how they would be enforced led to a sharp drop in tax collection and enforcement actions and a decline in morale. Conversely, in interviews with researchers, some executives within the IRS observed that the situation probably strengthened the power and authority of the new IRS commissioner to carry out the reforms mandated by Congress, by convincing IRS employees and stakeholders of the need for drastic change to improve the agency's relations with political officials, citizens, and taxpayers. As described further in later chapters, the commissioner would later receive praise from all major stakeholders – the major unions, members of Congress, the press, professional groups, and others – for his leadership of the reform process and the skillful way in which he developed and used his authority in the change process.

People in organizations have varying degrees of power and authority (Ocasio et al., 2020). Whether or not people like to think about attaining power, they need to consider the matter, because only with some power can they pursue valuable goals and patterns of effectiveness of the sort discussed in the previous chapter. Also, people may abuse power, and others have to use their power to stop the abuses. As the examples just presented indicate, the very definition and identification of what constitutes an abuse depends on the distribution of power among those who want to influence that definition.

Also, people need power and authority to participate in making decisions and in carrying them out, as with the decisions in the IRS about how to carry out the reforms. Organizations exist, in a sense, as ongoing systems of decision making. Herbert Simon (1948), a Nobel Laureate in economics as well as one of the most influential scholars in organization theory and public administration, treated decision making as the central concept in organizations and management.

As described in earlier chapters, strategic planning holds a prominent place in public and nonprofit organizations (Bryson, 2018; Bryson, Edwards and Van Slyke, 2018; Bryson and George, 2020, Bryson, 2021). The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) requires all federal agencies to create strategic plans. Most states have similar legislation, and many local governments have developed strategic plans. The framework presented in the first chapter indicates that organizational leadership teams lead the development of strategies aimed at achieving goals. When effective, the strategy-building process links the organizational environment, goals and values, structure, processes, and people in the pursuit of organizational performance and effectiveness. To develop and carry out strategies, the members of the organization must exert their influence within it. They have to manage and work with internal power relationships and decision-making processes. This chapter describes concepts, theories, and research that experts and scholars on organizations have developed about three of these topics – power, decision making, and strategy – and suggests applications and examples for public organizations and their management.

Power and Politics Inside Organizations

As the examples in the preceding section showed, external power and politics influence internal power and politics. Political scientists have long recognized the role of external politics in determining the power of public organizations as well as the fact that units within the government bureaucracy engage in power struggles and turf warfare (Meier and Bothe, 2007; Wilson, 1989). As discussed in other chapters, early management theories depicted managers as basing their decisions on rational choices and optimal alternatives. Researchers increasingly realized, however, that politics and power relationships figure importantly in all organizations (Pfeffer, 1981, 1992; Tolbert and Hall, 2009). Some authors have claimed that politics in business firms and politics in government agencies are very similar to each other (Yates, 1985). They have warned managers about overlooking power and politics within their organizations, and they have exhorted managers to assess these dimensions of their settings. They have also discussed power in a positive sense, as necessary to performing effectively and, when shared, as a means of motivating people (Block, 1987; Kanter, 1987).

Over the years, observers have claimed that the many rules and controls that external authorities imposed on public organizations weaken the authority of public sector managers. Political alliances among people in agencies, interest groups, and legislators further weaken the authority of higher-level executives. This situation suggests that in spite of the claims of management writers that business firms resemble public agencies in such matters, issues of power and influence are more complex for government managers. At the same time, paradoxically, observers typically depict the public bureaucracy as quite powerful. So, although they are constrained in many ways, public managers clearly can attain considerable power and authority within their organizations.

Public managers also vary in power, just as agencies do. Agency power can be enhanced by a number of factors: strong, well-organized constituencies; skillful leadership; organizational esprit de corps or cohesion (a relatively strong commitment to the agency and its role, as with the Forest Service or the Peace Corps); and expertise – specialized technical knowledge required for the delivery of a service that the public values highly (Meier and Bothe, 2007; Rourke, 1984). These factors in turn determine the power of people and units within public organizations.

Bases of Power in Organizations

The HUD official's inability to attain sustained, successful power in the situation described earlier raises the question of how one does so. Social scientists usually refer to French's and Raven's typology of the bases for power in groups (1968): *reward* power is the power to confer or withhold rewards that others want, such as pay; *coercive* power comes from the ability to take forceful action against another person; a person has *referent* power over others if they see him or her as someone they wish to be like, as a standard for them to emulate; *expert* power derives from the control of knowledge, information, and skills that others need; and a person holds *legitimate* power if others accept his or her authority to tell them what to do.

These types of power have important implications for managers. One might think of coercive power as the ultimate mode of influence. The capacity to tax, arrest, imprison, and execute individuals is a fundamental attribute of government. These powers justify strong controls on public organizations, which often have a coercive character themselves. As for their own leadership behaviors, however, public managers need to recognize that management theorists have long emphasized the relative clumsiness and costliness of coercive power (Etzioni, 1975). Forcing and threatening people requires costly vigilance and oversight and can make enemies.

Managers may have authority to coerce, but their real challenge lies in finding ways to reward (Barnard, 1938). As Chapter Ten describes, public managers face particular constraints on their power over certain rewards. They may have some legitimate authority because of their rank and position, but they also have to maintain a less formal legitimacy in the eyes of their subordinates and external authorities. Managers must invest heavily in setting a good example and performing well in order to obtain referent power and expert power. For all the politics that surrounds public managers, experienced officials and observers still report that a public administrator's skill, integrity, experience, and expert knowledge can give him or her a positive form of power over both members of the organization and external authorities.

The HUD official described earlier rewarded certain supporters, illustrating the importance of political alliances. Yet her coercive treatment of some agency officials probably contributed to her ultimate troubles. Also, she allegedly abused legitimate power (the secretary's auto-pen), and she lacked sufficient legitimate, expert, and referent power to sustain her position. Later chapters provide examples of more effective approaches that also involve development of constituencies but entail a more effective vision of a contribution to society, a vision sustained by a reputation for expertise and integrity (Chase and Reveal, 1983; Cohen, Eimicke, and Heikkla, 2013; Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Hunt, 1999; IBM Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002).

Dependency and Strategic Contingencies

In analyzing power, organization theorists have also drawn on the concept of dependency – how much a person or group must rely on another person or group for resources. Groups and units that have the most to do with obtaining key resources for their organization gain power. Studies of business firms have found that their members rate the sales and production divisions of their firms as the most powerful units (Kenny and others, 1987; Perrow, 1970a). Businesses depend on these units to produce and sell the products essential to bringing in money. Other people can also depend on a person or unit for information, completed tasks, and services.

Similarly, power accrues to units that manage *strategic contingencies*, or the factors and events that figure crucially in the operations of the organization and its ability to achieve goals (Hickson and others, 1971; Daft, 2020). Units that handle the biggest problems facing the organization gain power. Earlier chapters discussed the central role of environmental uncertainty in recent analyses of organizations; strategic contingencies include circumstances that impose major uncertainties on an organization, and those who handle these uncertainties become important. Nothing illustrates the influence of a strategic contingency more than the intense national concern with terrorism and homeland security since the attack on the World Trade Center, and the amount of attention the federal government paid to the formation of the Department of Homeland Security to confront this contingency.

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978; also Pfeffer, 1992) applied similar thinking to the analysis of power distributions among subunits. A department or bureau has more power when there is greater dependency on it, when it has more control over financial resources and greater centrality to the important activities of the organization, when there is less substitutability of services (that is, when others have few or no alternatives to dealing with the unit for important needs), and when it has a larger role than other units in coping with important uncertainties facing the organization.

Kenny and his colleagues (1987) also suggested that these concepts apply to public organizations, but with important distinctions. They analyzed major decisions in thirty public and private organizations in Great Britain. The private organizations included manufacturing and service firms. The public group included local governments, health districts, and state-owned enterprises such as a chemical manufacturer and an airline (both nationalized in the United Kingdom). The researchers asked managers of both types of organizations which internal and external units were involved in major decision making and how much influence these units had. The two groups had similar patterns of unit involvement. For example, accounting, auditing, and production units were most frequently involved in making major decisions. In the public organizations, however, external government agencies became involved much more often. Sales, marketing, and production units had a great deal of influence in both groups. In the public organizations, adjudication units – committees or commissions that decide on resources and policies, such as a health services district commission – had the strongest influence rating. Yet this type of unit approached having the lowest rating in the private organizations. Surprisingly, external government agencies were also rated as having little influence in the public organizations, in spite of their frequent involvement, but were rated as being very influential in the private organizations. The authors suggest that this might mean that public sector managers take for granted the influence of external agencies, whereas business managers react more sharply to government interventions.

Overall, the study indicates that units that produce and distribute primary goods and services wield strong influence in both types of organizations. Even in public organizations with a high market or client orientation, such as those in the study – government manufacturers, a health district, and so on – the institutional authority of government affects internal influence patterns, and external agencies often become involved. The strong role of adjudication units in public organizations reflects the authority conferred on them by the institutions of government. In the organizations studied, those units also handle key strategic dependencies by representing external constituencies and making policy decisions. Later we will see that the same researchers also found that the strategic decision-making processes of the public organizations also reflect the effects of their public sector status.

Power at Different Organizational Levels

Management experts also consider how people at different levels and in different units obtain power. Daft (2020) points out that top managers have a variety of sources of power. They have considerable authority by virtue of their formal position, such as authority to control key decisions. They can also influence allocation of resources. In government agencies, in spite of external constraints and politics, the agency heads usually exert considerable influence over funding for subunits and allocation of other key resources, such as personnel. Top managers can control decision premises – fundamental values or principles that guide decision making – and information (Simon, 1948). For example, a new director of the law enforcement department in a large state found a strong emphasis on hierarchical authority in the department. He wanted to develop a climate of more open communication, in which employees could express their opinions and make suggestions. The director made it clear to his managers that the agency would adopt these orientations through open-door policies and improved communications. This position became a guide for decision making by the other managers. The director established guidelines on how to respond when an employee asks to speak to a manager: “You listen!” The basic premise behind the agency's decision-making procedure now guides subsequent, more specific decisions.

Top managers can also take advantage of network centrality. They occupy the center of networks of information, personal loyalty, and resource flows. The HUD official placed loyal associates in key positions to develop an information network. This worked effectively until deficits in other dimensions of her power eroded her position (Maitland, 1989).

Lower-level members of an organization can have substantial power as well. They may serve as experts on key tasks. They can obtain influence through effort, interest, informal coalitions (such as those formed by groups of friends), or formal organizations (such as unions). They can use rules and other organizational norms to their advantage. In his analysis of "street-level" government service providers, Lipsky (1980) points out that they have considerable autonomy. Civil service rules, vague performance measures, and extensive rules governing service delivery constrain higher officials' authority over them.

Middle managers have some of the influence potential of both executives and lower-level employees. Management experts interested in empowerment as a means of making managers more effective have lately focused increased attention on these managers (Block, 1987; Kanter, 1987). These authors often focus on business firms, but empowerment also has important implications for public agencies. Middle managers occupy positions below corporate vice presidents or major division and department heads. In government, this would include those below assistant secretaries or major bureau heads, such as managers in GS 13–15 positions in the federal government.

Employee Empowerment

The concept of employee empowerment as a managerial or leadership approach has become prominent in the field of management. Large American firms began developing employee empowerment programs in the 1980s to increase profitability and customer satisfaction and encourage innovation (Bowen and Lawler, 1992; 1995). Within a decade, employee empowerment had gained currency among policymakers spearheading New Public Management reforms throughout the world, including in the US where employee empowerment became one of four guiding principles of the National Performance Review launched by the Clinton Administration (Fernandez and Moldogaziev, 2010). The intellectual roots of employee empowerment run much deeper, however, to the Human Relations Movement described in Chapter 2, particularly Follett's (1942) writings on supervision and leadership, McGregor's (1960) Theory Y of leadership, and Likert's (1967) classification of managerial styles (Herrenkohl et al., 1999).

Empowerment has developed into such a widely used concept that it has achieved buzzword status and is even referred to satirically in the *Dilbert* comic strip by Scott Adams. In one, the boss announces that empowerment is the management concept of the era and that he is empowering the employees. Dilbert and a fellow worker immediately start trying to fire one another, while another employee rejoices over never having to work hard again. While obviously meant to be amusing, the cartoon makes a point that many management experts make: empowering people in the workplace requires careful preparation, in such forms as training people and providing resources and organizational conditions to support their new roles (see, e.g., Yukl, 2001, pp. 106–109).

Kanter (1987) argued that middle managers in business firms have so little power that they cannot perform effectively. Many rules and routines govern their work, and there are few rewards for innovation. They rarely participate in important conferences or task forces. They lack resources and support to do useful things, such as rewarding excellent subordinates or pursuing a promising initiative. Higher-level managers must bestow a positive form of power on these middle managers. They must relax rules, increase participation, assign important tasks, and reward innovation (Kanter, 1987). This sharing of power expands power, giving more people in the organization the capacity and incentive to do good work. In a similar vein, Bowen and Lawler (1992, 1995) argued that the sharing of authority of managers with frontline employees is a necessary but insufficient measure to empower them. They defined employee empowerment as a service delivery or managerial approach that entails providing lower-level employees with information about goals and performance, rewarding them based on performance, helping them acquire knowledge and skills to perform their work effectively, and granting them power to make decisions that influence organizational performance (Bowen and Lawler, 1992).

A variety of studies of private sector organizations have identified employee empowerment as a management or leadership approach that can increase performance (Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford, 1992, 1995; Srivastava, Bartol, and Locke 2006; Neilsen and Pedersen, 2003; Kirkman and Rosen, 1999; Vecchio, Justin, and Pearce 2010), job satisfaction (Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford, 1995; Kirkman and Rosen, 1999; Vecchio, Justin, and Pearce 2010), and organizational commitment (Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford, 1995; Guthrie, 2001; Kirkman and Rosen, 1999; Hanaysha 2016), and promote creativity and innovation (Zhang and Bartol, 2010; X Zhang and Zhou, 2014). In addition, a growing number of public management studies reveal the benefits of employee empowerment for public organizations. In a series of articles, Fernandez and Moldogaziev (2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2015) explored the relationship between employee empowerment, performance, job satisfaction, and innovativeness in US federal agencies. Their findings indicate that employee empowerment practices generally have a positive effect on perceived performance. Importantly, they found that employee empowerment leads to higher performance by increasing employee job satisfaction and innovativeness. A related study revealed that employee empowerment helps to reduce voluntary turnover intention (Kim and Fernandez, 2017). A trend uncovered in these studies is that employee empowerment as a managerial approach seems to work when it comes to improving performance and encouraging innovativeness, but that specific empowerment practices vary in their efficacy. Granting employees more discretion and providing them with knowledge and resources needed to perform well are effective empowerment practices in a wide range of situations, but other empowerment practices like rewarding employees based on their performance may have unintended negative consequences for public organizations.

Additional studies by Hassan and co-authors (Hassan, Park, and Raadschelders, 2018; Park and Hassan, 2019; Hassan, DeHart-Davis, and Jiang, 2019) have corroborated some of these findings and revealed other advantages to employee empowerment as a leadership style in the public sector. One study by Hassan, Park, and Raadschelders (2019) found that empowering leadership is positively related to performance of subordinates and work units. Park's and Hassan's (2018) analysis revealed that managers are more likely to empower their subordinates when their own supervisors empower them, suggesting that the benefits of empowering leadership trickle down the chain of command in organizations. Hassan, DeHart-Davis, and Jiang (2019) found that empowering leadership, by promoting trust between leaders and subordinates and causing the latter to feel they have more control at work, encourages employees to speak up more at work and provide vital feedback to leaders.

This supporting evidence notwithstanding, we still need to consider that Kanter's analysis of problems in industry sounds like the complaints about heavy constraints on managers in government. The solution that Kanter proposes, however, contrasts sharply with common approaches in government. Elected officials and top agency executives often impose more rules to try to improve performance and maintain control (Lynn, 1981; Warwick, 1975; Wilson, 1989), as the Senate did in the IRS example at the beginning of this chapter. President Reagan aggressively sought to disempower career federal civil servants (Durant, 1992; Golden, 2000), and political officials have made more recent efforts to exert strong controls over the bureaucracy (Hedge and Johnson, 2002). As these efforts indicate, the accountability pressures in government complicate empowerment approaches. Government officials face a serious challenge in finding ways to allow civil servants sufficient authority and participation to maintain a competent and motivated public service (National Academy of Public Administration, 1986; Volcker Commission, 1989). In addition, officials continue various efforts to build more flexibility into governmental management systems. In 2001, the Bush administration launched such an initiative by advancing Freedom to Manage legislation (Bush, 2001). The legislation stated the objective of providing federal managers with “tools and flexibility” to manage areas such as personnel, budgeting, and property management and disposal.

Getting and Using Power

When they draw practical suggestions from this literature about how to obtain and use power, management writers offer advice such as this (adapted from Daft, 2020, pp. 546–548):

- Move into areas of great uncertainty or strategic contingencies facing the organization and play an important role in managing those areas.
- Increase other departments' dependence on your own by making them depend on you for key resources and information. Incur obligations by doing additional work for others.
- Provide resources for the organization by bringing in money and other resources from external sources.

- Build coalitions and networks with others by building trust and respect through helpfulness and high motivation. Involve many people, including those who disagree with you.
- Influence the premises behind decision-making processes by such means as influencing the flow of information about one's department and shaping the agendas of important meetings.
- Enhance the legitimacy and prestige of your position and department.
- Be reasonably aggressive and assertive, but be quiet and subtle about power issues – do not make loud claims or demands about power.

Suggestions as general as these certainly apply in most management settings. For public management, they need to be interpreted in light of the points made here about legitimate authority and external political authority.

Decision Making in Organizations

Decision-making issues are closely related to power issues, because power determines who gets to decide. The literature often suggests that, as with power issues, public organizations should have distinct decision-making processes because of factors different from those faced by private organizations, such as political interventions and constraints and more diverse, diffuse objectives (Nutt, 1999, 2000). The most recent evidence supports such assertions. Although this evidence shows that the general decision-making processes of public organizations often resemble those of private organizations, it also indicates that major decisions in public organizations involve more complexity, dynamism, intervention, and interruption than those in their private counterparts. These conditions help to explain why demands for accountability and efficiency that have led to schemes for rationalizing government decision-making processes have often failed. At the same time, however, public employees engage in much routine decision making that can be highly standardized. This raises another key challenge for public managers: deciding when to try to standardize and rationalize decision-making processes. Concepts from general organization theory help in the analysis of this issue.

Many contemporary management scholars have analyzed decision-making processes according to a contingency-theory perspective of the sort described in Chapters One and Two. In some situations, managers can successfully adopt highly rationalized decision-making processes. Other situations involve too much uncertainty for such structured approaches and require more complex, intuitive decision making.

Rational Decision-Making Models

Rationality has various meanings and dimensions, but in the social sciences, a strictly rational decision-making process would involve the following components:

1. Decision makers know all the relevant goals clearly.
2. Decision makers clearly know the values used in assessing those goals and targeting levels of attainment for them, so they also know their preferences among the goals and can rank order them.
3. Decision makers examine all alternative means for achieving the goals.
4. Decision makers choose the most efficient of the alternative means for maximizing the goals.

These strict conditions are seldom met except in the most simple of situations, but we know that simple situations that require decisions come up all the time. A bureau chief receives a careful committee report that demonstrates that three alternative vendors can sell the bureau identical copying machines. The bureau chief chooses the least expensive machine. To do otherwise would invite others to question the chief's competence, ethics, or sanity.

Rational Decision-Making Techniques in Public Organizations. Public agencies apply techniques akin to those of scientific management when they have consultants or in-house experts analyze work processes to design more efficient, effective work procedures. The public service centers of the Social Security Administration, e.g., needed a system for keeping track – to prevent misplacement – of the huge number of client file folders that move around to various employees who process the clients' claims. Consultants working with the agency developed a system for putting bar codes on the file folders so that the codes can be read into the computer with a scanner wand at each work location. This scan records the folder's location and creates a record of the location of each file within the system.

Similarly, management science techniques have wide applications in government (Downs and Larkey, 1986). These techniques involve mathematical models or other highly structured procedures for decision making. Linear programming, e.g., uses mathematical formulas to determine how many units of output can be produced with given levels of inputs and thus the best mix of inputs for a production process. Other mathematical techniques support design of workflows and queuing processes. Many discussions of such techniques emphasize the greater difficulty of achieving successful applications in government because of such factors as vague performance criteria and political interventions (Drake, 1972; Morse and Bacon, 1967). In many technical areas of government work, however, these techniques have applications that are just as useful as those in industry.

Many of the proposals for improving government operations over the past several decades have advocated approaches that involve elements of rational decision making (Downs and Larkey, 1986; Lynn, 1981). Lyndon Johnson issued a presidential directive ordering that the planning and program budgeting system (PPBS) be implemented in the budgeting processes of federal agencies. PPBS involves a systematic process of organizing budget requests according to major programs, with the plans and objectives for those programs specified and justified. Advocates proposed PPBS as a reform of previous budgeting techniques that concentrated on the items or activities to be funded and paid little attention to program objectives. The Department of Defense had used the system with some success prior to President Johnson's order. However, problems in implementing PPBS more widely led to the order's cancellation a few years later.

When Jimmy Carter campaigned for president, he proposed the use of zero-based budgeting techniques as a way of exerting greater control over federal spending. These techniques involve looking at the requests for funding of various activities as if their funding levels were zero. The idea is to force a systematic, rational review of major commitments and possible reallocations rather than simply taking existing programs for granted. The procedure never came into use in any significant way.

Others have proposed that the public sector can use “management by objectives” techniques as well as the private sector does (Rodgers and Hunter, 1992). These techniques involve careful negotiation and specification of primary objectives for individuals and units, with performance evaluations concentrating on whether those objectives have been achieved (Swiss, 1991). As with the techniques discussed previously, debate goes on over prospects for using such a systematic and explicit technique in public organizations (Bowsher, 1990).

Some public organizations use elements of these techniques, but attempts to implement them widely have not been successful. Apparently the public sector conditions of diffuse goals, political complications, and highly complex programs often overwhelm such highly rationalized procedures. The GPRA requires federal agencies to produce strategic plans and performance plans that state their objectives, with reports on their success in accomplishing the objectives. This requirement involves a version of a rational process, and Radin (2000) poses difficult questions about whether such a process can prove successful within the political and institutional context of government in the United States.

Rationality Assumptions and the Behaviors of Public Managers and Officials. Another role that the concept of rationality has played in analyzing public organizations is its use to interpret the behavior of public managers and other government officials. “Public choice” economists have developed a body of theory using approaches typical in economics to analyze how citizens and officials make political decisions. They argue, e.g., that in political contexts, just as in economic ones, individuals rationally maximize utility. Voters vote in their own self-interest, and political officials in essence try to buy votes by providing the government programs and services that voters want. Because no market process ensures that one has to pay directly for the goods and services one receives, groups of voters use the political system to benefit themselves at the expense of others. They demand that their elected officials give them services and subsidies that they need, sometimes shifting to other voters much of the burden of paying for them. When these theorists turn to the public bureaucracy, they suggest similar problems. In some of the most prominent, widely cited academic works on public bureaucracies, they suggest that government organizations strive for ever greater budgets (Niskanen, 1971) and tend toward rigidity (Downs, 1967) and information distortion (Tullock, 1965).

Evidence about these assertions has accumulated, and some of it supports them. Clearly, these assertions refer to serious challenges for public managers and potential shortcomings of public agencies. The evidence and careful assessment of the assertions, however, also indicate that they are oversimplified and, as depictions of many bureaucrats and public bureaucracies, simply inaccurate (Bendor and Moe, 1985; Blais and Dion, 1991). Chapters Six and Fourteen return to questions about the performance of government agencies and their managers. While acknowledging the severe performance problems that public agencies and managers sometimes exhibit, those chapters also present evidence and assertions that public agencies and their managers often perform very well.

The Limits of Rationality. Chapter Two describes how Herbert Simon (1948) advanced his observations about constraints on managers' ability to follow highly rational procedures, especially in complex decision-making settings (see also Jones, 1999). Simon argued that for large-scale decisions, the deluge of relevant information and uncertainties overloads the cognitive capacity of managers to process it. Managers strive for rationality – they are *intendedly rational*. But cognitive limits, uncertainties, and time limits cause them to decide under conditions of *bounded rationality*. They do not maximize in accordance with rationality assumptions; they “satisfice.” They undertake a limited search among alternatives and choose the most satisfactory of them after as much consideration as they can manage within the constraints imposed by their situation. Chapters Two and Six also describe how Cyert and March (1963) studied business firms and found that they approached major decisions largely as Simon had suggested. Rather than making decisions in highly rational modes, managers in the firms followed satisficing approaches, as Chapter Six explains. These include “problemistic searches,” “sequential attention to alternatives,” and rules of thumb rather than careful specification of goals.

Contingency Perspectives on Decision Making. Current views of management typically follow the pattern of regarding strictly rational approaches to decision making as applicable within relatively limited domains of managerial activity. As long as tasks and the operating context afford relatively stable, clear, simple conditions, managers find such approaches feasible. As conditions become more complex and dynamic, however, the deluge of information and uncertain conditions overwhelms procedures that require highly explicit statements of goals and painstaking analysis of numerous alternatives. More intuitive and experience-based judgment then comes into play, supplementing or supplanting highly rational procedures.

James Thompson (1967; see also Daft, 2020) suggested a contingency framework to express these variations. Decision-making contexts vary along two major dimensions: the degree to which the decision makers agree on goals, and the degree to which they understand means–ends or cause–effect relationships – that is, the degree to which they have well-developed technical knowledge about how to solve the problems and accomplish the tasks. When both goal agreement and technical knowledge are high, very rational procedures apply. The earlier example about the Social Security Administration's file-tracking system illustrates a situation in which everyone agreed on the goals. Everyone wanted more efficient, effective file-tracking procedures. In addition, the consultants had well-developed ways of analyzing the efficiency and effectiveness of the new file-tracking system. A rational procedure served very well.

The Internal Revenue Service deals each year with the problem of receiving a flood of tax returns and extracting and sorting them correctly. State departments of motor vehicles and the US Social Security Administration process many routine applications and claims every day. In decisions about activities such as these, management science techniques and other forms of highly rationalized analysis have valuable applications (as long as they are properly implemented in a humane and communicative fashion). For example, the US Navy once effectively implemented a planned maintenance system with elaborate scheduling charts that directed when the various pieces of machinery and equipment on a ship should receive maintenance. Instruction cards detailed the maintenance tasks to be performed and included a system for recording the completion of tasks. In effect, the ships followed a strict recipe for maintenance.

At the other end of the scale, when decision makers have no clear consensus on goals and little clarity as to the technical means of achieving them, one can hardly follow a simple blueprint. Measurement, mathematical models and analysis, and strict guidelines for decisions become more tenuous. Under these conditions, managers engage in more bargaining and political maneuvering and more intuitive, judgmental decision making.

Incremental Decision-Making Processes

Scholars have debated whether government decision-making processes follow an *incremental* pattern (Bendor, 2015; Feitsma, 2020). This perspective on public sector decisions has features similar to those of the bounded rationality perspective and has similar intellectual origins. Incrementalism in decision making means concentrating on increments to existing circumstances or relatively limited changes from existing conditions. Those who regard the policymaking process as having this characteristic argue that major, wrenching changes to federal budget categories seldom receive much consideration. Instead, the officials formulating the budget concentrate on the limited increments, up and down, proposed in any given year. Policymakers restrict the size of the changes they propose. The bigger the change, the more opposition they stir up and the more complex becomes the task of analyzing the change.

Political scientists have debated intensively over whether incrementalism accurately characterizes the policymaking and budgeting processes. In addition, they debate its desirability. Some argue that incremental processes stimulate useful bargaining among active political groups and officials and that they guard against ill-considered radical changes. Others complain that they make the policymaking and budgeting processes too conservative and shortsighted and too supportive of existing coalitions and policies.

The debate has become mired in difficulties about what is meant by an increment: How large does a change have to be in order to be considered large? It has led to the conclusion, however, that policy and budgetary changes tend to be incremental but are not always. Fairly drastic cuts in some portions of the federal budget during the Reagan administration, along with fairly sharp increases in military spending, illustrate that regardless of how one identifies an increment, cuts or increases can greatly affect public managers and their agencies (Rubin, 1985). More generally, however, the decision-making processes of public organizations play out within these larger incremental policymaking processes. Policy changes that agencies initiate or that influence them involve a complex interplay of political actors tugging and hauling over any significant change.

In fact, these aspects of the governmental context lead to prescriptions for using incremental approaches as the most feasible alternative. Charles Lindblom's article “The Science of Muddling Through” (1959) is a classic statement of this perspective. He noted that the requirement for political consensus and compromise results in vague goals for public policies and programs. In addition, public administrators carrying out these policies must maintain political support through public participation and consensus building. They have to remain accountable to elected officials, who usually have less experience than they do. As a result, stated goals and ends for policies provide little clarity, and means become inseparable from ends. Administrators find it difficult or politically unacceptable to state a precise societal impact for which a program aims. They must identify a package of means and ends that can achieve political consensus and support. Far-reaching, original procedures and goals evoke particularly strong opposition and usually must be modified if support is to be maintained. In addition, the need for political support often outweighs such criteria as efficiency and substantive impact. Thus, in formulating their packages of means and ends, administrators must strive for satisfactory decisions – that is, they must satisfice – after examining a relatively limited set of alternatives. Often they rely heavily on past practice. A good deal of intelligence may enter the decision-making process through the involvement of many groups, experts, and officials. Generally, however, the approach involves avoiding major departures and concentrating on relatively limited, politically feasible steps. One can see why critics worry about the implications of such an approach (Rosenbloom, Kravchuck, and Clerkin, 2008). It can lead to unduly conservative decisions, and it can favor politically influential groups over disadvantaged and less organized groups.

Mixed Scanning. Etzioni (1967, 1986) proposed an approach aimed at reaching a compromise between the extreme versions of rational decision making and incrementalism. He argued that administrators and other officials make both decisions that have large-scale, long-term implications and decisions of more limited scope. The latter decisions often follow major directions already selected by the former. Etzioni suggested that decision makers strive, through "mixed scanning," to recognize the points at which they concentrate on broader, longer-range alternatives and those at which they focus on more specific, incremental decisions that are a part of larger directions. Decision makers need to mix both perspectives, taking the time to conduct broad considerations of many major issues and alternatives to prevent the shortsightedness of incrementalism. Yet such broad scans cannot involve all the comprehensive analysis required by highly rational models; thus, more intensive analysis must follow on decisions within areas of pressing need.

Logical Incrementalism. Quinn (1990) suggested a pattern of logical incrementalism in which long-range strategic decisions set a framework for incremental steps aimed at carrying out the broader objectives. Focused mainly on business organizations, the approach involves careful consideration of long-range, general priorities. Implementing these priorities, however, involves limited, experimental steps. Decision makers must recognize that the priorities need adaptation and that compromise remains important. These suggestions are consistent with some prescriptions for successful large-scale change in organizations discussed in Chapter Thirteen.

An Incremental Model of Decision-Making Processes Within Organizations. Political scientists usually apply the concept of incrementalism to the process of creating broad public policy. Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976) studied twenty-five major decisions in organizations and formulated an incremental model of decision-making processes. The model depicts decisions, even major ones, as involving numerous small, incremental steps moving through certain general phases. "Decision interrupts" can occur at any of these phases, causing the process to cycle back to an earlier point. The *identification* phase involves recognizing the problem and diagnosing it through information gathering. Then, in the *development* phase, a search process that identifies alternatives is followed by design of a particular solution. Finally, in the *selection* phase, the solution is evaluated, and through an authorization step the organization makes a formal commitment to the decision.

This process seldom flows smoothly. Interruptions at any of the steps make the decision-making process choppy and cyclical rather than smooth and carefully directed. An internal interruption may block diagnosis of a problem. Even when a solution has been designed, a new option may pop up and throw the process back. For example, a new executive may come in and refuse to authorize a decision that is otherwise ready for implementation, or an external interruption such as a government mandate may cause higher-level executives to push a proposal back for further development.

This incremental decision-making model has been used in research comparing private managers with managers from public and nonprofit organizations. Schwenk (1990) used it to analyze managers' perceptions about decision processes in their organizations. He found that compared with private business managers, public and nonprofit managers reported more interruptions, recycling to earlier phases, and conflicts in the decision processes in their organizations. This evidence of differences in decision-making processes between public and private organizations is consistent with the results of other research, such as the study by Hickson and others (1986) discussed later in this chapter.

The Garbage Can Model. The tendency to regard major organizational decisions as complex and dynamic rather than smoothly rational now dominates the management literature. It reaches its apex in the *garbage can model*. This metaphor comes from the observation that decisions are made in organizations when particular decision-making opportunities or requirements arise. Like garbage cans, these instances have a diverse array of material cast into them in a disorderly fashion. As noted earlier, James March participated in research validating Simon's observations about constrained rationality in organizational decisions (Cyert and March, 1963). March and his colleagues also observed that organizational decisions involve much more internal political activity than is generally supposed, with extensive bargaining and conflict among coalitions (March, 1962; Pfeffer, 1982).

These observations evolved into the garbage can model, which holds that in organizational decision-making processes, participation, preferences, and technology (know-how, techniques, equipment) are ambiguous, uncertain, and rapidly changing. These conditions tend to occur especially in “loosely coupled” organizations such as universities and many government agencies (March and Olsen, 1986; Weick, 1979). The members and units have loose control and communication with one another. It is often unclear who has the authority to decide what and for whom. In addition, people may loosely engage even with very important issues, because other matters preoccupy them. People come and go in the organization and in decision-making settings such as committees. Problems and potential solutions come and go as well as conditions change. Choice opportunities also come up: a committee may look for decisions to make, or a manager may look for work to do. A solution may go looking for a problem: a promising alternative may become available that virtually begs for some type of application, or a person or group may have a pet technique that they want to find a way to use. Thus problems, decision-making participants, solutions, and choice opportunities flow along in time relatively independent of one another.

Decision making occurs when these elements come together in a way that is conducive to making a decision – the right problem arises when the right decision-making participants are receptive to an available solution, all coming together in a choice opportunity. The model emphasizes that the linkages between these elements are more temporal than consequential; that is, they result as much from coincidence as from rational calculation (March and Olsen, 1986).

The model has considerable intuitive appeal; anyone who has worked in a complex organization knows of chaotic or accidental decisions. In addition, a number of studies have found that the model accurately depicts decision-making processes in a variety of organizations. March and Olsen (1986) stressed that they intended the model not as a replacement for other perspectives on decision making but as a supplement to them, thus implying that they did not claim that it perfectly accounts for all decision-making processes and contexts. They did not rule out relatively rational approaches in certain instances. In addition, they pointed out that the model does not imply that all decisions involve unavoidable bedlam and chaos. Dominant values and norms, historical contexts, leaders with a firm sense of mission, and other factors can guide or bias decisions in systematic ways.

The proponents of the model do not state very clearly just where and when it applies. Early on in their theoretical work, they suggested (without explaining) that the model applies mainly to public and educational organizations (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972; March and Olsen, 1976). Most of the applications apparently have concentrated on educational and military organizations and courts. Yet at times the proponents also suggested that it applies to business firms and generally to all organizations (March and Olsen, 1986, p. 12). Critics have attacked the garbage can model for remaining too metaphorical, imprecise, and internally contradictory to support scientific progress (Bendor, Moe, and Shotts, 2001), although – not surprisingly – the developers of the perspective disagree (Olsen, 2001). Still, the model has important implications for public management. As discussed shortly, Hickson and his colleagues (1986) found that this type of decision-making process occurs more frequently in public organizations than in private firms.

Strategic Management

Although most experts on managerial decision making emphasize the rather chaotic nature of the process, by no means do they deny that managers do and should engage in purposeful, goal-oriented actions. As described in earlier chapters and in earlier sections of this chapter, the topic of strategic management has advanced prominently in recent decades, and government agencies at all levels engage in strategic planning. Berry and Wechsler (1995) conducted a national survey of state agencies and found that even by the early 1990s the majority of agencies – about 60% – employed strategic planning. The concept of strategy comes from the idea of military strategy, of using the resources and strengths of a military force to achieve goals – military victory, usually – by forming plans and objectives and executing them. The concept is more attractive than similar rubrics, such as planning and business policy, because of this emphasis on assessing one's own general goals, one's strengths and weaknesses, and the external threats and opportunities that one faces in deploying one's forces to best advantage in pursuit of those goals.

Prescriptive Frameworks for Strategic Management

Management consultants and experts propose a variety of approaches for developing strategy. Bryson and Roering (1996) provided an excellent summary of eight major approaches to strategic planning that gave more depth and detail on the models mentioned in this discussion. Bryson (1995) concluded that managers can apply virtually all of them in the public sector (although with several provisos, discussed shortly). Some of the models, such as that of the Boston Consulting Group, focus on high-level corporate decisions about the relative priority of the corporation's business activities. The Boston Consulting Group's “portfolio model” exhorts executives to treat the mix of business units in a large corporation as if they represented stocks in an individual's portfolio of assets. Executives assess the business units in the corporation on two dimensions: market growth and size of market share. The units high on both of these dimensions are “stars”; they should receive priority attention and reinvestment of profits. Units with small shares in slow-growing markets – low on both key dimensions – are “dogs” and candidates for divestiture. Mixed situations provide opportunities for strategic shifting of resources. A unit with a high market share in a slowly growing market brings in a lot of money but does not have strong growth prospects. These activities should be treated as “cash cows” and used to provide resources for units that provide growth opportunities. Units that are in a rapidly growing market but not yet in command of a large share of it should be considered for infusions of resources from other units, especially the cash cows. The approach sounds cutthroat, but it actually emphasizes synergy: the effective meshing of all the activities in an organization to produce overall gains beyond what the activities would gain as the sum of their independent operations.

Ring (1988) applied a modified portfolio model to public sector strategy making. He used “tractability of the problem” and “public support” as the key dimensions. When problems are manageable and public support is high, public managers can seek to gain resources that they can then use to deal with more difficult policy problems in settings where public support is high but the problem is very difficult to solve. When public support and tractability are both low, public managers simply seek to shift the priority away from those problems. Similarly, Rubin (1988) suggests that strategic patterns will differ according to whether the time horizon for the policy issue is long or short and whether the policy plays out within a disruptive or an anticipated environment.

Other approaches emphasize different levels and issues (Bryson, 1995). *Strategic planning systems* propose methods for formulating and implementing strategic decisions and allocating resources to back them up across units and levels of an organization. *Stakeholder management* approaches analyze how key stakeholders evaluate an organization and form strategies to deal with each stakeholder. (Stakeholders include individuals or groups who have a major interest in an organization, such as unions, customers, suppliers, and regulators.) *Competitive analysis* approaches analyze major forces acting on an industry, such as the power of buyers and suppliers, the prospects for substitute products, and competition in its markets. The aim is to gain competitive advantage through such strategies as differentiating oneself from competitors and selecting the segments of an industry in which one should compete (Porter, 1998). *Strategic issues management* focuses on identifying major issues that appear crucial to an organization's ability to achieve its objectives and deciding how a working group in the organization will respond to these issues and resolve them. *Process strategies* and *strategic negotiation* approaches treat strategic decision making as a highly political process and prescribe ways of managing the constant bargaining required. Similarly, *logical incrementalism*, as described earlier, emphasizes the incremental nature of strategic decisions and ways to guide bargaining along a consistent path. (For more detail, see Bryson, 1995, and Bryson and Roering, 1996.)

Applications of Strategic Management in the Public Sector

Numerous frameworks for strategic management in the public sector are available (Bryson, 1995; Bryson and Roering, 1996; Nutt and Backoff, 1992). They tend to involve a version of the Harvard Policy and Stakeholder model of strategic planning (Berry and Wechsler, 1995), which focuses on such procedures as strategic issue management, stakeholder analysis, environmental scanning, and SWOT analysis (described shortly). The procedures prescribed by scholars and consultants usually begin with a planning and organizing phase. A strategic management group (SMG) typically manages the process and must agree on who will be involved, how the strategic analysis will proceed, and what the group expects to achieve. Usually the procedure requires a structured group process and a facilitator – a consultant skilled in helping groups make decisions. The facilitator often asks members of the group to list their views about important points, such as stakeholders, opportunities, and threats. Then the group members follow a procedure for synthesizing their views, such as the nominal group technique described in Chapter Twelve.

The SMG usually begins with a preliminary assessment of the history and current status of the organization to produce a general statement of the organization's mission. Bryson (1995) suggested that for public organizations this step requires a careful review of the organization's mandates – the requirements imposed by external authorities through legislation and regulations. This review can clarify what external authorities dictate and can also provide insights about new approaches. For example, representatives of a public hospital who interpret their mandate as forbidding competition with private health services may find upon review that they have the authority to do so.

Working toward the mission statement, the SMG typically reviews trends in the operating environment, using a framework like those described in Chapter Four. It may also conduct a stakeholder analysis at this point and develop idealized visions of how it wants the organization to be in the future. Ultimately, the mission statement expresses the general purpose of the organization and its major values and commitments.

Next, the SMG members assess the strengths and weaknesses of the organization and look outward to the environment and forward to the future to identify opportunities and threats facing the organization. This assessment of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats is called a SWOT analysis. The SMG can choose from an array of techniques for this analysis (Nutt and Backoff, 1992). A typical approach involves the nominal group technique mentioned earlier. From the SWOT analysis, the SMG develops a list of *strategic issues*: conflicts among opposing forces or values that can affect the organization's ability to achieve a desired future (Nutt and Backoff, 1992). Then the group develops plans for managing these issues (Eadie, 1996; Nutt and Backoff, 1992; Ring, 1988). A wide variety of public sector organizations now use this approach to strategic planning (Boschken, 1988; Bryson, 1995; Wechsler and Backoff, 1988).

Analytical Research on Managerial Strategies in the Public Sector

In addition to recommending procedures, researchers have studied the strategies that public organizations actually pursue and how their strategic decisions actually develop. Some of these studies show the effects of government ownership on strategy. In their study of strategic decisions in thirty British organizations, Hickson and his colleagues (1986) found that strategic decision-making processes in publicly owned service and manufacturing organizations differed from those in private service and manufacturing firms. The public organizations followed a “vortex-sporadic” decision-making process. This involves more turbulence, more shifting participation by a greater diversity of internal and external interests, more delays and interruptions, and more formal and informal interaction among participants. The type of decision made a great difference, as did the distinction between service and manufacturing organizations. The results, however, indicate that the public sector context does impose on internal strategic decision making the sorts of interventions and constraints described in earlier chapters. The findings are consistent with other analyses of the distinctive context of strategic planning in the public sector, which observe that strategic planners in the public sector must consider a broader scope of impact and a more diverse and attentive set of stakeholders (Nutt and Backoff, 1992, 1995), and considerations of market volatility and competition that apply in the private sector need to be replaced by considerations of need for governmental action and responsiveness (Nutt and Backoff, 1992, 1995). Nutt (1999) has also identified distinctive patterns of assessing alternatives in the public sector.

Mascarenhas (1989) studied 187 public and private offshore drilling firms in thirty-four countries to analyze their strategic domains (markets served, product type, customer orientation, and technology applied). The government-owned firms operated mainly in domestic markets, with narrow product lines and stable customer bases. Publicly traded private firms (those whose stock is traded on exchanges) were larger, operated in many geographical markets, and offered a wider range of products. Privately held firms were more like the state-owned firms but had less stable customer bases. The nationality and size of the firms also made a big difference, but the ownership distinctions persisted even with controls for those factors. The results support the point, mentioned in Chapter Three, that public organizations tend to have greater constraints on their strategic domains.

Other studies have analyzed important variations in strategy within the public sector. Wechsler and Backoff (1986) studied four state agencies in Ohio and found that they pursued four types of strategies. The Department of Natural Resources followed a developmental strategy. This agency had diverse tasks, constituencies, and independent funding sources. The managers had relative independence to pursue a strategy of enhancing the capabilities, resources, and general performance of the organization. Stronger external forces shaped the transformational strategy of the Department of Mental Retardation. Professional experts and legal rights groups advocated deinstitutionalization of the mentally retarded – getting them out of large hospitals and into normal living conditions. The agency also faced constant budgetary pressures. It responded by transforming itself from a manager of hospitals to a monitor and regulator of client services delivered through community-based programs and contracts. The Department of Public Welfare received intense criticism in the media and from legislators and faced increasing human service needs and potential cutbacks in funding, so its managers followed a protective strategy. They strengthened internal controls, lowered the agency's public profile (“getting the agency out of the newspapers”), mended relations with legislators, and worked to protect funding levels. The Public Utilities Commission, which regulates utility pricing decisions, adopted a political strategy. Nuclear energy issues and increasing fuel prices led to more political activity by consumer advocates. The agency's decisions became more favorable to consumers, reflecting a shift in response to changing configurations of stakeholders.

The Miles and Snow Typology

In recent years, researchers have conducted a number of studies applying the Miles and Snow (1978) strategy typology to government organizations, often relating the typology to organizational performance measures. The typology is one of the widely cited and utilized classifications of business-level strategies. It is based on the idea that managers seek to formulate strategies that are congruent with the external environment that their organization confronts (Daft, 2020; Miles and Snow, 1978; Zahra and Pearce, 1990). The four orientations of the Miles and Snow typology are as follows:

- *Prospectors*: Organizations that "continually search for market opportunities, and … regularly experiment with potential responses to emerging environmental trends" (Miles and Snow, 1978, p. 29). Prospectors often stress product development, have a keen learning orientation, are strong in research, and tend to adopt flexible organizational structures (Boyne and Walker, 2004; Zahra and Pearce, 1990).
- *Defenders*: Organizations that emphasize controlling secure and premium niches in their respective industries and "seldom need to make major adjustments in their technology, structure or methods of operation … [and] devote primary attention to improving the efficiency" of their operations (Miles and Snow, 1978, p. 29). They engage in little or no product development, work under centralized authority, and have little employee empowerment (Boyne and Walker, 2004; Zahra and Pearce, 1990).
- *Analyzers*: Organizations that typically exhibit characteristics of both Prospectors and Defenders. They "operate in two types of product market domains, one relatively stable, the other changing" (Miles and Snow, 1978, p. 29). Analyzers balance efficiency and learning, use tight cost control with flexibility and adaptability, and often have efficient production for stable product lines while yet maintaining an emphasis on research, creativity, and innovative risk-taking (Daft, 2020; Zahra and Pearce, 1990).
- *Reactors*: Organizations "in which top managers frequently perceive change and uncertainty occurring in their organizational environments, but are unable to respond effectively" (Miles and Snow, 1978, p. 29). Reactors have a general lack of consistent strategy and have no clearly defined organizational approach. They are generally viewed as dysfunctional. Boschken (1988) found that this model of strategic variations applies well to government enterprises. He used the framework to analyze the strategic behaviors of port authority organizations for various cities on the West Coast. More recent research applies the typology to public sector organizations (Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O'Toole, and Walker, 2005; Boyne and Walker, 2004; Meier, O'Toole, Boyne, and Walker, 2007). Boyne and Walker (2004) emphasize the importance of a clearer understanding of the strategies of public service organizations and point out that expectations for more strategic focus have been evident in examples such as the National Performance Review in the United States (Thompson, 2000) and the "Modernisation Agenda" in the United Kingdom (Boyne, Kitchener, and Kirkpatrick, 2001). The purpose of Boyne's and Walker's research was to develop a framework to classify strategies pursued by public organizations. They define strategy content as patterns of service provision that are selected and

implemented by organizations. They posit that strategy does not need to be viewed as a "weapon" that is used to defeat rivals in competitive struggles (Boyne and Walker, 2004; Greer and Hoggett, 1999). Boyne and Walker asserted that a framework that has applicability to public organizations will make it possible to identify and measure their strategy content. As a dependent variable, their classification scheme could be used to understand why particular strategies are adopted, and as an independent variable it can be used in models of organizational performance. They then asserted that the Miles and Snow typology corresponded closely with their concept of strategic "stance," although their typology of strategic stance includes only Prospectors, Defenders, and Reactors (Boyne and Walker, 2004). Boyne and Walker joined with other colleagues in additional research that applied the Miles and Snow typology in other research situations (Andrews, Boyne, Law, and Walker, 2008, 2009; Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O'Toole, and Walker, 2005; Andrews, Boyne, and Walker, 2006; Enticott and Walker, 2008; Meier, O'Toole, Boyne, and Walker, 2007; Walker and Boyne, 2006). The earliest of these studies focused on the issue of representative bureaucracy and workforce diversity. Representative bureaucracy is likely to benefit the Prospector types and further enhance their performance (Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O'Toole, and Walker, 2005). Because strategies of employee involvement are central to the Prospector's achievement of higher levels of organizational performance, Prospectors are then expected to be able to take advantage of an ethnically diverse workforce that brings alternative perspectives on agency goals and strategies. Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2006) reported the first empirical test of the proposition that strategy content is a key determinant of organizational performance in the public sector. The authors posited that strategy content is composed of *strategic stance*, that is, the extent to which organizations act consistently with categories of the Miles and Snow typology (such as Prospector, Defender, Reactor), and *strategic action*, which is related to changes in markets, services, revenues, external relations, and internal characteristics. The authors, using a survey of English local authorities, determined that, overall, strategy content matters and that organizational performance is positively associated with a Prospector stance and negatively associated with a Reactor stance. In addition, Walker and Boyne (2006) used the data from this same survey to assess empirically the Labour government's public management reform program in the United Kingdom. As in the previous study, the authors illustrate that strategies and actions of managers in public sector organizations can influence performance. Enticott and Walker (2008) similarly found that sustainable management is related to sustainability performance. Meier, O'Toole, Boyne, and Walker (2007) used the typology again as an important influence on organizational performance (see also Chapter 6). They tested the strategic management concepts in a large sample of public organizations. They found that the Defender strategy is the most effective for the primary mission of the organization and that the Prospector and Reactor strategies work best in regard to goals of more politically powerful elements of the organization's environment. They found little evidence, however, of "a one-size-fits-all pattern – whether it be the prospectors-outperform-defenders-who-outperform-reactors idea in the earlier literature or another clear ordering of strategies in terms of overall effectiveness." (p. 373)

Andrews, Boyne, and colleagues (2008, 2009, 2017) continued in this stream of research on strategy and public service performance. They examined centralization as a measure of the hierarchy and authority in decision making. Again, they used Miles and Snow typology – Prospectors, Defenders, and Reactors – as the authors contend that "[s]ervice improvement is at the heart of contemporary debates in public management" (Andrews, Boyne, Law, and Walker, 2008, p. 1). Their findings showed that centralization has no independent effect on service performance, but that the strategic orientation of organizations may affect the impact of centralization (Andrews, Boyne, Law, and Walker, 2008).

The second study examines the effects of external and internal variables that have strong effects on success in public sector organizations (Andrews, Boyne, Law, and Walker, 2009). The authors found that the strategy that is most strongly associated with service success is prospecting, and that organizations that emphasize innovation and change in service provision are more likely to achieve better results. This is consistent with prior findings in both the public and private sectors.

These studies show that strategic orientation varies considerably among public organizations. Public managers, like private managers, engage in a variety of purposeful efforts to respond to their environment and achieve their objectives. This general perspective stands in sharp contrast to negative stereotypes of public managers as passive and inattentive to long-term purposes – stereotypes that often get drawn into academic theory. The research also suggests that we can develop generalizations about power, decision making, and strategy formulation in the public sector.

Issues for Managers and Researchers

There are more observations about the general features of the public sector context than there is consensus about how to deal with the variations within it. The assertions in the literature about the general characteristics of public organizations that distinguish them from their private counterparts can be summarized as follows:

- There are more political intrusions into management in public organizations and there is a greater infusion of political criteria.
- A more elaborate overlay of formal, institutional constraints governs the management process, involving more formal laws, rules, and mandated procedures and policies.

- Goals and performance criteria are generally more vague, multiple, and conflicting for public organizations.
- Economic market indicators are usually absent, and the organizations pursue idealized, value-laden social objectives.
- The public sector must handle particularly difficult social tasks, often under relatively vague mandates from legislative bodies.
- Public organizations must jointly pursue all of the complex goals described earlier: accountability, responsiveness, representativeness, openness, and efficiency.

The literature on power in organizations reminds us that power is elusive and complex and that thinking too much in terms of power relationships can be deluding. Yet the best-intentioned of managers have to consider the means of exerting influence for the good ends they seek. We now have a considerable literature on the power of bureaucracies in general, with a growing set of case studies of effective public managers and how they gain and use influence within the political system (Allison, 1983; Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Kotter and Lawrence, 1974; Lewis, 1980; Olshfski, 1990). We do not, however, have many studies of large samples of public managers that analyze their power and influence within the system and what causes variations in it. Both managers and researchers, then, face the question of what to make of the current state of knowledge on this topic.

Pulling together the material from organization theory and political science suggests some answers. For one thing, public administrators apparently face relatively sharp constraints on their power and influence as a result of their particular context. High-level executives such as politically elected executives and appointed cabinet officers must share authority over their administrative units with legislators and other political authorities. Their authority over their subordinates and organizations is constrained by rules and procedures imposed by other units, such as those governing civil service procedures, purchasing, procurement and space-allocation decisions, and budgeting decisions. At lower managerial levels, managers' authority is further overshadowed by the stronger formal authority and resource control of other institutional authorities. Kingdon (1995) reports a survey in which federal officials rated the president and Congress as having much more influence over the policy agenda than administrative officials.

Within this disadvantaged setting, however, administrative officials have varying degrees of influence. Given the assertions of the literature on organizational and bureaucratic power, one would expect that administrative officials, although always subject to the shifting tides of political, social, and technical developments, have greater influence under the following conditions:

- When they play important roles relative to major policy problems and to obtaining resources for their agency – when they are in key budgetary decision-making roles or in policymaking positions central to the agency's mandates and to the support of major constituencies.

- When they have effective political support from committees and actors in the legislative branch, in other components of the executive branch, and in interest and constituency groups.
- When they have strong professional capabilities and credentials. Some agencies are dominated by a particular professional group, such as attorneys, foreign service officers, police officers, or military officers. Managers without strong credentials and abilities in these specializations will need other strengths, such as excellent preparation or a reputation as a strong generalist manager.
- When they have excellent substantive knowledge of government and its operations and institutions (e.g., the legislative and administrative lawmaking processes) and of the policies and programs of the agencies in which they work.
- When they achieve or have the capacity to achieve a reputation for general stature and competence, including high energy, intelligence, integrity, and commitment to serving the public.

Public managers have to consider these power and influence issues because they are directly related to the autonomy and authority they exercise in decision-making processes and to the nature of the decision-making process itself. The evidence and analysis discussed in this chapter and earlier suggest more political intrusions and institutional constraints on decision making in public organizations than in private organizations. Executives who have had experience in business and government echo these observations (Perry and Kraemer, 1983).

More explicitly, Ring and Perry (1985) synthesized literature and research on management strategy for public organizations and came to a similar conclusion. They found that existing research and observations indicate that public sector strategic decision making takes place under such conditions as the following:

- Policy ambiguity (policy directives that are more ill-defined than those in business firms)
- Greater openness to the participation and influence of the media and other political officials and bodies, and greater attentiveness from a more diverse array of them
- More artificial time constraints due to periodic turnover of elected and appointed officials and mandated time lines from courts and legislatures
- Shaky coalitions (relative instability in the political coalitions that can be forged around a particular policy or solution)

Besides the implications of the political science literature and these observations, research findings increasingly validate this general scenario. A number of studies show more constraints, interruptions, interventions, and external contacts in the public sector than in the private sector. Porter and Van Maanen (1983) compared city government administrators with industrial managers and found that city administrators feel they have less control over how they allocate their own time, feel more pressed for time, and regard demands from people outside their organization as a much stronger influence on how they manage their time. The study by Hickson and his colleagues (1986) described earlier emphasizes the more turbulent pattern of participation, delay, interruption, and participation in public sector decision making.

Ring and Perry (1985) also suggested some of the consequences of this context for strategic management. They said that because public managers must often shoot for more limited objectives, they are more likely to have to follow incremental decision-making patterns, and thus their strategies are more likely to be more emergent than intended (that is, their strategic decisions and directions are more likely to emerge from the decision-making process than to follow some originally intended direction). Effective public managers must maintain greater flexibility in their orientation toward staff assignments and controls and avoid premature commitments to a given set of objectives. According to Ring and Perry, they must straddle competing demands for efficiency, equity, high moral standards, and political responsiveness to constituent groups by showing open-mindedness, shunning dogmatism, and skillfully integrating competing viewpoints. They must effectively “wield influence rather than authority” and minimize discontinuities in the process.

The question of political influences on decisions raises one final issue addressed in the organizational literature on decision making: Which contingencies determine that decisions must be less structured and less systematically rational? Many decisions in public organizations are not pervaded with politics and institutional constraints but take place much as they might in a business firm. A challenge facing practitioners and researchers alike concerns the clarification of when and how deeply the political environment of public organizations affects their decision-making processes. Public managers appear to have more encapsulated, internally manageable decision-making settings (in which rational decision-making processes are often more appropriate) when tasks and policy problems are clear, routine, and tractable, and at levels of the organization and in geographical locations that are remote from political scrutiny; when issues are minimally politically salient or enjoy consistent public support; when legislative and other mandates are clear as opposed to “fuzzy” (Lerner and Wanat, 1983); and when administrative decision makers gain stronger authority to manage a situation autonomously, without political intervention.

This theme of appropriately assessing and managing the political context in relation to other organizational contingencies comes up again in later chapters. The next chapter addresses additional issues about structure and technology in public organizations – issues related to decision-making processes and influence of the political environment, which in turn relate to later questions about human behavior and performance in public organizations.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Seven

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercisses
- Case Study: Enron: Crossing the Ethics Line

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

CHAPTER EIGHT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, DESIGN, TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIAL MEDIA

The US Internal Revenue Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (known as RRA98) directed the IRS to redesign its structure. The IRS had operated for about half a century with the same geography-based structure; that is, the agency was organized on the basis of geographic regions and further subdivided into districts. Most of the important auditing, enforcement, and tax collection work occurred in the 33 geographic districts. The directors of these 33 districts had a lot of authority over what happened in their districts and often had considerable prestige and presence there as well. Most of the tax returns they received were sent to be processed at one of ten major service centers located around the nation.

As part of the set of reforms that RRA98 mandated, IRS executives led a major transformation in the agency's structure to a customer-focused design. The new commissioner of the IRS, Charles Rossotti, proposed the design as a version of similar approaches used by major banks. Large banks face a variety of demands from different clusters of their customers. Individual retail customers want checking accounts and small loans. Small businesses and self-employed persons have additional needs for business loans and payroll services. Very large corporations have further needs for support of their larger loans and payroll services, pension plans, and stock and bond offerings. The large banks have often designed their structures into divisions to address the needs of these different sets of customers.

The IRS developed a similar plan. The agency reorganized into four main operating divisions:

- A wage and investment division, for taxpayers filing their individual income tax returns
- A small business and self-employed division
- A large and medium-sized business division
- A tax-exempt and government entities division, which has no analog in the example about large banks; it deals with issues of concern to nonprofit organizations and tax-exempt pension programs

The IRS also established an agency-wide shared services division that handles many of the common service and support needs of the other parts of the agency, such as maintenance of personal computers and payroll processing. Many business firms and other organizations have recently established a division of this sort to handle widely shared common services.

Redesigning the IRS represented a huge undertaking, because the organization employs more than a hundred thousand people, processes more than 425 million tax returns per year, and handles well over a trillion dollars in revenue each year. The reorganization required several years and involved numerous design teams working on plans for the new organization. The new divisions came into operation in 2000 and 2001, and the success of the new design remains to be evaluated, but clearly the reorganization worked in the sense of firmly establishing the new structure.

Another organization that underwent redesign is the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) on Long Island, which serves as an important scientific resource for the nation and the world (see www.bnl.gov). Scientists at BNL conduct leading research in physics, biology, chemistry, medicine, environmental science, and other areas. One major facility at BNL, the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider, allows scientists to conduct experiments in which they use this massive particle accelerator to stage collisions between large subatomic particles and to study the results of the collisions for evidence about the fundamental characteristics of atomic particles and matter. Although scientists at BNL take pride in the lab's research in part because of its peacetime applications (as opposed to nuclear research for military applications), environmentalists and local residents have worried for a long time about the danger of environmental pollution from the lab. During the 1990s, the discovery and disclosure of a small leak of tritium, a radioactive substance, caused a public outcry. Although scientists at the lab considered the leak extremely minor and not at all dangerous, the news of the leak aggravated the long standing worries about the lab. Demonstrators conducted protests at the entrance to the lab compound. Celebrities, such as a supermodel and a famous actor, pled in public for the closing of the lab and claimed that it caused cancer in local residents. They and other activists prevailed upon political leaders in the area to do something about BNL.

Amid the controversy, the secretary of energy canceled the contract for the management of the lab. The lab is a government-owned, contractor-operated organization. Years ago, when the federal government established national laboratories, the management of the labs was contracted out. Under these contracts, private business firms or consortia of universities would manage the labs. Brookhaven had been managed for more than fifty years under a contract with a consortium of major universities. After the secretary of energy canceled the contract, the Department of Energy entered into a new contract with a partnership between a university and a major research institute, who provided the new management team for the lab.

Soon the administrative structure at BNL changed significantly. The main organizational departments, called directorates, included directorates for the major scientific programs in which the scientists conducted research, such as the directorate for high energy and nuclear physics, and for life sciences. There were also administrative directorates, such as the directorate for finance and administration. The new management group added additional administrative directorates: one for environment, safety, health, and quality, which oversees environmental protection and safety procedures at BNL, and one for community involvement, government, and public affairs. The directors who headed the directorates met regularly as a group with the director of the lab – the top administrator – and often voted on major issues. Scientists at the lab pointed out that the addition of the new administrative directorates meant that the administrative functions were receiving increased emphasis and influence. For example, more directors of administrative directorates meant more votes for administrative functions in the meetings with the lab director.

Soon the new management group also introduced requirements that employees working at BNL had to complete web-based training programs in laboratory safety procedures and waste disposal and environmental protection procedures. Many of the scientists grumbled about these requirements, because they saw them as unnecessary training in elementary procedures that they already followed. They felt that the new rules and procedures wasted time and resources because they tied up employees in completing the training instead of working on research. In addition, scientists at BNL often got grants from other sources to conduct research, and overhead expenses were taken out of their grants to pay for the added administrative functions and the additional training.

In effect, then, the new administrative directorates and the added administrative rules and procedures increased the importance of administrative controls and influences relative to scientific research priorities. Why did this occur? The new laboratory director explained that something had to be done to respond to the public controversy and outcry about the environmental dangers at BNL. Although the scientists at the lab grumbled about the new procedures, they expressed great respect for the director, a former university president and a scientist himself. The scientists acknowledged that he had to do something to respond to the political and public relations pressures on the lab.

These examples illustrate why the historical overview in Chapter Two and the discussion of organizational environments in Chapter Four show that so many factors – such as environmental complexity, public sector status (including political oversight and mandates), goals, and leadership – affect organizational structures and their design.

Organizational analysts have developed more than one definition of structure. Some management researchers distinguish organizational structure from an organization's technology and tasks. They use *structure* to refer to the configuration of the hierarchical levels and specialized units and positions in an organization and to the formal rules governing these arrangements. *Technology* and *tasks* refer to an organization's work processes, including the knowledge involved, that often serve as major influences on the design of organizational structure. Other definitions of structure combine elements of the organizational configuration with processes. For example, Mintzberg (1979) defines structure as the ways in which an organization divides its labor and integrates efforts.

As the historical review in Chapter Two showed, the concept of organizational structure has played a central role in organization and management theory from the beginning. Researchers have analyzed organizational technologies and tasks as important elements affecting the best structure. In spite of the constraints placed on them, public managers have considerable authority over the structure of their organizations and make many decisions in relation to technology and tasks, so current thinking on these topics is important to effective public management.

This chapter first discusses whether public organizations have distinctive structural characteristics, such as more red tape than private organizations. It then examines the importance of organizational structure and its relation to political power, strategy, and other topics. Next, it describes major concepts and findings from the research on organizational structure, technology, and design. Organization theorists have generally addressed structure from a generic perspective, devoting little attention to the distinctive structural attributes of public organizations, even though some important studies have concentrated on public agencies. These general points apply to most organizations, however, and the discussion here gives examples specifically involving public organizations. The chapter concludes by turning more directly to the evidence about whether public organizations differ in structure and design from private organizations.

Do Public Organizations Have Distinctive Structural Characteristics?

Novels, essays, and popular stereotypes have all bemoaned the absurdity and inhumanity of government bureaucracies. Their observations often focus on structural matters, such as rigid rules and hierarchies. More formal scholarship often follows suit. In a virtual tradition among some economists, government bureaucracies play the role of villain, sometimes threatening both prosperity and freedom. In probably the most widely cited book on bureaucracy ever published, Downs (1967) argues that government bureaucracies inevitably move toward rigidity and hierarchical constraints. He states a “law of hierarchy” that holds that large government organizations, with no economic markets for their outputs, have more elaborate and centralized hierarchies than do private business firms. Downs's law represents a broad consensus that government bureaucracies have exceedingly complex rules, red tape, and hierarchies, even in comparison with large private sector organizations (Barton, 1980; Bozeman, 2000; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Lindblom, 1977; Sharkansky, 1989).

An opposite consensus also exists, however. Organization theorists' research on organizational structure offers the best-developed concepts and empirical findings on the topic. Yet as the first several chapters of this book pointed out, most organization theorists have not regarded public organizations as a particularly distinctive category. They have usually adopted a generic perspective that contends that their concepts of structure apply broadly across many types of organizations with distinctions such as “public” and “private” regarded as oversimplified and based on crude stereotypes. Many organization theorists regard other factors, such as organizational size, environmental complexity, and technology, as more important influences on structure than public or private status. Mainstream organization theory in effect sharply disputes the view that public bureaucracies have excessive red tape and highly centralized and elaborate hierarchies.

We will further examine the evidence in this controversy later in this chapter. First, however, we will review the concepts and insights about organizational structure developed by organization theorists and how they apply to public organizations – because they do. Most of the research comparing public and private organizations' structures use these concepts and methods from organization theory. After reviewing these concepts, we will turn to the evidence comparing public and private organizational structures, which will show some very interesting developments in this research, some of them quite recent. To some people, carefully examining research on the structures of public bureaucracies and business firms sounds about as inviting as reading the telephone book. But if you like to base your thinking on well-developed evidence instead of on stereotypes and the half-baked assertions we hear in popular discourse, following and interpreting the research on this topic is an intriguing challenge.

The Development of Research on Structure

We have already seen examples of the influence of political actors and government authorities on the structures of public agencies: legislation and political pressures that force structural changes; rules and clearances imposed on federal managers by oversight agencies; micromanagement by legislators who specify rules and organizational structure; legislators and interest groups jealously guarding the structural autonomy of an agency, preventing its reorganization under the authority of another organization; and President Reagan's demotion of federal career civil servants by creating new positions above them. Presidents have created new agencies and placed them outside existing agencies to keep them away from those agencies' powerful political and administrative coalitions (Seidman and Gilmour, 1986). John Kennedy placed the Peace Corps outside the State Department, and Lyndon Johnson kept the youth employment training programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity away from the Department of Labor. Interest group pressures have led to the removal of bureaus from larger agencies. Due to such pressures, Congress removed the Department of Education from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which then became the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (Radin and Hawley, 1988). Later, similar political pressures led Congress to remove the Social Security Administration (SSA) from HHS.

Interestingly, however, early in this century, public administration experts leading the development of the field did not emphasize such political dynamics in their most prominent analyses of government organizations. Proponents of the Administrative Management School argued that its principles of administration applied equally well in government and business organizations. These principles were to guide decisions about structure that would maximize efficiency and performance. Even though it tended to downplay distinctions between government and business, this drive toward developing efficient, effective structure drew strength from important issues in government at the time. A reform movement, which was active in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the earlier decades of the twentieth, attacked government corruption and mismanagement, particularly in urban areas. Reformers saw these principles as guidelines for efficient structuring of organizations to purge political patronage and slovenly management (Knott and Miller, 1987).

Later, government growth during the New Deal and after World War II brought a vast proliferation of government agencies. Gulick and other proponents of the principles of the administrative management school influenced major proposals for reorganizing the sprawling federal bureaucracy and played an important role in major developments in the structure of the federal government. For example, some of the reforms proposed grouping various federal agencies under larger “umbrella” agencies as a means of narrowing the chief executive's span of control. During past decades, some experts have argued that many government officials continue to hold the general view of proper organization espoused by the administrative management school (Knott and Miller, 1987; Seidman and Gilmour, 1986; Warwick, 1975).

As explained in Chapter Two, the classic approach to structure came under criticism as research on organizations burgeoned during the middle of the twentieth century. The contingency perspective on organizational structure rejected the quest for one common set of principles to guide organizational design. Contingency theorists contended that an organization's structure must be adapted to key contingencies facing the organization, such as environmental variations and uncertainty, the demands of technology or the production process, the size of the organization, and strategic decisions by managers and coalitions within the organization.

Empirical studies in the 1960s and 1970s added to this perspective, seeking to define and measure structural concepts. By the 1970s, research journals were filled with empirical studies analyzing these concepts. The activity led to the fairly typical version of contingency frameworks that we will examine next, and to the topic of *organizational design*, which we will take up after that.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the literature on organizations and the practice of management within them moved still further in the direction described in Chapter Two: away from bureaucratized, mechanistic structures and toward flexible, organic structures. Management mavens touted extremely loose and informal structure as the ideal (Peters, 1988). Many large corporations launched initiatives to decentralize their structure and make themselves more flexible, and business periodicals carried stories about “bureaucracy-busting” executives. By the turn of the new century, experts on organizational design were describing how many corporations had adopted “lateral,” “horizontal,” or “team-based” structures in the quest for high levels of flexibility and adaptability.

The public sector followed the lead of the private sector in these directions (Barzelay, 1992). For example, the National Performance Review (described in Chapter Six) called for a 50% reduction in agency rules, eliminated the federal personnel manual as a symbolic gesture toward reducing personnel rules, and took other steps toward decentralizing and loosening up the bureaucratic structure of the federal government. The Winter Commission, which proposed ways of revitalizing state and local public service, also proposed reducing bureaucratic rules and decentralizing procedures. Among other proposals, the commission called for “flattening” the bureaucracy by eliminating middle layers in public agencies, and “deregulating” government by eliminating many personnel rules and decentralizing procedures (Thompson, 1993). State and local governments in the US have also undertaken reforms to eliminate layers of middle management (Walters, 1996) and to loosen the rules that gave public employees merit system protections in their jobs (Walters, 2002). More recently, experts continue to advance proposals for more flexible government (National Academy of Public Administration, 2021). President Trump's efforts in 2020 to de-federalize disaster preparation provides an example. Trump called on state and local entities to fund their own training for disaster preparedness and proposed eliminating millions of grants from the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The emphasis on decentralization and flexibility has had major influences on how practicing leaders, managers, and researchers think about the best ways to design organizations. Yet ideas and concepts developed by their predecessors continue to have relevance. Academic journal articles still address early topics about organizational structure such as centralization (e.g., see Joseph et al., 2016; 2018) and hierarchy (Keum and See, 2017). We still need such concepts to analyze organizations.

Structural Dimensions and Influences

Researchers developing definitions and measures of organizational structure have run into many complications. For example, you can measure structural features objectively (by counting the number of rules, e.g.,) or subjectively (by asking people how strictly they must follow the rules). In addition, organizations can be very complex, with different units having markedly different structures, and this makes it hard to develop an overall measure of an organization's structure.

Dimensions of Structure

Just as researchers have used varied definitions of structure, they also use different conceptualizations of what constitutes a structural dimension. Nevertheless, analysts have produced concepts that clarify the topic of structure (e.g., Hage, 1968; Porter and Lawler 1965; Pugh et al., 1968; Hall, Haas, and Johnson, 1967). Many of the dimensions identified in early research still play important roles in organizational theory (Daft, 2020; Hinings and Meyer, 2018; Hall and Tolbert, 2004; Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden, 2001; Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, and Spaeth, 1996).

These concepts include the following:

Size. Total organizational size, often measured by the number of full-time employees.

Centralization. The degree of centralization in an organization refers to the degree to which power and authority concentrate at the organization's higher levels (Prien and Ronan, 1971). Some researchers measure this dimension with questions about the location of decision-making authority (Pugh et al., 1968).

Configuration. The configuration refers to the "shape" of an organization's administrative apparatus or some aspect of it. This includes such measures as span of control (Porter and Lawler, 1965; Pugh et al., 1968), the number of levels in hierarchy (Hall et al., 1967), and the communications structure (Indik, 1968).

Specialization. This is the division of labor according to functional specialization (Sells, 1963) and/or task specialization (Indik, 1968).

Interdependence of subsystems. The degree of task interdependence or its opposite, the degree of autonomy, is identified with respect to internal functions (Sells, 1963).

Standardization of procedure. Standardization refers to the degree to which procedures are standardized (Prien and Ronan, 1971). Procedures that are not standardized are ad hoc.

Formalization of procedures. Formalization is the extent to which an organization's structures and procedures are formally established in written rules and regulations. Some researchers measure this element by asking employees how much they have to follow established rules, whether they must go through "proper channels," and whether a rule manual exists (Hage and Aiken, 1969; see also, Pandey and Scott, 2002). Others determine whether the organization has organization charts, rule manuals, and other formal instructions (Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, and Spaeth, 1996; Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings, 1969).

Complexity. Organizational complexity is measured in terms of the number of subunits, levels, and specializations in an organization. Researchers break down this dimension further into sub-dimensions (Hall and Tolbert, 2004). Organizations vary in horizontal differentiation, or the specialized division of labor across subunits and individuals. To measure horizontal differentiation, some researchers have simply counted the number of subunits and individual specializations in an organization (Meyer, 1979; see also Blau and Schoenherr, 1971). Vertical differentiation refers to the number of hierarchical levels in an organization – its “tallness” or “flatness.”

The above dimensions are representative of concepts used in prominent studies. The relevance of each dimension depends on the research context. For example, in public management, a stream of research focuses on whether rules and procedures facilitate or hamper performance. These researchers distinguish between rules that provide needed guidance and rules that are more onerous than needed. A similar but distinct research stream concerns the effects of administrative burdens.

Red Tape. Red tape consists of burdensome administrative rules and requirements. Sociologists and psychologists who study organizations have not used this concept a great deal, but scholars in public administration have recently refined and applied the concept in research on organizations. In earlier work, Bozeman (1993) defined red tape as “rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden” but “have no efficacy for the rules' functional object” (p. 283). He later revised his definition to associate red tape with performance, defining red tape as “burdensome administrative rules and procedures that have negative effects on the organization's performance” (Bozeman, 2000). Other researchers have expanded this research (e.g., Bozeman, 2000; Bozeman and Feeney, 2011; DeHart-Davis and Pandey, 2005; Pandey and Welch, 2005; Heinrich et al., 2020; Kaufman et al., 2021).

Administrative Burdens. An administrative burden refers to an individual's experience of policy implementation as onerous (Herd and Moynihan, 2018). Burdens affect citizens' access to public services. In explaining the differences between red tape and administrative burdens, Moynihan and Herd emphasize three categories of costs that individuals experience in their interactions with government: learning costs, psychological costs, and compliance costs. These costs are discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

Influences on Structure

Research has also analyzed influences on organizational structure. The following sections describe research about influences on the structural dimensions discussed previously.

Size. Various studies have shown that larger organizations tend to be more structurally complex than smaller ones, with more levels, departments, and job titles (e.g., Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, and Spaeth, 1996; Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings, 1969). However, Blau and Schoenherr (1971) also concluded that the rate at which complexity increases with size falls off at a certain point; organizations that reach this point grow larger without adding new departments and levels as rapidly as they did before. In addition, this research indicates that larger organizations tend to have less administrative overhead. So, contrary to stereotypes and popular books about bureaucracy (Parkinson, 1957), larger organizations often have smaller percentages of their personnel involved in administrative work.

Argyris (1972) criticized the findings about public organizations in some studies of organizational size. He noted that Blau studied government agencies controlled by civil service systems and, in drawing his conclusions, applied the results to all organizations. Civil service regulations may have caused these organizations to emphasize task specialization and narrow spans of control and thus grow in the patterns that Blau observed. Business organizations might not follow these patterns, however. In contrast to the findings of a study of state employment agencies by Blau and Schoenherr (1971), Beyer and Trice (1979), studying a set of federal agencies, found no direct relationship between size and vertical or horizontal differentiation. Ultimately, they concluded that increased size increases the division of labor, which in turn increases vertical and horizontal complexity. In addition, the relationships among size, division of labor, and vertical and horizontal differentiation were stronger in federal units doing routine work than in those doing nonroutine work. Thus larger public organizations tend toward somewhat greater structural complexity (more levels and subunits, greater division of labor) than smaller ones. Much larger organizations almost certainly show more complexity than much smaller ones, but the effects of size are not clear-cut.

Other researchers have reported further evidence that size has little clear influence on structure. Reviewing this research, Kimberly (1976) pointed out that size is actually a complex variable with different components, such as number of employees and net assets. This complicates conclusions about the influence of size. Even so, in the National Organizations Study (Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, and Spaeth, 1996), described by its authors as the first analysis of organizations based on a national probability sample, size figured as one of the important correlates of organizational structural characteristics.

According to the well-known “Schumpeterian hypothesis” due to economies of scale, most innovation and technical change can be attributed to giant corporations and imperfect competitors. However, David Audretsch and his colleagues provide strong evidence that economies of scale do not play an important role in the production of output (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1990, 1991); their findings imply no relationship between size and innovation and suggest small organizations can be just as innovative as large organizations. This finding appears to hold for multiple sectors and countries. For example, in a sample of Austrian firms, Hutschenreiter and Leo (2013) regress R&D expenditure and innovation expenditure on organization size variables (employment and sales) and do not find a more than proportional relationship (contrary to Schumpter). Moreover, they find a lower relationship at lower levels (degressive relationship) when they model the impact of the size variables on R&D employees.

Centralization/Decentralization. Centralization is one of the earliest themes in the literature on organizational structure that continues to be of interest to researchers (e.g., see Joseph et al., 2016; for a review see Joseph et al., 2018). Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) examined how decentralization impacts the search for high-performing activities and found that decentralization allows for the sufficient exploration of new combinations of activities; they also found that switching back to centralization (reintegration) is required to account for all interdependencies among activities. Research by Nickerson and Zenger (2002) implies similar performance advantages when an organization alternates between efficient and flexible structures. And, Joseph, Klingebiel, and Wilson (2016) find that centralized managers are more likely to change strategy associated with unsuccessful products; this finding suggests decentralized decision makers may not be in the best position to halt a losing strategy. However, environmental turbulence and complexity may be important boundary conditions for the advantages of such centralization (Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005).

Configuration. Wu (2014) found an association between span of control and the production of high-value products. The greater the span of control (flatter organization with more intensive vertical interactions), the more likely was the production of higher value products. The same research also finds a more pronounced (positive) effect with more communication.

Specialization. Establishing hierarchies and specialization are among the ways organizations integrate (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. For example, a hierarchy may impose divisions or new vocabularies. Alternatively, it may strengthen existing complementarities among subdivisions (Rafaelli, Glynn, and Tushman, 2019; see Keum and See, 2017 for a review).

Interdependence of subsystems. Aggarwal and Wu (2015) examined firms in the US defense system industry between 1996 and 2006. The scholars found that coordination across product area creates greater adaption challenges than does coordination within product interaction. That is, higher product complementarity is mitigated when interdependencies are grouped by organizational units.

Complexity. Siggelkow (2002) treats the degree of interactions between activities as complexity. Exploring the effects of managers not fully understanding the degree of interactions among activities, he finds managers' misperceptions involving complementary activities are costlier than those involving substitute activities because complements tend to amplify the performance consequences.

Red Tape. Research on red tape continues to be of interest to public management researchers. A key claim in the literature is that rules are either designed as ineffective or become ineffective during implementation (Bozeman, 1993, 2000; Bozeman and Feeney, 2011; DeHart-Davis et al., 2014). According to one review of the literature, over the last two decades, scholars have produced more than 50 articles on its effects (Bozeman and Feeney, 2011, p. 13; see also DeHart-Davis et al., 2014). Red tape research has produced several negative findings with respect to impacts on organizational performance, including reduced services to clients (Scott and Pandey, 2000), role ambiguity (Pandey and Rainey, 2006), managerial alienation (DeHart-Davis and Pandey, 2005), and lower morale (DeHart-Davis and Pandey, 2005; Pandey and Kingsley, 2000; Quratulain and Khan, 2013; Wright and Davis, 2003). One of the impediments to this research is the challenge of distinguishing between helpful rules and onerous rules (see also Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003; Oberfield, 2010; Walker and Brewer, 2008). In an attempt to overcome the problem, DeHart-Davis (2009) introduced a theory of green tape (effective rules). In subsequent research, DeHart Davis et al. (2014) put the theory to a partial test. They find a positive relationship between consistent rule application, optimal control, and job satisfaction.

Administrative Burdens. Recent research on administrative burdens provides another perspective on organizational design (e.g., Heinrich, 2016; Herd and Moynihan, 2018). This research has particular relevance to public organizations, to public service delivery and policy implementation, and to citizen relationships with government. It has political and psychological dimensions and draws from political science, law, and behavioral economics. Administrative burdens are similar but distinct from administrative discretion, rules, and red tape. In explaining the differences in these concepts, Herd and Moynihan point to three categories of costs that individuals experience in their interactions with government. Learning costs include time and effort to learn about a service or program and about one's eligibility status. Psychological costs include frustration at dealing with time-consuming and unfair procedures. Compliance costs involve financial costs of access, such as fees for transportation or legal representation. Research on administrative burdens conceives of organizational performance as including the quality of the relationship between the citizen and the state. Administrative burdens affect how citizens perceive their government, including whether they trust government, believe government is fair, and consider their participation worthwhile. It adds to a substantial volume of work on public sector performance measurement, such as that of Carolyn Heinrich and her colleagues (e.g., Heinrich, 2012; Heinrich and Marschke, 2003, 2012; Heinrich et al., 2020) and including their recent work on the effects of implementation processes on equity.

Information processing and decision making. Theory and research connecting organizational structure, information processing, and decision making has gained traction over the last few decades (Burton, 2013). Some authors have referred to this literature as the neo-Carnegie perspective (Gavetti et al., 2007). A good deal of the research takes the work of Herbert Simon as a starting point. Herbert Simon considered the key problem regarding organizational structure to be "how to organize to make decisions – that is, to process information" (1997, p. 240). Joseph and Gaba (2015) identify four major streams of this research: problem-skills matching, screening, learning/adaptation, and cognition. Research on problem-skills matching is grounded in organizational economics; using a decision-theoretic approach, this research focuses on coordinating the tasks and skills used to make decisions. Screening concerns the screening of information by individuals situated in different structures, including how decision rules affect the quality of decisions and how hierarchies affect psychological biases (e.g., Sah and Stiglitz, 1985, 1988, comparing the screening properties of hierarchies and polyarchies; see also Christensen and Knudsen, 2010, building upon their insights). Research in the domain of learning/adaptation focuses on how organizations adapt via trial-and-error, experiential, or reinforcement learning (indicated by updated actions in response to performance feedback), given that bounded rational individuals satisfice in their decision making (e.g., Denrell and March, 2001). The cognition stream that broadly deals with the relationship between organizational structure, individual cognition, and decision making includes such themes as knowledge sharing, hierarchy, and coupled search (e.g., Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti et al., 2012).

Environment. Chapter Four discussed the effects of organizational environments. One of the classic observations in organizational analysis maintains that a formalized, centralized structure performs well enough in a simple, stable environment, where it can take advantage of specialization and clear patterns of communication and authority. As the environment presents more changes and more uncertainty, however, strict rules, job descriptions, and chains of command become more cumbersome and managers are unable to evolve and process information rapidly enough. Therefore, rules and assignments have to become more flexible. Communication needs to move laterally among people and units, not strictly up and down a hierarchy. People working at lower levels must be given more authority to decide without having to ask permission up the chain of command. As its environment becomes more fragmented, an organization must reflect this complexity in its own structure, giving the people in the units that confront these multiplying environmental segments the authority they need to respond to the conditions they encounter. Although in some ways this general perspective was superseded by more recent perspectives on organizations (Aldrich, Ruef, and Lippman, 2020), it still exerts great influence on current prescriptions for managers (Daft, 2020; Galbraith, 2014).

More recent approaches, such as institutional models, contend that organizations adopt rules and structural arrangements because of prevailing beliefs about their appropriateness or because of influences from external institutions such as government. As we have seen, a number of researchers have advanced claims and evidence that governmental ownership and funding have important influences on the structures of public organizations.

Technology and Tasks. A number of studies indicate that an organization's structure also depends on the nature of its work processes, that is, its technologies and tasks. Researchers use a wide variety of definitions of technology and tasks, such as the interdependence required by and the routineness of the work. The effects on structure depend on which of these definitions one uses (Tehrani, Montanari, and Carson, 1990).

In his influential book, *Organizations in Action*, Thompson (1967) analyzes technology in terms of the type of interdependence among workers and units the work requires. Organizations such as banks and insurance companies have mediating technologies. They deal with many individuals who need largely the same set of services, such as checking accounts or insurance policies. Their work involves *pooled* interdependence because it pools together such services and sets of clients. They establish branches that have little interdependence with one another and formulate standardized rules and procedures to govern them. *Long-linked technologies*, such as typical assembly line operations, have a *sequential* pattern of interdependence. One unit completes its work and passes the product along to the next unit, which completes another phase of the work, and so on. Plans and schedules become an important coordination tool for these units. Units with *intensive* technologies have a *reciprocal* pattern of interdependence. The special units in a hospital or a research and development (R&D) laboratory need to engage in a lot of back-and-forth communication and adjustment in the process of completing the work. These units must be close together and coordinated through mutual adjustments and informal meetings. Thompson contended that organizations may have all these forms of interdependence. They will first organize together those persons and units that have reciprocal interdependence and require high levels of mutual adjustment. Then they will organize together those units with sequential interdependence, and then group units with pooled interdependence (such as the branches of a bank around a city). Analyzing many studies of structure, Tehrani, Montanari, and Carson (1990) found some support for Thompson's observations.

One can find examples of public organizations that follow the patterns that Thompson described. The SSA operates regional service centers around the country that process beneficiaries' claims, or applications for Social Security benefits. These centers provide an example of pooled interdependence and mediating technology. For a long time, within these centers, employees and units that processed the claims were organized as a long-linked technology. One large unit would perform one step or phase in the processing of a claim, such as claims authorization, in which a specialist ensures that the client's claim is legal and acceptable. Then the claim would be delivered to another department in the service center where another specialist would perform the next phase of processing the claim, which involved calculating the amount the beneficiary would receive in monthly Social Security payments. Then the claim would go through several more steps in processing, such as recording and filing the claim in the beneficiary's record. As the population of beneficiaries grew and became more complex, however, and as the Social Security eligibility rules became more complex, the people working on different parts of the claims processing procedure needed to communicate with one another more and more about individual cases. As a result, they sent cases back and forth between units, and this created backlogs. As Chapter Thirteen describes, the agency reorganized to establish modular work units, which brought together people from the different phases in single units. They could thus communicate and adjust more rapidly, an example of a more intensive technology. Other factors besides work processes influenced the reorganization, but Thompson's ideas about interdependence clearly apply.

Another very influential perspective on technology, developed by Perrow (1973), argues that work processes vary along two main dimensions: the frequency with which exceptions to normal procedures arise and the degree to which these exceptions are analyzable (that is, the degree to which they can be solved through a rational, systematic search). If a machine breaks down, often a clear set of steps can lead to fixing it. If a human being breaks down psychologically, usually few systematic procedures lead as directly to diagnosis and treatment.

Organizational technologies can rank high or low on either of these two main dimensions. *Routine* technologies involve few exceptions and provide clear steps in response to any that occur (high analyzability). In such cases, the work is usually programmed through plans and rules, because there is little need for intensive communication and individual discretion in performing the work. For examples of routine technology, researchers usually point to the work of many manufacturing personnel, auditors, and clerical personnel. At the opposite extreme, non-routine technologies involve many exceptions, which are less analyzable when they occur. Units and organizations doing this type of work tend toward flexible, “polycentralized” structures, with power and discretion widely dispersed and with much interdependence and mutual adjustment among units and people. Units that are engaged in strategic planning, R&D, and psychiatric treatment apply such non-routine technologies.

Between these extremes, Perrow suggests, are two intermediate categories: *craft* technology and *engineering* technology. Craft technology involves infrequent exceptions but offers no easily programmed solutions when they occur. Government budget analysts, e.g., may work quite routinely but with few clear guidelines on how to deal with the unpredictable variations that may arise, such as unanticipated shortfalls. These organizations tend to be more decentralized than those with routine technologies. Engineering technology involves many exceptions but also offers analyzable responses to them. Engineers may encounter many variations, but often they can respond in systematic, programmed ways. Lawyers and auditors often deal with this type of work. When an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) auditor examines a person's income tax return, many unanticipated questions come up about whether certain of the person's tax deductions can be allowed. The auditor can resolve many of the questions, however, by referring to written rules and guidelines. Organizations with engineering technologies tend to be more centralized than those with nonroutine technologies, but more flexibly structured than those with routine technologies. Tehrani, Montanari, and Carson (1990) also found support for Perrow's observations. They reviewed numerous studies that showed that organizational units with routine technologies had more formal rules and procedures and fewer highly educated and professional employees.

Perrow's analysis has applications to public organizations. In a study of state employment agencies, Van de Ven, Delbecq, and Koenig (1976) used questionnaire items about task variability and task difficulty based on Perrow's work. The questions asked about how much the work involves the same tasks and issues, how easy it is to know whether the work is being done correctly, and similar issues. The researchers found relationships between the structures and coordination processes in organizational units and the nature of their tasks. Some units, such as units that handled applications for unemployment compensation, had tasks low in uncertainty (low in variability and difficulty). The employees mainly filled out and submitted application forms for the persons who came in to seek unemployment compensation. These units had more plans and rules and fewer scheduled and unscheduled meetings than other units, and relatively little horizontal communication among individuals and units. Other units had tasks higher in task uncertainty, such as the unemployment counseling bureau, which helped unemployed people seek jobs. This task involved many variations in the characteristics of the clients – in their needs and skills, for example – and often there was no clearly established procedure for responding to some of these unique variations. In this bureau, employees relied little on plans and rules and had more scheduled and unscheduled meetings and more horizontal communication than other units. Units that were intermediate on the task dimensions fell in the middle ranges on the structural and coordination dimensions. So, in many government agencies, in spite of the external political controls, subunits tend toward more flexible structures when they have uncertain, non-routine, variable tasks.

Yet Perrow himself pointed out that organizations doing the same work can define the nature of it differently. Job Corps training centers for disadvantaged youths in the 1960s were first operated by personnel from the US Office of Economic Opportunity, who adopted a nurturant approach to running the centers. Serious disciplinary problems led to the transfer of some of the centers to the Department of the Interior, after which the staff increasingly emphasized strict rules and discipline and highly structured routines. The same organization in effect altered its definitions of the same task. Similarly, many organizations have purposely tried to transform routine work into more interesting, flexible work to better motivate and utilize the skills of the people doing it. The SSA changed to modular work units partly for such reasons.

Also complicating the analysis of technology, various studies have found weak relationships between structure and technology, sometimes finding that size influences structure more than technology does. Research indicates that technology shows stronger effects on structure in smaller organizations than in larger ones (Tehrani, Montanari, and Carson, 1990). Similarly, the effects of task characteristics on structure are strongest within task subunits; that is, the task of a bureau within a larger organization has a stronger relationship to the structure of that bureau than to the structure of the larger organization. In sum, factors such as size, technology, and structure have complex interrelationships.

Information Technology. Increasingly, organizational researchers and managers have to try to assess the influence of information technology (IT) on organizational design. The advent and dissemination of computers, the Internet, e-mail, and other forms of information and communication technology have transformed organizations and working life within them and continue to have dramatic effects. A later section of this chapter reviews recent literature on the effects of IT.

Strategic Choice. Managers' strategic choices also determine structure. Managers may separate an organization into divisions and departments designed to handle particular markets, products, or challenges that have been chosen for strategic emphasis. In the examples at the beginning of this chapter, the IRS's reorganizing for a more customer-oriented structure was part of a major strategic reorientation that IRS leadership sought to develop; and the changes in structure at BNL – the new directorates and new rules and procedures – represented strategic decisions about how to respond to intense challenges and pressures from the environment.

Organizational Design

Work on contingency theory led to the development of literature offering guidelines for managers and others engaged in designing organizations (Burton, Obel, and Hakonsson, 2020; Daft, 2020; Galbraith, 2014; Mintzberg, 1979, 1983). Although these authors usually do not consider the distinctiveness of public organizations, many of the concepts they discuss apply in public management.

Design Strategies

Jay Galbraith (1977) proposed a set of techniques for designing and coordinating activities in organizations that is based on an information-processing approach. Organizations face varying degrees of uncertainty, depending on how much more information they need than they actually have. As this uncertainty increases, the organizational structure must process more information. Organizations employ a mix of alternative modes for coordinating these activities. First, they use the organizational *hierarchy of authority*, in which superiors direct subordinates, answering their questions and specifying rules and procedures for managing the information processing load. As uncertainty increases, it overwhelms these approaches. The next logical strategy, then, is to set *plans and goals* and allow subordinates to pursue them with less referral up and down the hierarchy and with fewer rules. They can also narrow *spans of control* so that superiors must deal with fewer subordinates and can process more information and decisions.

Many contemporary organizations operate under such great uncertainty that these basic modes become overloaded, so they must pursue additional alternatives. First, managers can try to reduce the need for information. They can engage in *environmental management* to create more certainty through more effective competition for scarce resources, through public relations, and through cooperation and contracting with other organizations. They can create *slack resources* (that is, create a situation in which they have extra resources) by reducing the level of performance they seek to attain, or they can create *self-contained* tasks, such as profit centers or groups working independently on individual components of the work. Alternatively, managers can increase information-processing capacity by investing in *vertical information systems*, such as computerized information management systems, or by creating *lateral relations*, such as task forces or liaison personnel. Thus, managers have to adopt coordination modes in response to greater uncertainty and information processing demands. In recent work, Galbraith (2014) exemplifies the movement among organizations and organization design experts toward increasing emphasis on flexibility and rapid adaptation to complex and quickly changing challenges. He emphasizes processes for lateral coordination, including *e-coordination*, greater utilization of teams, and methods of designing *reconfigurable* organizations amenable to continuous redesign, as well as *virtual corporation* models, wherein an organization contracts out all activities except those at which it is superior (Galbraith, 2014).

Mintzberg's Synthesis

Mintzberg (1979) presented one of the most comprehensive reviews of the literature on structure, summarizing the set of structural alternatives that managers can pursue. Although his synthesis has grown somewhat dated in relation to the sorts of developments that Galbraith covered, many of the fundamental challenges for organization designers remain the same and Mintzberg's review still provides a valuable analysis of alternatives and distinctions. He began by setting forth his own scheme for describing the major components of organizations. They have an operating core, including members directly involved in the organization's basic work: police officers, machine operators, teachers, claims processors, and so on. The strategic apex consists of the top managerial positions: the board of directors, chief executive officer, president, and president's staff. The middle line includes the managers who link the apex to the core through supervision and implementation: the vice presidents down through the supervisors. Finally, two types of staff units complete the set of components. The technostructure consists of analysts who work on standardizing work, outputs, and skills: the policy analysts and program evaluators, strategic planners, systems engineers, and personnel training staff. The support staff units support the organization outside the workflow of the operating core: e.g., mail room, food service, and public relations personnel.

Design Parameters. Organizations establish structures to divide and then coordinate work within and among these units through the design of four different structural categories: positions, superstructures, lateral linkages, and decision-making systems.

Design of Positions. Individual positions can be established through *job specialization, behavior formalization* (written job descriptions, written work instructions, general rules), and *training and indoctrination* (in which individuals learn the skills they will apply using their own judgment).

Design of Superstructures. The different positions must be coordinated through the design of the organization's superstructure. All organizations do this in part through *unit grouping*, which is based on any of a number of criteria: knowledge and skill (lawyers, engineers, social workers), function (police, fire, and parks and recreation employees; military personnel), time (night shift, day shift), output (the products produced by the different divisions of a corporation), clients (inpatients or outpatients, beneficiaries of insurance policies), or place (the regional offices of business firms, the federal government, and many state agencies; precincts in a city police department).

Managers choose among these bases or some combination of them. We have little conclusive scientific guidance for those choices, but Mintzberg offered suggestions about criteria for grouping. It can follow *workflow interdependencies*, in which natural phases in the work require certain people to communicate closely or to be located near one another. *Process interdependencies* make it useful to group together people who perform the same type of work (attorneys, claims eligibility experts), so they can learn from one another and share tools and materials. Because of *scale interdependencies*, certain units may become large enough to need their own functional categories – their own set of attorneys, for example. Also, *social interdependencies* may make it useful to group individuals to facilitate social relations, morale, and cohesiveness. Military units that have trained together are often kept together for these reasons.

Design of Lateral Linkages. Mintzberg suggested that coordination also requires linking operations laterally. For this purpose, organizations can use *performance-control systems, action-planning systems*, or *liaison devices*. Performance-control systems specify general results to be attained as indications that operations are effectively coordinated. For example, as described in Chapter Thirteen, in large service centers operated by the SSA, employees are organized into "modules." A module is a work unit that includes all the personnel required to handle a client's application for Social Security benefits (as well as other types of services), including people who authorize the benefits, people who calculate what the benefit payment will be, file clerks, typists, and other specialists. Administrators keep track of the average time the modules take in handling clients' requests: For example, how many days, on average, does each module take to complete the handling of a client's application? They can compare these times across modules and to national standards. A low average time (that is, fast processing of the requests) indicates effective coordination within the module. Good average times for all the modules suggest that the service center is effectively coordinated – that all modules are performing well. When a module falls behind the others and has backlogs of applications and slower times, however, this indicates a possible coordination problem – not just in that module, but among the modules. Sometimes a module may have an overload of particularly difficult cases or some personnel problems such as high absenteeism or a lot of newer employees who need training. The slower time for the module may thus indicate that the assignment of cases and personnel is not effectively coordinated among the modules, and administrators may shift some of the caseload to other modules or transfer some personnel among modules temporarily so as to better coordinate the work of the modules. Thus, the performance-control information provides evidence about coordination within and among units. (Of course, simple reviews of limited performance information, such as time taken to complete the processing of an application, can have serious pitfalls as an evaluation system, and managers must be sensitive to these weaknesses.)

An action-planning system, by contrast, specifies not the general result or standard but the details about actions that people and groups are to take. In the modules just mentioned, the applications from clients are placed in file folders that move from point to point in the modules as different people do their part of the work on the case. The filing clerks are trained in a system for moving and keeping track of the many thousands of files for each module, so they will not be lost and can be located at any given time. As the clerks move the files around the module, they log them in when they arrive at certain points, using a bar code scanner similar to those used in supermarkets. The careful specification of the actions of the file clerks in this file-tracking system is essential to coordinating the different specialists in the module and to assessing the coordination of the work among all the modules.

Liaison devices include such arrangements as having a person serve in a special position as “ambassador” to another unit, keeping track of developments there and facilitating communication with the other unit. Task forces or standing liaison committees can also address problems of coordination. One of the service centers used a task force to respond to a major coordination problem. The first three digits of a person's Social Security number indicate where that person was born or where he or she was when the number was issued. In the service centers, cases are usually assigned to modules on the basis of these first three digits. That alone can create coordination problems, because certain regions of the country produce more cases that are difficult to handle than other regions. Modules assigned to certain geographical areas may thus get more difficult cases than other modules. One service center considered moving its modules to "terminal digit case allocation" – that is, allocating cases on the basis of the last four digits of the Social Security number to achieve a fairer distribution. Yet moving to this new allocation system required extensive coordination among the modules because they had to transfer all the files among themselves to redistribute them according to the new system. The director of the center appointed a task force to consider and plan the new system. The task force was highly representative, with people from all levels and many different modules and units. Empowered by the director to plan and implement the new system as they saw fit, the task force effectively managed the transition to the new system.

Design of Decision-Making Systems Through Decentralization. Organizations can also decentralize. *Vertical decentralization* involves pushing decision-making authority down to lower levels. *Horizontal decentralization* involves spreading authority out to staff analysts or experts or across individuals involved in the work of the organization.

Types of Organizational Structures. Mintzberg also proposed a typology of five types of organizational structures, based on the employment of these design alternatives and shifts in the roles of the components described earlier. *Simple* structures are usually adopted by new, small government agencies, small corporations run by an entrepreneur, and other new, small, aggressive organizations headed by strong leaders. They tend toward vertical and horizontal centralization and coordination by means of direct supervision from a strong strategic apex. *Machine bureaucracies* include the prototypical large bureaucracies in the public and private sectors. They evolve from simple structures as growth, age, or external control lead to greater emphasis on standardizing work processes. The techno-structure becomes more important as experts and staff specialists assume roles in this process. Mintzberg suggested a subcategory—*public* machine bureaucracies—consisting of government agencies that assume this form because they are required to standardize for political oversight. Alternatively, simple structures with a strong professional component (law firms, research organizations) evolve toward *professional bureaucracies*, with a profession that dominates their operating core, coordination primarily through standardization of skills (through professional training) rather than standardization of tasks, and general decentralization. Machine bureaucracies may further evolve into *divisionalized forms* as further growth leads to economies of scale for product-oriented subunits. It becomes more cost-effective to break the organization up into product divisions with their own versions of the various functional components – e.g., their own manufacturing and marketing divisions. Mintzberg (1989) observed that public machine bureaucracies cannot do this. Without profit and sales measures by which their general performance can be monitored, and because they operate under more intensive, political oversight, public machine bureaucracies face more constraints on their ability to decentralize to relatively autonomous divisions than their private counterparts do. Finally, an *adhocracy*, such as NASA, or an innovation-oriented firm, has a very organic structure, with great emphasis on fluid communication and flexibility, largely through decentralization to project teams.

Major Design Alternatives

Functional Structures. Management writers also contrast the pros and cons of the major design alternatives from which organizations choose (Burton, Obel, and DeSanctis, 2011; Chichocki and Irwin, 2011; Daft, 2020; Galbraith, 2014). Functional structures, the classical prototype, organize according to major functions: marketing and sales, manufacturing, finance, R&D. The advantages include economies of scale within the functional units (e.g., all the attorneys in the legal department can use the same law library; the manufacturing personnel share plants and machinery). Departments concentrate on their functions and enhance their specialized skills. Yet this may weaken coordination with other functions to ensure overall product quality or the implementation of needed changes.

Product and Hybrid Structures. As organizations grow, producing more diverse products and competing in more diverse, rapidly changing markets, the functional structure proves too slow in responding to changes and too hierarchical to allow rapid coordination across functional divisions. Large corporations, such as the major automobile manufacturers, thus adopt *product structures*, with separate divisions, each responsible for its own product line. Each division possesses its own units to perform major functions such as sales and manufacturing (e.g., the Oldsmobile, Chevrolet, and Buick divisions of General Motors or, in a high-technology firm, divisions for medical instruments, personal computers, and electronic instruments). This approach sacrifices some of the advantages of the functional form, but it provides for more rapid responses to environmental changes (in product technology, customer demands, competitors) and greater concentration on the quality of the products rather than on individual functions. In fact, many corporations actually employ *hybrid structures*, with major product divisions (e.g., chemicals, fuels, lubricants; see Daft, 2020) but also some major functional units (finance, human resources).

Matrix Designs. During the past century, some firms developed a matrix structure in response to demands for both high-quality products in highly technical areas (product emphasis) and rapid and reliable production (functional emphasis). The sort of mixing or crosshatching of different types of responsibility and authority characteristic of matrix organizations evolved into different alternatives, but still occurs quite frequently. Military weapons manufacturers, e.g., faced pressure to produce highly technical weapons systems according to demanding standards, and to do so within sharp time constraints. Matrix structures purposely violate the classic prescriptions for “one master” and clear chains of authority. High-level managers share authority over the same activities, with some exercising functional authority (such as vice presidents for product development, manufacturing, marketing, procurement) and others having responsibility for the particular products or projects that cross all those functions. Thus, one manager may have responsibility for pushing the completion of a particular aircraft project, while others may share responsibility for the particular functions involved in getting the craft built. The authority of the product executives crosses all the functions, whereas the functional executives have authority over their functions across all the products. Diagrammed, this structure appears as a matrix of two sets of executives with crosshatched lines of authority. It offers the advantage of the ability to share or shift personnel or other resources rapidly across product lines and to coordinate the organization's response to dual pressures from the environment. However, it requires a heavy investment in coordination, liaison activities, and conflict resolution. Successful matrix designs often require a lot of training and good interpersonal skills on the part of managers, because such designs typically produce high levels of stress and conflict that must be resolved.

Some structures in the public sector have been equated with matrix structures. Simon (1983) described the use of a matrix management arrangement at the US Consumer Product Safety Commission. This commission was organized into functional bureaus, including the Bureau of Engineering, the Bureau of Economics, the Bureau of Biomedical Science, and so on. Each bureau had partial responsibility for developing regulations issued by the commission, but none had overall responsibility. The matrix arrangement involved six functional directorates and the Office of Program Management. The Office of Program Management had a program manager for each of a set of new product-oriented programs, including a chemical products program, an electrical products program, and a children's products program. These program managers chaired program teams made up of representatives from the various functional directorates. The teams managed the overall development of regulations for the products for which their programs were responsible, and they coordinated the work of the functional directorates pertaining to those programs. The commission's executives felt that the matrix arrangement would improve productivity, morale, effective use of resources, communication, and accountability, but it also increased stress and turf battles and evoked some resistance, as matrix arrangements usually do.

The executive director of the commission observed that public managers face particular challenges in adopting matrix designs. He felt that private executives have more authority over rewards and have profit targets to use as incentives for cooperation. Public executives can impose fewer sanctions and have weaker authority to reassign those who resist a new design. Here again we see that a design developed in industry has potential value in government but requires skillful implementation within the constraints imposed by the public sector. Swiss (1991) provided further examples of the use of matrix organization in city governments.

Market and Customer-Focused Designs. According to Galbraith (2014), many corporations have moved toward a *market structure*, in which the main organizational units are organized on the basis of their orientation to groupings of customers, markets, or industries. The IRS reorganization described at the beginning of the chapter exemplifies a *customer-focused* version of this alternative. The more frequent adoption of this structural form has been driven by the rise of the service industry, which increases the value of knowledge of market segments and customers, and by the increasing tendency to contract out functions and services, which reduces demands for large-scale production operations that used to force an organization toward functional divisions or large-scale product divisions.

Geographical Designs. Organizations have employed *geographical structures*, such as the emphasis on geographic regions and districts in the original IRS structure described at the beginning of the chapter. Although the IRS has moved away from that alternative, organizations continue to utilize it, sometimes as part of a hybridized combination with another structural emphasis, as in the case of a *global matrix structure* for a business firm's international operations (Daft, 2020). This alternative can reduce transportation and logistics costs and challenges. It can bring services closer to customers and allow service delivery on site, and it can enhance the perception that the organization is local (Galbraith, 2014). In addition, organizations often face major geographical imperatives because of such developments as globalization and internationalization of organizational activities. Such developments virtually require emphasis on geography in organizational design, through such obvious alternatives as headquarters or centers of operation on different continents or in different nations (Daft, 2020).

Process Structures. Still another contemporary approach to organizational design involves the process structure: Divisions are organized around processes, such as the new product development process, and customer acquisition and maintenance processes, in which customer service teams focus on segments or groupings of customers.

Given all these alternatives, it should not be surprising that structures in organizations show a great deal of variation. These alternatives actually serve as prototypes that organizational designers choose among and blend using heavy doses of pragmatism, because obviously no scientific method exists for designing organizations. As discussed earlier, management experts currently propose that many organizations should adopt highly adaptive, permeable, fluid, loosely arranged structures, and they observe that organizations increasingly attempt to do so.

The literature on organization structure and design provides many illustrations of the employment of teams – including shifting teams in “reconfigurable” organizations – and of designs for lateral and horizontal coordination in and among organizations. The heavy emphasis on the accountability of public organizations to external authorities may impede the use of some flexible structures in government agencies, but these alternatives are often applicable in some form. A geologist with the US Geological Survey, e.g., works with officials of the nation of Afghanistan to develop that war-ravaged nation's geological resources, such as water, oil, and mineral deposits. A project assessing the potential for such resources and their development will involve an ad hoc team representing different organizational units, including experts on water resources, mineral resources, oil and gas resources, and other resources and related issues (such as earthquakes). The team will be flexible and "reconfigurable" over time. In many other instances as well the more contemporary design alternatives apply to government and its organizations.

Holacracy. A holacracy refers to a decentralized management and organizational structure of governance, a sort of "no-structure structure" that claims to distribute authority and decision making via self-organizing teams. The term "holarchy" was first coined by Arthur Koestler (1967) in "The Ghost in the Machine" wherein Koestler describes a holocracy as comprised of holons (from the Greek), autonomous and self-reliant units, and at the same time, dependent on the greater whole. Puranam and Hakonsson (2015) describe a holocracy as an organizational form without a formal hierarchy, job titles, or job descriptions. Organizational analysts have advanced similar ideas, such as "postbureaucratic," "poststructuralist," "information-based," and "organic" organizations. Holacracy has been adopted by businesses in several countries and in non-profit organizations. The online shoe company Zappos has been described as a holocracy (Groth, 2016). In its early phase, the online publisher Medium was also structured as a holacracy. However, in 2016, the company reportedly abandoned the form because of difficulty coordinating large-scale projects (Boyd, 2013; Stirman, 2013; Doyle, 2016).

In a *Harvard Business Review* article, "Beyond the Holacracy Hype," Bernstein et al. (2016) argue that organizations are attracted to the holacracy form as a way to balance reliability and adaptability. They describe the holacracy as the latest variation of self-managing teams and an extension of adhocracy – e.g., a flexible informal management form, observed by Warren Bennis and Henry Mintzberg in the 1980s. They also predict that despite the challenges associated with holacracies, elements of self-organization will become valuable tools for all organizations in the future. In 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic made work-from-home arrangements widespread. Companies increasingly grapple with novel ways to communicate, integrate, and coordinate. The lessons from Zappos and other organizations, which have structured their organizations as holacracies, deserve attention.

Organizational Structures in Public Organizations

The question of alternative designs for public organizations brings us back to whether public organizations have distinctive structures. As mentioned earlier, some academic theories and observations suggest that public organizations are inherently different from private organizations, because governmental oversight and the absence of performance indicators such as sales and profits cause them to emphasize rules and hierarchy. If this is true, it suggests that public organizations cannot adopt some structural forms, such as decentralized and flexible designs, or that they can do so only with great difficulty. Conversely, many organization theorists regard public sector status as unimportant (in part because their research has often found little evidence that public organizations have distinctive structures). Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings (1969), e.g., predicted that government organizations in their sample would show higher levels of formalization (they used a measure called "structuring of activities"), but they did not. Over the years, additional studies have concurred. Buchanan (1975) also sought to test the proverbial red-tape differences by comparing federal managers to business managers on a "structure salience" scale. Unexpectedly, the public managers perceived that a lower level of salience was assigned to structure in their organizations. Bozeman and Loveless (1987) found that public sector R&D units differed only slightly from private sector R&D units in the amount of red tape with which they had to contend. Langbein (2000) analyzed the results of a 1994 survey of 2,750 members of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and compared those who worked in the public sector to those employed in the private sector on the degree to which they felt they had discretion – autonomy in decision making – in their work. She found no significant difference between the two groups (although she concluded that conditions that the engineers perceive as constraining discretion, such as disagreement among higher-level authorities, were more likely to prevail in the public sector). Kurland and Egan (1999) analyzed a small sample of organizations, comparing responses from members of two public agencies to those in seven private firms, and found little difference between the two sets of employees on perceptions about the formalization of their jobs and their communication patterns.

Yet other evidence suggests that public organizations do differ. Although Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings (1969) did not find greater "structuring of activities" in government organizations, in those organizations authority was more concentrated at the top of or outside the organization, especially concerning personnel procedures. The researchers concluded that an organization's size and technological development act as the main determinants of how the organization structures its activities, but government ownership exerts an influence independent of size and technology, causing this concentration of authority at the top or with external authorities. The study included only eight public organizations, all local government units with tasks similar to those of many business firms, including a local water department and a manufacturing unit of a government agency. This might explain why these organizations did not show as much bureaucratic structuring as anticipated. It also indicates, however, the effects of government ownership even on organizations that are much like business firms. A public manager would probably comment that the researchers simply observed the effects of civil service systems.

Mintzberg (1979) cited this evidence from Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings when he designated public machine bureaucracies as a subtype within the machine bureaucracy category in his typology of structures. He argued that many public bureaucracies tend toward the machine bureaucracy form because of external governmental control. Other studies have come to similar conclusions. Warwick (1975) concluded from his case study of the US Department of State that public bureaucracies inherently incline toward elaborate hierarchies and rules. Meyer (1979) analyzed a national sample of state and local finance agencies and found their vertical hierarchies to be very stable over time. Political pressures forced frequent changes in their subunit composition, however, and pressures from the federal government led to formalization of their personnel systems. Meyer concluded that public bureaucracies have no alternative to elaborate hierarchies. Their managers' political strength and skill, however, determine how well they can defend themselves from external forces that can strip away their subunits and assign them to some other organization.

Holdaway, Newberry, Hickson, and Heron (1975) found, in a study of Canadian universities, that higher degrees of government control are related to correspondingly higher levels of formalization, standardization of personnel procedures, and centralization. Chubb and Moe (1990) reported that public school employees in the United States perceive more externally imposed formal constraints on personnel procedures and school policies than do private school employees. Rainey's sample of middle managers in state agencies (1983) perceived more organizational formalization, particularly concerning going through channels and adhering to standard operating procedures, than did middle managers in business firms. This study and a number of others found that government managers report much stronger constraints on the administration of extrinsic rewards such as pay and promotion under the existing personnel rules for their organizations than do business managers. Chapters Nine and Ten cite various studies that have found this difference at all levels of government. Also indicating the effects of public sector status on personnel procedures, Tolbert and Zucker (1983) showed how federal pressures influenced the diffusion of civil service personnel systems across governments in the United States. Light (2002b) compared the results from a survey of 673 US federal employees to those of a survey of 505 private employees and found that federal employees perceived more layers of supervisors in their organizations. Zaffane (1994) compared survey responses of 474 public sector managers and 944 private sector managers in 238 organizations operating in Australia. The public managers perceived more emphasis on rules and regulations in their organizations than did their private counterparts.

Studies by professional associations and government agencies, and the testimony of public managers, paint a similar picture. A National Academy of Public Administration (1986) report lamented the complex web of controls and rules governing federal managers' decisions and the adverse effects of these constraints on their capacity and motivation to manage. The report complained that managers in charge of large federal programs often face irritating limits on their authority to make even minor decisions. The head of a program involving tens of millions of dollars might have to seek the approval of the General Services Administration before he or she can send an assistant to a short training program. Very large surveys of federal employees have found that a large percentage of federal managers and executives say they do not have enough authority to remove, hire, promote, and determine the pay of their employees. Large percentages have also expressed the opinion that federal personnel and budgeting rules create obstacles to productivity (US Office of Personnel Management, 1979, 1980, 1983). Executives who have served in both business and government say similar things about the constraints on the authority of managers in government positions imposed by overarching rules and oversight agencies (Allison, 1983; Blumenthal, 1983; Chase and Reveal, 1983; IBM Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002). The National Performance Review during the Clinton administration sought to enact a number of reforms aimed at reducing rules and red tape in the federal government. President Clinton issued an executive order instructing all federal agencies to reduce their rules by 50% (an order that appears to have had virtually no impact), and other initiatives sought to decentralize and reduce the rules and constraints in federal human resource management and procurement procedures. These efforts reflect a widespread conviction that government organizations are subject to extensive and excessive rules and hierarchical controls.

Research on *red tape* also generally supports this view. Sociologists and psychologists who study organizations have not made much use of the concept of red tape, probably because they regard it as a vague, colloquial idea that supports crude stereotypes about organizations. Because the problem of red tape has been a classic and proverbial topic in government, however, researchers in public administration have done more in recent years to develop the concept. It derives from the practice in the British civil service of binding official documents in red tape, and it generally refers to cumbersome organizational rules and procedures, frequently associated with government. A topic of satire and ridicule at least since Charles Dickens wrote an essay about it, the red tape problem has over the years led to many initiatives aimed at reducing red tape in government. These efforts have tended to make little headway, often because even as one person or group may regard a rule as burdensome and absurd, another person or group defends it as an essential protection of the public interest (Kaufman, 1977). Bozeman and others (Bozeman, 2000; Bozeman and Feeney, 2011) have developed the concept for use in research, however, and their research tends to support the generalization that public organizations have more red tape than private ones—a finding consistent with the findings about greater levels of formalization in public organizations. Bozeman defines red tape as “rules, regulations, and procedures that … entail a compliance burden but do not advance the legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve” (2000, p. 12). Thus, red tape differs from formalization (formal rules and procedures) in that red tape involves excessive and unduly expensive or burdensome rules and regulations.

Bozeman also develops concepts for dimensions and types of red tape, such as *rule inception red tape*, which originates when the rule is established because of such problems as inaccurate forecasts about the effects of the rule, or because managers make excessive attempts at control. *Rule-evolved red tape* occurs when rules drift away from their original form because of how they are implemented or because they are incompatible with other rules. Pandey and Scott (2002) and Pandey and Kingsley (2000) further show empirical evidence that red tape should be regarded as a concept distinct from formalization.

Most important, when surveys have asked government and business managers about the extent of red tape in their organizations, the public managers have consistently reported higher levels than the business managers (Rainey, Pandey, and Bozeman, 1995). In other studies, in which public and private managers have responded to questions about how long it takes to finish certain administrative functions, such as hiring a new person, firing an employee, or purchasing a piece of equipment, the public managers have reported longer times than the business managers (Scott and Falcone, 1998; Bozeman and Rainey, 1998).

All of these studies and reports provide increasing evidence that public sector status influences an organization's structure in a number of ways, particularly in regard to rules and structural arrangements over which external oversight agencies have authority, such as personnel and purchasing procedures. The stream of research does show some inconsistencies, however, on such dimensions as formalization, in which some studies find differences between the two sectors and some do not. A very interesting and important interpretation of these inconsistencies involves a distinction between formalization and red tape in general and formalization and red tape in such areas as personnel and purchasing, in which government agencies are subject to control by external authorities that impose the rules on them. This interpretation takes on importance because it contrasts with the common assertion that a lot of rules and red tape originate inside public bureaucracies because bureaucrats have an affinity for rules and because higher-level government bureaucrats issue a profusion of rules in attempts to control lower-level bureaucrats (e.g., Downs, 1967; Lynn, 1987; Warwick, 1975).

Bozeman and Bretschneider (1994) provided explicit evidence of these patterns. They analyzed them in R&D laboratories on the basis of the labs' public or private status and on the amount of government funding they received. The government labs had highly structured personnel rules. The private labs did not, even when they received high levels of government funding. The private labs did, however, receive more contacts and communications from government officials when they received more public funding. This suggests that government funding brings with it a different pattern of governmental influence than does governmental ownership. Ownership brings with it the formal authority of oversight agencies to impose rules, usually governing personnel, purchasing, and accounting and budgeting procedures.

Bretschneider (1990) provided more evidence in an analysis of decisions about computer systems in public and private organizations. Managers in the public organizations experienced longer delays in getting approval to purchase computer equipment and in the processing of those purchases. The delays apparently reflect the procurement rules imposed by central procurement agencies such as the General Services Administration. In sum, these studies provide evidence, consistent with the pattern that began to emerge with the Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings (1969) study, that government ownership often subjects organizations to central oversight rules over such matters as personnel, purchasing, and budgeting and accounting procedures.

More recent survey evidence supports this observation more strongly than ever. Feeney and Rainey (2010) reported results of surveys in several different states, involving all levels of government and many different organizations, at different points across a thirty-year period. They compared the responses of public and private managers to numerous questions about constraints under personnel rules. They asked whether the rules made it hard to fire a poor manager or reward a good manager with higher pay, and similar questions. The differences between the public and private managers were huge by the standards of survey research. Roughly 90% of the public managers agreed that their organization's personnel rules make it hard to fire poor managers and hard to reward good managers with higher pay, whereas 90% of the business managers disagreed. These differences shape the context of leadership and motivation in public organizations discussed in later chapters.

Another recent study provides further evidence of distinctive structural characteristics of public organizations, with findings based on a large representative sample of work organizations in the United States (Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden, 2001; Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, and Spaeth, 1996). The study also supports the interpretation that higher levels of rules and formalization in public organizations tend to be concentrated in areas such as personnel and purchasing, which are subject to controls by external authorities. The researchers undertook the National Organizations Study (NOS) project in part because the samples in most studies of organizations are not large, representative ones, in that such samples are expensive and hard to attain. Chapter Three of this book, in the section headed “Findings from Research,” described a study by Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings (1969) that sought to develop a taxonomy of organizations. Pugh and associates did not find that the public organizations in their sample differed sharply from their sample of private organizations, although they did find some distinctive attributes of the public organizations. The researchers included only eight public organizations in their sample of nearly sixty organizations, however, and they expressed reservations about their findings for the public organizations. The NOS, by contrast, surveyed a carefully designed representative sample consisting of 725 work organizations, about 94 of which were state, local, or federal government agencies. Status as a public agency turned out to be one of the strongest correlates of structural characteristics in the study.

The NOS researchers asked the respondents in the organizations they surveyed to reply to questions aimed at measuring the structural characteristics of their organizations, including decentralization and formalization (defined earlier in this chapter). Status as a public organization was among the variables most strongly related to these two structural characteristics. The public organizations tended to be less decentralized (thus more centralized) and more formalized (Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden, 2001; Marsden, Cook, and Kalleberg, 1994). In addition, the method of measuring formalization makes this finding consistent with the evidence mentioned earlier about the formalization of personnel rules and procedures in public organizations that appears to result from government civil service personnel systems. The researchers followed a procedure similar to that of Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings (1969), in which they asked whether the organization had written documentation for various important organizational matters. In the NOS, almost all of the questions used to measure formalization asked about written documentation of personnel matters: documentation on fringe benefits, hiring and firing procedures, personnel evaluation, and the requirement for written job descriptions and written performance records (Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden, 2001; Marsden, Cook, and Kalleberg, 1994). Thus, this study of a nationally representative sample of organizations, although not intended as a study of public organizations, provides evidence of the tendencies toward distinctive structural characteristics on the part of public organizations in the United States.

All of this evidence supports the interpretation that the heavier dose of rules and regulations in public organizations originates mostly from external sources and not from the bureaucrats within the agencies. Adding to this evidence, Bozeman and Rainey (1998) reported a survey that showed that managers in government, compared with business managers, would prefer their organizations to have fewer rules. This contradicts the view that managers in government generate excessive rules.

As indicated earlier, researchers have also found distinctive structural characteristics of public organizations that are not tied to rules imposed by oversight agencies. Tolbert (1985) found differences in the subunit structures of public and private universities related to external influences from public and private institutions and the universities' dependence on them for resources. Crow and Bozeman (1987) and Emmert and Crow (1987, 1988) reported that public R&D units differ from private units in the size and structure of the administrative component of the organization and the way the research teams were organized. The public labs actually had more team-based organization. This again emphasizes that government organizations vary a great deal from one another, and that by no means do all follow a rigid bureaucratic pattern. In fact, these government labs appeared to respond more directly than the private labs to task contingencies of the sort discussed earlier.

The Macrostructure of Public Organizations

The evidence of the influence of government ownership on the structures of public organizations brings up another structural topic, one that needs much additional attention from both researchers and managers. Structure within public organizations cannot easily be separated from structures outside the organization that are an inherent part of government. In other words, the internal structures of public agencies reflect, in part, the jurisdictional structures of the government body under which they operate. Legislatures, oversight agencies, and other governmental institutions impose system-wide rules and configurations on all the agencies within their jurisdiction (Hood and Dunsire, 1981; Meyer, 1979; Warwick, 1975). In addition, different units of government differ in the structural arrangements of their major institutional attributes, such as their formal, constitutional powers. In some states the governor has less formal power than in others, and the legislature has more formal authority. The governor of Florida, e.g., appoints fewer of the cabinet officers of the state government than do governors in other states. Instead, some of these officers have to run for independent election, and consequently the agencies they head tend to have more independence from the governor than in other states. Meyer (1979) found that independently elected heads of finance agencies more effectively defend their agencies against the loss of subunits than do political appointees. Such characteristics of the complex macrostructural terrain support the observation that public organizations operate within larger structures that heavily influence their own.

Summing Up the Literature on Structure

The researchers on organizational structure who reject a public–private distinction have shown us that structure is multidimensional and that both types of organization vary widely on different structural dimensions. Often these variations are related to the major contingencies of size, strategy, technology and tasks, and environmental uncertainty and complexity. Obviously, technological similarities cause government-owned electric utilities, hospitals, railroads, airlines, R&D labs, and manufacturing units to show stronger structural similarities to private or nonprofit versions of the same types of organizations than to other types of government organizations. The same holds true for organizations or organizational units engaged in similar tasks, such as R&D labs and legal offices. Indeed, the general structure of subunits of public organizations often resembles the structure of their private sector counterparts more than it resembles that of other units in the parent organization. Also, relatively small, independent organizations usually have simpler structures than larger organizations, so a smaller unit of government may exhibit less red tape or hierarchical complexity than a large private firm. Obviously, government agencies respond to environmental complexities and uncertainties just as private organizations do, as the examples at the beginning of this chapter illustrate. Thus, we can see that it is incredibly simplistic to treat all public organizations as a uniform mass that is inherently subject to intensive red tape and bureaucracy.

However, research on the structures of government organizations and research comparing government and business organizations supports a balanced conclusion. This research suggests that public organizations generally tend toward higher levels of internal structural complexity, centralization, and formalization – especially in such areas as personnel and purchasing – than do private organizations. Size, task, technology, and environmental contingencies make a difference, often figuring more importantly than public or private ownership. Within given task categories, however, public organizations tend toward stable hierarchies and centralized and formalized rules, especially rules pertaining to the functions governed by oversight agencies: personnel, purchasing and procurement, and budgeting and accounting. Government organizations may not have more formalized and elaborate rules than private organizations of similar size, but they often have more centralized, formalized rules for functions such as personnel and procurement. Comparisons of government and nongovernment organizations engaged in the same type of work tend to support such conclusions.

Still, wide variations are likely. For example, R&D labs or other special units may have even more general structural flexibility under government ownership. In addition, government ownership and influence are multidimensional in that hybrid organizations such as public enterprises may be owned by government but privately funded and exempt from some central rules and controls. Privately owned organizations with extensive public funding often show heavy governmental influences on certain aspects of their structures; e.g., defense contractors have small armies of government auditors on-site, making sure their spending and record-keeping practices adhere to government regulations. Here again, government rules tend to follow from government ownership or funding.

All managers must deal with structural complexity and with external influences on their authority. Public managers usually face more elaborate structural arrangements and constraints, however, and must learn to work with them. Their understanding of the elaborate macrostructural patterns in government, of the structures of their own agencies, and of the origins and purposes of these arrangements can serve as a valuable component of their professional knowledge as public managers. Among other challenges, they must find ways to reward and encourage people working within these complex structures, even when the personnel rules they must follow do not readily provide much flexibility. The next chapter further considers that topic. Later chapters discuss how public managers can and do make valuable changes, in part through effective knowledge of the structure of government and its agencies and in part through effective applications of the general body of knowledge on organizational structure.

Information Technology and Public Organizations

Information technology (IT) has been the most rapidly developing topic related to technology, with the developments coming so fast that everyone has had difficulty keeping up with them and providing conclusive interpretations about their effects on organizations. The rapid advent of computer applications, the internet, social media, and other forms of information and communication technology have had major implications for organizations and their management, but people have had trouble saying exactly what effects they have. As for effects on public organizations, especially until close to the turn of the new century, little research had been done (Kraemer and Dedrick, 1997).

Public managers are also starting to realize potential benefits of adopting artificial intelligence (AI) systems (Kankanhalli et al., 2019). The United States and India are at the forefront of this effort. Although academic research on AI is still in short supply, the literature discusses application associated with public sector functions. These include public health (Qian and Medaglia, 2019; Ziuziański, Furmankiewicz, and Sołtysik-Piorunkiewicz, 2014), transport (Kouziokas, 2017), education (Fernandes et al., 2018), security (Ku and Leroy, 2014), and communications (He et al., 2010). In the United States, the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard Kennedy School is conducting ongoing research on AI and sharing it with government officials interested in AI solutions.

Experts on IT tend to report that the more salient effects in industry include the extension of computing technology into design and production applications, such as *computer-aided design*, in which computer programs carry out design functions, and *computer-aided manufacturing*, in which computers actually control machinery that carries out the manufacturing process. *Computer-integrated manufacturing* links together the machinery and the design and engineering processes through computers. Ultimately, an integrated information network links all major components of the organization, including inventory control, purchasing and procurement, accounting, and other functions, in addition to manufacturing and production. These developments supported an evolution from mass production to mass customization, whereby manufacturers and service organizations produce large quantities of goods and services that are more tailored to the preferences of individual customers than previously possible. In addition, observers suggest that computerized integration of production processes has effects on organizational structures and processes. Computer-integrated manufacturing reportedly moves organizations toward fewer hierarchical levels, tasks that are less routine and more craft-like, more teamwork, more training, and more emphasis on skills in cognitive problem solving than in manual expertise (Daft, 2020).

While computer-aided manufacturing and terms such as *digital corporation* might not apply in many public and nonprofit organizations, similar developments have led to the international usage of such concepts as digital government and e-government. E-government is now institutionalized in many countries, with 94% of countries in the world possessing infrastructures to support e-government systems (Ramnarine and Endeley, 2008, p. 14). Practices and levels of implementation vary across governments, because each government identifies its needs and resources for information and communication technologies (ICT) in different ways. Commonwealth countries, e.g., have used three approaches to adopting and developing e-government: benchmarking (comparing projects against other projects), best practices (identifying the best alternatives), and technology transfer through such procedures as training and consultation (Ramnarine and Endeley, 2008, pp. 9–14).

Computer technology and the internet have also become more influential in organizational decision-making processes. For many years organizations have been using computers to store large data sets and retrieve information from them, but more recently the capacity for active utilization of that data has advanced, so that computer-based *management information systems* (MISs) have become very common. An MIS typically provides middle-level managers with ready access to data they can use in decision making, such as sales and inventory data for business managers, and client processing and status data for managers in public and nonprofit organizations. *Decision support systems* provide software that managers can use interactively. Such a system may, e.g., provide models that enable managers to assess the effects of certain decisions or changes they may be considering. *Executive information systems* provide MIS-type support, but at a more general, strategic level, for the sorts of decisions required at higher executive levels. Many government organizations currently use *geographic information systems* (GISs), which provide information about facilities or conditions in different geographic locations. A GIS might allow a planner to designate any particular geographic location in a city and pull up on the computer screen a diagram showing the underground utility infrastructure, such as pipelines and electric cables, at that location. State employment training agencies have used a GIS to store and retrieve data on clients and potential clients at different locations in the state for use in planning the location of their facilities and programs. In a case study of a regional development project in the Netherlands, Bekkers and Moody (2006, pp. 113–118) describe how GISs played an important role in the policy formulation process by integrating economic, residential, and ecological information. GIS technology allowed town and country planners, civil engineers, regional board members, and representatives of the province to visualize potential effects of the project and to analyze complex policy problems. Computers, the internet, electronic mail, and other forms of information and communication technology have made possible more elaborate and interactive networking of people and organizational units, both within and between organizations. Some organizations have moved away from traditional hierarchical and departmental reporting relationships to forms of virtual organization and dynamic network organization, in which a central hub coordinates other units that formally belong to the same organization, as well as organizations formally outside the hub organization (such as contractors or agencies with overlapping responsibility for public agencies), via e-mail and the internet. Advances in IT reportedly lead to more decentralized organizations, better coordination internally and with external entities, more professional staff and professional departments for developing and maintaining the information systems, and more employee participation.

Over the past several decades, researchers have sought evidence about just how widely and deeply these generalizations apply to government organizations, but examples clearly indicate that they definitely apply in certain cases. Concerning evolution toward smaller organizations, e.g., few Americans are aware that during the 1970s and 1980s the SSA went through Project 17,000, in which the agency eliminated 17,000 jobs, due largely to the computer taking over large portions of the processing of client claims that human beings had formerly handled.

As for effects on professional staff, governments and government agencies, like business firms, have increasingly appointed chief information officers (CIOs) to lead the development and maintenance of IT and information systems (IS), with staff to support the CIO. Governments often face challenges in attracting and retaining the professionalized personnel required for IT, due to such conditions as lower compensation levels in government and cumbersome recruiting and hiring procedures (McKinsey and Company, 2010; National Academy of Public Administration, 2010).

In government, of course, the multiple levels of authority create special issues and challenges for IT professionals. In 2009, President Obama appointed the first federal government CIO (Williams, 2009). This new federal CIO oversees information technology investments and spending by the federal government. While one might expect various IT-related activities by industry associations, can anyone imagine a national CIO with authority over IT matters in all corporations in the United States or in most other nations? Significantly, in relation to levels of government, state CIOs, as represented by the National Association of State Chief Information Officers, paid close attention to this official's work. The state CIOs are very interested in the coordination of federal agencies' programs that provide funding for state-level IT initiatives, among other issues (Newcombe, 2009).

Concerning internal and external coordination, most large government agencies, like business firms and nonprofit organizations, now have an *intranet*: a network within the organization with access restricted to designated organizational members. To maintain security of data about individual citizens and about such sensitive matters as national security, these intranet arrangements usually require elaborate provisions for controlled access. Some government employees carry with them devices that periodically inform them of newly assigned access codes for their agency's intranet because the codes are changed periodically as a security precaution. Access to information raises additional issues concerning internal and external coordination. The federal CIO emphasized “democratic” access to federal government data and launched www.data.gov to begin to provide such access.

All federal agencies and virtually all state and local government agencies of any reasonable size now have websites that provide a lot of information to clients and citizens, and more and more public services are handled through the internet and website-based operations, just as more and more business organizations relate to customers and suppliers through e-commerce. For example, because of federal laws that resulted from abuses of human beings in research projects in the past, the Centers for Disease Control requires researchers proposing research on human subjects to go through a “human subjects review” of their proposal. Researchers can obtain forms for such a review and submit the required information via the agency's website. As another example, Congress directed the IRS to increase the number of tax returns submitted electronically. The IRS did so with considerable success, because in customer satisfaction studies of federal agencies, the IRS has gotten much higher customer satisfaction ratings from taxpayers who filed electronically than from those who filed through surface mail. This development contributed to the IRS receiving its all-time highest customer satisfaction rating in 2012. In 1998, 32% of respondents to the American Customer Satisfaction Survey expressed satisfaction with their experience in filing taxes. In 2012, 73% expressed satisfaction (Insight, 2013).

To enhance internal coordination and communication, some governmental executives and managers have actively encouraged employees to contact them with questions and comments. For example, as part of the National Performance Review during the Clinton years, the administration encouraged federal agencies to establish or designate “reinvention laboratories,” organizational units that would try new ways of improving and streamlining the agency's services and administrative procedures. In one such unit in the Department of Defense, the leaders invited employees to submit questions and suggestions to them via e-mail and promised to respond to each e-mail within several days. During his widely praised service as commissioner of the IRS, Charles Rossotti developed a reputation for reading, and frequently responding to, e-mail from employees at many organizational levels.

These examples indicate that IT has provided significant improvements and opportunities for government, its employees, and the clients of government agencies. As one might expect, however, IT has raised many challenges for managers in government. These challenges involve the topics covered in this book and challenges similar to those encountered in managing any significant operation or initiative (McKinsey and Company, 2010, p. 40). Fountain (2001; see also Dawes, 2002) has analyzed developments in and challenges of IT in government by using a technology enactment framework based on an institutional perspective similar to the one described in Chapter Four. The framework treats IT developments as emerging from interactions among objective technologies such as computer hardware and software, organizational forms such as bureaucracies and networks, and institutional arrangements such as cultural and legal conditions. These components of the framework combine to influence the way technological initiatives play out. The framework helps to explain why even very similar technological initiatives can have very different outcomes, because of different organizational and institutional influences on their implementation. Fountain also describes how such influences raise formidable challenges for successful utilization in government, given the strong, often entrenched organizational and institutional influences. She describes the complications encountered by officials in the numerous agencies involved in trying to develop the International Trade Data System, an IS on international trade that linked all the different agencies with responsibilities related to it. The differences among the agencies in their cultures, missions, stakeholders, standard practices, and other characteristics caused the project to founder. Fountain concluded that this and other examples suggest the impediments to major IT initiatives linking and coordinating diverse agencies and programs, and the likelihood that developments in IT applications will involve more modest projects and changes. Other authors point to evidence that the bureaucratic characteristics and political contexts of government agencies create significant challenges for major IT projects and initiatives in government (McKinsey and Company, 2010; Nye, 1999).

Illustrating and analyzing challenges in IT adoption in government, Bozeman (2002b) chronicled the agonies of the IRS in trying to modernize the tax system with IT. One glaring example of the problem took the form of a “meltdown” at one of the large centers where IRS employees process tax returns. A visiting official found tax returns, including checks for payment of taxes, stuffed in the trash cans in the restroom. The new equipment designed by contractors for automated reading and processing of the tax returns did not work. Employees, fearful of discipline for not finishing enough tax returns fast enough, resorted to discarding the returns. News of such breakdowns and failures in the new systems brought a tidal wave of criticism. In 1996, one congressman referred to the agency's efforts as “a four billion dollar fiasco” (Bozeman, 2002b). Bozeman pointed out that the “fiasco” was not as disastrous as critics sometimes claimed, because the IRS was still successfully using much of the equipment and hardware years later. The problems were severe, however, and Bozeman described how many of them arose from management lapses, such as failures in project management and in management of relations with contractors. The IRS struggled with the challenges of tax systems modernization, but succeeded in updating their systems.

Also providing evidence about IT developments and challenges in government, for over two decades researchers in public administration have conducted surveys covering large numbers of organizations. These studies also show a mixed picture of difficulties, but also progress and influence of IT initiatives in public organizations. Bretschneider (1990), e.g., added survey results to the evidence of particular challenges for public managers and IT professionals. He found that public organizations tend to be more information intensive than private firms; they have to engage in more information processing. Even so, he found that managers in government agencies report longer delays in procuring computer equipment than do private managers, due to more red tape, procurement rules, and accountability requirements in the public agencies. Conversely, Bretschneider and Wittmer (1993) reported evidence of innovativeness in IT adoption by government agencies. In comparing IT conditions in government agencies with those in business firms, they found that the government organizations reported having more microcomputers per employee than the business firms. This appears to result from the more information-intensive task environment in public organizations, and the evidence tends to contradict the view that public agencies tend to lag behind private firms in IT adoption and utilization (Moon and Bretschneider, 2002). Somewhat similarly, Rocheleau and Wu (2002) surveyed municipal government IS managers and compared their responses to those of IS managers in business firms and found that the government managers rated IT and IT training as more important than business managers did. Conversely, the business managers reported higher levels of spending on IT, IT training, and IT personnel in their organizations.

Moon and Bretschneider (2002) reported survey results that indicated that public sector managers engage in higher levels of IT innovativeness in response to higher levels of red tape (as measured by survey items about the level of burdensome rules and procedures). Public managers may regard red tape as a transaction cost and try to minimize it through proactive adoption of IT. In addition, Moon and Bretschneider found evidence that more entrepreneurial and risk-receptive leadership in the organization has a positive relationship to IT innovativeness.

Other studies have reflected on IT influences in addition to its utilization. On the basis of a mail survey of government program managers in the 450 largest US counties, Heintze and Bretschneider (2000) analyzed the impact of IT implementation on organizational structures and performance. They found that the managers reported that IT implementation has little impact on organizational structures, in the sense of increasing management levels and numbers of decision makers. In addition, the managers perceived that any structural changes caused by IT implementation in public agencies have little impact on organizational performance (measured as improved ease of communication and improved technical decision making). However, the managers tended to regard IT adoption as having a direct positive impact on improving technical decision making (as opposed to an impact on decision making by way of influences on structure). Although Heintze and Bretschneider noted that county government managers may have different responses to developments in IT than state and federal managers, the lack of perceived structural effects of IT is striking.

Moon (2002) found generally similar results when he analyzed the data on 2,899 municipal governments with populations of more than ten thousand from the 2000 E-Government Survey conducted by the International City/County Management Association and Public Technology, Inc. Moon found that most municipal governments surveyed have their own websites and intranets. However, few had well-developed e-government strategic plans. At that time, most of the municipal governments were in early stages of evolution in e-government utilization, using it mainly for simple information dissemination or two-way communication with citizens and stakeholders. Few governments reported being at the more advanced stages of development that involve using e-government for service provision and financial transactions. In findings similar to those of Heintze and Bretschneider, Moon stated that only a small portion of the governments reported that e-government programs enhance cost saving, downsizing, and entrepreneurial activities. A higher portion, however, reported improvements in work environment, general efficiency, and effective procurement. Although larger governments showed more active engagement with e-government, Moon concluded that in general municipal governments were not aggressively utilizing IT and that IT innovations were not contributing strongly to cost savings, revenue generation, and downsizing.

More recent evidence tends to be consistent with Moon's conclusions in some ways, but again provides a mixed picture of progress and valuable development, coupled with ongoing challenges. In a survey of about nine hundred cities, the International City Management Association (ICMA) found that 96% of the cities reported having a website (International City Management Association, 2011). Only 24%, however, had surveyed residents to determine the information, services, or forms of participation they wanted from the website, and 84% had no plans for such a survey. Small percentages (4 to 15%) reported using the website to conduct forums, operate chat rooms, permit citizen petitions, conduct town hall meetings, enable citizens to vote in elections or referendums, or enable citizens to participate in a public hearing. On the other hand, 50% or more of the respondents reported that "e-participation" had improved the quality and quantity on information available to local officials for decision making, and improved the quantity of citizen participation. The responses indicate that the websites tended to provide information to citizens more than to facilitate communication from citizens to local governments. While interactive communications with citizens via websites may be limited, however, websites are providing enhanced services in many ways. Very high percentages of the respondents reported that they provide online services for downloading forms such as building permit forms, for employment information, for council agendas and minutes, for codes and ordinances, and for e-newsletters (International City Management Association, 2011).

The ICMA survey also provides indications of management issues for local government IT services, and again makes the point that effective IT requires effective management. Among the local governments, 39% do not have a dedicated webmaster. Among the top five barriers to e-governments that the governments have encountered, lack of financial resources led the list (67%), followed by lack of technology and web staff (46%).

The findings in these studies about IT in government provide indications of progress and successes, as well as ongoing challenges. Both the good news and not-so-good news underscore the imperative of effectively organizing and managing IT. Organizing and managing any major new initiative, and especially highly technical ones such as IT projects, should be expected to involve challenges for leaders and professionals. As some of the sources indicate, the challenges may be even more formidable in the public sector. The studies and sources reviewed here suggest conditions for meeting those challenges and for effective management of IT resources and projects: strategic thinking and planning to guide the processes involved; clarification of mission, goals, and timetables; measures to identify progress and successes; clarification of leadership roles, authority, and responsibilities on the part of CIOs, webmasters, and others involved; adequate resources; and knowledge and skill in systems of control and project management. Prospects for improved service delivery, efficiency, communication, and general effectiveness should motivate anyone concerned with public service – which should include literally everyone – to confront the challenges and take advantage of the possibilities.

Social Media and Public Management

The challenges in managing information technology apply as well to governments' rapidly growing use of social media. Social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, wikis, and blogs, add new dimensions to the already widespread use of websites, e-mail, and other media. O'Reilly (2005; see also Mossberger, Wu, and Crawford, 2013) coined the term "Web 2.0" to refer to these new media that add to previous web applications the possibility for users to contribute content and to participate in developing collective intelligence, information, and communication. Mergel (2012a; 2012b) has contributed the term "Government 2.0" to refer to employment of these media in government and public management. The use of social media and interest in them has grown rapidly because of their potential to support much higher levels of interaction and information sharing between governments and their clients, stakeholders, and citizens. Government organizations now attempt to use social media to invite comments and reactions from citizens to post policy and program statements, to participate in policymaking in various ways, and to form social networks. Governments and their organizations seek public participation in problem solving in such areas as crime prevention and responses to crimes, and many others.

The examples of such uses of social media are now widely recognized and can be quite dramatic. They include law enforcement officials' responses when two men planted explosive devices among the spectators at the Boston Marathon, which injured numerous people and killed a young boy. Law enforcement authorities used social media to make public the footage from surveillance cameras that showed the men who had apparently planted the explosive devices. Citizen responses very soon helped to locate the suspects and contributed to their final confrontation with police.

Less nationally publicized examples further illustrate the role that social media can play, even if in a rather gruesome way. In Oconee County, Georgia, a man murdered a woman. He used his truck to take the deceased woman in her automobile to a shopping mall parking lot and left her there in the car. County sheriff's officials, one of whom was a graduate of a well-reputed MPA program in the area, circulated surveillance camera footage of the truck via social media, asking for public assistance in identifying the truck and its owner. Within twenty-four hours, a citizen had suggested the owner of the vehicle, and the sheriff's officers made an arrest and obtained a confession.

Much broader than these individual instances of social media use are program- and policy-related initiatives that government agencies at all levels of government now undertake. President Obama issued the *Transparency and Open Government* memorandum (2013), and federal agencies have engaged in a variety of initiatives. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration used social media to publicize the Mars rover landings and to encourage citizen engagement through such opportunities as meeting astronauts. The Environmental Protection Agency, the Centers for Disease Control, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have launched efforts to employ social media in engaging citizens and interacting with them about policy issues and the agencies' programs (Mergel and Bretschneider, 2013).

Social media have played a widely publicized role in citizen unrest and protest in various nations, with communication among protesters building and encouraging the protests. Erkul and Fountain (2012; see also Fountain, 2013a) describe the role of social media and other media and IT resources in the nation of Turkey's efforts to expand e-government and use of IT and social media in their society. The initiative led to a vast increase in the number of citizens using social media. The developments had ironic effects, since when citizens protested against the government, the availability of social media supported their efforts. One social medium provides information as to where an individual is located. This medium widely distributed information indicating that a large number of people were at the location of the protest, which encouraged supporters of the protest and potential participants in it. Erkul and Fountain ultimately conclude that social media cannot alone enhance democratization in a nation moving in that direction, but can play a substantial role in the process.

Regardless of the accuracy of such observations, the challenge for leaders, managers, and professionals involves deciding how governments can employ social media to avoid the need for protest. Governmental use of social media has been increasing dramatically. Mossberger, Wu, and Crawford (2013) report an analysis of local governments' use of social media, concentrating on the thirty-five largest US cities. In 2009, about 13% of the cities were using Facebook. By 2011, 87% were using that medium. In 2009, 25% used Twitter, but by 2011, 87% used it. Use of a YouTube link increased from 16% in 2009 to 75% in 2011.

As rapidly as social media have become an issue in public management and government, experts have provided resources to support development of knowledge and skills for public managers' use of social media. Mergel (2012a) provides a comprehensive discussion of the experiments, best practices and policies, and available guidance for the employment of social media. Mergel (2102b) also provides the design of an online course to develop such skills. These resources include detailed listings and references to additional resources.

The spreading, growing government use of social media raises issues that have been common as in governance for years (Fountain, 2013a; 2013b; Mergel, 2012a). Encouraging citizen participation in government decisions has always raised questions about who gets to participate, and whether advantaged groups participate more than less advantaged groups. Experts on social media report that “trolls” representing particular issues and interests try constantly to impose themselves about all topics (Mergel, 2012a). The “digital divide,” which refers to certain groups' lack of access to computers and the internet, aggravates this problem. City councils and city-county commissions have to decide how much to allow single-issue groups to influence their decisions. In addition, there are issues regarding who owns information that citizens contribute to postings on various media, and about confidentiality and privacy versus public access.

Effective use of social media to create social networks and citizen participation and communication poses challenges. Mossberger and associates (2013) reported in-depth case studies of major cities' experiences with social media. They found no evidence of overwhelming successes and found the city officials to be very interested in practices in other cities that provide insights. Norris and Reddick (2013) analyzed two nationwide surveys of e-government among local governments and found no evidence of major advances. They found that implementation of e-government at local levels has been incremental, rather than “transformative,” as some authors had earlier predicted. E-government at the local level tends to involve governments delivering one-way transmission of information and services online with limited interactivity.

These apparent limitations of social media use suggest questions about how social media policies and processes will be managed. The framework presented in Chapter One illustrates many of the matters to be considered. What will be the goals of the process and how will they support the overall mission? Who will provide leadership? What level of resources will be provided?

Initiating and implementing social media use raises questions about how public managers and government officials can go about implementing social media processes. Mergel and Bretschneider (2012) provide a three-stage framework for understanding government use of social media. A first stage involves *intrapreneurship and experimentation*. New technologies become available in product and service markets external to the organization. Intrapreneurs, or entrepreneurs inside the organization, often act as “mavericks” and experiment with initiatives using a new technology. Multiple and separate instances of this process go on that differ among themselves in protocols, norms, and procedures. This leads to recognition of the need for better organization of social media use. It leads to a second stage of *constructive chaos* involving efforts to bring *order from chaos*. The growing recognition of the need for common standards leads to establishment of task forces and steering committees to achieve standards and coordination of activities. In a third stage of *institutionalization*, the organization develops uniformity and standards, rules, and processes. New elements of technologies will still be introduced, but the rate of change will slow down. This provides more predictability and sharing of innovations, common training, and other benefits.

The advent of social media provides opportunities and challenges for leaders, managers, and professionals in government. The three-stage adoption process that Mergel and Bretschneider describe provides a valuable perspective for understanding the challenges and addressing them.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Eight

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Study: The Management of Brookhaven National Laboratory

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

CHAPTER NINE
UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS: MOTIVATION AND MOTIVATION THEORY

Obviously, the people in an organization are crucial to its performance and to the quality of work life within it. This chapter and the next one are concerned with the people in public organizations. The chapters discuss public employees' motivation and work-related values and attitudes. This chapter defines motivation and describes the most important theories of work motivation. Chapter Ten describes concepts important to the analysis of motivation and work attitudes, including concepts about people's values, motives, and specific work attitudes such as job satisfaction. It covers values and motives that are particularly important in public organizations, such as the desire to perform a public service, and values and attitudes about pay, security, and work that often distinguish public sector managers and employees from those in other settings.

These topics receive attention in every textbook on organizational behavior because of their fundamental importance in all types of organizations. In public organizations and public management they have been receiving even greater attention in recent years than in the past. For example, the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regularly surveys very large samples of federal employees and managers about their perceptions and attitudes about leadership in their agencies and their job satisfaction. (The sample size was 687,000 in 2012 (US Office of Personnel Management, 2013). The OPM website for the surveys encourages agency representatives to compare their agency's results with the government-wide results and with those of other agencies. The Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit organization that seeks to promote and support public service, uses the results of these surveys to develop rankings of the "best places to work" in the federal government (Partnership for Public Service, 2013a). Federal agency administrators take these rankings very seriously. The US Merit Systems Protection Board also conducts periodic federal employee surveys and uses the results to produce reports on such topics as "employee engagement" in their work and their agencies (US Merit Systems Protection Board, 2012). Some of these surveys have used ideas and questions based on motivation theories that we will cover in this chapter. State and local governments conduct employee surveys as well (e.g., State of Washington, 2012). These developments make it important for persons preparing for roles in government service, or serving in such roles, to gain a firm grounding in the theories, concepts, and methods for analyzing the attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors of human beings in their organizations and workplaces.

Motivation and Public Management

Human motivation is a fundamental topic in the social sciences, and motivation to work is similarly a basic topic in the field of organizational behavior (OB). The framework presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter One indicates that the people in an organization, and their behaviors and attitudes, are interrelated with such factors as organizational tasks, organizational structures and processes, leadership processes, and organizational culture. With all of these factors impinging on people, motivating employees and stimulating effective attitudes in them become crucial and sensitive challenges for leaders. This and the next chapter show that, as with many topics in management and OB, the basic research and theory provide no conclusive science of motivation. Leaders have to draw on the ideas and apply the available techniques pragmatically, blending their experience and judgment with the insights the literature provides.

These two chapters show that OB researchers and management consultants often treat motivation and work attitudes as internal organizational matters influenced by such factors as supervisory practices, pay, and the nature of the work. Such factors figure importantly in public organizations; however, motivation in public organizations, like the other organizational attributes discussed in this book, is also affected by the public sector environment. The effects of this environment require public managers to possess a distinctive knowledge of motivation that links OB with political science, public administration, and public policy processes.

The effects of the political and institutional environment of public organizations on the people in those organizations show up in numerous ways. In recent decades, governments at all levels in the United States and in other nations have mounted efforts to reform governmental administrative systems to improve the management and performance of those systems (Gore, 1993; Peters and Savoie, 1994; Pollitt and Bouckeart, 2011; Thompson, 2000). Often, the reformers have sought to correct allegedly weak links between performance and pay, promotion, and discipline, claiming that these weak links undermine motivation and, hence, performance and efficiency. Government managers have for decades complained about having insufficient authority over pay and discipline and other managerial responsibilities that they have (Macy, 1971; National Academy of Public Administration, 1986). The reforms also reflect, then, the context in which public managers and organizations operate and that earlier chapters have described. That such reforms have often foundered (Ingraham, 1993; Kellough and Lu, 1993; Perry, Petrakis, and Miller, 1989) raises the possibility that these constraints are inevitable in the public sector (Feeney and Rainey, 2010). Many analysts and experienced practitioners regard the constraining character of government personnel systems as the critical difference between managing in the public sector and managing in a private organization (Thompson, 1989; Truss, 2013), and for decades, government officials have sought to decentralize government personnel systems to provide them with more flexibility in human resource management (e.g., Gore, 1993).

If anything, the focus on the management and motivation of public employees intensified as the new century began. A *human capital movement* got under way in the federal government, with implications for the other levels of government. This emphasis on human capital reflects the assumption that the human beings in an organization and their skills and knowledge are the organization's most important assets, more important than other forms of capital such as plants, machinery, and financial assets. Accordingly, organizations must invest in the development of their human capital. The US General Accounting Office, the US Office of Personnel Management, and the US Office of Management and Budget joined in trying to develop human capital policies and models and to get federal agencies to adopt them (see, e.g., US General Accounting Office, 2002a, 2002b). The legislation authorizing the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security in 2002 contained a provision requiring each federal agency to appoint a chief human capital officer to engage in strategic planning for human capital and in other steps to maintain and develop human capital.

These developments all suggest that motivating people in government, and encouraging their positive work attitudes, raises challenges that can be distinct from those faced by business and nonprofit organizations. They indicate that the political and institutional context of government can influence motivation and work attitudes in government in distinctive ways. As with other topics in this book, however, another side argues that government differs little from business in matters of motivation. Businesses also have problems motivating managers and employees, because of union pressures, ineffective bonus and merit-pay systems, and other problems. In addition, Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon (1995), one of the most influential contributors to public administration theory, once asserted that reward practices in public, private, and nonprofit firms do not differ: “Everything said here about economic rewards applies equally to privately owned, nonprofit, and government-owned organizations. The opportunity for, and limits on, the use of rewards to motivate activities towards organizational goals are precisely the same in all three kinds of organizations” (p. 283, n. 3). For this reason, the discussion to follow in the next two chapters will pay attention to evidence about whether public organizations and management are distinctive with regard to motivation and work values and attitudes.

This dispute over whether government is different makes it important to look at evidence about it. Observations about the distinctive character of government often suggest problems with the motivation and performance of people in government. As we will see, however, evidence often indicates high levels of motivation and positive work attitudes in many government organizations. Executives coming to government from business typically mention how impressed they are with how hard government employees work and how capable they are (Hunt, 1999; IBM Endowment for the

Business of Government, 2002; Volcker Commission, 1989). In surveys, government managers have mentioned frustrations of the sort discussed earlier, but have also reported high levels of work effort and satisfaction (see, e.g., Light, 2002a; US Office of Personnel Management, 2013).

In this debate over whether there are similarities or differences in managing people in the public and private sectors, in a sense both sides are right. Public managers often do face unique challenges in motivating employees, but they can also apply a great deal from the general motivation literature. The challenge is to draw from the ideas and insights in the literature while taking into consideration the public sector context discussed in other chapters, while basing one's conclusions on as much actual evidence as possible.

The Context of Motivation in Public Organizations

Previous chapters have presented observations and research findings that suggest a unique context for motivation in public organizations (Perry and Porter, 1982):

- The absence of economic markets for the outputs of public organizations and the consequent diffuseness of incentives and performance indicators in the public sector
- The multiple, conflicting, and often abstract values that public organizations must pursue
- The complex, dynamic political and public policy processes by which public organizations operate, which involve many actors, interests, and shifting agendas
- The external oversight bodies and processes that impose structures, rules, and procedures on public organizations, including civil service rules governing pay, promotion, and discipline, and rules that affect training and personnel development
- The external political climate, including public attitudes toward taxes, government, and government employees, which turned negative during the 1970s and 1980s

Earlier chapters have also related these conditions to various characteristics of public organizations that in turn influence motivation:

- There are sharp constraints on some public leaders and managers that limit their motivation and ability to develop their organization. Politically elected and appointed top executives and their appointees turn over rapidly. Institutional oversight and rules limit their authority.
- The turbulent, sporadic decision-making processes in public organizations can influence managers' and employees' sense of purpose and their perception of their impact (Hickson and others, 1986; Light, 2002a).

- There are relatively complex and constraining structures in many public organizations, including constraints on the administration of incentives (Feeney and Rainey, 2010).
- Vague goals in public organizations, both for individual jobs and for the organization, can hinder performance goals and evaluation, and can weaken a sense of personal significance within the organization (Buchanan, 1974, 1975; Perry and Porter, 1982).
- Scholars have claimed that people at the lower and middle levels of public organizations often become lost in elaborate bureaucratic and public policy systems. They work under elaborate rules and constraints that, paradoxically, fail to hold them highly accountable (Barton, 1980; Lipsky, 1980; Lynn, 1981; Michelson, 1980; Warwick, 1975).
- On a more positive note, the people who choose to work in government often express high levels of motivation to engage in valuable public service that helps other people or benefits the community or society; they are often motivated by the sense of pursuing a valuable mission (e.g., Goodsell, 2011). Government work is often interesting and very important.

Some of these observations are difficult to prove or disprove. For others we have increased evidence, which later sections and the next chapter present. As we examine this evidence, it is important to look at how organizational researchers have treated the concept of motivation and its measurement.

The Concept of Work Motivation

A substantial body of theory, research, and experience provides a wealth of insight into motivation in organizations (Pinder, 2008). Yet in scrutinizing the topic, scholars have increasingly shown its complexity. Everyone has a sense of what we mean by motivation. The term derives from the Latin word for “move,” as do the words motor and motif. We know that forces move us, arouse us, and direct us. Work motivation refers to a person's desire to work hard and work well – to the arousal, direction, and persistence of effort in work settings. Managers in public, private, and nonprofit organizations use motivational techniques all the time. Yet debates about motivation have raged for years, because the simple definition just given leaves many questions about what it means to work hard and well, what determines a person's desire to do so, and how one measures such behavior.

Measuring and Assessing Motivation

Motivation researchers have tried different ways of measuring motivation, none of which provides an adequately comprehensive measurement (Pinder, 2008, pp. 43–44). For example, the typical definition of motivation, such as the one just provided, raises complicated questions about what we actually mean by motivation. Is it an attitude or a behavior, or both? Must we observe a person exerting effort?

As Table 9.1 shows, researchers have tried to measure motivation in different ways that imply different answers to these questions. As the examples in the table imply, OB researchers have attempted very few measures of general work motivation. One of the few available general measures – section 1 in the table – relies on questions about how hard one works and how often one does some extra work. Researchers have reported successful use of this scale (Cook, Hepworth, Wall, and Warr, 1981). One study using this measure, however, found that respondents gave very high ratings to their own work effort. Most reported that they work harder than others in their organization. They gave such high self-ratings that there was little difference among them (Rainey, 1983). This example illustrates the problem of asking people about their motivation. It also reflects the cultural emphasis on hard work in the United States, which leads people to report that they do work hard. If, however, as in the study just cited, most respondents report that they work harder than their colleagues, there must be organizations in which everyone works harder than everyone else!

TABLE 9.1 QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED TO MEASURE WORK MOTIVATION

1. *Job Motivation Scale* (Patchen, Pelz, and Allen, 1965)

   This questionnaire, one of the few direct measures of job motivation, poses the following questions:

   > On most days on your job, how often does time seem to drag for you?
   >
   > Some people are completely involved in their job – they are absorbed in it night and day. For other people, their job is simply one of several interests. How involved do you feel in your job?
   >
   > How often do you do some extra work for your job that isn't really required of you?
   >
   > Would you say that you work harder, less hard, or about the same as other people doing your type of work at [name of organization]?

2. *Work Motivation Scale* (Wright, 2004)

   > I put forth my best effort to get the job done regardless of the difficulties.
   >
   > I am willing to start work early or stay late to finish a job.
   >
   > It has been hard for me to get very involved in my current job. (Reversed) I do extra work for my job that isn't really expected of me.
   >
   > Time seems to drag while I am on the job. (Reversed)

3. *Intrinsic Motivation Scale* (Lawler and Hall, 1970)

   Intrinsic motivation refers to the motivating effects of the work itself. Researchers have measured it with items such as these:

   When I do my work well, it gives me a feeling of accomplishment.

   When I perform my job well, it contributes to my personal growth and development.

   I feel a great sense of personal satisfaction when I do my job well.

   Doing my job well increases my self-esteem.

4. *Reward Expectancies* (Rainey, 1983)

   Some surveys, such as the Federal Employee Attitude Survey, use statements about reward expectations, such as those that follow, to assess reward systems but also as indicators of motivation:

   Producing a high quality of work increases my chances for higher pay.

   Producing a high quality of work increases my chances for a promotion.

5. Peer Evaluations of an Individual's Work Motivation (Guion and Landy, 1972; Landy and Guion, 1970)

   For this method of measuring motivation, fellow employees evaluate an individual's work motivation on the following dimensions:

   Team attitude

   Task concentration

   Independence/self-starter

   Organizational identification

   Job curiosity

   Persistence

   Professional identification

Wright (2004) reported the successful use of the questions in section 2 of Table 9.1 in a survey of government employees in New York State. The respondents' answers to the items were consistent, and the scale containing these items showed meaningful relations to other variables, such as the respondents' perceptions of the clarity of their work goals and the organization's goals.

Partly due to the problems with general measures of motivation, researchers have used various alternatives, such as measures of intrinsic or internal work motivation (section 3 in Table 9.1; see also Cook, Hepworth, Wall, and Warr, 1981). Researchers in OB define intrinsic work motives or rewards as those that are mediated within the worker: psychological rewards derived directly from the work itself. Extrinsic rewards are externally mediated and are exemplified by salary, promotion, and other rewards that come from the organization or work group. As the examples in Table 9.1 indicate, questions on intrinsic motivation ask about an increase in feelings of accomplishment, growth, and self-esteem through work well done. Measures such as these assess important work-related attitudes, but they do not ask directly about work effort or direction.

Researchers and consultants have used items derived from expectancy theory, described later in this chapter, as proxy measures of work motivation. Such items (see section 4 in Table 9.1) have been widely used by consultants in assessing organizations and in huge surveys of federal employees used to assess the civil service system and efforts to reform it (US Office of Personnel Management, 1979, 1980, 1983). Surveys have also found sharp differences between government and business managers on questions such as these (Rainey, 1983; Rainey, Facer, and Bozeman, 1995). The US Merit Systems Protection Board (2012, p. 37), in a survey of over forty-two thousand federal employees, used questions similar to these and interpreted them as indicators of motivation.

If one cannot ask people directly about their motivation, one can ask those around them for their observations about their coworkers' motivation (see section 5 in Table 9.1). Landy and Guion (1970) had peers rate individual managers on the dimensions listed in the table. Significantly, their research indicated that peer observers disagree a lot when rating the same person. This method obviously requires a lot of time and resources to administer, and few other researchers have used this interesting approach. The method does provide a useful illustration of the many possible dimensions of motivation.

Motivation to Join and Motivation to Work Well

Another important consideration about the meaning of motivation concerns one of the classic distinctions in the theory of management and organizations: the difference between motivation to join an organization and stay in it, on the one hand, and motivation to work hard and do well within it, on the other. Chester Barnard (1938), and later James March and Herbert Simon (March and Simon, 1958), in books widely acknowledged as seminal contributions to the field, emphasized this distinction. You might get people to shuffle into work every day rather than quit, but they can display keen ingenuity at avoiding doing what you ask them to do if they do not want to do it. Management experts widely acknowledge Barnard's prescience in seeking to analyze the ways in which organizational leaders must employ a variety of incentives, including the guiding values of the organization, to induce cooperation and effort (DiIulio, 1994; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Williamson, 1990).

Rival Influences on Performance

Motivation alone does not determine performance. Ability figures importantly in performance. One person may display high motivation but insufficient ability, whereas another may have such immense ability that he or she performs well with little apparent motivation. The person's training and preparation for a certain task, the behaviors of leaders or coworkers, and many other factors interact with motivation in determining performance. A person may gain motivation by feeling able to perform well or lose motivation through the frustrations brought on by lacking sufficient ability. As we will see, the major theories of employee motivation try in various ways to capture some of these intricacies. Major reforms of the civil service and of government pay systems have frequently oversimplified or underestimated these ideas (Ingraham, 1993; Perry, Petrakis, and Miller, 1989; Rainey and Kellough, 2000).

Motivation as an Umbrella Concept

The complexities of work motivation have given the topic the status of an umbrella concept that refers to a general area of study rather than a precisely defined research target (Campbell and Pritchard, 1983; Pinder, 2008). Indeed, Locke (1999), in an article reviewing and summarizing motivation research, proposed an elaborate, integrated model of work motivation that does not include the term *motivation*. Research and theorizing about motivation continue, but theorists usually employ the term to refer to a general concept that incorporates many variables and issues (see, e.g., Klein, 1990; Kleinbeck, Quast, Thierry, and Harmut, 1990). Locke and Latham (1990a), e.g., presented a model of work motivation that does not include a concept specifically labeled “motivation.” Motivation currently appears to serve as an overarching theme for research on a variety of topics, including organizational identification and commitment, job engagement, and characteristics of work goals.

Theories of Work Motivation

This chapter reviews the most prominent theories of motivation, which represent theorists' best efforts to explain motivation and to describe how it works. Some of the terms sound abstract, but the effort is quite practical: How do you explain the motivation of members of your organization and use this knowledge to enhance their motivation? No one has yet developed a conclusive theory of work motivation, but each theory provides important insights about motivation and can contribute to managers' ability to think comprehensively about it. The examples provided show that reforms in government have often revealed simplistic thinking about work motivation on the part of the reformers, thinking that could be improved by more careful attention to the theories described here.

One way of thinking about theory in the social and administrative sciences regards theory as an explanation of a phenomenon we want to understand. A theory proposes concepts that refer to objects or events that we need to define and include as contributions to the explanation. The theory also states propositions about how those concepts relate together to bring about the phenomenon. The theories of work motivation, then, attempt to explain how work motivation operates: How and why does it happen? How and why does a person become more highly motivated? In attempting to answer such questions, the theories provide ideas, concepts, and propositions that can guide our thinking about motivation. They can help to guide research and analysis of motivational phenomena in organizations, as they did in the case of the Merit Principles survey, mentioned earlier (US Merit Systems Protection Board, 2012).

One way of classifying the theories of motivation that have achieved prominence distinguishes between *content theories* and *process theories*. Content theories are concerned with analyzing the particular needs, motives, and rewards that affect motivation. Process theories concentrate more on the psychological and behavioral processes behind motivation, often with no designation of important rewards and motives. The two categories overlap, but the distinction serves as a way of introducing major characteristics of the different theories.

Content Theories

Table 9.2 summarizes the needs, motives, and rewards that play a part in prominent content theories of motivation. These theories not only propose the important needs, motives, and rewards, but also attempt to specify how such factors influence motivation.

TABLE 9.2 CATEGORIES OF NEEDS AND VALUES EMPLOYED IN SELECTED CONTENT THEORIES

Source: Adapted from Rainey (1993).

Maslow's Needs Hierarchy (1954)	
Physiological needs:	Needs for relief from hunger, thirst, and fatigue and for defense from the elements
Safety needs:	Needs to be free of the threat of bodily harm
Social needs:	Needs for love, affection, and belonging to social units and groups
Self-esteem:	Needs for sense of achievement, confidence, recognition, and prestige
Self-actualization:	The need to become everything one is capable of becoming, to achieve self-fulfillment, especially in some area of endeavor or purpose (such as motherhood, artistic creativity, or a profession)
McGregor: Theory X and Theory Y (1960)	
Theory X:	Assumes that workers lack the capacity for self-motivation and self-

	direction and that managers must design organizations to control and direct them
Theory Y:	Assumes that workers have needs for growth, development, interesting work, and self-actualization, and hence have capacity for self-direction and self-motivation
Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory (1968)	
Hygiene Factors Company policy and administration Supervision Relations with supervisor Working conditions Salary Relations with peers Personal life Relations with subordinates Status Security	*Motivators* Achievement Recognition The work itself Responsibility Growth Advancement
McClelland: Need for Achievement, Power, and Affiliation (1961)[a]	
Need for achievement:	The need for a sense of mastery over one's environment and successful accomplishment through one's own abilities and efforts; a preference for challenges involving moderate risk, clear feedback about success, and ability to sense personal responsibility for success. Purportedly stimulates and facilitates entrepreneurial behavior.
Need for power:	A general need for autonomy and control over oneself and others, which can manifest itself in different ways. When blended with degrees of altruism and inhibition, and low need for affiliation, can facilitate effectiveness at management.
Need for affiliation:	The need to establish and maintain positive affective relations, or “friendships” with others.
Adams: The Need for Equity (1965)	
The need to maintain an equitable balance between the ratio of one's	

inputs/contributions to an organization and the organization's returns/compensation and a fellow employee's ratio of inputs/contributions to an organization and the organization's returns/compensation.	
Self-Determination Theory (Deci, Ryan, Gagne, Leone, Usunov, and Kornazheva, 2001; Gagne and Deci, 2005)	
Need for competence:	The universal human necessity to succeed at challenging tasks and attain desired outcomes
Need for autonomy:	The universal human necessity to experience choice and feel like one's actions are self-initiated
Need for relatedness:	The universal human necessity to experience a sense of mutual respect, caring, and reliance on others

[a]McClelland and other researchers do not provide concise or specific definitions of the need concepts.

Maslow's Needs Hierarchy. Abraham Maslow's theory of human needs and motives (1954), described earlier in Chapter Two, advanced some of the most widely influential ideas in social science. Contemporary scholars of work motivation do not accept the needs hierarchy as a complete theory of motivation, but it contributed concepts that are now regarded as classic. Maslow's conception of self-actualization as the highest-order human need was his most influential idea. It has appealed widely to people searching for a way to express an ultimate human motive of fulfilling one's full potential.

In later writings, Maslow (1965) further developed his ideas about self-actualization, going beyond the ideas summarized in Chapter Two and Table 9.2, to discuss the relationship of this motive to work, duty, and group or communal benefits. His ideas are particularly relevant to anyone interested in public service. Maslow was concerned that during the 1960s some psychologists interpreted self-actualization as self-absorbed concern with one's personal emotional satisfaction, especially through the shedding of inhibitions and social controls. He sharply rejected such ideas. Genuinely self-actualized persons, he argued, achieve this ultimate state of fulfillment through hard work and dedication to a duty or mission that serves values higher than simple self-satisfaction. They do so through work that benefits others or society, and genuine personal contentment and emotional satisfaction are by-products of such dedication. In this later work, Maslow emphasized that the levels of need are not separate steps from which one successively departs. Rather, they are cumulative phases of a growth toward self-actualization, a motive that grows out of the satisfaction of social and self-esteem needs and also builds on them.

Maslow's ideas have had a significant impact on many social scientists, but researchers trying to measure Maslow's needs and test his theory have not confirmed a five-step hierarchy. Instead they have found a two-step hierarchy in which lower-level employees show more concern for material and security rewards and higher-level employees place more emphasis on achievement and challenge (Pinder, 2008).

Critics also point to theoretical weaknesses in Maslow's hierarchy. Locke and Henne (1986) identified the dubious behavioral implications of Maslow's emphasis on need deprivation – that is, his contention that unsatisfied needs dominate behavior. Being deprived of a need does not tell a person what to do about it, and the theory does not explain how people know how to respond.

In spite of the criticisms, Maslow's theory has had a strong following among many other scholars and management experts. Maslow contributed to a growing recognition of the importance of motives for growth, development, and actualization among members of organizations. His ideas also influenced other developments in the social sciences and OB. For example, in a prominent book on leadership, James MacGregor Burns (1978) drew on Maslow's concepts of a hierarchy of needs and of higher-order needs such as self-actualization. Burns observed that transformational leaders – that is, leaders who bring about major transformations in society – do not engage in simple exchanges of benefits with their followers. Rather, they appeal to higher-order motives in the population, including motives for self-actualization that are tied to societal ends, involving visions of a society transformed in ways that fulfill such personal motives. As a political scientist, Burns concentrated on political and societal leaders, but writers on organizational leadership have acknowledged his influence on recent thought about transformational leadership in organizations (see Chapter Eleven). In addition, Maslow's work foreshadowed and helped to shape current discussions of organizational mission and culture, worker empowerment, and highly participative forms of management (see, e.g., Lawler, 2003; Peters and Waterman, 1982).

McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y. Douglas McGregor's ideas about Theory X and Theory Y (1960) also reflected the influence of Maslow's work and the penetration into management thought of an emphasis on higher-order needs. As described in Chapter Two, McGregor argued that industrial management in the United States has historically reflected the dominance of a theory of human behavior that he calls Theory X, which assumes that workers lack the capacity for self-motivation and self-direction and that managers must design organizations to control and direct them. McGregor called for wider acceptance of Theory Y, the idea that workers have needs like those Maslow described as higher-order needs: for growth, development, interesting work, and self-actualization. Theory Y should guide management practice, McGregor argued. Managers should use participative management techniques, decentralized decision making, performance evaluation procedures that emphasize self-evaluation and objectives set by the employee, and job enrichment programs to make jobs more interesting and responsible. Like Maslow's, McGregor's ideas have had profound effects on the theory and practice of management. Chapter Thirteen describes two examples of efforts to reform and change federal agencies that drew on McGregor's ideas about Theory Y.

Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory. Frederick Herzberg's two-factor theory (1968) also emphasized the essential role of higher-order needs and intrinsic incentives in motivating workers. From studies involving thousands of people in many occupational categories, he and his colleagues concluded that two major factors influence individual motivation in work settings. They called these factors *hygiene factors* and *motivators* (see Table 9.2). Insufficient hygiene factors can cause dissatisfaction with one's job, but even when they are abundant they do not stimulate high levels of motivation. As indicated in Table 9.2, hygiene factors are extrinsic incentives – including organizational, group, or supervisory conditions – or externally mediated rewards such as salaries. Hygiene factors can only prevent dissatisfaction, but motivators are essential to increasing motivation. They include intrinsic incentives such as interest in and enjoyment of the work itself and a sense of growth, achievement, and fulfillment of higher-order needs.

Herzberg concluded that because motivators are the real sources of stimulation and motivation for employees, managers must avoid the negative techniques of controlling and directing employees and should instead design work to provide for the growth, achievement, recognition, and other elements people need, which are represented by the motivators. This approach requires well-developed job enrichment programs to make the work itself interesting and to give workers a sense of control, achievement, growth, and recognition, which produces high levels of motivation.

Herzberg's work sparked controversy among experts and researchers. He and his colleagues developed their evidence by asking people to describe events on the job that led to feelings of extreme satisfaction and events that led to extreme dissatisfaction. Most of the reports of great satisfaction mentioned intrinsic and growth factors. Herzberg labeled these motivators in part because the respondents often mentioned their connection to heightened motivation and better performance. Reports of dissatisfaction tended to concentrate on the hygiene factors.

Researchers using other methods of generating evidence did not obtain the same results, however (Pinder, 2008). Critics argued that when people are asked to describe an event that makes them feel highly motivated, they might hesitate to report such things as pay or an improvement in physical working conditions. Instead, in what social scientists call a social desirability effect, they might attempt to provide more socially acceptable answers. Critics also questioned Herzberg's conclusions about the effects of the two factors on individual behavior. These concerns about the limitations of the theory led to a decline in interest in it. Locke and Henne (1986), e.g., found no recent attempts to test the theory and concluded that theorists no longer took it seriously. Nevertheless, the theory always receives attention in reviews of motivation theory because of its contribution to the stream of thought about such topics as “job enrichment” and restructuring work to make it interesting and to satisfy workers' needs for growth and fulfillment. Thus, the theory continues to contribute to contemporary thinking about motivating people in organizations.

McClelland's Needs for Achievement, Power, and Affiliation. In its day, David McClelland's theory about the motivations for seeking achievement, power, and affiliation (friendly relations with others) – especially his ideas about the need for achievement – was one of the most prominent theories in management and OB. It elicited thousands of studies (McClelland, 1961; Locke and Henne, 1986). Need for achievement (*n Ach*), the central concept in his theory, refers to a motivation – a "dynamic restlessness" (McClelland, 1961, p. 301) – to achieve a sense of mastery over one's environment through success at achieving goals by using one's own cunning, abilities, and efforts. McClelland originally argued that *n Ach* was a common characteristic of persons attracted to managerial and entrepreneurial roles, although he later narrowed its application to predicting success in entrepreneurial roles (Pinder, 2008).

McClelland measured *n Ach* through a variety of procedures, including the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). The TAT involves showing a standard set of pictures to individuals, who then make up brief stories about what is happening in each picture. One typical picture shows a boy sitting at a desk in a classroom reading a book. A respondent identified as low in *n Ach* might write a story about the boy daydreaming, while someone high in *n Ach* might write a story about the boy studying hard to do well on a test. Researchers have also measured *n Ach* through questionnaires that ask about such matters as work role preferences and the role of luck in outcomes.

McClelland (1961) argued that persons high in *n Ach* are motivated to achieve in a particular pattern. They choose fairly challenging goals with moderate risks, for which outcomes are fairly clear and accomplishment reflects success through one's own abilities. Persons in roles such as research scientist, which requires waiting a long time for success and recognition, may have a motivation to achieve, but they do not conform to this pattern. As one example of the nature of *n Ach* motives, McClelland cited the performance of students in experiments in which they chose how to behave in games of skill. The researchers had the students participate in a ring-toss game. The participants chose how far from the target peg they would stand. The high-*n Ach* participants tended to stand at an intermediate distance from the peg, not too close but not too far away. McClelland interpreted this choice as a reflection of their desire to achieve through their own skills. Standing too close made success too easy and thus did not satisfy their desire for a sense of accomplishment and mastery. Standing too far away, however, made success a gamble, a matter of a lucky throw. The high–*n Ach* participants chose a distance that would likely result in success brought about by the person's own skills. McClelland also offered evidence of other characteristics of persons with high *n Ach*, such as physical restlessness, particular concern over the rapid passage of time, and an aversion to wasting time.

McClelland claimed that measuring *n Ach* could determine the success of individuals in business activities and the success of nations in economic development

(McClelland, 1961; Pinder, 2008). He analyzed the achievement orientation in the folktales and children's stories of various nations and produced some evidence that cultures high in *n Ach* themes also showed higher rates of economic development. He has also claimed successes in training managers in business firms in less developed countries to increase their *n Ach* and enhance the performance of their firm (McClelland and Winter, 1969). McClelland suggested achievement-oriented fantasizing and thinking as a means to improving the economic performance of nations. Others have also reported the use of achievement motivation training with apparent success in enhancing motivation and increasing entrepreneurial behaviors (Miner, 2005).

McClelland (1975) later concluded that *n Ach* encouraged entrepreneurial behaviors rather than success in managerial roles. He argued, however, that his conceptions of the needs for power and affiliation did apply in predicting success in management roles (although there is much less empirical research about these needs to support his claims). McClelland concluded that the most effective managers develop high motivation for power, but with an altruistic orientation and a concern for group goals. This stage also involves a low need for affiliation, however, because too strong a need for friendship with others can hinder a manager.

Reviewers vary in their assessments of the state of this theory. Some rather positive assessments contrast with others that focus only brief attention on it (Pinder, 2008) or criticize it harshly. Locke and Henne (1986) condemned the body of research on the theory as chaotic. Miner (2005), however, evaluates the theory as high on validity and usefulness and importance. Miner points out that McClelland's work had a variety of influences on managerial development practices, including such procedures as "competency modelling."

McClelland's theory adds another important element to a well-developed perspective on motivation. Individuals vary in the general level and pattern of internal motivation toward achievement and excellence that they bring to work settings. These differences suggest the importance of employee selection in determining the level of motivation in an organization, but also the importance of designing conditions to take advantage of these patterns of motivation.

Adams' Equity Theory. J. Stacy Adams (1965) argued that a sense of equity in contributions and rewards has a major influence on work behaviors. A sense of inequity brings discomfort, and people therefore act to reduce or avoid it. They assess the balance between their inputs to an organization and the outcomes or rewards they receive from it, and they perceive inequity if this balance differs from the balance experienced by other employees. For example, if another person and I receive the same salary, recognition, and other rewards, yet I feel that I make a superior contribution by working harder, producing more, or having more experience, I will perceive a state of inequity. Conversely, if the other person makes superior inputs but gets lower rewards than I get, I will perceive inequity in the opposite sense; I will feel overcompensated.

In either case, according to Adams, a person tries to eliminate such inequity. If people feel overcompensated, they may try to increase their inputs or reduce their outcomes to redress the inequity. If they feel undercompensated, they will do the opposite, slowing down or reducing their contributions. Adams advanced specific propositions about how workers react that depend on factors such as whether they receive hourly pay or are paid according to their rate of production. For example, he predicted that if workers are overpaid on an hourly basis, they will produce more per hour, to reduce the feeling that they are overcompensated. If they are overpaid on a piece-rate basis, however, they will slow down, to avoid making more money than other workers.

These sorts of predictions have received some confirmation in laboratory experiments. The theory proves difficult to apply in real work settings, however, because it is hard to measure and assess inequity, and some of the concepts in the theory are ambiguous (Miner, 2005). People vary in their sensitivity to inequity, and they may vary widely in how they react to the same conditions.

Regardless of the success of this particular theory, equity in contributions and rewards figures very importantly in management. As described later, more recent models of motivation include perceptions about equity as important components. Equity issues also play a role in debates about civil service reforms and performance-based pay plans in the public sector. Governments at all levels in the United States and in other countries have tried to adopt performance-based pay plans. Supporters of such plans have often cited equity principles akin to those stressed in this theory. They have argued that people who perform better than others but receive no better pay perceive inequity and experience a loss of morale and motivation, and that the highly structured pay and reward systems in government tend to create such situations. The more recently popular alternative involves *broadbanding* or *paybanding* systems. In these systems, a larger number of pay grades and pay steps within those grades are collapsed into broader bands or categories of pay levels. Better performers can be more rapidly moved upward in pay within these bands, rather than having to go through the previous, more elaborate set of grades and steps one at a time. People promoting and designing these plans also point to pay equity as a major justification for such plans. For example, the Internal Revenue Service implemented a carefully developed paybanding system for their middle managers, in part because some of these managers had commented in focus group sessions that they felt demoralized when they worked and tried very hard but received the same pay raises as other managers who did so little that they were “barely breathing” (Thompson and Rainey, 2003).

Equity theory has influenced a stream of research on justice in organizations (Greenberg and Cropanzano, 2001). This research examines employees' perceptions of two types of justice in organizations. Distributive justice in organizations concerns the fairness and equity in distribution of rewards and resources. Procedural justice concerns the fairness with which people feel they and others are treated in organizational processes, such as decision making that affects them, layoffs, or disciplinary actions. For example, are they given a chance to have hearings about such decisions?

In general, researchers have found that perceptions of higher levels of justice in organizations tend to relate to positive work-related attitudes such as work satisfaction and satisfaction with supervision and leadership. Kurland and Egan (1999) compared perceptions of organizational justice on the part of public employees in two city agencies to those of employees in seven business firms. The public employees perceived lower levels of procedural and distributive justice than the private employees did. For the public employees, higher levels of perceived distributive and procedural justice were related to higher satisfaction with supervisors. For the private employees, only higher levels of procedural justice were related to higher satisfaction with supervisors. Lee and Shin (2000), conversely, compared employees in public and private R&D organizations in Korea and found no differences between the two groups in perceptions of procedural justice, but the public employees perceived less distributive justice in relation to pay.

For most managers, trying to ensure that people feel they are rewarded fairly in comparison to others is a major responsibility and challenge. A manager often finds it easier to rely heavily on the most energetic and competent people than to struggle with the problem of dealing with less capable or less enthusiastic ones. If a manager cannot or does not appropriately reward those on whom he or she places heavier burdens, these more capable people can become frustrated. Managers in government organizations commonly complain that the highly structured reward systems in government aggravate this problem. In work groups and team-based activities, too, the problem of a team member's not contributing as well as others can raise tensions. Many of the motivational techniques described later in this chapter, and the leadership and cultural issues discussed in the next chapter, pertain to the challenge of maintaining equity in the work setting.

Process Theories

Process theories emphasize how the motivational process works. They describe how goals, values, needs, or rewards operate in conjunction with other factors to determine motivation. The content factors – the particular needs, rewards, and so on – are not typically specified in the theories themselves.

Expectancy Theory. Expectancy theory states that an individual considering an action sums up the values of all the outcomes that will result from the action, with each outcome weighted by the probability of its occurrence. The higher the probability of good outcomes and the lower the probability of bad ones, the stronger is the motivation to perform the action. In other words, the theory draws on the classic utilitarian idea that people will do what they see as most likely to result in the most good and the least bad.

Although the theory draws on classic utilitarian ideas, it assumed an important role in contemporary OB theory. Vroom (1964) stated the theory formally with algebraic formulas (see Figure 9.1). The formula expresses the following idea: the force acting on an individual and causing him or her to work at a particular level of effort (or to choose to engage in a particular activity) is a function of the sum of the products of the perceived desirability of the outcomes associated with working at that level (or the *valences*) and the *expectancies* for the outcomes. Expectancies are the person's estimates of the probability that the expected outcomes will follow from working at a particular level. In other words, multiply the value (positive or negative) of each outcome by the expectancy (perceived probability) that it will occur, and sum these products for all the outcomes. A higher sum reflects higher expectancies for more positively valued outcomes and should predict higher motivation.

A FORMULATION SIMILAR TO VROOM'S EARLY VERSION	
$F_i = \Sigma\left(E_{ij}V_j\right)$	
where F =	the force acting on an individual to perform act $_i$
E =	the expectancy, or perceived probability, that act $_i$ will lead to outcome j
V =	the valence of outcome $_j$
and	
$V_j = \Sigma\left(V_k I_{jk}\right)$	
where *V* =	the valence of outcome $_j$
I =	the instrumentality of outcome $_j$ for the attainment of outcome $_k$
V =	the valence of outcome $_k$
A FORMULATION SIMILAR TO VARIOUS REVISED FORMULATIONS	
Motivation =	*f [EI × EII(V)] = f [(E→P) × [(P→O)(V)]]*
where *EI* = *(E → P)* =	expectancy I, the perceived probability that a given level of work effort will result in a given level of performance
EII = (P → O) =	expectancy II, the perceived probability that the level of performance will lead to the attainment of outcome *j*
V =	the valence of outcome *j*

FIGURE 9.1 FORMULATION OF EXPECTANCY THEORY

Researchers originally hoped that this theory would provide a basis for the systematic research and diagnosis of motivation: ask people to rate the positive or negative value of important outcomes of their work and the probability that desirable work behaviors would lead to those outcomes or avoid them, and use the expectancy formula to combine these ratings. They hoped that this approach would improve researchers' ability to predict motivational levels and analyze good and bad influences on them, such as problems due to beliefs that certain outcomes were unattainable or that certain rewards offered little value. A spate of empirical tests soon followed, with mixed results. Some of the studies found that the theory failed to predict effort and productivity. Researchers began to point out weaknesses in the theory (Pinder, 2008, pp. 376–383). For example, they complained that it did not accurately represent human mental processes, because it assumed that humans make exhaustive lists of outcomes and their likelihoods and sum them up systematically.

Nevertheless, expectancy theory still stands as one of the most prominent work motivation theories. Researchers have continued to propose various improvements in the theory and to seek to integrate it with other theoretical perspectives (e.g., Steel and Konig, 2006). Some versions relax the mathematical formula and simply state that motivation depends generally on the positive and negative values of outcomes and their probabilities, in ways we cannot precisely specify (see Figure 9.1). Some of these more recent forms of the theory have broken down the concept of expectancies into two types, as illustrated in the figure. Expectancy I (EI) perceptions reflect an individual's beliefs about the likelihood that effort will lead to a particular performance level. Expectancy II (EII) perceptions reflect the perceived probability that a particular performance level leads to a given level of reward. The distinction helps to clarify some of the components of motivational responses.

As an example of applying the theory, the Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS), one of the many pay-for-performance plans adopted by governments during the 1980s, applied to middle managers in federal agencies (General Schedule salary levels 13–15). Under PMRS, a manager's superior would rate the manager's performance on a five-point scale, and the manager's annual salary increase would be based on that rating. PMRS got off to a bad start in many federal agencies, however. In some agencies, the vast majority of the managers received very high performance ratings and their EI perceptions strengthened. It became clear that they had a high likelihood of performing well enough to receive a high rating. Yet about 90% of the managers in some agencies received pay raises of 3% or less, and fewer than 1% received pay raises of as much as 10%. EII perceptions, then, naturally weaken. One may expect to perform well enough to get a high rating (EI), but performance at that level may not lead to a high probability of getting a significant reward (EII). PMRS, like many other performance-based pay plans in government, applies expectancy theory implicitly but fails to do so adequately (Perry, 1986; Perry, Petrakis, and Miller, 1989). Soon after its introduction, PMRS was canceled. The fundamental problem persists, moreover, in performance evaluation systems in the public and private sectors. For example, officials of the US Office of Personnel Management have repeatedly pointed out that a very high percentage of the members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) received the highest performance rating. (The SES consists of the highest ranks of career executives in the US federal civil service.) They have called on the executives who gave these ratings to do more to make distinctions among the performance levels of the people they evaluated.

Analysts at the US Merit Systems Protection Board (2012, p. 37) used a version of the theory similar to this latter version to develop proposals for enhancing motivational conditions in federal agencies. Using the responses to their survey, mentioned earlier, they calculated a “motivation force” statistic for each of a set of rewards the questionnaire asked respondents to rate on the basis of the reward's attractiveness. The motivation force statistic was the product of the respondent's responses to questions measuring the extent to which (1) effort leads to performance, (2) performance leads to the particular reward, and (3) the reward is desirable. The motivation force statistic related positively to respondents' performance ratings.

Some recent versions of the theory also draw in other variables. They point out, e.g., that a person's self-esteem can affect EI perceptions. Organizational characteristics and experiences, such as the characteristics of the pay plan or the perceived equity of the reward system, can influence EII perceptions – as in the PMRS case. Some of the most recent versions bring together expectancy concepts with ideas about goal setting, control theory, and social learning theory, discussed in the following sections (Latham, 2007, p. 260; Steel and Konig, 2006). These examples show how recent formulations of the theory provide useful frameworks for analyzing motivational plans and pinpointing the sources of problems.

Operant Conditioning Theory and Behavior Modification. Another body of research that has influenced motivation theory and practice and that has implications similar to those of expectancy theory applies operant conditioning and behavior modification concepts to the management of employees. This approach draws on the theories of psychologists such as B. F. Skinner, who argued that we can best analyze behavior by studying the relationships between observable behaviors and contingencies of reinforcement.

The term *operant conditioning* stems from a revision Skinner (1953) and others made to older versions of stimulus–response psychology. Skinner pointed out that humans and animals do not develop behaviors simply in response to stimuli. We emit behaviors as well, and those behaviors operate on our environment, generating consequences. We repeat or drop behaviors depending on the consequences. We acquire behaviors or extinguish them in response to the conditions or contingencies of reinforcement.

A reinforcement is an event that follows a behavior and changes the probability that the behavior will recur. (We might call this a reward or punishment, but Skinner apparently felt that the term *reinforcement* was a more objective one, because it assumes less about what goes on inside the subject.) Learning and motivation depend on schedules of reinforcements, referring to how regularly they follow a particular behavior. For example, a manager can praise an employee every time he or she does good work, such as completing a task on time, or the manager can praise the behavior once out of every several times it occurs. According to the operant conditioning perspective, such variations make a lot of difference.

Operant theory derives from what psychologists have called the behaviorist school of psychology. Behaviorism gained its label because it emphasizes observations of the overt behaviors of animals and humans without hypothesizing about what goes on inside them. In a classic debate in psychology, some theorists (the precursors to the expectancy theorists) argued that motivation and learning theories should refer to what goes on inside the organism. Behaviorists, such as Skinner, rejected the use of such internal constructs, arguing that because one cannot observe them scientifically, they can only add confusing speculation to the analysis of motivation. Skinner argued that one can scientifically analyze only those behaviors that are overtly observable. In recent years psychologists have worked toward reconciling operant behaviorism with cognitive concepts (Bandura, 1978, 1997; Bandura and Locke, 2003; Kreitner and Luthans, 1987; Pinder, 2008, pp. 455–473).

Skinner and other behaviorists analyzed relationships between reinforcements and behaviors and developed principles related to various types and schedules of reinforcement. For example, Skinner pointed out that a subject acquires a behavior more rapidly under a constant reinforcement schedule, but the behavior will extinguish (stop occurring) faster than one brought about using a variable-ratio schedule. Accordingly, the behaviorists would suggest that constant praise by a supervisor might have more immediate effects on the employee than intermittent praise, but the effects would fall off rapidly if the manager stopped the constant praise. Intermittent praise might be slower to take effect, but it would last longer. Behaviorists also point out that positive reinforcement works better than negative reinforcement or punishment. Table 9.3 summarizes the concepts and principles from this body of theory.

TABLE 9.3 CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF OPERANT CONDITIONING

Types of Reinforcement	
Positive reinforcement:	Increasing a behavior by providing a beneficial stimulus, contingent on workers exhibiting that behavior. *Example:* An agency director announces that she will reward her assistant directors in their performance appraisals for their efforts to help their subordinates with professional development. She praises and rewards those efforts in the appraisals. As a result, the assistant directors devote even more attention to their subordinates' professional development.

Negative reinforcement:	Decreasing a behavior by removing or withholding an aversive stimulus (withholding punishment). *Example:* A supervisor stops reprimanding an employee for arriving late when the employee arrives on time; the probability increases that the employee will thereafter arrive on time.
Operant extinction:	The result of withholding or removing a positive reinforcement. *Example:* A new agency director replaces the one described and ignores the assistant directors' efforts at promoting their subordinates' professional development. As a result, the assistant directors reduce their effort.
Punishment:	Application of an aversive stimulus to reduce occurrence of a behavior. A habitually late worker has his pay docked.
Schedules of Reinforcement	
Fixed schedule:	Applies the reinforcement on a regular basis or after a fixed period of time or a fixed number of occurrences of the behavior.
Variable schedule:	Varies the time period or number of repetitions.
Ratio schedule:	Applies reinforcements according to a designated ratio of reinforcements to responses, such as once for every five occurrences.
Interval schedule:	Applies reinforcement after a designated time interval.
These categories can be combined:	
	A fixed-interval schedule – a weekly paycheck
	A variable-interval schedule – a bonus every so often
	A fixed-ratio schedule – piece-rate pay scales
	A variable-ratio schedule – intermittent praise for a behavior
Selected Principles of Reinforcement	

- Positive reinforcement provides the most efficient means of influencing behavior.
- Punishment is less efficient and effective in shaping behavior (Skinner 1953).
- A low-ratio reinforcement schedule – reinforcement after each occurrence of a behavior, e.g., – produces rapid acquisition of the behavior but more rapid extinction when the reinforcement stops.
- Intermittent reinforcement, especially in highly variable intervals or according to a variable-ratio schedule (reinforcement after long, varying periods or after

varied numbers of occurrences), requires more time for behavior acquisition, but extinction occurs more slowly when the reinforcements cease.

Behavior modification refers to techniques that apply principles of operant conditioning to modify human behavior. The term apparently comes from the way in which the behaviorists studied the principles of reinforcement by modifying and shaping behaviors. They would, e.g., develop a behavior by reinforcing small portions of it, then larger portions, and so on, until they developed the full behavior (e.g., inducing an anorexic patient to eat by first reinforcing related behaviors such as picking up a fork, and then eating a small amount, and so on).

Behavior modification has come to refer broadly and somewhat vaguely to a wide variety of techniques for changing behaviors, such as programs for helping people to stop smoking. Some of these techniques adhere closely to behaviorist principles; others may have little to do with them. Behavior modification practitioners claimed successes in psychological therapy, improvement of student behavior and performance in schools, supervision of mentally retarded patients, and rewarding the attendance of custodial workers (Bandura, 1969; Sherman, 1990). Many organizations, including public ones such as garbage collection services, have adopted variants of these techniques to improve performance and productivity.

As these examples show, managers and consultants have applied behavior modification techniques in organizations. The ideas about intermittent schedules just mentioned and noted in Table 9.3, e.g., lead some behavior modification proponents (Kreitner and Luthans, 1987) to prescribe such managerial techniques as not praising a desired behavior constantly. They advise praise on a varying basis, after a variable number of repetitions of the behavior. They might also prescribe periodic bonuses to supplement a worker's weekly paycheck, arguing that the regular check will lose its reinforcing properties over time but the bonuses will act as variable-interval reinforcements, strengthening the probability of sustained long-term effort. They have also offered useful suggestions about incremental shaping of behaviors by reinforcing successively larger portions of a desired behavior.

These kinds of prescriptions provide examples of those offered by practitioners of organizational behavior modification (OB Mod). OB Mod often involves this approach:

- Measure and record desirable and undesirable behaviors to establish baselines.
- Determine the antecedents and consequences of these behaviors.
- Develop strategies for using reinforcements and punishments – such as praise and pay increases – to change the behaviors.
- Apply these strategies, following the reinforcement schedules mentioned earlier.
- Assess the resultant behavioral change.

A number of field studies of such projects have reported successes in improving employee performance, attendance, and adherence to safety procedures (Miner, 2006; Pinder, 2008, 448ff.). A highly successful effort by Emery Air Freight, e.g., received widespread publicity (Kreitner and Luthans, 1987). The project involved having employees monitor their own performance, setting performance goals, and using feedback and positive reinforcements such as praise and time off.

Yet controversy over explanations of the success of this project reflects more general controversies about OB Mod. Critics have argued that the success of the Emery example, as well as other applications of OB Mod, was not the result of the use of operant conditioning principles. These practices succeeded, according to the critics, because they included such steps as setting clear performance goals and making rewards contingent upon them (Locke, 1977). Therefore, the critics contend, these efforts do not offer any original insights derived from OB Mod. One might draw similar conclusions from expectancy theory, e.g. Other criticisms focus on the questionable ethics of the emphasis on manipulation and control of people. Also, behavior modification and OB Mod appear to be most successful in altering relatively simple behaviors that are amenable to clear measurement. Even then, the techniques often involve practical difficulties, because of all the measuring and reinforcement scheduling required.

In response to criticisms, however, proponents of OB Mod, and of behavior modification more generally, pointed to the successes of the techniques. They counterattacked on the ethics of their approach by arguing that they cut through a lot of obfuscating fluff about values and internal states and move right to the issue of correcting bad behaviors and augmenting good ones. ("Do you want smokers to be able to stop, anorexics to eat, and workers to follow safety precautions, or do you not?") Similarly, OB Mod advocates claim that their approach succeeds in developing a focus on desired behaviors (getting the filing clerk to come to work on time), as opposed to making attributions about attitudes ("The filing clerk has a bad attitude"), and an emphasis on strategies for positive reinforcement of desired behaviors (Kreitner and Luthans, 1987; Stajkovic and Luthans, 2001).

Social Cognitive Theory and Self-Efficacy. Social cognitive theory reflects both the limitations and the value of operant conditioning theory and OB Mod. Developed by psychologist Albert Bandura (1977a, 1977b, 1989, 1991, 1997) and others, social cognitive theory blends ideas from operant conditioning theory with greater recognition of internal cognitive processes such as goals and a sense of self-efficacy, or personal effectiveness. It gives attention to forms of learning and behavior change that are not tightly tied to some external reinforcement.

Bandura argues that people possess considerable ability to regulate and motivate themselves through several critical self-regulatory processes (1977a, 1989, 1991). People monitor their own behavior and thoughts to understand how they affect their emotions, motivation, and performance. They also set personal standards or goals to guide their behavior, with many people exhibiting a tendency to raise their standards and goals once they have been met. Standards are acquired in various ways, including by observing and adopting other people's standards and by evaluating and comparing one's own behavior over time. When people set a standard or goal, they anticipate how likely different behaviors are to produce the desired outcome and act accordingly. Finally, people create their own incentives and reward themselves for meeting their personal standards, including self-respect and self-satisfaction that comes from success. In short, people form beliefs about what they can accomplish, set goals for themselves, anticipate the likely results of their actions, and devise a course of action that will help them achieve their goals (Bandura 1991).

Central to the process of self-regulation is the concept of self-efficacy, a personal judgment of how capable one is in executing a course of action necessary to effectively deal with a problem or achieve a goal (1977b, 1989, 1997). Self-efficacy influences cognition, affect, and behavior in four ways. First, people with high self-efficacy have a tendency to set higher goals for themselves, are more likely to visualize scenarios where one succeeds, are less likely to dwell on failure, and are more committed to achieving their goals. Self-regulated motivation involves a combination of discrepancy reduction, with people making necessary adjustments in behavior to get closer to reaching their goals, and discrepancy production, meaning that people set goals at higher levels than preciously accomplished ones. Second, self-efficacy beliefs influence the level of effort people will exert toward goal achievement and their persistence in the face of adversity. Third, people with high self-efficacy experience less stress and depression when faced with difficult, risky, or threatening situations and are more likely to learn and overcome them. Finally, self-efficacy helps to determine the choices people make as to situations and challenges they are willing to face. While people with high self-efficacy avoid situations they believe they cannot cope with adequately, they still choose challenging situations where their actions can lead to success.

Various factors or processes can increase self-efficacy and enhance motivation (1977a, 1977b, 1991). The first involves performance accomplishments. Spending time performing a task, learning from failures, and gaining mastery over the task enhances self-efficacy. So does vicarious learning, as people watch others engage in a threatening or difficult activity without failing, learn about what works from others, and gain knowledge of how to cope with challenging situations. Weaker sources of self-efficacy include verbal persuasion and exhortation by others to increase confidence in one's ability to perform effectively, as well as emotional arousal, which refers to stress and anxiety associated with anticipated outcomes and feeling energized by task performance.

Applications of social cognitive theory in organizational settings have included frameworks for developing leadership and self-improvement, with studies suggesting that the sorts of techniques just mentioned can improve performance. For example, Sims and Lorenzi (1992) proposed models and methods for motivating oneself and others through self-management that make use of some of the techniques just suggested, such as setting goals for oneself and developing the capacity of others to set their own goals, developing self-efficacy in oneself and others, and employing modeling and self-rewarding behaviors (such as self-praise). Sims and Lorenzi proposed that this approach can support the development of more decentralized, participative, empowering leaders and teamwork processes in organizations.

Empirical studies also point to the relevance of social cognitive theory for public organizations. For instance, Belle and Cantarelli (2017) find that exposure to justifications for unethical behavior and dishonest conduct can increase unethical behavior. They posit that such exposure leads people to become disengaged from their own moral standards, making them less inclined to sanction themselves for acting unethically. Wright's (2004) analysis points to the influence of self-efficacy on work motivation in the public sector and reveals how work context can influence self-efficacy. Procedural constraints and vague organizational goals can indirectly reduce self-efficacy by making personal job-related goals seem more ambiguous and less attainable. This can be mitigated through better communication and clarification of organizational goals, individual performance feedback, and employee training and mentoring to increase confidence.

Goal-Setting Theory. Psychologists Edwin Locke, Gary Latham, and their colleagues have advanced a theory of goal setting that has been very successful in that it has been solidly confirmed by well-designed research (Latham, 2007; Locke, 2000; Locke and Latham, 1990a; Miner, 2005; Pinder, 2008, pp. 389–422). The theory states that difficult, specific goals lead to higher performance than easy goals, vague goals, or no goals (e.g., “Do your best”). Difficult goals enhance performance by directing attention and action, mobilizing effort, increasing persistence, and motivating the search for effective performance strategies. Commitment to the goals and feedback about progress toward achieving them are also necessary for higher performance. Commitment and feedback do not by themselves stimulate high performance without difficult, specific goals, however. Research findings also indicate that participation in setting a more difficult goal, giving a rationale when assigning a goal, and expecting success in attaining the goal enhance commitment (Lathan, 2012).

Locke and Latham (1990b) contended that assigning difficult, specific goals enhances performance because of the goals' influence on an individual's personal goals and his or her self-efficacy. *Self-efficacy* refers to a person's sense of his or her capability or effectiveness in accomplishing outcomes (Bandura, 1989). Assigned goals influence personal goals through a person's acceptance of and commitment to them. They influence self-efficacy by providing a sense of purpose and standards for evaluating performance, and they create opportunities for accomplishing lesser and proximal goals that build a sense of self-efficacy (Earley and Lituchy, 1991).

Although many studies support this theory, another reason for its success may be its compactness and relatively narrow focus (Pinder, 2008). The theory and much of the research that supports it concentrate on task performance in clear and simple task settings, which is amenable to the setting of specific goals. Also, a few studies have examined complex task settings (Locke and Latham, 1990a). However, some of the prominent contributions to organization theory in recent decades, such as the contingency theory and garbage can models of decision making (described in previous chapters), have emphasized that in many situations clear, explicit goals are quite difficult to specify. This suggests that in many of the most important settings, such as high-level strategy development teams, clear, specific goals may be impossible, or even dysfunctional. Similarly, precise goals can raise potential problems for public organizations, given their complex goal sets.

Nevertheless, this body of research emphasizes the value of clear goals for work groups. Whether or not it applies precisely to higher-level goals for public agencies, developing reasonably clear goals remains one of the major responsibilities and challenges for public executives and managers. This is turn raises the interesting question of whether this will be a nearly impossible challenge, given the frequent observations about vague goals in the public sector, mentioned earlier. The literature on public management, however, now offers numerous examples of leaders in public agencies who have developed effective goals (Behn, 1994; DiIulio, 1990; Moore, 1990; Allison, 1983). In addition, Wright (2001) proposed a model of the motivation of government employees that emphasizes both goal-setting theory and social learning theory. He has also reported results of a survey of state government employees in New York State that show relations between goal concepts such as greater work goal clarity and self-reported work motivation (Wright, 2004).

Jung (2013) reports evidence that federal programs that state clearer goals have higher levels of employee satisfaction. He analyzed programs' reports that were required for the federal government's Performance Assessment and Rating Tool process that evaluated the performance of a very large number of federal programs. He developed methods for assessing the clarity of the goals that the programs stated in their reports and found that programs with clearer goal statements have higher levels of employee satisfaction.

Taylor (2013) reports a study of Australian federal government employees, and their perceptions of goal specificity, goal difficulty, psychological empowerment, and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). She found that goal specificity and difficulty had positive effects on OCB and psychological empowerment.

Latham, one of the two primary authors of goal-setting theory, with colleagues addressed the matter of whether goal-setting theory can apply in the public sector (Latham, Borgogni, and Pettita, 2008). The authors acknowledge the claims that organizational goals tend to be vague in the public sector. They note that research shows that organizational goal ambiguity varies among federal agencies but that many of them show high levels of goal ambiguity. Yet they provide evidence from an Italian local government setting that goal clarification can have very beneficial effects. The authors suggest the possibility that goal setting may be more often applicable at local levels of government. In general, though, the study supports the conclusion that goal-setting theory can apply in many governmental settings in many nations.

These developments in research suggest that, in spite of the frequent observations that government organizations and programs have vague goals, there are many situations in government in which stating clear goals can have beneficial results. There are many examples, spanning decades, that show that inappropriate, premature, or excessive goal clarification in government programs can have bad effects (e.g., Blau, 1969). A careful look at the evidence just described, however, indicates that leaders in government should be aware of goal-setting theory and should invest in appropriate goal clarification.

Self-Determination Theory. One of the most interesting theories of motivation to appear during the last few decades is self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 1987; Ryan, 1995; Ryan and Deci, 2000, Gagne and Deci, 2005; Deci and Ryan, 2012). Like earlier content theories of motivation, self-determination theory postulates that three innate, essential, and universal psychological needs energize people and determine the direction of their behavior: competence, relatedness, and autonomy. Competence refers to the need to acquire abilities and gain mastery over actions that produce desired outcomes. Relatedness involves the need to develop stable and fulfilling attachments to others. Finally, autonomy denotes the need to feel in control of one's goals and to be able to self-direct and self-regulate behavior that leads to goal achievement.

Central to self-determination theory is the distinction between controlled and autonomous initiation and regulation of behavior and the notion that people can experience different kinds of motivation beyond just intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Gagne and Deci, 2005). As Table 9.4 illustrates, the theory posits a range of motivations (involving initiation and regulation of behavior) along a continuum, the two ends of the continuum representing controlled motivation, where the source of motivation is external, and autonomous or self-determined motivation, defined by an internal source of motivation. Intrinsic motivation is the prototypical kind of autonomous motivation. People are considered endowed with intrinsic motivation, an inherent tendency to engage in and learn from new and challenging activities that are interesting to people (Ryan and Deci, 2000). While nothing needs to be done to make people intrinsically motivated, social and environmental factors can either facilitate or undermine intrinsic motivation through satisfaction of the need for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. For instance, freedom to choose an interesting task to perform, the opportunity to learn and improve during task performance, and performing the task when surrounded by emotionally supportive colleagues facilitates satisfaction of the need for autonomy, competence, and relatedness, respectively, thereby causing someone to experience intrinsic motivation.

Of course, intrinsic motivation is not the only or even most common kind of motivation that people experience, especially in the workplace (Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier and Ryan, 1991). In organizations, people are often extrinsically motivated, meaning that they engage in behavior for instrumental purposes, that is, to achieve or avoid some consequence. One of the major contributions made by self-determination theory is to draw attention to the different kinds of extrinsic motivation people experience, from external regulation and introjected regulation, which are completely or mostly controlled, to identified regulation and integrated regulation, which are characterized more by autonomy (Ryan and Deci, 2000; Gagne and Deci, 2005). When a person experiences external regulation, he acts purely because of the consequences associated with the act, such as to receive a reward or avoid punishment. For instance, an employee can be motivated to achieve a goal solely due to the compensation expected from goal achievement. While with external regulation the source of motivation is external to the person, other kinds of extrinsic motivation that people experience become more internalized and integrated, making them feel more autonomous and less controlled. With introjected regulation, an employee might take in an external rule or directive and respond to it, usually to avoid anxiety or guilt or to improve self-esteem. This second kind of extrinsic motivation is mostly but not totally controlled. The rule or directive has been internalized in the sense that the person has acquiesced to it and uses it to guide his behavior, but the person has not fully accepted the rule or directive as his own. The third kind of extrinsic motivation, identified regulation, involves someone internalizing and beginning to identify with a prescribed behavior because it is congruent with, at least to some extent, her own values and goals. For example, an employee could be motivated to provide a service to clients because she believes in the mission of her organization and feels it is personally important to help people who are in need. Although in this example the source of motivation, namely, the work requirements of an organization, continues to be external, the person feels more autonomy and volition. The fourth and final kind of extrinsic motivation, and the one where a person experiences the greatest amount of autonomy, comparable to that associated with intrinsic motivation, is integrated regulation. In this case, a person responds to an external requirement by adopted it as her own and assimilating it to her notion of self so that it becomes congruent with her self-identity. As an example, a doctor may risk her life to treat highly contagious patients because doing so is highly consistent with her values, goals, and personal identity as a caring person and dedicated medical clinician. Integrated regulation is still considered to be extrinsic motivation because actions are still taken because of their consequences and not because they produce internal joy and satisfaction. However, integrated regulation feels much like intrinsic motivation in that both kinds of motivation are characterized by a strong sense of autonomy and control over the choices one makes. Importantly, satisfaction of the needs for relatedness and competence can lead to internalization of external regulations (Ryan, Kuhl and Deci, 1997). However, the need for autonomy must also be satisfied in order for people to integrate external regulations and feel autonomous and self-determined (Ryan and Deci, 2000).

TABLE 9.4 SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY

	Controlled Motivation	⟵	⟶		**Autonomous/S Determined Motivation**
	(Extrinsic Motivation)				(Intrinsic Motivation)
Initiation and regulation of behavior	External Regulation	Introjected Regulation	Identified Regulation	Integrated Regulation	Intrinsic Regulat
Source of motivation	External	Mostly external	Somewhat internal	Internal	Internal
Regulatory process	Compliance, external rewards and punishments	Self-control, internal rewards and punishments, involvement of ego	Personal importance, conscious valuing	Congruence, awareness, synthesis with self	Interest, enjoyme inherent satisfact

Why does it matter that people experience different kinds of motivation along a continuum from controlled motivation to autonomous motivation? Empirical studies reveal that an internal source of motivation and the corresponding sense of autonomy and self-determination can profoundly impact people's attitudes and behavior. Research on self-determination theory indicates that as people's needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness are satisfied and they experience autonomous motivation, they report greater intrinsic motivation, higher levels of job satisfaction and organizational commitment, greater persistence and intensity of effort, higher performance, greater acceptance of organizational change, and lower turnover intention (Gillet, Gagne, Sauvagere, and Fouquereau, 2013; Baaard, Deci, and Ryan, 2004; Gagne and Koestner, 2002; Deci, Ryan, Gagne, Leono, Usunov, and Kornazheva, 2001; Illardi, Leono, Kasser, and Ryan, 1993). Experiencing autonomous motivation is also associated with greater emotional wellbeing, higher self-esteem, and lower stress and exhaustion (Patrick, Knee, Canevello, and

Lonsbary, 2007; Deci and Ryan, 2012; Weinstein and Ryan, 2011; Roth, Assor, Kanat-Maymon, and Kaplan, 2007).

Since employees spend a considerable amount of time responding to organizational goals, rules, and directives, a critical question then becomes, what can managers do to satisfy the need for autonomy, competence, and relatedness so that external regulations become internalized and integrated and autonomy is experienced? Research points to a range of factors related to autonomous motivation. The meta-analysis of extrinsic rewards by Deci, Ryan, and Koestner (1999) shows that tangible rewards based on task engagement, task completion, and performance are all negatively related to intrinsic motivation and detrimental to feelings of autonomy. Conversely, verbal rewards, like positive feedback and praise, are positively related to experiencing autonomous motivation. The use of threats, deadlines, and close surveillance or monitoring of subordinates by managers is also negatively associated with autonomous motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1987; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Deci and Ryan, 2012). Providing choice, offering feedback that is not controlling or judgmental (e.g., refraining from telling someone what they ought to do), acknowledging someone's feelings and perspective, and promoting autonomous motivation are all actions that support autonomy; so do encouragement, emotional support, and expressions of warmth and care (Deci, Connell and Ryan, 1989; Ryan and Deci, 2000). A participative leadership style involves employees in decision making. A transformational leadership style aims to inspire followers through a clear vision and challenges and enables them to achieve at high levels. Both styles foster self-determination (Gagne and Deci, 2005). Finally, more structured tasks, clear goals, and acquisition of task-relevant knowledge and skills promote competence and a sense of autonomy (Fernet, Austin, Trepanier, and Dussault, 2013; Roth, 2014).

Self-determination theory has various interesting implications for public organizations. Studies indicate that public organizations have higher levels of formalization (written rules and procedures) about personnel management and procurement than private organizations. Research also finds that public managers perceive more red tape than their private sector counterparts. Red tape refers to burdensome rules that contribute little to the effective functioning of organizations (Rainey and Bozeman, 2000). Public organizations also appear to be more centralized in regards to managerial authority (Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden, 2001). Research on self-determination theory suggests that these distinct structural features of public organizations adversely affect work motivation by denying employees a sense of choice and making them feel controlled by their work environment rather than autonomous (Ryan and Deci, 1987; Gagne and Deci, 2005). In a similar vein, public managers operate in a complex and contested environment in which myriad external stakeholders and political principals monitor their behavior and exert influence over the actions and decisions they make, often imposing conflicting expectations and demands (Meier and Bohte, 2007). Such an external environment makes motivating public employees more challenging from a self-determination theory perspective, as empirical studies show surveillance and monitoring of people's behavior can undermine self-determination and reduce intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1987; Deci and Ryan, 2002).

Self-determination theory also raises questions about the efficacy of certain performance assessment and compensation practices that are becoming increasingly popular in the public sector, particularly performance measurement and performance-related pay. As noted earlier, clear goals enable people to satisfy their need for competence and thus make them feel more self-determined at work (Fernet, Austin, Trepanier, and Dussault, 2013; Roth, 2014). Research on goal ambiguity, however, points to difficulties that managers face in setting clear goals in public organizations (Chun and Rainey, 2005). In addition, performance feedback, which is a critical phase of the performance measurement process, can either help to satisfy the need for competence or thwart satisfaction of the need for autonomy, depending on how managers frame feedback. Empirical research on self-determination theory has shown that positive and nonjudgmental feedback can help foster a sense of competence by acknowledging contributions and offering guidance on how to improve performance, but judgmental feedback that highlights deficiencies in performance and strongly prescribes corrective measures comes across as controlling, undermining the need for autonomy (Deci and Ryan, 1987; Deci, Connell, and Ryan, 1989; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 1999). Finally, research on the use of performance-related pay in the public sector reveals that this practice often fails to increase motivation or improve performance (Perry, Engbers, and Jun, 2009). While this practice can serve to clarify performance expectations, public organizations often fail to properly design and implement pay-for-performance systems, including the inability to provide adequate funding to pay out performance bonuses. As discussed earlier, research on self-determination theory points to another reason why performance-based pay often fails in the public sector. Performance-contingent rewards can provide information that can foster a sense of competence and increase motivation. The need, however, to meet some external standard of performance in order to get a reward causes many people to feel controlled. This has a negative effect on motivation that undermines the efficacy of this form of compensation (Deci, Koester, and Ryan, 1999).

Person–Organizational Fit. Among management scholars there has been a long debate between those who believe that individual differences like values, personality traits, and abilities primarily influence behavior and those that assert it is characteristics of a situation that best predict how one will behave (Chatman, 1989). More recently, a growing number of management scholars have taken the intermediate position where the interaction between person and organization largely determines behavior (Schneider, Goldstein, and Smith, 1995; Kristoff-Brown, Zimmerman, and Johnson, 2005). In particular, a stream of literature by scholars interested in understanding work motivation has proposed theoretical models of how the fit between a person's values and those of his organization influences motivation, other work-related attitudes, and performance (Latham, 2012). For instance, Schneider (1987) proposed an attraction-selection-attrition model of organizational behavior that predicts that founders of organizations, as well as top managers, have a strong influence on the goals and values of an organization. Organizations have a tendency to attract and retain people whose values are congruent with their own, causing the workforce to become more homogeneous in its outlook and beliefs. Importantly, research suggests that it is the fit between people and organizations' values that promotes satisfaction and commitment and explains where people choose to work and for how long (Schneider, Goldstein, and Smith, 1995). In a similar vein, Shaw and Gupta (2004) focused on what employees desire in regard to work (e.g., task complexity or autonomy), and the extent to which an organization's values are congruent with those desires. Their findings reveal that whenever there is a misfit between what a person desires and what the organization is willing to provide, employees will become distressed, their well-being will decline, and their performance will worsen.

Jennifer Chatman (1989) put forth one of the most compelling person–organization fit models. She posits that people are not passive agents and that they choose their environments and can modify them. Central to her model are the values people and organizations cherish and pursue, these acting as behavioral norms or generalized justifications for how to behave and function. The model predicts that the degree of congruence between these two sets of values, particularly when the values are strongly and widely held, will predict employee behavior. A high level of congruence between an employee and her organization's values will motivate the employee to remain in the organization and engage in positive extra-role behavior, such as working longer hours and engaging in constructive behavior not prescribed by the organization. A person with discrepant values who is amenable to change will begin to adopt the organization's values, but one who has strongly held values is more likely to leave the organization. Interestingly, the model also predicts that an employee with discrepant values who has a high level of self-efficacy, especially when joined by other employees with similar values, will attempt to change the values of the organization to make them congruent with their own values. Chapman suggests organizations can improve person–organization fit to encourage positive extra-role behavior and increase retention by carefully screening and selecting employees with congruent values, as well as by molding their values through socialization activities like training, mentoring, and social and recreational events, particularly those undertaken soon after people are hired.

Kristoff-Brown, Zimmerman, and Johnson (2005) performed a meta-analysis of various types of fit, including person–organization fit. Their findings were largely consistent with the predictions from Chatman's model. They found that person–organization fit was moderately positively correlated with organizational commitment and job satisfaction and moderately negatively related with turnover intention. Person–job fit was more modestly positively correlated with satisfaction with coworkers and supervisors and negatively correlated with strain at work. The weakest correlations for person–job fit were with job and task performance (positive) and with organizational withdrawal (negative).

Person–organization fit seems to account partly for why people choose to work in the public sector and for their work-related attitudes. Kim (2012) found that person–organization fit mediates the relationship between public service motivation (PSM) and both job satisfaction and organizational commitment (see also Wright and Pandey, 2008; Taylor, 2008). PSM, which is covered in more detail in Chapter 10, refers to personal motives or a personal predisposition to serve the public and promote the well-being of society (Perry and Wise, 1990; Perry and Hondeghem, 2008). Employees with high levels of PSM seem to experience stronger person–organization fit, leading to higher levels of satisfaction and commitment at work. Christensen and Wright (2011) assert that while person–organization fit may help explain the kinds of jobs people choose, and why people with high PSM are more likely to work in the public sector, it is not just sector of employment that attracts people with high PSM to public organizations. People with high PSM are also attracted to jobs, regardless of sector, that afford them the opportunity to serve others and engage in prosocial behavior, such as those in nonprofit or for-profit organizations where one can serve people in need and advocate on their behalf.

As mentioned earlier, no theory has provided a conclusive general explanation of work motivation, and reviewers tend to agree that motivation theory is in a disorderly state (e.g., Locke and Latham, 2004; Pinder, 2008, p. 484; Steel and Konig, 2006). Authors have tried to integrate the theories just described (e.g., Katzell and Thompson, 1990; Latham, 2007, p. 260; Steel and Konig, 2006). For the time being, however, motivation theory remains interesting and valuable work, even though a comprehensive theory of work motivation remains elusive.

Motivation Practice and Techniques

The state of motivation theory just described confronts both managers and researchers with the problem of what to make of it. The theorists lament their inability to provide a universal, conclusive work motivation theory, but that is quite a demanding standard. As illustrated earlier by the use of expectancy theory to analyze the PMRS and the use of motivation theory by the Merit System Protection Board, the individual theories provide useful frameworks for thinking about motivation and developing means of increasing it. Taken together, they make up a valuable framework for analyzing motivational issues in practical settings. The content theories remind us of the importance of intrinsic incentives and equity and provide concepts for expressing them. This may seem obvious enough, but civil service and pay reforms in government in the past several decades have concentrated heavily on extrinsic incentives, to the virtual exclusion of the intrinsic incentives the content theorists emphasize.

Expectancy and operant conditioning theories emphasize an analysis of what is rewarded and punished in organizations and work settings. Kerr (1989), in an article now considered a classic, pointed out that leaders in organizations very frequently fail to reward the behaviors they say they want and in fact reward those they say they do not want. The theories just discussed provide concepts and suggestions for analyzing such reward practices. The theories direct attention to rewards and disincentives rather than to dubious assumptions or attributions about a person's reasons for behaving as he or she does.

Also, in spite of the travails of the theorists, organizations need motivated members, and they address this challenge in numerous ways. Table 9.5 provides a description of many of the general techniques used to motivate employees, several of which have a large literature devoted to them. Real-world practice often loosely reflects theory, stressing pragmatism instead. Far from making theory irrelevant, however, the practices of organizations often justify the apparently obvious advice of the theorists and experts, because organizations frequently have trouble achieving desirable motivational strategies on their own (Kerr, 1989). For example, surveys find that fewer than one-third of employees in organizations feel that their pay is based on performance (Katzell and Thompson, 1990). As illustrated in the earlier example about PMRS, these techniques often involve implicit motivational assumptions and theories that could be improved through more careful analysis.

TABLE 9.5 METHODS COMMONLY USED TO ENHANCE WORK MOTIVATION IN ORGANIZATIONS

Improved performance appraisal systems: Reforms involving the use of group-based appraisals (ratings for a work group rather than an individual), or appraisals by a member's peers.
Merit pay and pay-for-performance systems: A wide variety of procedures for linking a person's pay to his or her performance.
Broadbanding or paybanding pay systems: Pay systems in government and other settings have often had numerous pay grades and pay steps within those grades. A person would move step-by-step up these categories, usually moving only one step per year. Broadbanding systems collapse many of these steps and grades into broader “bands” or ranges of pay. This enables a supervisor to more quickly move a well-performing person to a higher pay level.
Bonus and award systems: One-time awards for instances of excellent performance or other achievements.
Profit-sharing and gain-sharing plans: Sharing profits with members of the organization (usually possible only in business organizations, for obvious reasons).

Employee stock ownership plans are roughly similar, providing a means of rewarding employees when the organization does well.

Participative management and decision making: These involve a sustained commitment to engage in more communication and sharing of decisions, through teams, committees, task forces, general meetings, open-door policies, and one-to-one exchanges.

Work enhancement: job redesign, job enlargement, and rotation: Usage varies, but job redesign usually means changing jobs to enhance control and interest for the people doing the work. Job enlargement, or “horizontal loading,” involves giving employees a greater variety of tasks and responsibilities at the same skill level. Job restructuring, or “vertical loading,” involves giving employees more influence over decisions normally made by superiors, such as work scheduling, or, more generally, enlarging employees' sense of responsibility by giving them control of a complete unit of work output (e.g., having work teams build an entire car or having caseworkers handle all the needs of a client). These approaches may involve job sharing and rotation among workers and various team-based approaches.

Quality of Work Life (QWL) programs and Quality Circles (QCs): Organizations of all types have tried QWL programs, which typically involve efforts to enhance the general working environment of an organization through representative committees, surveys and studies, and other procedures designed to improve the work environment. Quality Circles, used successfully in Japanese companies, are teams that focus directly on improving the quality of work processes and products.

Incentive Structures and Reward Expectancies in Public Organizations

The challenge of tying rewards, especially extrinsic rewards, to performance is even greater in many public organizations than it is in private ones. Chapter Eight described numerous studies that demonstrate that organizations under government ownership in many nations usually have more highly structured, externally imposed personnel procedures than private organizations have (e.g., Truss, 2013). The civil service systems and centralized personnel systems in government jurisdictions apparently account for these effects.

Of course, public organizations also vary among themselves in how much such systems affect them. The US General Accounting Office, e.g., has a relatively independent personnel system and uses a pay-for-performance plan. Government enterprises often have greater autonomy in their personnel procedures than typical government agencies. Some government agencies have adopted paybanding systems (Thompson, 2007) with apparent success. Such examples contribute to a continuing debate over whether pay and other personnel system constraints are an inherent feature of government. Significantly, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Pfiffner and Brook, 2000) sought to loosen the constraints on pay and other personnel rules and procedures in the federal government, but then about fifteen years later the Clinton Administration's National Performance Review (Gore, 1993) launched still another initiative to decentralize federal personnel rules, including those governing pay and other incentives. The US Office of Personnel Management (2001) has for years sought to provide flexibilities in the rules and procedures of the federal system, yet federal managers still call for more of them (Rainey, 2002). While the debate continues, the evidence indicates that at present public organizations more often have more formalized, externally imposed personnel systems than private organizations do.

This evidence of more formalized personnel rules does not in itself prove that people in public organizations perceive them as such. Chapter Eight also described surveys revealing that public managers, in comparison with their private sector counterparts, report more formalized personnel procedures and greater structural constraints on their authority to administer extrinsic rewards such as pay, promotion, and discipline, and to base these on performance (Elling, 1986; Feeney and Rainey, 2011; US Office of Personnel Management, 1979, 1980, 1983, 2013).

The perceptions of the public managers in these studies may reflect shared stereotypes. Business managers may have personnel problems that are just as serious as those faced by public sector managers, despite the stereotype of a stronger relationship between rewards and performance in private business than in government. Interestingly, the US Office of Personnel Management (1999) issued a report about a study that found no evidence that federal agencies have lower discharge rates than private firms, and little evidence that an inordinate number of poor performers remain employed in the federal service. Even if that is the case, these findings indicate that the perception among public managers of having greater difficulty with such matters currently forms part of the culture at all levels of government in the United States.

The existence of formalized personnel systems and managers' perceptions of constraints under them do not prove that public employees see no connection between extrinsic rewards and their performance. For years, expert observers (Thompson, 1975) have pointed out that some public managers find ways around formal constraints on rewards by isolating poor performers, giving them undesirable assignments, or establishing linkages between rewards and performance in other ways. The motivation theories repeatedly make the point that pay and fear of being fired are often not the best motivators. There are alternative forms of motivation in the public service, including motivation to engage in public service and to pursue important public missions (e.g., Goodsell, 2011).

Nevertheless, a number of surveys have indicated that public employees perceive weaker relationships among performance and pay, promotion, and disciplinary action than private employees do (Coursey and Rainey, 1990; Feeney and Rainey, 2011; Lachman, 1985; Porter and Lawler, 1968; Rainey, 1979, 1983; Rainey, Traut, and Blunt, 1986; Solomon, 1986; U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2013). These studies used expectancy-theory questionnaire items about such relationships and found that public sector samples rated them as weaker. Similarly, the OPM surveys (US Office of Personnel Management, 1979, 2013) have found that sizable percentages of federal employees feel that pay, promotion, and demotion do not depend on performance. Again, these results may reflect shared stereotypes. In fact, there are some conflicting findings. Analysts in the OPM compared results from their survey question about pay and performance with results from a similar item on a large survey of private sector workers; they found little difference in the percentages of employees who expect to get a pay raise for good performance.

Self-Reported Motivation Among Public Employees

The reforms of the civil service system and numerous writers on public organizations assume that the differences in incentive structure diminish motivation among public employees. One can more readily make that claim than prove it. As noted earlier, organizational researchers have difficulty measuring motivation. A few studies have compared public and private managers and employees on scales of self-reported motivation, however, and have found no large differences. Rainey (1983), using the Patchen scales mentioned in Table 9.1, found no differences in self-reported motivation between middle managers in public and private organizations. Virtually all of the public and private managers said they work very hard. Baldwin (1990) also found no difference in self-reported motivation between groups of public and private managers. Rainey found no difference in responses to expectancy items about the connection between performing well and intrinsic incentives such as the feeling of accomplishing something worthwhile, although the public managers perceived stronger connections between performance and the sense of engaging in a meaningful public service. Bozeman and Loveless (1987) reported somewhat higher levels of positive work climate in public R&D labs than in private labs. Wright's (2004) study of the motivation of state government employees did not compare them with private sector respondents, but the level of self-reported motivation they expressed clearly indicated that they claim to work very hard. Brehm and Gates (1997) also analyzed surveys of government employees of various types and found that they reported that they work hard and that their supervisors tended to agree. In addition, the very large surveys of public employees and managers mentioned earlier found that they report high levels on measures related to motivation. They report very high work effort, a strong sense of challenge in their job, a strong sense of their organization's being important to them, high ratings of their organization's effectiveness, and high general work satisfaction (National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, 1978; US Merit Systems Protection Board, 1987, 2012; US Office of Personnel Management, 1979, 2013).

Similarly, in spite of the stereotype of the cautious government bureaucrat (Downs, 1967; Warwick, 1975), public managers have claimed in response to surveys that they feel open to change and to new ways of doing things (Rainey, 1983; US Office of Personnel Management, 2013). Many federal employees express skepticism about prospects for changing their organization, but surveys have found that most federal managers and executives see change as possible. Bellante and Link (1981) reported a study showing that more risk-averse people join the public sector. Their measures of risk aversion, however, included smoking and drinking less, using automobile seat belts, and having higher medical and automobile insurance coverage. These could just as well serve as indicators of the sort of dutiful, public-service-oriented, somewhat ascetic individuals suggested in studies of work-related values (Kilpatrick, Cummings, and Jennings, 1964; Sikula, 1973a), and they do not themselves indicate aversion to professional and managerial risks. Golembiewski (1985) reviewed 270 organizational development efforts in public organizations and concluded that more than 80 percent of them were apparently successful. Bozeman and Kingsley (1998) found no differences between managers in public and private organizations in their perceptions of the degree to which the leaders of the organization engaged in risk taking and encouraged a risk-taking culture (although they did find that more managers perceived that political influence on their organizations from elected officials diminished the risk-taking orientation in both types of organizations). Roessner (1983) noted scant evidence concerning the comparative innovativeness of public and private organizations but found no indication of private sector superiority in rates of diffusion of technological innovations. Light's (2002a) comparison of survey responses of federal employees to those of private sector employees appears to illustrate some of the complications in coming to conclusions about innovativeness and receptivity to change among government employees. The federal employees were more likely than their private sector counterparts to express pessimism about whether their organizations encouraged risk taking, about whether they trusted their organizations, about the morale of their coworkers, and about whether their jobs were dead-ends. At the same time, they were just as likely as the private sector respondents to express satisfaction with the chance to accomplish something worthwhile, and more likely to say that they would choose to work in the same sector if they had the choice.

These results appear to indicate that working in government often involves many frustrations and constraints of the sort discussed in earlier sections and chapters, but it also involves intrinsic rewards and other encouragements that lead many of the people in public service to continue to cope with the frustrations, to seek improvements and accept changes, and to devote effort and energy to their tasks and missions.

Self-reports about one's efforts and about these other factors have obvious limitations. The research indicates, nevertheless, that although many public employees and managers perceive relatively weak connections between performance and extrinsic rewards such as pay and promotion, they report attitudes and behaviors consistent with high motivation.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Nine

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Studies: The Case of the Vanishing Volunteers; A Funeral in the Public Service Center; The Case of Joe the Jerk (or the Very Capable Jerk)

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

CHAPTER TEN
UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS: VALUES, INCENTIVES, AND WORK-RELATED ATTITUDES

The internal and external impetuses that arouse and direct effort – the needs, motives, and values that push us and the incentives, goals, and objectives that pull us – obviously play major roles in motivation. Every theory of work motivation discussed in Chapter Nine includes such factors in some way. Classic debates have raged, however, over what to call them; what the most important needs, values, goals, and incentives are; and what roles they play. These debates raise serious challenges for both managers and researchers. This chapter discusses these topics and also describes important work-related attitudes, such as job satisfaction, that OB researchers have developed. These work attitudes provide valuable insights that help us to analyze and understand the experiences that people have in their work. All these topics are related to work motivation but differ from it in important ways. They are covered here separately not only because they are distinct from motivation and motivation theory, but also because discussing all these topics together would make for a very long chapter!

For a long time, the concepts of values, motives, and incentives have been prominent in the theory and practice of management, including public management. If anything, they have become even more prominent in recent years. Studies of leadership, change, and organizational culture – topics covered in later chapters – have increasingly emphasized the importance of shared values in organizations. Writers and consultants exhort leaders to learn to understand the values of the members of their work groups and organizations, and the incentives that will motivate them. DiIulio (1994) showed how particularly important this can be in public organizations by describing how members of the Bureau of Prisons display a strong incentive to serve the organization's values and mission, in part because some of the bureau's long-term leaders have effectively promoted those values. Goodsell (2010) describes the motivating effects of the missions of government organizations that appeal to the values and motives of the members of those organizations.

As described in Chapter Nine, people in all types of organizations, including government organizations in many different nations, have responded to surveys that ask about their work attitudes and the value they place on various rewards or incentives. In 2005, a consortium of researchers administered the International Social Survey Program in many nations in Asia, Europe, and North America. The survey asked numerous questions about the respondents' lives, including about their work. These included questions about how important to them were each of a list of work rewards, and about the rewards that attracted them to their jobs. Two of the questions asked whether the respondent regarded his or her work as providing the ability to help others, and whether it was useful to society. Additional questions asked the respondent to rate the importance she or he attached to having a job that helps others and that is useful to society. On such questions, public sector respondents in twenty-nine out of thirty nations were higher in agreement, to a statistically significant degree, than respondents who worked in the private sector. The public sector respondents also rated work that is useful to society and helpful to others as more important to them, as compared to the private sector respondents. Very consistently across the nations, people who worked for government were more likely to say that they consider it important to have work that helps others and benefits society and that they felt that their work does benefit society and help others (Bullock, Stritch, and Rainey, 2015).

Exactly what these responses mean, and how important they are as influences on the respondents' work behaviors, is not entirely clear. Yet remember the “generic” view of organizations that Chapters One and Two discussed, which assumes or contends that there are no important differences between public and private organizations? If that is so, how do we get such internationally consistent responses from people that appear to contradict that generic perspective in important ways? More generally, the example of this survey illustrates the challenges practicing managers and researchers face in analyzing and understanding the needs, values, and motives of people in organizations.

How can managers and scholars understand values, motives, incentives, and related concepts? This chapter approaches the problem by reviewing many of the efforts to specify and define important needs, values, motives, and incentives. This review provides a complex array of approaches to the problem, but it also gives a lot of examples and suggestions from which managers can draw.

Motivation theorists use terms such as *need, value, motive, attitude, incentive, objective*, and *goal* in overlapping ways. We can, however, suggest definitions for them:

- A need is a resource or condition required for the well-being of an individual.
- A motive is a force acting within an individual that causes him or her to seek to obtain or avoid some external object or condition.
- An attitude is a way of thinking or feeling about something.
- An incentive is an external object or condition that evokes behaviors aimed at attaining or avoiding it.
- A goal is a future state that one strives to achieve, and an objective is a more

specific, short-term goal, a step toward a more general, long-term goal.

- Rokeach (1973), an authority on human values, offered an often-quoted definition of a value as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence." (p. 5)

Many people would disagree with these definitions and switch some of them around. The challenge for public managers, however, is to develop a sense of the range of needs, values, motives, incentives, and goals that influence employees. The research on motivation tells us to expect no simple list, because these factors always occur in complex sets and interrelationships. The next section provides a description of some of the most prominent conceptions of these topics.

Attempts to Specify Needs, Values, and Incentives

Tables 10.1 and 10.2 present some of the prominent lists and typologies of needs, motives, values, and incentives. These lists illustrate the diversity among theorists and provide some of the most useful enumerations of these topics ever developed. Murray's typology of human needs (1938), e.g., provided one of the more elaborate inventories of needs ever attempted, but even so, it failed to exhaust all possible ways of expressing human needs and motives. Maslow's needs hierarchy (1954), described in Chapters Two and Nine, proposed five categories of needs, arranged in a "hierarchy of prepotency" from the most basic physiological needs through safety needs, social needs, and self-esteem needs, and up to the highest level, the self-actualization needs.

TABLE 10.1 THE COMPLEXITY OF HUMAN NEEDS AND VALUES

			Rokeach's Value Survey (1973)	
Murray's List of Basic Needs (1938)	**Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs (1954)**	**Alderfer's ERG Model (1972)**	**Terminal Needs**	**Instrumental Needs**
Abasement Achievement Affiliation Aggression Autonomy Counteraction Defendance Deference Dominance Exhibition	Self-actualization needs Esteem needs Belongingness/social needs Safety needs Physiological needs	Growth needs Relatedness needs Existence needs	A comfortable (prosperous) life An exciting (stimulating, active) life A sense of accomplishment (lasting contribution)	Ambitious (hard-working, aspiring) Broad-minded (open-minded) Capable (competent, effective) Cheerful (lighthearted,

Harm avoidance Nurturance Order Play Rejection Sentience Sex Succorance Understanding			A world at peace (free of war and conflict) A world of beauty (of nature and the arts) Equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all) Family security (taking care of loved ones) Freedom (independence, free choice) Happiness (contentment) Inner harmony (freedom from inner conflict) Mature love (sexual and spiritual intimacy) National security (protection from attack) Pleasure (an enjoyable, leisurely life) Salvation (eternal life) Self-respect (self-esteem) Social recognition (respect, admiration) True friendship	joyful) Clean (neat, tidy) Courageous (standing up for one's beliefs) Forgiving (willing to pardon others) Helpful (working for the welfare of others) Honest (sincere, truthful) Imaginative (daring, creative) Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient) Intellectual (intelligent, reflective) Logical (consistent, rational) Loving (affectionate, tender) Obedient (dutiful, respectful) Polite (courteous, well-mannered) Responsible (dependable, reliable) Self-controlled

			(close companionship) Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)	(restrained, self-disciplined)

TABLE 10.2 TYPES OF INCENTIVES

Incentive Type	**Definitions and Examples**
Barnard (1938)	
Specific incentives	Incentives "specifically offered to an individual"
Material inducements	Money, things, physical conditions
Personal, nonmaterialistic inducements	Distinction, prestige, personal power, dominating position
Desirable physical conditions of work	
Ideal benefactions	"Satisfaction of ideals about nonmaterial, future or altruistic relations" (pride of workmanship, sense of adequacy, altruistic service for family or others, loyalty to organization, esthetic and religious feeling, satisfaction of hate and revenge)
General incentives	Incentives that "cannot be specifically offered to an individual"
Associational attractiveness	Social compatibility, freedom from hostility due to racial or religious differences
Customary working conditions	Conformity to habitual practices, avoidance of strange methods and conditions
Opportunity for feeling of enlarged participation in course of events	Association with large, useful, effective organization

Condition of communion	Personal comfort in social relations
Simon (1948)	
Incentives for employee participation	Salary or wage, status and prestige, relations with working group, promotion opportunities
Incentives for elites or controlling groups	Prestige and power
Clark and Wilson (1961) and Wilson (1973)	
Material incentives	Tangible rewards that can be easily priced (wages and salaries, fringe benefits, tax reductions, changes in tariff levels, improvement in property values, discounts, gifts)
Solidary incentives	Intangible incentives without monetary value and not easily translated into one, deriving primarily from the act of associating
Specific solidary incentives	Incentives that can be given to or withheld from a specific individual (offices, honors, deference)
Collective solidary incentives	Rewards created by act of associating and enjoyed by all members if enjoyed at all (fun, conviviality, sense of membership or exclusive–collective status or esteem)
Purposive incentives	Intangible rewards that derive from satisfaction of contributing to worthwhile cause (enactment of a law, elimination of government corruption)
Downs (1971)	
General "motives or goals" of officials	Power (within or outside bureau), money income, prestige, convenience, security, personal loyalty to work group or organization, desire to serve public interest, commitment to a specific program of action
Niskanen (1971)	
Variables that may enter the bureaucrat's utility	Salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes, ease of managing the bureau, increased budget

function	
Lawler (1971)	
Extrinsic rewards	Rewards extrinsic to the individual, part of the job, given by others, a consequence of task performance
Intrinsic rewards	Rewards intrinsic to the individual and stemming directly from job performance itself, which satisfy higher-order needs such as self-esteem and self-actualization (feelings of accomplishment and of using and developing one's skills and abilities)
Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson, and Capwell (1957)	
Job "factors" or aspects, rated in importance by large sample of employees	In order of average rated importance: security, interest, opportunity for advancement, company and management, intrinsic aspects of job, wages, supervision, social aspects, working conditions, communication, hours, ease, benefits
Locke (1969)	
External incentive	An event or object external to the individual which can incite action (money, knowledge of score, time limits, participation, competition, praise and reproof, verbal reinforcement, instruction)

Researchers trying to determine whether individuals rank their needs as the theory predicts have found that Maslow's five-level hierarchy does not hold. Alderfer's (1972) typology of basic human needs describes three needs: existence, relatedness, and growth. Other evidence points to a two-step hierarchy: lower-level employees show more concern with material and security rewards, while higher-level employees place more emphasis on achievement and challenge (Pinder, 2008). Analyzing the results of a large survey of federal employees, Crewson (1995b) found this kind of difference between the employees at lower General Schedule (GS) salary levels (GS 1–8) and the highest GS levels (GS 16 and above). He found that respondents at the lower salary levels rated job security and pay as the most important job factors, while executive-level employees gave the highest rating to the importance of public service and to having an impact on public affairs. The executive-level employees also gave their lowest ratings to job security and pay. This suggests that the self-actualization motives among public sector executives focus on public service, a point to which we will return later.

As Crewson's analysis shows, this distinction between higher- and lower-order motives holds in public organizations. Surveys have shown that lower-level public employees attach more importance to job security and benefits than public managers and executives, who say they consider these factors less important than accomplishment and challenging work. Managers coming into government often say they are attracted by the opportunity to provide a public service and to influence significant events.

Human values are also basic components of motivation. Rokeach (1973) developed two corresponding lists of values – instrumental values and terminal values (see Table 10.1) – and designed questionnaires to assess people's commitment to them. Sikula (1973a, 1973b) compared government and business executives using the Rokeach instrument, compiling responses from managers in twelve occupational groups. Six of the groups consisted of managers from industry, education, and government, including fifty-four executives in the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW, now the Department of Health and Human Services). The other six groups consisted of people in nonmanagerial roles. The value profile of the HEW executives was generally similar to that of the other managerial groups, whose members all placed a higher priority on values related to competence (being wise, logical, and intellectual) and initiative (imagination, courage, sense of accomplishment) than the members of the other groups. Among the six managerial groups, the HEW executives placed the highest priority on being responsible, honest, helpful, and capable. They also gave higher ratings than any other group to the terminal values of equality, mature love, and self-respect, and they were lower than the other groups on the terminal values of happiness, pleasure, and a comfortable life. Sikula's limited sample leaves questions about whether the findings apply to all public managers. Yet the emphasis on service (helpfulness) and integrity and the deemphasis on comfort and pleasure conform with other findings about public managers described later in this chapter and in the next one.

Researchers continue to use the Rokeach concepts and methods to study values among people in government and the nonprofit sector. Simon and Wang (2002), e.g., used this approach to assess value changes over time in Americorps volunteers. Among other changes, they found increases in the ratings of freedom and equality among the volunteers after their service, compared with their expressed values prior to their service. Later in the chapter the discussion will return to the issue of values when it focuses on how the social identity of employees influences their values, which in turn influence their behavior.

Incentives in Organizations

Other researchers have analyzed incentives in organizations as a fundamental aspect of organized human activity. As described in Chapter Two, some very prominent theories about organizations have depicted them as “economies of incentives.” Organizational leaders must constantly maintain a flow of resources into their organization to cover the incentives that must be paid out to induce people to contribute to the organization (Barnard, 1938; March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1948). In analyzing these processes, these theorists developed the typologies of incentives outlined in Table 10.2, which provides about as thorough an inventory as anyone has produced (although Barnard used some very awkward terms). The typologies reflect the development across the twentieth century of an increasing emphasis in management theory on incentives besides material ones, such as personal growth and interest and pride in one's work and one's organization. Barnard, March, and Simon implied that all executives, in both public and private organizations, face these challenges of attaining resources and providing incentives.

Clark and Wilson (1961) and Wilson (1973) followed this lead in developing a typology of organizations based on the primary incentive offered to participants: *material, solidary* (defined as "involving community responsibilities or interests"), or *purposive* (see Table 10.2). Differences in primary incentives force differences in leadership behaviors and organizational processes. Leaders in solidary organizations, such as voluntary service associations, face more pressure than leaders in other organizations to develop worthy service projects to induce volunteers to participate. Leaders in purposive organizations, such as reform and social protest organizations, must show accomplishments in relation to the organization's goals, such as passage of reform legislation.

Subsequent research on this typology of primary organizational incentives has concentrated on why people join political parties and groups; it has not specifically addressed public agencies. The concept of purposive incentives has great relevance for government, however. For many public managers, a sense of valuable social purpose can serve as a source of motivation. In addition to the Crewson (1995b, 1997), DiIulio (1994), and Goodsell (2010) examples described earlier, large surveys of federal employees have found that high percentages of them agree that the opportunity to have an impact on public affairs provides a good reason to join and stay in government service, especially at higher managerial and professional levels, and especially in certain agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency.

Extrinsic and Intrinsic Incentives. The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic incentives described in Table 10.2 figures importantly in research and practice related to motivation in organizations. Since the days of Frederick Taylor's pay-them-by-the-shovelful approach to rewarding workers (see Chapter Two), management experts have increasingly emphasized the importance of intrinsic incentives in work.

The "Most Important" Incentives. The variety of incentives presented in Table 10.2 shows why we can expect no conclusive rank-ordered list of the most important needs, values, and incentives of organizational members. There are too many ways of expressing these incentives, and employees' preferences vary according to many factors, such as age, occupation, and organizational level. Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson, and Capwell (1957) compiled the importance ratings shown in Table 10.2

from sixteen studies covering eleven thousand employees. Other studies have come to different conclusions, however. Lawler (1971), e.g., disagreed with the Herzberg ratings, indicating that a wider review of research suggested that people rate pay much higher (averaging about third in importance in most studies). He argued that management scholars have often underestimated the importance of pay because they object to managerial approaches that rely excessively on pay as a motivator. He pointed out that pay often serves as a proxy for other incentives, because it can indicate achievement, recognition by one's organization, and other valued outcomes. Pay can serve as an effective motivating incentive in organizations, if pay systems are designed strategically (Lawler, 1990).

Anyone interested in public management and public organizations should be aware of theories and research results about the importance of certain motives and incentives in public organizations. Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971), two economists who developed theories about public bureaucracies, proposed the inventories of public managers' motives listed in Table 10.2. They made the point that for public managers, political power, serving the public interest, and serving a particular government bureau or program become important potential motives.

Downs developed a typology of public administrators on the basis of such motives. Some administrators, he argued, pursue their own self-interest. Some of these people are climbers, who seek to rise to higher, more influential positions. Conservers seek to defend their current positions and resources. Other administrative officials have mixed motives, combining concern with their own self-interest with concerns for larger values, such as public policies and the public interest. They fall into three groups of managers who pursue increasingly broad conceptions of the public interest. Zealots seek to advance a specific policy or program. Advocates promote and defend an agency or a more comprehensive policy domain. Statesmen pursue a more general public interest. As public agencies grow larger and older, they fill up with conservers and become rigid (because the climbers and zealots leave for other opportunities or turn into conservers). Among the mixed-motive officials, few can maintain the role of statesmen, and most become advocates. In the absence of economic markets for outputs, the administrators must obtain resources through budget allocation, and they have to develop constituencies and political supports for their agency. This pushes them toward the advocate role and discourages statesmanship.

For years, Downs's book (1967) was a widely cited work on government bureaucracy, but researchers have seldom tested his theory in empirical studies. Its accuracy remains uncertain, then, but it does make the important point that public managers' commitments to their agencies, programs, and the public interest become important motives for them.

Niskanen (1971) also was interested in how bureaucrats “maximize utility,” as economists put it. He theorized that, in the absence of economic markets, bureaucrats pursuing any of the incentives listed in Table 10.2 do so by trying to obtain larger budgets. Even those motivated primarily by public service and altruism have the incentive to ask for more staff and resources and hence larger budgets. Government bureaucracies therefore tend to grow inefficiently. Public managers clearly do defend their budgets and usually try to increase them. Yet many exceptions occur, such as when agency budgets increase because of legislative adjustments to formulas and entitlements that agency administrators have not requested. Some agencies also initiate their own cuts in funding or personnel or accept such reductions fairly readily (Golden, 2000; Rubin, 1985). In the 1980s, the Social Security Administration launched a project to reduce its workforce by 17,000, about 21% of its staff (US General Accounting Office, 1986). As part of the National Performance Review, the major federal government reform initiative during the Clinton administration, federal agencies eliminated over 324,000 jobs in the federal civilian workforce (Thompson, 2000). For reasons such as this, Niskanen's more recent work focused on discretionary budgets: those parts of the organizational budget over which administrators have some discretion (see Blais and Dion, 1991). An increasing body of research finds mixed support for many of Niskanen's basic assumptions about the motives and capacities of bureaucrats to engage in budget maximization (Bendor and Moe, 1985; Blais and Dion, 1991; Dolan, 2002).

Both of these theories reflect some theorists' tendency to argue that public bureaucracies incline toward dysfunction because of the absence of economic markets for their outputs (see, e.g., Barton, 1980; Tullock, 1965). The theories may accurately depict problems to which public organizations are prone. Later chapters discuss the ongoing controversy over the performance of public organizations and point out that in fact they often perform very well.

Attitudes Toward Money, Security and Benefits, and Challenging Work. Government does not offer the large financial gains that some people make in business, although civil service systems have traditionally offered job security and well-developed benefits programs. One might expect these differences to be reflected in public employees' attitudes about such incentives. We have increasing evidence that they do. Numerous surveys have found that government employees place less value than employees in business on money as an ultimate goal in work and in life (Houston, 2000; Jurkiewicz, Massey, and Brown, 1998; Karl and Sutton, 1998; Khojasteh, 1993; Kilpatrick, Cummings, and Jennings, 1964; Lawler, 1971; Porter and Lawler, 1968; Rainey, 1983; Rawls, Ullrich, and Nelson, 1975; Siegel, 1983; Wittmer, 1991). Some studies have found no difference between public and private employees in the value they attach to pay (Gabris and Simo, 1995). Such variations in research results probably reflect the way such attitudes vary by time period, organizational level, geographical area, occupation, and type of organization. Gabris and Simo used a sample containing only two public and two private organizations, so the sample may not be representative of the two sectors. Yet this possibility reminds us that we have to be careful, in designing research and drawing general conclusions, to take into account such factors as the organizational and professional level of the individuals.

Organizational level figures importantly in comparisons of attitudes about pay because, obviously, for executives and professionals, public sector salaries are usually well below those in the private sector. Below the highest organizational levels, however, pay levels are often fairly comparable in the public and private sectors (Donahue, 2008). Studies have sometimes found that federal white-collar salaries were lower than private sector salaries for similar jobs, by about 22% according to one study (US General Accounting Office, 1990).

For such reasons, analyzing the comparability of pay between the two sectors can be complicated. Public employee unions often emphasize studies showing lower levels of pay in the public sector, but other analysts respond by pointing out that superior benefits in the public sector, such as greater job security and security of health and retirement benefits, eliminate the difference in total compensation. When all forms of compensation are taken into account, public sector compensation levels often appear comparable or superior to those in the private sector at lower organizational levels (Donahue, 2002). Gold and Ritchie (1993), e.g., pointed out that average salaries for state and local government employees tend to be higher than average salaries for private sector employees in the same state. Yet public sector workers with higher skill levels and those at higher levels make less than comparable private sector employees. Differences between public and private sectors are due to a different skill mix in the two sectors. The private sector has a higher proportion of blue-collar workers, and the public sector has a higher proportion of technical and professional workers, who tend to get higher pay than blue-collar workers. So the higher average in the public sector is apparently due to the employment of a larger proportion of higher-paid technical and professional employees, although these same employees may make less than comparable employees in the private sector (Gold and Ritchie, 1993).

Langbein and Lewis (1998) analyzed results of a survey of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and compared the engineers in the public sector and in defense contractor firms to those in the nondefense-related private firms. They found evidence that the engineers in the public and defense contractor organizations had lower levels of productivity than the engineers in the nondefense-related firms, but the public and defense contractor engineers were significantly underpaid compared with the private sector engineers, even after controlling for productivity.

As this suggests, at the highest executive levels and for professions such as law, engineering, and medicine, the private sector offers vastly higher financial rewards, and the differences in these areas have been increasing (Donahue, 2008). Studies of high-level officials who entered public service have found that most of them took salary cuts to do so. Compensation did not influence their decision, however; challenge and the desire to perform public service were the main attractions (Crewson, 1995b; Hartman and Weber, 1980). In sum, many people who choose to work for government do not emphasize making a lot of money as a goal in life, even though at lower organizational levels many public employees do not work at markedly lower pay than people in similar private sector jobs.

Research also indicates that security and benefits serve as important incentives for many government employees, although the research results are mixed. Decades ago, a major survey by Kilpatrick, Cummings, and Jennings (1964) found that vast majorities of all categories of public employees, including federal employees, cited job and benefit security (retirement, other protective benefits) as their motives for becoming a civil servant. A survey of about seventeen thousand federal employees by the US Merit Systems Protection Board (1987) found that 81% considered annual leave and sick leave benefits as reasons to stay in government, and 70% saw job security as a good reason to stay. Houston (2000) and Jurkiewicz, Massey, and Brown (1998) also reported surveys in which public employees placed higher value on job security than did private sector respondents to the surveys.

As described earlier, however, a version of the Maslow needs hierarchy tends to apply. Compared to employees at lower salary levels, smaller percentages of the public sector executives, managers, and professionalized employees (such as scientists and engineers) responding to surveys attached a high level of importance to benefits and job security (Crewson, 1995b), and at least one study found that they placed lower value on job security than private sector respondents did (Crewson, 1997). It appears that job security and other forms of security such as stable health and retirement benefits have served as significant incentives for many public sector employees, although employees at higher salary, managerial, and professional levels attach less value to them.

As compared with employees at lower salary levels, managers and executives generally attach more value to intrinsic incentives; they report more attraction to opportunities for challenge and significant work (Hartman and Weber, 1980). The large Federal Employee Attitude Surveys of the late 1970s and early 1980s asked newly hired employees to rate the importance of various factors in their decision to work for the federal government. Virtually all of the executive-level employees (97% of GS 16 and above) rated challenging work as the most important factor. Employees at lower GS levels rated job security and fringe benefits more highly than did the executives, but about 60% of them also rated challenging work as the most important factor. Rawls, Ullrich, and Nelson (1975) found that students headed for the nonprofit sector – mainly government – showed higher “dominance,” “flexibility,” and “capacity for status” ratings in psychological tests and a lower valuation of economic wealth than did students headed for the for-profit sector. The nonprofit-oriented students also played more active roles in their schools. Guyot (1960) found that a sample of federal middle managers scored higher than their business counterparts on a need-for-achievement scale and about the same on a measure of their need for power. We have some evidence, then, that government managers express as much concern with achievement and challenge as private managers do – or express even more concern.

Khojasteh (1993) found that intrinsic rewards such as recognition had higher motivating potential for a sample of public managers than for a sample of private managers. Crewson (1997) analyzed two large surveys that indicated that public sector employees placed more importance than private employees on intrinsic incentives such as helping others, being useful to society, and achieving accomplishments in work. Gabris and Simo (1995) found no differences between public and private employees on perceived importance of a number of extrinsic and intrinsic motivators, but they did find that the public sector employees placed more importance on service to the community. Karl and Sutton (1998) reported survey results showing that workers in both the public and the private sectors appear to be placing more importance on job security than in the past, but public sector workers report that they value interesting work more than private sector workers do, whereas the private sector workers place more importance than public sector respondents do on good wages. Jurkiewicz, Massey, and Brown (1998) reported that public sector employees gave higher ratings than private employees to having the chance to learn new things and the chance to use their special abilities. Comparing a large sample of federal executives to a large sample of business executives, Posner and Schmidt (1996) found that the federal executives placed greater importance on such organizational goals as quality, effectiveness, public service, and value to the community. The business executives, however, attached more importance to morale, productivity, stability, efficiency, and growth than did the federal executives.

These studies suggest that challenging, significant work and the opportunity to provide a public service are often the main attractions for public managers. Perceptions of public service vary over time, however, with changes in the political climate, the economy, and generational differences. Surveys of career preferences among top students at leading universities have found that these students place a high priority on challenging work and personal growth. They see government positions as less likely than positions in private industry, however, to provide challenging work and personal growth (Partnership for Public Service, 2002; Sanders, 1989).

On the other hand, researchers have found that younger workers in the public sector express higher levels of general job satisfaction than younger workers in the private sector (Steel and Warner, 1990). Employees entering the public sector show higher levels on measures of skill and quality than do those entering the private sector (Crewson, 1995a). These findings indicate that, overall, government does provide working conditions that are generally superior to those in the private sector, because private employers can more readily fire, lay off, and otherwise impose difficulties on workers. The differences may not hold, however, for highly talented young people considering the public service as a career. If the public sector can indeed attract high-quality employees, the challenge of providing them with challenging work becomes all the more important.

The Motive for Public Service: In Search of the Service Ethic

The motives for pursuing work in public service, and for performing well, raise the question of a special form of motivation: the service ethic, the desire to serve the public. An international survey, described earlier, found that in dozens of nations, government employees give higher importance ratings than private sector employees to work that benefits society and that helps others (Bullock, et al., 2015). In the past several decades, scholars have analyzed this topic, calling it public service motivation (PSM).

The topic is centuries old. People in public service have often expressed motivation to serve the public or the public good, as shown by Sikula's survey (1973a), described earlier. Kilpatrick, Cummings, and Jennings (1964) asked federal executives, scientists, and engineers to identify their main sources of occupational satisfaction. The respondents, compared to their counterparts in business, gave higher ratings to the importance of work that is worthwhile to society and that helps others. Surveys have found that managers and executives entering the federal government rated public service and having an impact on public affairs as the most important reasons for entering federal service. Very low percentages rated salary and job security as important attractions (Crewson, 1995b). These and other findings suggest that persons motivated by public service place a high value on work that helps others and benefits society, that involves self-sacrifice, and that provides a sense of responsibility and integrity (Crewson, 1997; Hartman and Weber, 1980; Houston, 2000; Kelman, 1989; Lasko, 1980; Sandeep, 1989; Wittmer, 1991).

As indicated in Tables 10.1 and 10.2, many analyses of values, motives, and incentives in organizational research do not focus on public service motivation (PSM). This suggests the need for a distinct concept of PSM. While it is by no means restricted to government employees, PSM should play a major part in theories of public management and public organizations. The surveys and findings mentioned earlier use general questions about benefiting society and helping others. This leaves questions about what we mean by PSM. Can we define such motivation clearly? Can we measure and assess how much a person has? Earlier chapters and sections have cited examples of how such motives can energize people in their work. Such motivation can serve as an incentive alternative to pay and other rewards that are often constrained in government.

For these reasons, researchers began to pursue the meaning and measurement of PSM. Perry and Wise (1990) suggested that public service motives can fall into three categories: instrumental motives, including participation in policy formulation and commitment to a public program; norm-based motives, including desire to serve the public interest, loyalty to duty and to government, and devotion to social equity; and affective motives, including commitment to a program based on convictions about its social importance and the “patriotism of benevolence.” They drew the term patriotism of benevolence from Frederickson and Hart (1985), who defined it as an affection for all the people in the nation and a devotion to defending the basic rights granted by enabling documents such as the Constitution. Drawing on these ideas, Perry (1996) proposed dimensions of a general public service motive and ways of assessing it. He analyzed survey responses from managers and employees in government and business organizations, and graduate and undergraduate students, to develop the survey questions in Table 10.3. Perry's dimensions and questions present a conception of public service motivation that has led to a vast amount of research by researchers from many different nations.

Researchers have found evidence that links PSM to other important factors. Brewer and Selden (1998) analyzed federal employees' survey responses about whistle blowing (exposing wrongdoing). They found more public-service-related motives among employees who engaged in whistle blowing than among those who did not. Naff and Crum (1999) found that the respondents to another large survey, who expressed higher levels of PSM, also expressed higher job satisfaction and had higher performance ratings from their supervisors. Alonso and Lewis (2001), analyzing the results of two surveys of very large samples of federal employees, also found that one of the surveys indicated that employees with higher levels of PSM received higher performance ratings from their supervisors. Complicating matters, however, the other survey showed a negative relationship between the supervisor's performance ratings and the respondent's expression of PSM.

Much of the research has used questionnaire surveys of government employees and social service volunteers, such as Perry's PSM questionnaire or similar questions. Researchers have assessed the Perry questionnaires' reliability and conceptual structure, and have developed shorter or alternative versions of it (e.g., Coursey and Pandey, 2007; Vandenabeele, 2008). Research has identified factors that relate positively to PSM, including a strong religious orientation, a family background that encourages altruistic service to others, gender, positive leadership, and low levels of red tape (DeHart-Davis, Marlowe, and Pandey, 2006; Pandey and Stazyk, 2008; Park and Rainey, 2008). Wright (2007), e.g., finds that when government employees express higher levels of “mission valence,” they report higher levels of PSM; that is, when they consider their organization's goals important and when their job goals are specific and difficult, they report higher service motivation. Studies also show that PSM shows positive relations to organizational commitment, work satisfaction, self-reported performance, intent to turn over (that is, to leave the organization), citizenship behavior (helpful and supportive behaviors toward other employees), perceptions of leadership and organizational mission, and charitable activities (Bright, 2007; 2011; Leisink and Steijin, 2009; Frank and Lewis, 2004; Houston, 2006; Pandy and Stazyk, 2008; Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan, 2008; Park and Rainey, 2008; Vandenabeele, 2007, 2009; Wright, Moynihan and Pandey, 2012). Francois (2000) proposed a formal model that postulates that public sector organizational activities can operate as efficiently and effectively as private business organizations, when PSM acts as a basic incentive.

TABLE 10.3 PERRY'S DIMENSIONS AND QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURES OF PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION

Source: Perry, 1996.

Dimensions	Examples of Questionnaire Items
Attraction	The give and take of public policymaking doesn't appeal to me. (Reversed)[a] I don't care much for politicians. (Reversed)
Commitment to the public interest	I unselfishly contribute to my community. Meaningful public service is very important to me. I consider public service a civic duty.
Compassion	I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged. (Reversed) Most social programs are too vital to do without. It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress. To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others.
Self-sacrifice	I believe in putting duty before self. Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it. I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society.

[a]"Reversed" indicates items that express the opposite of the concept being measured, as a way of varying the pattern of questions and answers. The respondent should disagree with such statements if they are good measures of the concept. For example, a person high on the compassion dimension should disagree with the statement, "I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged."

Perry's index of PSM implies that it is a general motive on which people are higher or lower. What if people vary in the way they perceive and approach public service? Brewer, Selden, and Facer (2000) analyzed the responses concerning PSM from about seventy government employees and public administration students and concluded that the respondents fell into four categories of conceptions of public service: Samaritans express a strong motivation to help other people, communitarians are motivated to perform civic duties, patriots work for causes related to the public good, and humanitarians express a strong motivation to pursue social justice. This differentiation of conceptions of PSM makes the important point that PSM is likely to vary among individuals and organizations.

Researchers have also found evidence that the beneficial effects of high levels of PSM depend on the fit between the person and the job and work environment. The environment and job need to have characteristics that fit the person's needs and skills (Stijn, 2008; Vigoda and Cohen, 2003). Persons with high levels of PSM tend to attain jobs in the public sector, but those jobs must provide conditions that will fulfill public service motives. Research has also shown that people involved in work that serves others show higher productivity when they receive information from the people whom they serve about the benefits those people experience (Grant, 2008; Bellé, 2013).

Analysis of PSM has raised an important issue in the “motivation crowding” hypothesis, which proposes that pay can diminish intrinsic motives such as PSM under certain conditions. Chapter Nine discusses self-determination theory and explains the conditions under which extrinsic rewards such as money can diminish intrinsic motives such as enjoyment of the work itself (Ryan and Deci, 2000a, 2000b). The crowding-out of intrinsic motivation depends on a person's perceived self-determination. If a person feels under the control of another person, intrinsic motivation diminishes. Frey and Reto (2001) suggest that a person's PSM can go down when pay or salary is administered to the person in a way that reduces self-determination. Andersen and Pallesen (2008) provide an analysis of Danish research institutions implementing new financial incentives for research productivity. Researchers received pay supplements for academic publication. Andersen and Pallesen report that the more the researchers perceived the incentives as supportive, as opposed to reducing self-determination, the more the incentives encouraged researchers to publish.

One important aspect of research on PSM is the international attention to the concept that includes analysis of data from many nations. These studies indicate that measures of PSM generally show relations to other important variables, and thus indicate an international significance of PSM. Vandenabeele and Steven Van de Walle (2008) employ an international survey to study differences in public service motivation across nations. They find that public service motivation has a universal character, but that patterns of public service motivation vary around the world. For example, because the Perry scale was developed for use with American respondents, Vandenabeele (2008) conducted a survey of Flemish civil servants with a scale developed with an orientation toward European society. The new scale confirmed the dimensional structure of the Perry scale, except that the Flemish results include an additional dimension of “democratic governance.”

Addressing the international character of this research, Kim, Vandenabeele, Wright, Anderson, and eleven other authors (2012) developed a questionnaire about PSM to survey local government employees in twelve nations. The results indicated that there were similarities among nations that have similar political cultures, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The evidence indicates, however, that while PSM plays an important role in the motivation of public employees in many nations, it can have different meanings and requires different measures in different cultures.

Research on PSM accelerated rapidly. By 2016, Ritz, Brewer, and Neumann (2016) reviewed 323 studies of PSM, published in refereed professional journals, The research came from all continents, with most coming from Europe (43% of the studies) and the U.S. (31%), with additional studies based on research in Asia, Africa, and South America. Ritz and others found that the research had found positive relationships between PSM and work satisfaction (16% of the studies), choosing to work in a public sector job (14%), individual and organizational performance (11%), organizational commitment, person–organization fit (the congruence between a person's values and an organization's values, e.g., Wright and Pandey 2008), and lower turnover intentions.

The research included analyses of antecedents of PSM – factors that precede and may cause it. The research often found that, age, education, gender (with females showing higher PSM), management level, job tenure, and good employee–leader relations showed positive relations to PSM. The results are generally mixed, however, because some studies have not supported these findings. The large set of studies showed limitations, such as the frequent reliance on "survey results representing one point in time." This weakens researchers' ability to draw conclusions about cause-and-effect relations. Ritz and others also conclude that the PSM research has not identified PSM's practical applications for management in government and other settings. They call for such practices as identifying job applicants' PSM levels and developing practices that encourage and reward PSM. Such complications are common in social and organizational research, as Pinder (2008; see also Yukl, 2015) illustrates in his comprehensive review of motivation theory and research. Ultimately, Ritz and colleagues show that the PSM topic stimulated a valuable, very active stream of research, involving an international movement of significance for public sector management and organizations.

In another review, Brewer (2019) notes the impressive volume of research on PSM. Also, however, as with other major concepts in social and administrative research, questions remain. Authors still raise issues about the meaning and validity of the concept. They note that authors tend to treat PSM as very positive, when there are potential "dark sides." Excessive PSM might lead some persons to adhere to their own sense of service needs, possibly failing to be accountable to elected officials, or cause employees to experience stress because of their intense concern with serving others. In addition, researchers debate a "public sector" idea of PSM, as opposed to a "public service" perspective; that is, must PSM involve government employment? Or does it refer to more general public service, which people can provide from many different organizational settings?

Another important topic concerns the practical value of PSM. Can PSM be used to motivate people in government and other settings? Perry (2020) discusses in depth the procedures for involving PSM in motivating people. He describes prospects for leaders to use PSM as an incentive through applying ideas from transformational leadership theory (discussed in Chapter 11), which involve emphasizing an organization's service mission and showing employees evidence of their role in achieving it and serving beneficiaries. Compensation systems can be designed to recognize and reward PSM, and organizations can emphasize PSM in recruiting, hiring, and developing individuals.

Researchers continue to publish research on PSM (e.g., Boyd, 2020), analyzing its relationship to other important variables in multiple studies in multiple countries. Among many examples, Pedersen, Andersen, and Thomsen (2020) report evidence of relations between PSM and community values, such as a sense of responsibility to the community. Piatak and Holt (2019) report evidence that PSM shows a stronger relationship to prosocial behaviors than does a measure of altruism. Vogel and Homberg (2020) report evidence that PSM relates to measures of individual performance in multiple studies, after eliminating factors that might make the findings seem more significant than they actually are ("p-hacking"). Piatak, Sowa, Jacobson, and Johnson (2020) consider how PSM can be integrated into human resource management processes such as job design and recruiting and selection (see also Christensen, Paarlberg, and Perry 2017). These and many other studies make Public Service Motivation currently the most actively studied topic in public management research. Work also continues on using Public Service Motivation as a motivator for government employees and other people in service-oriented organizations (Perry, 2020).

Motives, Values, and Incentives in Public Management

In spite of the complexities in analyzing all the possible motives, values, and incentives in organizations, the research has produced evidence of their patterns among public sector employees and the differences between public sector and private sector employees. The evidence in turn suggests challenges for leaders and managers in the public sector. Even though many public employees may value intrinsic rewards and a sense of public service, often more highly than private sector employees value them, other chapters in this book describe some experts' concerns that the characteristics of the public sector context can impede leaders' efforts to provide such rewards. Yet other chapters also present examples and evidence of how public organizations and their leaders can and do provide rewarding experiences for employees and enhance their motivation.

In addition, while motivation is obviously very important, motives, values, and incentives also influence other work attitudes and behaviors that are related to motivation, but not the same as motivation. The rest of this chapter describes and discusses important work-related attitudes.

Other Important Work-Related Attitudes

As noted earlier, motivation as a general topic covers numerous dimensions, including a variety of work-related attitudes such as satisfaction, roles, involvement, commitment, and professionalism. Motivational techniques often aim at enhancing these attitudes as well as work effort. Researchers have developed many of these concepts about work attitudes, often distinguishing them from motivation in the sense of work effort. Increasingly, in the United States and in other nations, business, government, and nonprofit organizations have encouraged their employees' positive work-related attitudes. Part of this process has involved conducting surveys of the members of an organization (Brief, 1998; Gallup Organization, 2003; Bullock, Stritch, and Rainey, 2015; US Office of Personnel Management, 2013). Many government agencies regularly measure the work satisfaction of their people.

These work-related attitudes have importance in their own right, but they are also interesting because researchers have used some of them to compare public and private managers. The following sections define and discuss major concepts of work attitudes. Later sections then describe the research on their application in the public sector and in comparisons to the private sector.

Job Satisfaction

Thousands of studies and dozens of different questionnaire measures have made job satisfaction one of the most intensively studied variables in organizational research, if not the most studied. Job satisfaction concerns how an individual feels about his or her job and various aspects of it (Gruneberg, 1979), usually in the sense of how favorable – how positive or negative – those feelings are. Job satisfaction is often related to other important attitudes and behaviors, such as absenteeism, the intention to quit, and actually quitting.

Years ago, Locke (1983) pointed out that researchers had published about 3,500 studies of job satisfaction without coming to any clear agreement on its meaning. Job satisfaction nevertheless continues to play an important role in recent research. The different ways of measuring job satisfaction illustrate different ways of defining it. Some studies use only two or three *summary items*, such as the following:

- In general, I like working here.
- In the next year I intend to look for another job outside this organization.

General or global measures ask questions about enjoyment, interest, and enthusiasm to tap general feelings in much more depth. They often employ multiple-item scales, with the responses to be summed up or averaged, such as the following from the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (Weiss, Dawis, England, and Lofquist, 1967):

- I definitely dislike my work [reversed scoring].

- I find real enjoyment in my work.
- Most days I am enthusiastic about my work.

Specific, or *facet*, satisfaction measures ask about particular facets of the job. The following examples are from Smith's "Index of Organizational Reactions" (1976):

- *Supervision*: "Do you have the feeling you would be better off working under different supervision?"
- *Company identification*: "From my experience, I feel this organization probably treats its employees _______________" [five possible responses, from "poorly" to "extremely well"].

This index also includes scales for kind of work, amount of work, coworkers, physical work conditions, financial rewards, and career future. The Porter Needs Satisfaction Questionnaire (Porter, 1962) asks respondents to rate thirteen factors concerned with fulfillment of a particular need, rating how much of each factor there is now and how much there should be. The degree to which the "should be" rating exceeds the "is now" rating measures need dissatisfaction, or the inverse of satisfaction. The need categories are based on Maslow's need hierarchy, including, e.g., security needs, social needs, and self-actualization. This method has been used in some of the research on public sector work satisfaction described later.

Different measures of job satisfaction are based on different definitions of it. Studies using different measures – and hence different definitions – often come to conflicting conclusions about how job satisfaction relates to other variables. Partly because of these variations, researchers do not agree on a coherent theory or framework of what determines job satisfaction. Research generally finds higher job satisfaction associated with better pay and benefits; adequate training; sufficient opportunities for promotion; consideration from supervisors; recognition; safe working conditions; perceived fairness in the workplace; utilization of skills and abilities; and more skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, and feedback during task performance (Spector 1997). Focusing on personal characteristics as antecedents, Judge and Bono's (2001) meta-analysis, which aggregates the results of multiple empirical studies, identified the four personal traits of generalized self-efficacy, internal locus of control, self-esteem, and emotional stability as among the best dispositional predictors of job satisfaction.

It is obviously unrealistic to try to generalize about how much any single factor affects a worker's satisfaction. Any particular factor in a given setting contends with other factors in that setting. Various studies suggest the importance of individual differences between workers: level of aspiration, level of comparison to alternatives (whether the person looks for or sees better opportunities elsewhere), level of acclimation (what a person is accustomed to), educational level, level in the organization and occupation, professionalism, age, tenure, race, gender, national and cultural background, and personality (values, self-esteem, and so on). The influence of any one of these elements, however, depends on other factors. For example, tenure and organizational level usually correlate with satisfaction. Those who have been in an organization longer and are at a higher level report higher satisfaction. This makes sense. Unhappy people leave; happy people stay. People who get to higher levels should be happier than those who do not. Yet some studies find the opposite. In some organizations, longer-term employees feel undercompensated for their long service. Some people at higher levels may feel the same way or may feel that they have hit a ceiling on their opportunities. Career civil servants sometimes face this problem.

Researchers also look at *job characteristics* and *job design* as determinants of job satisfaction. The most prominent approach, by Hackman and Oldham (1980), also draws on Maslow's need-fulfillment theory. These researchers report higher job satisfaction for jobs higher on the dimensions measured by their Job Diagnostic Survey, which includes the following sub-scales: skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, feedback from the job. Measures of these dimensions are then combined into a “motivating potential score” that indicates the potential of the job to motivate the person holding it. Hackman and Oldham's findings conformed to a typical position among management experts: more interesting, self-controlled, significant work, with feedback from others, improves satisfaction. The US Merit Systems Protection Board (2012) used questions representing these job dimensions in their survey of over 42,000 federal employees. They used the results to draw conclusions about the motivating potential of federal jobs and to make recommendations about ways of improving the way jobs are designed to enhance their motivating potential.

Job satisfaction has received a lot of attention for years because of its very serious consequences. Authors have regularly pointed out that job satisfaction showed no consistent relationship to individual performance (Pinder, 2008). They typically cited Porter's and Lawler's (1868) interpretation of the evidence, which pointed out that the relationship between satisfaction and performance depends on whether rewards are contingent on performance. A good performer who receives better rewards as a result of his or her good performance experiences heightened satisfaction. Yet a good performer who does not get better rewards experiences dissatisfaction, thus dissolving any positive link between satisfaction and performance. The link between performance and rewards, they concluded, plays a key role in determining the performance-satisfaction relationship. However, the meta-analysis of Petty, McGee, and Cavender (1984) revealed a positive relationship between individual-level job satisfaction and performance that was stronger than previous studies suggested. In 2001, another widely cited meta-analysis by Judge, Thoresen, Bono, and Patton (2001) showed that job satisfaction and performance were correlated at about 0.30, and that the correlation was closer to 0.50 for highly complex jobs. They concluded that job satisfaction could very well have a causal effect on performance that is moderated (i.e., strengthened or weakened) by various factors, including job complexity, personality, autonomy, and norms.

Researchers have also pointed out that satisfaction shows fairly consistent relationships with absenteeism, turnover, and burnout. Job satisfaction is also positively related to another important work-related attitude, organizational commitment, particularly affective commitment (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, and Topolnytsky 2002). Some studies have also found job satisfaction to be related to life satisfaction, general stress levels, and physical health (Gruneberg, 1979). These behaviors and conditions cost organizations a lot of money, and they obviously can impose hardship on individuals. Job satisfaction thus figures very importantly in organizations. Distinct from motivation and performance, it can nevertheless influence them, as well as other important behaviors and conditions in organizations.

Role Conflict and Ambiguity

In an influential book, Kahn and his colleagues (1964) argued that characteristics of an individual's role in an organization determine the stress that the person experiences in his or her work. These ideas about organizational role characteristics are meaningful for anyone working in an organization or profession. A number of “role senders” seek to impose expectations and requirements on the person through both formal and informal processes. These role senders might include bosses, subordinates, coworkers, family members, or anyone else who seeks to influence the person's role. If these expectations are ambiguous and conflicting, the stress level increases. Researchers developed questionnaire items to measure role conflict and role ambiguity (House and Rizzo, 1972; Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman, 1970). *Role ambiguity* refers to a lack of clear and sufficient information about how to carry out one's responsibilities in the organization. The role ambiguity questionnaire asks about clarity of objectives and responsibilities, adequacy of a person's authority to do his or her job, and clarity about time allocation in the job.

Role conflict refers to the incompatibility of different role requirements. A person's role might conflict with his or her values and standards or with his or her time, resources, and capabilities. Conflict might exist between two or more roles that the same person is expected to play. There might be conflict among organizational demands or expectations, or conflicting expectations from different role senders. The survey items about role conflict ask whether there are adequate resources to carry out assignments, and whether others impose incompatible expectations.

The two role variables consistently show relationships to job satisfaction and similar measures, such as job-related tension (Miles, 1976; Miles and Petty, 1975). They also relate to other organizational factors, such as participation in decision making, leader behaviors, and formalization. Individual characteristics such as need for clarity and perceived locus of control (whether the individual sees events as being under his or her control or as being controlled externally) also influence how much role conflict and ambiguity a person experiences. These concepts are important by themselves, because managers increasingly concern themselves with stress management and time management. Managing one's role can play a central part in these processes.

Organizational Commitment

The concept of organizational commitment has also figured in research on public and private managers (discussed later in this chapter). Individuals vary in their loyalty and commitment to the organizations in which they work. Certain people may consider the organization itself to be of immense importance to them, as an institution worthy of service, as a location of friends, or as a source of security and other benefits. Others may see the organization only as a place to earn money. Professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and scientists often have loyalties external to the organization – to the profession itself and to their professional colleagues.

Scales for measuring organizational commitment ask whether the respondent sees the organization's problems as his or her own, whether he or she feels a sense of pride in working for the organization, and similar questions (Mowday, Porter, and Steers, 1982). Studies also show the multidimensional nature of commitment. For example, Angle and Perry (1981) showed the importance of the distinction between *calculative commitment* and *normative commitment* to organizations. Calculative commitment is based on the perceived material rewards the organization offers. In normative commitment, the individual is committed to the organization because he or she sees it as a mechanism for enacting personal ideals and values. Meyer and Allen's analysis also revealed a third unique dimension of organizational commitment, affective commitment, referring to an emotional attachment, identification, and involvement with an organization.

Balfour and Wechsler (1996) further elaborated the concept of organizational commitment in a model for the public sector based on a study of public employees. Their evidence suggested three forms of commitment. *Identification commitment* is based on the employee's degree of pride in working for the organization and on the sense that the organization does something important and does it competently. *Affiliation commitment* derives from a sense of belonging to the organization and of the other members of the organization as “family” who care about one another. *Exchange commitment* is based on the belief that the organization recognizes and appreciates the efforts and accomplishments of its members.

Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, and Topolnytsky (2002) undertook a comprehensive meta-analysis of the antecedents and consequences of organizational commitment. Their findings indicate that among the antecedents of commitment, role ambiguity and role conflict were negatively related to affective and normative commitment; age, tenure, organizational support, perceptions of justice in the workplace, and transformational leadership were all positively related to affective and/or normative commitment. In addition, job satisfaction and job involvement were positively related to both affective and normative commitment. Finally, in regards to the consequences of commitment, their analysis suggests affective commitment negatively impacts turnover, absences from work, stress, and work–family conflict and positively affects performance and organizational citizenship behavior; normative commitment negatively impacts turnover and family–work conflict and has a positive effect on overall job performance and organizational citizenship behavior.

Professionalism

Technological, educational, and other advances have made many occupations increasingly complex and difficult to learn, especially occupations that we consider professions. For many decades, the nature of government work has required the employment of many professionals and many types of professionals (Mosher, 1982). Specialists in these areas must have advanced training and need to maintain high standards. Professionals have the qualifications to establish and govern the standards, and professionals often prefer to be governed and assessed by members of their profession. This raises issues about how those outside the profession hold them accountable, to avoid excessive self-interest and other problems that can arise. Government and business organizations also face challenges in managing the work and careers of highly trained professionals. The Covid-19 crisis of 2020 illustrated the crucial roles that professionals play in society and in all types of organizations. Political leaders called upon scientists, medical doctors, public health officials, and many other professionals in government, nonprofit, and business positions to advise the leaders and the public, to develop policies and procedures, and ultimately to seek a vaccine to cure the virus.

Because the professions and professionals figure so importantly in society, social scientists and other experts have offered many definitions of *profession*. They have often distinguished among occupations that are highly professionalized and other occupations where professionalization may be an important topic, but is not as advanced. One way of characterizing the highly professionalized occupations involves these conditions:

- Application of a skill based on theoretical knowledge
- Requirement for advanced education and training
- Testing of competence through examinations or other methods
- Organization into a professional association
- Existence of a code of conduct and emphasis on adherence to it
- Espousal of altruistic service

Occupational specializations that rate relatively highly on most or all of these dimensions are highly “professionalized.” Medicinal doctors, lawyers, and highly trained scientists are usually considered members of advanced professions. Scholars usually place college professors, engineers, and accountants in the professional category. They often define less-developed specializations, such as library science, computer programming, police officers, social workers, and teachers as semiprofessions, emerging professions, or less professionalized occupations. In public administration, professionalism has figured importantly in a general sense of whether those in occupations often associated with government – police officers, fire fighters, military officers and personnel, public health officials, city managers, public administrators, and others – adhere to ethical standards and display expert knowledge and commitment to the effective performance of their special roles (Perry, Gaus lecture; Piatak, Douglas, and Raudia, 2020).

In turn, management researchers analyze the characteristics of individual professionals because of their important roles in organizations. As a result of their selection and training, professionals, especially those in more highly professionalized occupations, tend to have certain beliefs and values (Filley, House, and Kerr, 1976):

- Belief in the need to be expert in the body of abstract knowledge applicable to the profession
- Belief that they and fellow professionals should have autonomy in their work activities and decision making
- Identification with the profession and with fellow professionals
- Commitment to the work of the profession as a calling, or life's work
- A feeling of ethical obligation to render service to clients without self-interest and with emotional neutrality
- A belief in self-regulation and collegial maintenance of standards (that is, a belief that fellow professionals are best qualified to judge and police one another)

Members of a profession vary on these dimensions. Those relatively high on most or all are highly professional by this definition.

The characteristics of professions and professionals may conflict with the characteristics of large bureaucratic organizations. Belief in autonomy may conflict with organizational rules and hierarchical authority. The situation at the Brookhaven National Laboratory described at the beginning of Chapter Eight is an example of such conflict. The scientists chafed under the rules imposed on them by administrators seeking to enhance safety and public accountability. Conflicts can occur in other settings because altruistic service to clients can conflict with organizational emphases on standardized treatment of clients. Identification with the profession and desire for recognition from fellow professionals may dilute the impact of organizational rewards, such as financial incentives. Professionals might prefer an enhanced professional reputation to salary increases, and they might prefer their professional work to moving “up” into management. Without moving up, however, they hit ceilings that limit pay, promotion, and prestige. Some studies in the past have found higher organizational formalization associated with higher alienation among professionals (Hall and Tolbert, 2004).

Conflicts between professionals and organizations do not appear to be as inevitable as once supposed, however. Organizational priorities, such as emphasis on the technical qualifications, are compatible with professional values (Hall and Tolbert, 2004). Professionals may work in subunits such as laboratories, where they are relatively free to carry out their work (Bozeman and Loveless, 1987; Crow and Bozeman, 1987; Larson, 1977; Schott, 1978). Golden (2000) describes how professionals in certain federal agencies during the Reagan administration disagreed with policies of the Reagan appointees who headed their agency, but regarded it as their professional obligation to discharge those policies effectively. Brehm and Gates (1997) found evidence that professionalism can be an important motivating factor in the public sector.

People in organizations have developed useful approaches to dealing with professionals' needs and values. Since professionals may want to stay with their professional work rather than moving into management, organizations can offer dual career ladders, in which professionals can stay in their specialty (such as research) but move up to higher levels of pay and responsibility. This alleviates the conflict over deciding whether one must give up one's profession and go into management. Some government agencies rotate professionals in and out of management positions. For example, they rotate scientists in administrative positions back into professional research positions after several years. Some organizations also allow professionals to take credit for their accomplishments. For example, they allow them to claim authorship of professional research reports rather than requiring that they publish them anonymously in the name of the agency or company. Organizations can also pay for travel to professional conferences and in other ways support professionals in their desire to remain excellent in their field.

Employee Empowerment

As discussed in Chapter Seven, the idea of employee empowerment as sharing information, resources, and authority with frontline employees has its origins in the human relations movement of the 1940s. The concept of employee empowerment as a psychological state, or a work-related attitude, is a more recent development in the field of management. Conger and Kanungo (1988) described employee empowerment as enabling employees to act by removing constraints that foster powerlessness and by creating conditions that promote self-efficacy, effort, and persistence. Thomas and Velthouse (1990) further developed the concept of employee empowerment by describing four cognitions that cause employees to experience empowerment. Impact refers to a person feeling they make a difference through their actions. Competence concerns a person's ability to perform a task skillfully. Meaningfulness refers to how much value a person attaches to task accomplishment. Finally, choice is when a person feels their behavior is self-determined. When a person makes positive assessments of these four aspects of work, he or she will feel higher intrinsic task motivation and more empowered. Spreitzer (1995, 1996), drawing on Conger and Kanungo (1988) and Thomas and Velthouse (1990), developed and validated a measure of psychological empowerment. She characterized psychological empowerment as a motivational construct evident in four cognitions: meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact. Her analysis revealed that psychological empowerment is positively related to employee effectiveness and innovativeness.

Seibert, Wang, and Courtright (2011) undertook a comprehensive meta-analysis of the antecedents, or causes, of psychological empowerment and of its attitudinal and behavioral consequences, including task performance. They found that psychological empowerment can be enhanced by high performance management practices (e.g., training, rewards and recognition, goal setting, and information sharing); support from the organization (psychological support, access to resources, positive organizational culture, procedural and distributive fairness, political support, and interpersonal trust); positive leadership (e.g., an empowering leadership style, autonomy supportive leadership, charismatic and transformational leadership, high leader–member exchange, interpersonal trust, clear expectations, and supervisory support); and work design characteristics (e.g., job enrichment, role clarity, task impact and meaningfulness, autonomy, and feedback). The study also indicated that psychological empowerment is positively related to job satisfaction and organizational commitment and negatively related to turnover intention and job-related strain. Moreover, psychological empowerment is positively related to task performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and innovativeness. These findings were largely consistent with those from another meta-analysis of psychological empowerment at the team level (Maynard, Mathieu, Gilson, O'Boyle, and Cigularov, 2012).

Employee Engagement

During the last two decades, employee engagement has emerged as a prominent work-related attitude that is related to job involvement, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and employee empowerment but has a distinct meaning (Macey and Schneider 2008; Christian, Garza, and Slaughter, 2011). Promoting employee engagement has become a focus of recent public management reforms in many countries. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017) reports that a majority of member states have launched initiatives to promote employee engagement within the public service and use surveys to measure and track levels of engagement. In the US, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) have launched their own initiatives to measure and raise levels of engagement throughout the federal workforce.

Various definitions of employee engagement have been proposed, most inspired by

Kahn's (1990) seminal work on personal engagement. Kahn defined personal engagement as harnessing oneself to work by becoming fully invested physically, emotionally, and cognitively in a task. According to Khan, engagement requires three psychological conditions during task performance: safety, meaningfulness, and availability. Safety means feeling safe to express oneself. Meaningfulness refers to feeling worthwhile, useful, and valuable due to being physically, emotionally, and cognitively invested in work. Availability means having emotional, physical, and cognitive energies available for task performance.

Building on Kahn's (1990) ideas, Schaufeli, Salanova, Gonzalez-Roma, and Bakker (2002) defined employee engagement as a positive and fulfilling state of mind involving vigor, dedication, and absorption in work. Vigor signifies a willingness to invest in a task, high energy, and resilience and persistence in the face of adversity. Dedication means a sense of significance and challenge that generates enthusiasm, inspiration, and pride. Finally, absorption refers to being fully concentrated and engrossed in work and becoming detached from other thoughts and activities. Bakker, Albrecht, and Leiter (2011) noted these and other conceptualizations of employee engagement converge on the notion that energy, involvement, and a willingness to contribute are core elements or dimensions of the employee engagement construct.

Meta-analyses show that employee engagement enhances work-related attitudes and behavior, as well as performance. Cole, Walter, Bedeian, and O'Boyle (2011) found that employee engagement relates positively to job satisfaction and organizational commitment and negatively to burnout and health complaints. Halbesleben's (2010) meta-analysis revealed that employee engagement is negatively related to turnover intention. Christian, Garza, and Slaughter (2011) found that employee engagement is positively related to task performance (or performance of official duties) and contextual performance (or engaging in discretionary activities outside one's formal job that contribute to organizational success and wellbeing) (see also Halbesleben's, 2010). Hence, engaged employees strive toward ambitious goals but also appear to step outside their formal work duties to engage in extra-role behaviors that benefit their organizations by helping others perform their jobs, reducing conflict, and offering suggestions for improvement.

Since employee engagement benefits employees and organizations, researchers seek to understand its causes. Research points to a range of antecedents or causes of employee engagement. The meta-analysis of Christian, Garza, and Slaughter (2011) revealed that task variety and significance enhance employee engagement. Their findings also suggest that a transformational leadership style and high exchange relationships between leaders and followers characterized by mutual trust and reciprocity also promote employee engagement. Crawford, LePine, and Rich (2010) performed a meta-analysis of the relationship between job demands and resources and employee engagement. Job demands are conditions at work that require continuous physical and mental effort, such as time constraints, pressure to perform, and stressful interpersonal relationships. They hinder employees and cause mental and physical strain and exhaustion. At times, however, job demands like deadlines, high workloads, and increased responsibility can spark eagerness and excitement and challenge people to grow and achieve at higher levels. On the other hand, job resources like control, emotional support, and opportunities to learn reduce job demands and enable people to succeed. Crawford, LePine, and Rich (2010) found that job resources are positively related to engagement. Job demands that are perceived to be a hindrance reduce engagement, while those that challenge people to increase their effort and grow promote employee engagement.

Based on a meticulous review of the literature, Albrecht, Bakker, Gruman, Macey, and Saks (2015) propose human resource management practices to increase employee engagement through recruitment and selection, socialization, training and development, and performance management practices. Managers should develop a selection process that combines personality assessments, interviews, and other screening methods to identify prospective employees who score high on the general personality traits of conscientiousness, extroversion, emotional stability, and extroversion. New employees need job resources that provide safety (e.g., social support), enable them to experience meaningfulness (e.g., enriched jobs, autonomy, performance feedback, and job clarity), and help them become psychologically available (e.g., orientation, training, and mentoring activities). Through performance management, managers should provide clear goals that employees are committed to; timely and constructive feedback; coaching and other forms of social support; and ample training and development. Finally, managers should develop challenging jobs that allow employees to tap abundant job resources and grant discretion to modify jobs to make them more challenging and meaningful.

Employee engagement has not only become a focus of research, it has garnered interest from policymakers and public managers interested in making government more effective. In 2010, the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) developed the Employee Engagement Index (EEI) as part of its Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), a large annual survey representative of the federal civilian workforce. Initially, OPM officials defined employee engagement as a psychological state characterized by dedication, persistence, and effort at work, similar to the concept of engagement found in Kahn (1990) and Schaufeli, Salanova, Gonzalez-Roma, and Bakker (2002). When developing the EEI, however, they measured observable behavior and working conditions that should promote psychological engagement; that is, they set out to capture managerial and organizational factors that should increase psychological engagement rather than psychological engagement itself. The Gallup Organization established a precedent for such an approach when they developed a twelve-item scale, the Q^{12}, to measure satisfaction with and enthusiasm for work and managers' efforts to create a positive work environment (Gallup, 2020). The meta-analysis of Harter, Hayes, and Schmidt (2002) found that this twelve-item engagement scale is positively related to business-unit outcomes, including customer satisfaction, productivity, and profitability, and negatively related to employee turnover.

The EEI is designed to measure leadership and supervisory practices aimed at fostering a positive organizational climate conducive to high levels of employee engagement (Office of Personnel Management, 2015a, 2015b). From 2010 to 2014, the government-wide average score on the index dropped from 66% to 63% (Office of Personnel Management, 2015b). The OPM then issued a memorandum to federal agencies that stressed the need to strengthen efforts to foster an organizational culture of employee engagement and establishing the goal of improving the government-wide EEI average score from 63% to 67% by 2016 (Donovan et al., 2014). The memorandum makes improvements on the EEI a senior management responsibility. It also required agencies to establish their own target for improvement on the EEI; to make improvements on the EEI an integral part of their Government Performance and Results Act (GRPA) annual performance plan; and to carry out periodic monitoring of progress toward creating a culture of engagement (Hameduddin and Fernandez, 2019). In addition, OPM provides online resources for agencies to track and improve their EEI scores and has created a repository of practices that should promote employee engagement (Hochmuth, 2016). A recent study of the federal bureaucracy by Hameduddin and Fernandez (2019) indicates that an increase in OPM's EEI is positively related to performance as perceived by federal employees.

The US Merit Systems Protection Board (2008) initially set out to measure employee engagement using a six-dimensional scale. The survey items ask about pride in one's work, satisfaction with leadership, opportunity to perform well at work, satisfaction with recognition received, prospects for future personal and professional growth, and a positive work environment with a focus on teamwork. These items resemble those in OPM's EEI in that they represent aspects of organizations and management that should lead to psychological engagement (see MSPB, 2008, 2016a); they also appear to be in line with the Gallup Organization's approach to measuring engagement (see also Harter, Hayes, and Schmidt, 2002). MSPB officials have touted employee engagement as a way to improve organizational performance, promote the well-being of federal employees, and reduce turnover. Their own research findings indicate that employee engagement relates positively to performance as measured by the program results/accountability portion on the Program Performance Rating Tool (PART) and negatively to turnover intention, sick leave, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, and work-related injury or illness. Interestingly, MSPB (2016b) more recently developed additional survey items to measure psychological engagement and included them in the 2016 Merit Principles Survey.

Positive Organizational Behavior: Self-Efficacy, Hope,

Optimism, and Resilience

A growing Positive Organizational Behavior (POB) movement has begun to shift research away from employee weaknesses toward strength-building attitudes and capacities. This perspective brings a breath of fresh air to the field of management that expands the analysis of work-related attitudes and psychological states (Luthans, 2002; Luthans and Youssef, 2007; Luthans and Avolio, 2009). POB draws on the positive psychology movement that moves beyond the study of what is wrong with people by identifying and nurturing people's best qualities (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Research on POB has coalesced around the study of four work-related attitudes: self-efficacy, hope, optimism, and resilience (Luthans and Youssef, 2007; Youssef and Luthans, 2007). These positive capacities, unlike highly stable traits, are malleable and can be developed (Luthans and Youssef, 2007; Youssef and Luthans, 2007). Research indicates that these attitudes interact as elements of a higher-order construct, positive psychological capital (PsyCap) (Luthans and Youssef, 2004; Luthans, Avolio, Avey, and Norman, 2007; Avey, Reichard, Luthans, and Mhatre, 2011). PsyCap is defined as "an individual's positive psychological state of development that is characterized by: (1) having confidence (self-efficacy) to take on and put in the necessary effort to succeed at challenging tasks; (2) making positive attribution (optimism) about succeeding now and in the future; (3) persevering toward goals and, when necessary, redirecting paths to goals (hope) in order to succeed; and (4) when beset by problems and adversity, sustaining and bouncing back and even beyond (resiliency) to attain success" (Luthans, Youssef, and Avolio, 2007, p. 3). Self-efficacy, hope, optimism, and resilience are important work-related attitudes in their own right, so each will be examined first, along with their antecedents and consequences, before addressing PsyCap.

Building on Bandura's work on social cognitive theory discussed in Chapter 9, Stajkovic and Luthans (1998) define self-efficacy as a work-related attitude characterized by conviction, or confidence, in one's ability to use their motivation and cognitive resources to accomplish a task in a given situation. People with a high level of self-efficacy choose challenging goals, use foresight to develop pathways to achieving their goals, exert effort to achieve success, and persevere in the face of adversity (Luthans, Youssef, and Avolio, 2007). Meta-analytic findings indicate that self-efficacy is strongly related to performance at work (Bandura and Locke, 2003; see also Stajkovic and Luthans, 1998). Self-efficacy appears to have a direct positive impact on job satisfaction; through its influence on job satisfaction, it also has indirect positive and negative effects on organizational commitment and turnover intention, respectively (Luthan, Zhu, and Avolio, 2006). Self-efficacy can be developed by allowing people to experience success and mastery of a task, as well as through vicarious learning that allows people to observe others performing the task successfully. Positive feedback and encouragement also promote self-efficacy (Luthans, Youssef, and Avolio, 2007).

Hope is defined as a positive motivational state that combines determination to achieve one's goals, or “willpower,” and developing specific means for attaining those goals, or “waypower” (Snyder, Irving, and Anderson, 1991). It involves self-initiated actions a person takes to create a desirable future (Arnau, Rosen, Finch, Rhudy, and Fortunato, 2007; Alarcon, Bowling, and Khazon, 2013). Studies show that hope improves well-being. The meta-analysis of Alarcon, Bowling, and Khazon (2013) revealed a positive relationship between hope and happiness and negative relationship between hope and both depression and stress. In addition, hope leads to higher performance and greater satisfaction and the ability to cope (see Luthans and Youssef, 2007). While hope appears to have a dispositional baseline, measures can be taken to develop it further. These include setting measurable and challenging goals; “stepping” or breaking down goals into a series of sub-goals, each one a means for achieving a subsequent one; engaging in mental rehearsals; doing contingency planning to identify potential obstacles and devise alternative pathways; “regoaling” or revising goals after receiving feedback to avoid unrealistic expectations and prevent false hope; and empowering people with resources, information, skills, and authority (Luthans, Avey, Avolio, Norman, and Combs, 2006; Luthans, Youssef, and Avolio, 2007; Luthans and Youssef, 2007).

Optimism is a generalized expectation that attributes positive events to personal (or internal), permanent, and pervasive causes and negative events to external, temporary, and situation-specific causes (Seligman, 1998). The optimistic person expects success or fulfillment, through fortune, personal effort, or the actions of others (Alarcon, Bowling, and Khazon, 2013). Compared to hope, optimism places more emphasis on successes and failures as the result of external factors (Luthans and Youssef, 2007), thus representing more of a passive state than hope (Alarcon, Bowling, and Khazon, 2013). Optimism can enhance performance in a range of situations, including the workplace (see Luthans and Youseff, 2007). Alarcon, Bowling, and Khazon (2013) perform a meta-analysis that points to the benefits of optimism, showing that it is positively related to life satisfaction, happiness, psychological well-being, and physical health, and negatively related to anxiety and depression. As with hope, there are ways to develop or increase optimism, including Schneider's (2001) three-step process of leniency for the past, appreciation for the present, and opportunity seeking for the future. Leniency for the past entails evaluating past events in a manner that focuses more on reasonable positive aspects of the situation and giving oneself or others the benefit of the doubt for misfortunes to arrive at a more positive conclusion. Appreciation for the present means acknowledging the importance of current circumstances and how they positively contribute to one's experience. Finally, opportunity seeking for the future involves viewing tasks as opportunities for beneficial change and success rather than as chores or problems to solve. Luthans, Avey, Avolio, Norman, and Combs (2006) recommend analyzing a situation, anticipating potential obstacles to success (including worst-case scenarios), and creating alternative pathways to reduce the likelihood of a bad event and to counteract pessimism.

Resilience is defined as the learned capacity to bounce back or rebound from adversity, failure, and conflict (Luthans and Youssef, 2007). Resilient people recognize the destructive effects that failure and setbacks can have. They dedicate time, effort, and resources to recovering and rebounding, using setbacks as “springboards” for improvement and growth (Youssef and Luthans, 2007). Resilient people also accept risk and can adapt to it by managing resources to achieve a successful future (Masten and Reed, 2002). The meta-analysis of Hu, Zhang, and Wang shows that resilience is positively related to positive mental health, including life satisfaction and positive affect, and negatively related to negative mental health, including depression, anxiety, and negative affect. While resilience is perhaps the least frequently analyzed of the four positive work-related attitudes, a growing number of studies suggest it is positively related to performance at work (Meneghel, Salanova, and Martinez, 2016; Zehir and Narcıkara, 2016), organizational commitment (Youssef and Luthans, 2007), and commitment to change (Shin, Taylor, and Seo, 2012). Masten (2001; Masten and Reed, 2002) have proposed three sets of strategies for developing resilience. Asset-focused strategies involve accumulating assets in the workplace that increase the odds of success, such as financial and material resources, information, knowledge, skills, abilities, experience, social relationships, and interpersonal support. Risk-focused strategies minimize factors that make people vulnerable and prone to failure, including stress and conflict. Finally, process-focused strategies entail taking calculated risks to create opportunities for improvement and growth (Luthans, Youssef, and Avolio, 2007).

As mentioned above, research indicates that the four state-like capacities of self-efficacy, optimism, hope, and resilience are strongly related to each other and interact to form the higher-order construct known as positive psychological capital (PsyCap) (Luthans and Youssef, 2004; Luthans, Avolio, Avey, and Norman, 2007; Avey, Reichard, Luthans, and Mhatre, 2011). Thus, in addition to studies that examine each of these capabilities, researchers have also analyzed the effects of PsyCap on work-related attitudes, behaviors, and performance. The meta-analysis of Avey, Reichard, Luthans, and Mhatre (2011) points to benefits derived from high PsyCap. They find that PsyCap is positively related to job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and psychological well-being at work, and negatively correlated with cynicism, stress, anxiety, and turnover intention. They find that PsyCap is positively related to organizational citizenship behavior, negatively related to undesirable behaviors in the workplace, and importantly, positively related to performance.

POB has interesting implications for public organizations and their members. As reviewed in Chapters Three to Five and discussed throughout the book, research points to unique features of public organizations, including greater external oversight, more political intrusions into decision making, more formalization in the form of administrative rules and procedures, less flexibility in how human resources are managed, conflicting performance expectations, and greater goal ambiguity and goal conflict compared to private organizations (see Jin and Rainey, 2020). The work environment that many public managers face places a premium on people who have high levels of self-efficacy, resilience, hope, and optimism. It also underscores the importance for public managers to recognize the value of POB and to foster it in government. Jin and Rainey (2020), although not directly examining POB, found that compared to private sector employees, people working in government often hold more positive attitudes toward their jobs and organizations even in the face of constraints and frustration that they encounter working in the public sector. Moreover, given constraints on the ability to financially reward and empower public sector employees, research on self-efficacy, resilience, hope, and optimism points to other avenues by which public managers can increase employee motivation and performance, using many of the same managerial practices and approaches they would use to improve job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and employee empowerment and engagement.

Motivation-Related Variables in Public Organizations

Researchers have made comparisons on a number of motivation-related variables between public and private samples, shedding some light on how the two categories compare.

Role Ambiguity, Role Conflict, and Organizational Goal Clarity

For some work-related attitudes, researchers have found few differences between managers in public and private organizations. This has been the case with the most frequent observation in all the literature on the distinctive character of public management: public managers confront greater multiplicity, vagueness, and conflict of goals and performance criteria than managers in private organizations do. There is a fascinating divergence between political economists and organization theorists on the validity of this observation. Political scientists and economists tend to regard this goal complexity as an obvious consequence or determinant of governmental (nonmarket) controls, whereas many organization theorists tend to regard it as a generic problem facing all organizations.

Little comparative research directly addresses this issue, however. Rainey (1983) compared middle managers in government and business organizations about the role conflict and role ambiguity items described earlier, asking questions about the clarity of the respondents' goals in work, conflicting demands, and related matters. The government and business managers showed no differences on these questions nor on questions about whether they regarded the goals of their organization as clear and easy to measure. More recent surveys have confirmed these results (Bozeman and

Rainey, 1998; Rainey, Pandey, and Bozeman, 1995). One explanation may be that public managers clarify their roles and objectives by reference to standard operating procedures, whether or not the overall goals of the organization are clear and consistent.

These findings point to important challenges for both researchers and practitioners in further analyzing such issues as how managers in various settings (such as public, private, and hybrid organizations) perceive objectives and performance criteria; how these objectives and criteria are communicated and validated, if they are; and whether these objectives and criteria do in fact coincide with the sorts of distinctions between public and private settings that are assumed to exist in our political economy. Wright (2004) reports evidence that state government employees who perceive greater clarity of work and organizational goals also report higher levels of work motivation, so the frequent generalizations about vague goals in public organizations do not mean that leaders and managers in government cannot and should not continue efforts to clarify goals for organizational units and employees.

Work Satisfaction

Many studies have found differences between respondents from the public and private sectors concerning other work-related attitudes and perceptions. In the United States and other nations where such studies have been conducted, public employees and managers express high levels of general work satisfaction and other general attitudes about work, such as having a sense of worthwhile work, usually comparable to that reported by their private sector counterparts (Bozeman and Rainey, 1998; Cho and Lee, 2001; Davis and Ward, 1995; Gabris and Simo, 1995; Kilpatrick, Cummings, and Jennings, 1964; Light, 2002a; US Office of Personnel Management, 1979, 2007a, 2013). Some of these studies have found that public sector respondents express higher levels of satisfaction with certain facets of work, such as health care benefits and job security. Large-scale surveys have shown that younger members of the public sector workforce show higher levels of general work satisfaction than younger private sector workers do (Steel and Warner, 1990) and that persons entering the public sector workforce are higher on certain measures of quality than entry-level private sector employees (Crewson, 1995a).

However, numerous studies across several decades that compared the work satisfaction of public and private sector employees, especially at managerial levels, have reported somewhat lower satisfaction among public sector employees in various specific facets of work (Buchanan, 1974; Bogg and Cooper, 1995; Bordia and Blau, 1998; Hayward, 1978; Kovach and Patrick, 1989; Lachman, 1985; Light, 2002a; Paine, Carroll, and Leete, 1966; Porter and Lawler, 1968; Rhinehart and others, 1969; Rainey, 1983; Solomon, 1986; US Office of Personnel Management, 2013).

These studies used different measures of satisfaction and varied samples, which makes it hard to generalize about them. For example, Paine, Carroll, and Leete (1966) and Rhinehart and his colleagues (1969) found that groups of federal managers showed lower satisfaction than business managers on all categories of the Porter Needs Satisfaction Questionnaire (Porter, 1962), described earlier. Conversely, Smith and Nock (1980), analyzing results of a large social survey, found that public sector blue-collar workers show more satisfaction with most aspects of their work than their private sector counterparts, but public sector white-collar workers show less satisfaction with coworkers, supervisors, and intrinsic aspects of their work.

Hayward (1978) compared employees and managers in a diverse group of public and private organizations and found that satisfaction ratings were generally high among both groups. The public sector respondents, however, gave somewhat less favorable ratings concerning their job overall, their ability to make necessary decisions, the adequacy of the supplies in their organization, the amount of duplication with which they have to contend, and the amount of work they are expected to do. Rainey (1983) found that state agency managers scored lower than business managers on their satisfaction with promotion opportunities and with coworkers. Light (2002a) found that federal employees express higher satisfaction than private sector employees with job security and benefits and with the ability to accomplish something worthwhile, but the federal employees were lower on satisfaction with the public's respect for their work, with the extent to which their jobs were dead-end jobs, and with the degree to which they can trust their organizations. Cho and Lee (2001) reported that in their Korean sample the public managers perceived higher levels of prestige in their jobs than did the private sector managers.

The findings of these studies vary a great deal and are not easily summarized. The public and private responses often did not differ greatly, yet it is hard to dismiss as accidental the consistent tendency of the public managers and employees to score lower on various satisfaction scales. Taken together, these studies reveal comparable levels of general or global satisfaction among respondents from the public and private sectors. The studies also indicate lower satisfaction with various intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of work in many public organizations as compared to private ones. Some of the findings appear to reflect the administrative constraints described earlier: personnel system constraints (promotion and pay) and purchasing constraints (supplies). Others appear to reflect related frustrations with administrative complexities and complex political and policymaking processes, which are public sector realities that diminish some intrinsic rewards. The findings suggest that many public sector employees show high levels of satisfaction in their work, comparable to those of employees in the private and nonprofit sectors, and comparable or higher levels of satisfaction with certain facets of work, such as benefits and security, and sometimes with a sense that their work is important and socially valuable. Those public employees who express lower satisfaction with facets of work tend to be concerned over frustrating administrative and political constraints and complexities, and over certain extrinsic factors, such as constraints on pay and promotion.

Organizational Commitment and Job Involvement

Research has provided evidence about organizational commitment and job involvement in public organizations, much of it based on comparisons of public and private managers and employees. The research has produced some indications of particular frustrations in the public service. As with other topics, such as motivation and work satisfaction, however, the evidence is sometimes conflicting, but leads to the conclusion that public organizations and managers may face particular challenges, but the situation in the public sector is not necessarily worse than in other settings, such as the private and nonprofit sectors. The research further provides suggestions for public managers and indicates how public organizations and managers can apply them effectively.

The stream of research began with studies by Buchanan (1974, 1975), who found that groups of federal executives expressed lower organizational commitment and job involvement than executives from private firms. He concluded that the public managers felt less commitment for several reasons. They did not feel as strong a sense of having a personal impact on the organization; the organization did not expect as much commitment; and their work groups were less of a source of attachment to the organization. Buchanan also suggested that the lower involvement scores indicated a frustrated service ethic, and he expressed concern that it reflected weak public service motivation on the part of the public managers. His evidence showed that the public managers' weaker involvement responses resulted from a sense of holding a less challenging job, of working in less cohesive groups, and of having more disappointing experiences in the organization than the managers had expected when they joined it. These disappointments, he thought, might arise when idealistic, service-oriented entrants confront the realities of large government agencies, in which they feel they have little impact.

Flynn and Tannenbaum (1993) also reported a study in which a sample of public managers expressed lower organizational commitment than a sample of private sector managers. The public managers were lower on their ratings of the clarity, autonomy, and challenge of their jobs. Their lower scores on clarity and autonomy appeared to be the strongest influences on their lower commitment scores. Brown (1996) conducted a meta-analysis of job involvement studies and found a modest relationship between employment in the public or private sector and job involvement. For public sector respondents, several determinants of job involvement – such as the job's motivating potential, pay satisfaction, and participative decision making – were weaker. Moon (2000) reported survey results in which a sample of public managers expressed lower organizational commitment than a sample of managers in private business.

Though they have not measured organizational commitment directly, other studies and observations have indicated similar general characteristics of the public sector work context. Boyatzis (1982) drew a conclusion similar to Buchanan's from his comparisons of public and private managers. Chubb and Moe (1990) found a generally lower perceived sense of control and commitment among staff members and teachers in public schools than among their private school counterparts. Michelson (1980) described examples of hardworking bureaucrats in “nonworking” bureaucracies. They work hard, he observed, but the diffuse goals and haphazard designs of some programs make their efforts futile. Cherniss (1980) observed that many public service professionals experience stress and burnout as a result of their frustrated motivation to help their clients and because of the bureaucratic systems that aggravate their frustrations.

Other studies, however, have found that public employees were not necessarily lower on organizational commitment (Balfour and Wechsler, 1990, 1996). Steinhaus and Perry (1996) analyzed data from a major national survey, the 1991 General Social Survey, and found that public sector employees showed no significant difference from private sector employees on a measure of organizational commitment. They found that the industry in which a person was employed predicted organizational commitment better than whether the person worked in the public or private sector. They concluded that a public-versus-private dichotomy is too simple a distinction for analyzing organizational commitment. The International Social Survey, described earlier, found that levels of organizational commitment among public and private employees differed in a number of nations, but not in all of the thirty nations studied, and not in a consistent pattern (Bullock, Stritch, and Rainey, 2015).

These mixed results raise some important challenges for public sector managers and researchers alike. First, they emphasize the question of whether all the assertions about the context of public organizations reviewed in earlier chapters influence organizational commitment. The studies that found a public–private difference concentrated on managers, whereas those that did not, such as the Steinhaus and Perry study (1996), looked at all levels together, or mostly at nonmanagerial employees. This pattern suggests that the constraints and interventions that impinge on public organizations may have their greatest influence at managerial levels.

The evidence also raises doubts about Buchanan's concerns about weakened motivation and commitment in government agencies. Public managers and employees may show lower scores on organizational commitment because they feel strongly committed to serving clients or to more general societal values and missions and do not regard the organization itself as the most important object of pride and loyalty (Romzek and Hendricks, 1982). In addition, other chapters in this book describe the substantial body of evidence showing highly committed administrative leaders and professionals in government.

The studies of organizational commitment in the public and private sectors provide suggestions for both managers and researchers. Balfour and Wechsler (1996) found that four factors appeared to increase all three dimensions of commitment: more participation in decision making, lower political penetration (less external political influence on hiring, promotion, and treatment of clients), more respectful and supportive supervision, and more opportunity for advancement. In a similar vein, on the basis of her own research and that of others, Romzek (1990) concluded that highly committed employees in government feel that their jobs are compatible with their ethics, values, and professional standards. They also feel that their families and friends support their affiliation with the organization for which they work. Although the studies reviewed here indicate difficulties in bringing about such conditions in some public organizations – probably in very complex, controversial, and highly politicized ones with diffuse mandates – public managers can often overcome these problems. As the research also shows, the problems in the public sector may not be more severe than those in the private sector, but rather simply different.

Representative Bureaucracy: Why the Social Origins of Public Employees Matter

The importance of values was discussed earlier in the chapter. We return to the issue of values now by reviewing research on representative bureaucracy and demographic representation in public organizations, important work that highlights the influence of social identity and values on the behavior of public employees. Governments throughout the world have put in place policies to alter the demographics of the public sector workforce to achieve employment equity and proportional representation of all groups in society. Affirmative action in employment involves taking deliberate measures like establishing hiring targets for social groups, giving preference in hiring to members of historically underrepresented groups, and eliminating discriminatory hiring practices to increase representation of those who have experienced discrimination in employment. Such groups include ethnic, racial, religious, and regional groups, women, and people with disabilities. In some countries (e.g., the United States and Australia), the social groups that stand to gain from affirmative action in government have been ethnic and racial minorities (Kellough, 2007; Smith, 2013). In other countries that have undergone decolonization and democratic transitions (e.g., Malaysia, South Africa, and Fiji), policies have been promulgated to increase representation of historically disadvantaged majorities (Jaunch, 1998; Fernandez, 2020; Ratuva, 2013). Affirmative action policies have proved to be relatively effective in the United States, South Africa, Malaysia, and elsewhere, where the proportion of public sector employees from historically underrepresented groups is comparable to or slightly exceeds their share of the population. In 2019, racial and ethnic minorities comprised nearly 37% of all United States federal government civilian employees, compared to nearly 40% of the country's population (US Office of Personnel Management, 2020). A decade earlier, the percentage of all state and local government employees who were racial and ethnic minorities in the US had already slightly exceeded their share of the population at the time (Peters, 2013). Overall figures like these, however, can mask significant underrepresentation at various levels of the bureaucracy. In managerial and professional positions in federal, state, and local government, racial and ethnic minorities continue to be employed at rates far below their share of the population (US Office of Personnel Management, 2020; Peters, 2013)

Affirmative action in government employment relates to the social identity of public employees. The social origins of public employees are critical from a governance perspective. Social identity influences political values and attitudes, and, in turn, behavior. The development of political attitudes, values, and ideology involves a series of socialization processes, including parenting, education, religious experiences, ethnic upbringing, and exposure to media (Hatemi and McDermott, 2016). Representative bureaucracy scholars have argued that members of a social group (e.g., racial or ethnic group) undergo a similar socialization process that sets them apart from other social groups and that gives rise to a distinct set of political attitudes for each group (Meier, 1975; Meier and Nigro, 1976; Fernandez, 2020). Ethnic and racial socialization, which transmits information about a social group's beliefs, values, norms, customs, practices, and skills from parents to children, is considered a salient aspect of child rearing (Hughes, Smith, Stevenson, Rodriguez, Johnson, and Spicer, 2006). Research shows that ethnic and racial socialization influences how people identify with a group, their worldview and social and political attitudes, their self-esteem, and how they cope with prejudice and biases (Hughes, Smith, Stevenson, Rodriguez, Johnson, and Spicer, 2006). Such attitudes and behavior acquired in childhood tend to remain stable throughout adolescence and early adulthood (Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008).

A number of representative bureaucracy studies show that social identity predicts the political attitudes of bureaucrats (Meier and Nigro, 1976; Rosenbloom and Featherstonhaugh, 1977; Selden, 1997; Selden et al., 1998; Naff, 1998; Brudney et al., 2000; Dolan, 2002; Bradbury and Kellough, 2008; Fernandez, 2020). For instance, Bradbury and Kellough (2008) found that African-American citizens and bureaucrats were more likely than their white counterparts to favor policies that promote the interests of African Americans. Naff (1998) found that minority and female bureaucrats, like minority and female members of the general population, were more likely than their white and male counterparts to favor employment policies that promote workforce diversity. And Fernandez (2020) finds that Blacks in South Africa, both in the general population and in the public sector, are much more likely than whites to support the ruling party, to express confidence in public institutions, and to support the type of redistributive policies pursued by the current government. Importantly, socialization does not end in early adulthood, as agency socialization continues to exert influence on the political attitudes of public sector employees (Meier 1975; Meier and Nigro, 1976). Agency socialization, the process of disseminating and instilling views, norms, skills, and behavior among employees, ensures that the attitudes, priorities, and behavior of public employees are consistent with those of their employers (Wilkins and Williams, 2008). Agency socialization can offset, and even undo, the influence of socialization experiences from earlier in a person's life (Dolan, 2002; Wilkins and Williams, 2008).

The link between social identity and political attitudes is important because research shows that political attitudes predict behavior (Petty and Cacioppo, 1996). The relationship between attitudes and behavior strengthens when both the attitude and behavior are specific and correspond with each other (e.g., attitude toward the use of birth control and whether a woman uses birth control) (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977). If social identity predicts political attitudes, and political attitudes in turn predict behavior, then the social identity of public employees should bear on their decision making and behavior, and ultimately, on the outputs and outcomes produced by public organizations. Since the 1970s, a large body of empirical research on representative bureaucracy has focused on this very issue. Studies spanning policy domains such as public education, agricultural, labor, and law enforcement have established a positive relationship between representation of racial, ethnic, and gender groups in public organizations and actions taken by public employees to promote the interests and well-being of members of their social group (Hindera, 1993; Meier and Stewart, 1992; Selden, 1997). Mosher (1982) called bureaucratic advocacy of this sort “active representation.” Active representation is more likely to occur when public employees have discretion at work, when they can make decisions and take actions that impact citizens' well-being, and when policies and programs they implement are significant to them and their social group (Thompson, 1976; Meier, 1993; Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, and Holland, 2002).

In the area of K–12 education, studies have found that representation of Black school teachers is negatively related to subtle forms of discrimination against Black students (Meier, 1984; see also Rocha and Hawes, 2009; Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and Nicholson-Crotty, 2009), such as compelling Black students to drop out and assigning them to special education, vocational education, and educable mentally retarded classes, and positively relates to placement of Black students in gifted classes (Meier and Stewart, 1992). An analysis of loan eligibility decisions in the US Department of Agriculture's Farmers Home Administration revealed that an increase in the percent of administrators who were Black, Hispanic, and Asian American increased loan eligibility awards to Black, Hispanic, and Asian American loan applicants, respectively (Selden, 1997; see also Selden and Sowa, 2003). A study of the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's implementation of Title VII indicated that an increase in Black and Latino representation within the agency led to an increase in employment discrimination charges filed on behalf of Black and Hispanic employees, respectively (Hindera and Young, 1998). Finally, a review of the criminal justice literature found convincing evidence of active representation by police officers (Bradbury and Kellough, 2011). As studies of racial representation in police departments reveal, however, intense agency socialization can neutralize the influence of racial socialization and significantly reduce the likelihood of public employees engaging in active representation (Wilkins and Williams, 2008, 2009).

In addition to research on active representation or bureaucratic advocacy, a growing number of studies have uncovered evidence of a positive relationship between representation of historically disadvantaged groups and performance in public organizations. Whereas active representation involves employees pursuing their own goals through membership in an organization, performance entails achieving the official goals of public organizations (see Thompson, 1967). In studies of K–12 education, Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1999) and Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, and Holland (2002) found that an increase in minority and female representation among teachers improves standardized test scores for minority and female students, respectively. Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) report that American local governments that employ a larger number of female law enforcement officers are more effective at enforcing laws against rape and sexual battery. In the US federal procurement arena, the analysis of Fernandez, Smith, and Malatesta (2013) revealed that agencies that hire more racial minorities are better at achieving the goal of promoting minority-owned small business participation in federal contracting. Wilkins and Keiser (2006) found a positive relationship between female child support enforcement officers in American states and child support payments. And Fernandez (2020; Fernandez, Koma, and Lee, 2018) showed that as national departments in South Africa underwent demographic transformation by hiring more Blacks, they became more effective at achieving their annual performance goals. These studies focused on public programs created to promote the interests and well-being of a particular social group. From a principal–agent perspective, increased representation of a social group that is the intended beneficiary of a policy helps to align the goals of policymakers and bureaucrats. This reduces the likelihood of moral hazard and promotes bureaucratic responsiveness during implementation (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1989).

There are various reasons why representative bureaucracies that hire more members of historically disadvantaged groups can perform well (Hindera 1993; Lim 2006; Fernandez 2020). Public employees advocate on behalf of historically marginalize groups and ensure they receive the services they need. Representative bureaucracies also perform well because they possess cultural and linguistic competencies to communicate effectively with all segments of the population, a critical factor in multilingual societies. Finally, when public employees and the citizens with whom they interact have a common social identity, it bestows greater legitimacy on governmental bureaucracy, thereby encouraging citizens to cooperate, enroll in programs, and co-produce services (Theobald and Haider-Markel, 2009; Gade and Wilkins, 2013; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2014).

Affirmative action and other policies to promote representative bureaucracy have been pursued on normative and instrumental grounds (Fernandez, 2020). From a normative perspective, a representative bureaucracy signifies fairness and equity for all, including for historically disadvantaged groups. As Mosher (1982) argued, representative bureaucracy limits employment discrimination, ensures equality of opportunity, and represents an open system all citizens can turn to for support and justice, regardless of social origins; in short, representative bureaucracy embodies Lincoln's idea of government by the people. In addition, policymakers in various countries have argued that representative bureaucracy has instrumental value in improving public sector performance. This has been articulated clearly by South African government officials, who have argued that a representative bureaucracy will possess qualities critical to governmental performance that the apartheid bureaucracy lacked. These include legitimacy and public support, the ability to communicate with a multiracial and multilingual citizenry, empathy for historically marginalized communities, and a commitment to serve the needs of all South Africans (Ndletyana, 2008; Fernandez, 2020).

Affirmative action in the public sector has come under fire from critics around the world. In a number of countries, the argument has been made that gains in employment equity and representation of historically disadvantaged groups erodes the performance of public organizations, as less qualified employees take the place of more qualified ones, diminishing essential knowledge, skills, and abilities (Kellough, 2007; Kernaghan, 1978; Jaunch, 1998; Ratuva, 2013; Tummala, 2015), However, mounting evidence suggests that achieving greater representation of historically disadvantaged groups in bureaucracies does not inevitably compromise bureaucratic capacity and performance (Fernandez, 2020). Empirical studies from the United States reveal that affirmative action does not result in hiring job candidates who perform worse (Holzer and Neumark, 1999, 2000, 2006). Holzer and Neumark (1999, 2000) found that despite slightly lower qualifications, women and minorities hired under affirmative action perform about as well as other employees; they make compensatory effort, utilize unobserved skills, and take advantage of additional training and development opportunities (Holzer and Neumark, 1999, 2000). In a recent study of the Indian public service, Bhavnani and Lee (2019) found that employees from disadvantaged groups recruited via affirmative action performed as well as others. And Fernandez (2020) reports that as the South African public service has achieved proportional representation of historically disadvantaged Blacks, who constitute the country's majority, national departments have become more effective at achieving their goals. Hence, demographic transformation through affirmative action does not necessitate a fundamental trade-off between equity and fairness, on the one hand, and capacity and performance, on the other. Representative bureaucracies can promote both sets of values simultaneously.

Workforce Diversity

Representative bureaucracy research had been making important contributions to our understanding of public organizations for various decades. More recently, that work has been complemented by research on workforce diversity, another important aspect of organizational demography. Growing interest in the topic of workforce diversity has led to myriad meanings of diversity. Harrison and Klein (2007) note many terms have been used to refer to diversity in groups and organizations, including heterogeneity, dissimilarity, variation, divergence, disagreement, and inequality (and their opposites). To provide conceptual clarity, they identify three general types of diversity or within-unit differences: variety, separation, and disparity. Diversity as variety refers to how members of a unit differ from one another qualitatively or on a categorical attribute (e.g., race or ethnicity) (Harrison and Klein, 2007). Minimum variety occurs when all members fall in a single category (e.g., all employees are Black), moderate variety when members are clustered in several categories (e.g., many employees are either Black or White, but some are Asian and Native American), and maximum variety when each member falls in a unique category or when employees are equally distributed across categories (e.g., an equal share of employees are White, Black, Asian, and Native American). Blau's index is the most commonly used measure of diversity as variety (Pitts, 2005; Harrison and Klein, 2007). As a measure of heterogeneity in a group (e.g., a work team), the Blau index accounts for the spread of members across qualitatively different categories or subgroups (e.g., team members belonging to different racial groups) within the group. Since the emphasis so far in this section has been on social characteristics like race, ethnicity, and gender that are categorical attributes, the following discussion will focus on diversity as variety.[1]

In response to growing pressure to improve governmental performance while diversifying the workforce, many public organizations have embraced the business case for diversity (Thomas, 1990; Cox and Blake, 1991; Kochan, Bezrukova, Ely, Jackson, Joshi, Jehn, Leonard, Levine, and Thomas, 2003) and adopted diversity management programs to harness the benefits of diversity for performance (Pitts and Wise, 2010; Kellough and Naff, 2004; Riccucci, 2002). Although representation and diversity are distinct concepts, public management scholars often blend the terms, using them interchangeably (Pitts and Wise, 2010; Gooden and Portillo, 2011; Andrews, Ashworth, and Meier, 2014; Weisinger, Borges-Méndez, and Milofsky, 2016). Wise and Pitts (2010) treat *diversity* as an umbrella term that encompasses representation. And Andrews, Ashworth, and Meier (2014) maintain that bureaucracies that become more representative also become more diverse.

To be sure, representation and workforce diversity have certain similarities. Both pertain to the social identity of organizational members and to the demographic composition of organizations, particularly the extent to which they employ members of different social groups. Representation, however, typically involves the extent to which a social group is represented in an organization, while diversity considers representation of multiple groups at once and the differences in representation between the groups. Moreover, proportional representation concerns how a social group's representation in an organization corresponds with the group's share of the population. As such, it encompasses demographic features of both the organization and its external environment. Diversity as defined by researchers, however, is strictly an internal feature of an organization without reference to the external environment. As a result, the relationship between proportional representation of a social group and workforce diversity is contingent on the demographic composition of the relevant population. In countries like South Africa with a largely homogeneous population in which a large majority belongs to one racial group (approximately 80% of the South African population is African), proportional representation of that group in public organizations will be negatively related to workforce diversity as variety; proportional representation of small minority groups, on the other hand, will be positively related to workforce diversity (Fernandez, 2020). Thus, in very homogeneous countries, promoting workforce diversity entails overrepresenting minority groups and underrepresenting a large majority in order to increase variety within the workforce. Conversely, in more heterogeneous countries, organizations have a greater opportunity to have a diverse workforce in which all or most social groups are proportionally represented.

Two competing theoretical perspectives explain the impact of diversity on group processes and performance (see Fernandez, 2020). The first is the social categorization perspective, which posits that differences among members of a group prompt members to form into subgroups based on perceived similarities and distinguish themselves from other subgroups (van Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007; Williams and O'Reilly, 1998). Members tend to trust, communicate, and cooperate more with those in their subgroup (the in-group) than with members of other subgroups (the out-groups). As a result, more homogeneous groups tend to be more cohesive and perform better than diverse ones, which are more prone to division and conflict. An alternative perspective, the information processing or decision-making perspective, emphasizes the benefits of diversity. According to this perspective, greater diversity infuses groups with more knowledge, abilities, experiences, and perspectives, enabling group members to pool diverse cognitive resources to improve the quality of decisions and formulate more innovative solutions to problems. Given these competing perspectives, diversity can be a “double-edge sword” that can both benefit and hinder groups (Horowitz and Horowitz, 2007).

Many studies have examined the relationship between diversity and performance, with most focusing on team-level diversity and performance. Meta-analyses offer very nuanced findings and suggest the effects of diversity are generally small (Webber and Donahue, 2001; Horwitz and Horwitz, 2007; Joshi and Roh, 2009; Bell, Villado, Lukasik, Belau, and Briggs, 2011). Moreover, the relationship between diversity and performance depends highly on the type of diversity being examined as well as on the nature of the task, leading researchers to warn against general conclusions about diversity being “good” or “bad” (Bell, Villado, Lukasik, Belau, and Briggs, 2011). Importantly, diversity researchers often draw a distinction between two types of diversity: task-related (or highly job-related) diversity, which pertains to highly job-related attributes like functional and education background, occupation, and length of employment, and relations-oriented (i.e., less job-related) diversity, which refers to demographic attributes like age, race, and gender. Regarding task-related diversity, Horwitz and Horwitz (2007) and Joshi and Roh (2009) found that it has a small positive effect on team performance, with the effect magnified by moderators such as employee interdependence and use of sophisticated technologies (Joshi and Roh, 2009). In an earlier meta-analysis, however, Webber and Donahue (2001) found no evidence linking task-related diversity and performance. Bell, Villado, Lukasik, Belau, and Briggs (2011) performed a more granular analysis of specific task-related attributes and found that diversity in terms of functional background had a small positive effect on team performance, and the magnitude of the effect increases when teams are called upon to be innovative and creative. The same meta-analyses offer weaker evidence of a link between relations-oriented diversity and performance. Webber and Donahue (2001) and Horwitz and Horwitz (2007) failed to find conclusive evidence linking relations-oriented diversity and team performance. Joshi and Roh (2009) found that relations-oriented diversity generally has a small negative effect on team performance; in some instances, however, as when teams are required to perform for a short period of time, the effect can become positive. Focusing specifically on the relations-oriented attributes of race and gender, Bell, Villado, Lukasik, Belau, and Briggs (2011) found both to have a weak negative relationship to team performance.

Research on workforce diversity and performance in the public sector has focused almost exclusively on relations-oriented diversity, particularly race and gender. In line with the meta-analytic findings described previously, studies of racial diversity in public organizations have failed to produce strong evidence of a positive relationship between racial diversity and performance (Wise and Tschirhart, 2000; Pitts, 2005), with some even indicating racial diversity has a small negative impact on performance (Pitts and Jarry, 2007; Choi and Rainey, 2010). One exception is Opstrup and Villadsen (2015), who find gender diversity is positively related to performance but only in public organizations that support cross-functional teamwork. Importantly, Choi and Rainey's (2010) analysis reveals that diversity management policies and practices moderate the relationship between racial diversity and performance, turning a possibly negative relationship between the two phenomena into a positive one. Pitts (2009) and Oberfield (2014) both showed that diversity management has a positive influence on performance in public organizations, the former study having found that diversity management benefits minorities the most. Relations-oriented diversity seems to promote social categorization, which can lead to miscommunication, conflict, and lower performance. Diversity management, however, can offset these negative consequences so that relations-oriented diversity can become an asset that enhances performance (Olsen and Martins, 2012). The literature on diversity management points to organizational policies and managerial approaches to effectively manage and harness workforce diversity, turning it into a competitive advantage (Shen, Chanda, Netto, and Monga, 2009; Olsen and Martins, 2010; Yanh and Konrad, 2011;

Wyatt-Nichol and Antwi-Boasiako, 2012; Lindsey, King, McCausland, Jones, and Dunleavy, 2013). Building on the classification of diversity management practices of Lindsey, King, McCausland, Jones, and Dunleavy (2013), Table 10.4 summarizes much of what researchers know about how to manage workforce diversity effectively, focusing on five key aspects of diversity management: strategy, planning, and monitoring; employee attraction; employee selection; employee inclusion; and employee retention.

TABLE 10.4 EFFECTIVE DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Sources: Kosset, Lobel, and Brown (2006); Shen, Chanda, Netto, and Monga (2009); Olsen and Martins (2010); Yanh and Konrad (2011); Wyatt-Nichol and Antwi-Boasiako (2012); Lindsey, King, McCausland, Jones, and Dunleavy (2013).

<table>
<tr><td>Strategy, Planning, and Monitoring
Develop hiring goals for historically underrepresented groups and monitor progress toward achieving goals.
Link diversity goals and initiatives to strategic plans and operative goals.
Ensure leadership commitment to diversity, including commitment of resources and championing of diversity through formal communication, policies, and decision making.
Hold managers accountable for increasing workforce diversity (e.g., through the annual performance evaluation process).
Articulate the benefits of diversity for performance, innovation, and customer satisfaction.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Attraction
Engage in targeted recruitment, including developing relationships with schools, universities, and professional associations that train and advocate for historically underrepresented groups, and using media outlets that reach historically underrepresented communities.
Use employees from historically underrepresented groups to promote the organization (e.g., in advertisements) and have them play a prominent role in recruitment efforts.
Present an organizational image of sincere commitment to diversity.
Facilitate the application process for historically underrepresented groups (e.g., remove burdensome requirements to report background information).</td></tr>
<tr><td>Selection
Avoid use of extraneous job requirements that unfairly disadvantage members</td></tr>
</table>

of any social group.

- Use multiple evaluation methods to assess knowledge, skills, and abilities.
- Train members of hiring and selection committees on rules and regulations regarding nondiscrimination and affirmative action.
- Diversify the composition of hiring and selection committees.
- Emphasize objective selection criteria to minimize subjectivity in decision making.

Inclusion

- Seek inputs from all groups when formulating policy and making decisions.
- Provide sensitivity training to make members of social groups aware of their own goals, interests, and prejudices and those of other social groups.
- Use diversity training to increase awareness of various groups, the challenges each faces and advantages each offers to the organization, and develop skills to effectively manage intergroup communication and conflict.
- Provide mentoring and coaching of employees from historically underrepresented groups.
- Discourage and hold employees accountable for derogatory, prejudicial, and discriminatory remarks and behavior.
- Foster a physical work environment that provides reasonable accommodation for members of all social groups.

Retention

- Engage in career and succession planning to track growth and development of employees from all social groups and ensure members of historically disadvantaged groups have paths for advancement.
- Provide useful and timely performance feedback to all employees, especially those from historically underrepresented groups.
- Ensure equal pay for all social groups.
- Identify and prohibit arbitrary and discriminatory performance evaluation and disciplinary practices.
- Ensure members of all groups have equal access to training and development opportunities.
- Tailor employment policies and employee benefits to fit the needs of all social groups, especially historically underrepresented ones.

The Challenge of Stimulating Motivation and Positive Work Attitudes in Public Organizations

The topics discussed here dramatize the challenge for everyone concerned with effective public management. The evidence indicates frustrations, constraints, and problems of working and managing in the public sector, but also reflects a strong current of motivation, effort, and constructive attitudes in public organizations. The challenge for leaders and managers involves dealing effectively with the complex environment of public organizations so as to support and make the most of the human resources in public organizations. For all of us, the challenge is intensified by the absence of a conclusive, scientific solution to these problems in the research and theory of organizational behavior and related fields. Yet, as the review and examples here have shown, that body of knowledge does offer ideas, concepts, and methods that provide valuable support for those of us determined to pursue those challenges.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Ten

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Studies: The Case of the Vanishing Volunteers; A Funeral in the Public Service Center; Grandtown's New Public Library; The Case of Joe the Jerk (or the Very Capable Jerk)

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

Note

1. According to Harrison and Klein (2007), the concept of diversity as separation refers to how members of a unit differ along a lateral continuous attribute (e.g., job satisfaction or trust in leaders), with simple standard deviations and Euclidean distance as measures commonly used to capture diversity as separation. Diversity as disparity refers to how members of a unit differ in the extent to which they hold a valued or desirable resource (e.g., power or money). Diversity as disparity is operationalized in ways that capture asymmetry within groups like the coefficient of variation and the Gini coefficient (Harrison and Klein 2007).

CHAPTER ELEVEN
LEADERSHIP, MANAGERIAL ROLES, AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

All of the preceding chapters discuss topics that pose challenges for leaders at all levels in public organizations, and the framework presented in Chapter One implies the crucial role of leadership. As earlier chapters have discussed, some perspectives on organizations question whether leaders truly wield important influences or whether they are actually under the control of more powerful circumstances that determine the course of events. Recent research on leaders in private firms tends to find that there are weak relationships between leader behaviors and objective performance measures such as sales and profit margins, or at least that the effects of leadership are highly contingent on other factors (Klein and Kim, 1998; Waldman, Ramirez, House, and Puranam, 2001). Studies of leaders in the public sector, however, have recently been attributing a lot of influence to leader behaviors (such as Brudney, Hebert, and Wright, 1999; Hennessey, 1998; Kim, 2002; Thompson, 2000; Fernandez, Cho, and Perry, 2010), and this chapter later returns to the question of whether leaders in the public sector make much difference, given the shared power, politics, oversight, and other factors that can limit their impact in government. Whether or not leaders shape the destinies of their organizations and stride like titans over the rest of us, anyone who has served in an organization knows how much leaders can mean, or fail to mean, in the apparent direction and success of an organization and in the work lives of the people they purportedly lead. Yet in spite of such debates, the literature on leadership in the social sciences and elsewhere, including religious, literary, and philosophical discourse over the centuries, looms before us as a vast, complex body of human thought and effort (Kellerman and Webster, 2001) that, like other topics in the social sciences and related fields, ultimately plays out as rather confused and inconclusive.

As with previous topics, such as motivation, we are presented with the challenge of what to make of this body of work. This chapter takes the approach of first reviewing many of the theories and ideas about leadership and managerial roles that have been developed in the field of organizational behavior and organizational psychology, and then examining concepts and ideas about organizational culture. Leaders need to influence organizational culture, which in the past several decades has become one of the most widely used (and misused) terms in popular discourse on management and organizations. Business firms cannot merge without setting off an explosion of discussion in business magazines and business sections of newspapers about whether the cultures of the two firms will clash. Governmental challenges, such as poor coordination among agencies and reorganizations such as the design of the

Department of Homeland Security, spark heated discourse over the clashing cultures of different agencies. Lurie and Riccucci (2003) have described how proponents of the most significant reform of the social welfare system in the United States in recent history, the 1996 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Act, envisioned the reform as a means of actually changing the culture of welfare agencies and the welfare system. Because of such significant applications of the concept, even though *organizational culture* has risen to buzzword status in popular discussion, it still represents an interesting, important topic (Khademian, 2002). People preparing for roles in and research on public management need to confront the basic literature and research on it, in part to retrieve it from the dustbin of buzzwords that have gone before it.

Although scholars and experts have repeatedly asserted that leaders in government agencies can have only weak influence on their organizations and related events, in the past several decades a genre of literature on influential, innovative, effective leaders in governmental administrative settings has developed. This chapter concludes with a review of this work that identifies, describes, and analyzes such leaders.

Leadership Theories in Management and Organizational Behavior

An immense body of research on leadership in organizational settings offers a vast assortment of definitions and perspectives on leadership (Yukl, 2001). By *leadership*, most people mean the capacity of someone to direct and energize people to achieve goals. Faced with the challenge of understanding this topic, how have management researchers attacked the problem?

Traits and Skills Theories

First, researchers tried to determine those characteristics, or traits, that make a person an effective leader. Midcentury leadership researchers concentrated on this approach. They tried to identify the traits of effective leaders: physical characteristics such as height, intellectual characteristics such as intelligence and foresight, and personality characteristics such as enthusiasm and persistence. They identified many important characteristics such as these, often demonstrating a relationship between these traits and effective leadership, and leadership characteristics of various sorts have remained an important element of leadership research. No one, however, ever identified a common set of traits for excellent leaders (Stogdill, 1974). Leaders come in a variety of sizes, shapes, talents, and dispositions. The quest for universal traits has been replaced by other approaches.

A newer approach has focused on leadership skills and competencies that can be learned and developed rather than on innate traits of leaders. Katz (1955) proposed three categories of essential leadership skills: technical skills (e.g., knowledge and competencies in a specialized area that allow one to analyze a task and specialized tools and techniques); human skills (e.g., being sensitive to the needs and views of others, the ability to motivate and inspire trust, involving others in decisions); and conceptual skills (e.g., ability to analyze problems and think abstractly, ability to set goals and formulate strategies). More recently, Mumford, Zaccaro, Harding, Jacobs, and Fleishman (2000) developed a skills-based model of leadership. It focuses on competencies related to leadership effectiveness that can be developed through experience and training, implying that everyone has the potential to be a good leader. The three competencies are problem-solving skills (ability to solve new and unusual problems, to set goals and develop a plan to execute solutions); social judgment skills (ability to understand the attitudes and perspectives of others, have awareness of others' roles and functions, and communicate effectively and persuade others), and knowledge (a schematic understanding of facts and values pertaining to work). To the extent that leaders acquire these competencies, they will make better decisions and improve the performance of their followers. A subsequent study by Mumford, Campion, and Morgeson (2007) revealed that skills akin to Katz's technical and human skills and the social judgment skills of Mumford, Zaccaro, Harding, Jacobs, and Fleishman (2000) are more critical to the success of lower-level leaders, but senior-level leaders need all of these skills to be effective.

The Ohio State Leadership Studies

The social sciences developed rapidly during the middle of the twentieth century. More and more studies used new techniques such as questionnaires and computer analysis, and there was an increasing emphasis on systematic observations of human behavior. Drawing on samples from the military, schools, and other organizations, researchers at Ohio State University developed questionnaires that asked people to report on the behaviors of their superiors. After repeated analyses of the questionnaire results, they found that observations about leaders fell into two dimensions: *consideration* and *initiating structure*. Consideration refers to a leader's concern for his or her relationships with subordinates. Questionnaire items pertaining to consideration ask whether the leader is friendly and approachable; listens to subordinates' ideas and makes use of them; cares about the morale of the group; and otherwise deals with subordinates in an open, communicative, and concerned fashion. Initiating structure refers to a leader's emphasis on setting standards, assigning roles, and pressing for productivity and performance. The two dimensions tend to be related to each other, but only to a limited extent. These two leadership behaviors would become central issues, under various names, in much of the subsequent work on leadership. For instance, researchers at the University of Michigan identified two leadership behaviors, task-oriented and relations-oriented, that closely resemble initiating structure and consideration, respectively.

This research played a pivotal role in moving the field into empirical research on leadership. It drove the trait approach into disrepute by showing that effective leaders vary on these dimensions and do not display a uniform set of traits. It also set these two dimensions in place in the literature as two key aspects of leader behavior. Bass (1990) reviewed a number of empirical studies on the these two leadership behaviors and found that the most consistent findings were that consideration or relations-oriented behavior is positively related to job satisfaction and initiating structure or task-oriented behavior is positively related to performance and goal achievement. Several decades after the initial Ohio State and Michigan leadership studies, Scandinavian researchers identified a third leadership behavior, change-oriented leadership, representing actions that foster creativity and innovation, risk taking, and adaptability and flexibility (Ekvall and Arvonen, 1991; Lindell and Rosenqvist, 1992a, 1992b). Their empirical analyses revealed that change-oriented leadership was positively related to leadership effectiveness. These findings notwithstanding, leadership researchers have moved off in search of more complete models of leadership in organizations, particularly those that consider different situations in which certain leadership behaviors and styles are more appropriate or effective than others.

The Blake and Mouton Managerial Grid

The Ohio State leadership studies had a significant impact on Blake and Mouton's managerial grid approach (1984) to improving management practices. Blake and Mouton characterized organizations according to two dimensions with clear roots in the Ohio State studies: concern for people and concern for production. Organizations low on the former and high on the latter have *authority-obedience management*. Those high on concern for people and low on concern for production have *country club management*. Those low on both have *impoverished management*. This approach sought to move organizations toward high levels of both factors – to *team management* – through open communication, participative problem solving and goal setting, confrontation of differences, and teamwork. This framework supported the popular organization development consulting method of Blake and Mouton, which they applied in a broad range of government, business, and third sector organizations.

Fiedler's Contingency Theory of Leadership

Researchers still sought more complete theories, especially theories that would better address the numerous situations that leaders face. Fiedler's contingency theory (1967) received a lot of attention because at the time it offered one of the best frameworks for examining the relationship between leadership style and organizational setting and how that relationship affects a leader's effectiveness. Fiedler used the *least preferred coworker* (LPC) scale to distinguish between types of leadership styles. The LPC scale asked a leader to think of the person with whom that leader could work least well and then to rate that person on about twenty numerical scales of personal characteristics, such as pleasant or unpleasant, tense or relaxed, boring or interesting, and nasty or nice. After repeated studies, Fiedler and his associates felt that the responses indicated two basic types of leaders: High-LPC leaders gave relatively favorable ratings to this least preferred associate, and low-LPC leaders rated the associate much more unfavorably. The responses of high-LPC leaders showed that they had more favorable dispositions toward coworkers and thus were relationship-oriented. The low-LPC leaders were task-oriented; they concentrated on task accomplishment over relationships with coworkers, and found less desirable coworkers more irritating because they hindered successful work.

Fiedler's theory holds that either type of leadership style can be effective, depending on whether it properly matches the contingencies facing the leader. According to the theory, the key contingencies, in order of their importance in determining effective leadership, are *leader-member relations*, marked by the degree of friendliness, trust, initiative, and cooperativeness of the leader and the subordinates; *task structure*, shaped by the clarity and specificity of what must be done; and *position power of the leader*, determined by the amount of formal power the leader has.

Leadership situations vary on each of these dimensions, from good to bad. Obviously, a leader enjoys the most favorable setting when all three are good and the least favorable when all three are bad. Moderately favorable settings have a mixture of good and bad conditions, such as good leader-member relations but an unstructured task setting and weak position power. Fiedler contended that low-LPC (task-oriented) leaders perform most effectively in the very favorable or very unfavorable settings, whereas high-LPC (relationship-oriented) leaders do best in the intermediate settings.

Fiedler's rationale for this conclusion evades easy explanation, but the logic appears to go like this: low-LPC leaders do well in the best situations because everything is in place and the subordinates simply need to be given direction (and they accept the leader as authorized to give such direction). For example, the leader of an airplane crew who has the benefits of clear power, a strong task structure, and good relations with subordinates does best if he or she concentrates on giving orders to accomplish the task. The low-LPC type also does well in very bad situations that have so much potential disorder and disaffection that worrying about establishing good personal relations simply wastes time. In such settings, the leader might as well go ahead and press for structure, order, and output. High-LPC leaders do best in the intermediate situations because an emphasis on good relations can overcome the one or two bad dimensions and take advantage of other favorable aspects of the setting. For example, a weakly empowered chair of a newly formed, poorly structured interdepartmental committee who has good relations with the committee members can take advantage of those good relations, encouraging participation and opinion sharing, to overcome the committee's other problems.

Fiedler argued that his theory shows that rather than trying to train leaders to fit a particular setting, organizations must alter the setting to fit the leader. He and his colleagues developed a *leader match* procedure, in which leaders use questionnaires to assess their own style and their leadership situation and then consider ways of changing the situation to make it better fit their style.

While studies provide some support for the theory (Peters, Hartke, and Pohlmann, 1985), critics questioned the adequacy of Fiedler's evidence and the methods he used. Clearly, the theory includes a very limited picture of the possible situational factors and variations in leadership styles. Still, it raises key issues about leadership processes and has advanced the effort to develop more complete theories.

The Path-Goal Theory of Leadership

The path-goal theory of leadership draws on expectancy theory of motivation described in Chapter Nine. Expectancy theory treats motivation as arising from expectations about the results of actions and the value of those results. Similarly, path-goal theory holds that effective leaders increase motivation and satisfaction among subordinates when they help them pursue important goals – that is, when they help them see the goals, the paths to them, and how to follow those paths effectively. Leaders must do this by showing subordinates the value of outcomes over which the leader has some control by finding ways to increase the value to subordinates of those outcomes, by using appropriate coaching and direction to clarify the paths to those outcomes, and by removing barriers to those paths and frustrations that arise along the way.

The theory also considers a variety of leadership styles, characteristics of subordinates, and situational factors that affect the proper approach to a leader's path-goal work (Filley, House, and Kerr, 1976; House, 1971; House and Mitchell, 1974). House and Mitchell considered four leadership styles: *directive*, when the leader gives specific directions and expectations; *supportive*, marked by encouraging, sympathetic relations with subordinates; *achievement-oriented*, when the leader sets high goals and high expectations for subordinates' performance and responsibility; and *participative*, when the leader encourages subordinates to express opinions and suggestions.

Which style is best depends on various situational factors, such as whether the task is structured and provides clear goals, whether subordinates have well-developed skills and a sense of personal control over their environment (locus of control), how much formal authority the leader has, and whether the work group has strong norms and social relationships. When factors such as these provide weak path-goal indications and incentives, the proper leadership style can enhance them. The leader must avoid behaviors that impose redundancies and aggravations, however.

Researchers have predicted and tested relationships such as these:

- Directive leadership enhances satisfaction and expectancies if the task is ambiguous, but hurts them if the task is well structured and clear.
- Clear tasks already provide clear paths to goals, and subordinates may see more directions from a leader as redundant and irritating.
- Supportive leadership enhances satisfaction when tasks are frustrating and stressful, but can be inappropriate when the task, the work group, and the organization provide plenty of encouragement. In such situations the leader need only clarify directions as needed and set high standards.
- Achievement-oriented leadership increases performance on ambiguous tasks, either because those conditions allow (or require) ambitious goals more often than simple tasks do, or because achievement-oriented subordinates tend to select such tasks.
- Participative leadership works best for ambiguous tasks in which subordinates feel that their self-esteem is at stake, because participation allows them to influence decisions and work out solutions to the ambiguity. For clear tasks, however, participative leadership is effective only if subordinates value self-control and independence.

As these examples show, the theory weaves together leadership styles and situational factors to make sufficiently subtle predictions to capture some of the complex variations in real leadership settings. However, a lot of research based on the theory produced mixed results and much debate concerning its validity (Pinder, 2008; Yukl, 2001). House (1996) offers an elaborate reformulation of the theory, the adequacy of which remains to be established in research. Whether validated or not, the theory offers a number of interesting and useful suggestions for leaders to consider, about how to adapt leadership approaches to particular situations.

The Vroom-Yetton Normative Model

Vroom and Yetton (1973; see also Vroom and Jago, 1974) proposed an elaborate framework for leaders to use in deciding how and how much to involve subordinates or subordinate groups in decisions. The framework takes the form of a decision tree that guides the leader through a series of questions about how important the quality of the decision will be, whether the leader has the necessary information to make a high-quality decision, whether the problem is well structured, whether acceptance of the decision by subordinates is important, and whether conflict among them is likely. The decision-making process guides the leader in selecting from various ways of handling the decision, such as delegating it or making it after consulting subordinates.

Life-Cycle Theory

Hersey and Blanchard (1982) developed another form of contingency theory. Their life-cycle theory suggests that leadership styles must fit the level of maturity of the group being led. Mature groups have a higher capacity for accepting responsibility because they are well educated, experienced, and capable at accomplishing group tasks, and they have well-developed relationships with one another and with the leader. With groups that are very low on these dimensions, however, leaders must engage in telling, emphasizing task directions more than developing relationships with the group, to move the group toward better task capabilities. As the group moves higher on some dimensions of maturity but remains at a low level of maturity overall, the leader must do more selling, or heavy emphasizing of both tasks and relationships. As the group moves to moderately high maturity, participating becomes the most effective style. The leader relaxes the emphasis on task direction but still attends to relationships. Finally, for a very mature group, delegating becomes the effective approach. The leader deemphasizes his or her role in directing tasks and maintaining relationships and shifts responsibility to group members.

Loosely defined concepts plague the theory. Moreover, empirical support for the theory has been limited (Yukl, 2010). Nevertheless, it makes important points. Leaders often face the challenge of assessing just how much delegation the group can accept (how much it needs someone to take charge and set directions), and determining how to move the group toward a greater capacity for handling tasks and relationships independently.

Attribution Models

Social psychologists have developed a body of theory about how people make attributions about or attribute characteristics to one another. Some leadership researchers have applied this perspective to leadership and produced useful insights. They look at how leaders draw conclusions about how and why their subordinates are behaving and performing as they are and how subordinates form impressions about leaders. As leaders decide how to respond, they interpret the apparent causes of subordinate behavior and performance. They take into account the uniqueness of the particular task to the performance, the consistency of the behaviors, and how the behaviors compare to those of other subordinates. Some of the research shows that when a subordinate performs poorly, leaders tend to attribute the problem to the subordinate if he or she has a bad record. If the person has a good record of past performance, however, leaders often conclude that the problem results from the situation surrounding the person and is not his or her fault. For their part, subordinates often attribute the lion's share of credit or blame for the group's performance and characteristics to the group's leader. If the group has performed well in the past, they tend more readily to give the leader credit for current successes, even rating him or her higher on certain leader behaviors and interpreting these as causes.

Attribution theories obviously offer a partial approach that does not cover the full topic of leadership, but they clearly point to important processes for leaders to keep in mind. Leaders always face the challenge of managing others' impressions of them and of trying to form valid impressions of their colleagues and subordinates. These attribution processes pertain especially to problems in public management, in which political appointees come in at the top of agencies and must establish relations with career civil servants. Frequently the political appointees anticipate resistance and poor performance from the careerists, and the careerists anticipate amateurishness from the political appointee. When problems come up, the two types tend to interpret them according to their preconceptions about each other, aggravating the problem of developing effective working relationships. The careerists and appointees often come to respect each other, but attribution processes often slow this process (Golden, 2000; Heclo, 1978; Ingraham, 1988; Light, 1987).

Leader–Member Exchange Theory

The leader–member exchange (LMX) theory of leadership concentrates on the dyadic relationships between a leader and individual subordinates, and on the development of low-exchange and high-exchange relationships (Dansereau, Graen, and Haga, 1975). Low-exchange relationships involve little mutual influence between the leader and subordinate, and the subordinate generally follows formal role requirements and receives standard benefits such as salary. According to the theory, leaders tend to establish high-exchange relationships with a small set of trusted subordinates, with whom they engage in mutually influential relations. These subordinates usually receive benefits in the form of more interesting assignments and participation in important decisions, but they incur more obligations, such as meeting the leader's expectations of harder work, more loyalty, and more responsibility than is expected of those not included in the group. The leader, of course, incurs corresponding forms of obligation and benefit in these high-exchange relationships. Scholars developing this theory have devoted attention to measuring the existence of such relationships with questionnaires, analyzing the determinants of such relationships, and theorizing about how the relationships develop and mature over time. LMX theory has received more recent attention than a number of the other theories described previously and later in this chapter, sparking debate and criticism (Schriesheim, Castro, and Cogliser, 1999; Yukl, 2010). Studies indicate that high-exchange relationships are positively related to performance ratings of leaders, satisfaction with supervision, overall subordinate satisfaction, and role clarity and that they are negatively related to role conflict and turnover intention (Gerstner and Day, 1997). In addition, high-exchange relationships seem to encourage employees to go beyond the requirements of their formal role to assist their leaders and contribute to organizational efforts and success (Ilies, Nahrgang, and Morgeson, 2007). However, researchers have used different definitions and measures, leaving a lot of unresolved questions about the definition and nature of the exchange relations – that is, about how the relations develop and relate to group and individual performance. As with the other theories, LMX theory adds interesting suggestions about matters for leaders to consider in the leadership of individuals and groups.

Operant Conditioning and Social Learning Theory Models

The operant conditioning and behavior modification perspectives described in Chapter Nine have found their way into the search for leadership theories. Some early behavior modification approaches emphasized reinforcement of outcomes over concern with internal mental states. Proponents argued that these approaches offered significant improvements for leadership techniques, for several reasons. They stressed observations of behavior rather than dubious inferences about what happens in a person's head. For example, they said that managers should look at behaviors and performance outcomes rather than at whether a person has a “good attitude.” They called for close attention to the consequences of behavior, saying that leaders must attend to the behaviors they reinforce or extinguish by associating consequences with those behaviors. They emphasized positive reinforcement as the most effective approach.

Later approaches began to take into account developments in social learning theory. Albert Bandura (1978, 1997) and other psychologists demonstrated that operant conditioning models needed to expand to include forms of learning and behavioral change that are not tightly tied to some reinforcement. People learn by watching others, through modeling and vicarious learning. They use mental symbols, rehearsal, and memorization techniques to develop their behaviors. Taking these insights into account, social learning theory models of leadership have added analysis of internal mental states and social learning to their assessments of leadership (Kreitner and Luthans, 1987). This has led to additional suggestions about leadership practices. Because internal mental states and social learning (in addition to feedback and after-the-fact reinforcement) also affect behavior, leaders can use feed-forward techniques to influence behavior. They can anticipate problems and actively avoid them by clarifying goals. They can enhance employees' acceptance of goals by having them participate in their development, and through social cues (by acting as a good role model). They can also emphasize the development of self-efficacy and self-management, both for themselves and for their subordinates. This involves managing one's own environment by recognizing how environmental factors influence one's behavior, and through personal goal setting, rehearsal, self-instruction, and self-rewards (see, e.g., Sims and Lorenzi, 1992).

Cognitive Resource Utilization Theory

Researchers continue to work on additional theories. Among recent ones, Fiedler's cognitive resource utilization theory has received the most validation from supporting studies (Fiedler and Garcia, 1987). It extends the Fiedler contingency theory, specifying when directive (low-LPC) behaviors affect group performance, but also drawing in the effects of the leader's intelligence, competence, and stress level. Fiedler and Garcia reported the unexpected finding that considerate (high-LPC) leader behavior has little effect on group performance. If the group supports such a leader and the task requires cognitive abilities, then the cognitive abilities of the group determine its performance. If the group does not support the leader, then external factors, such as task difficulty, determine performance.

For directive leaders with much control over the situation, performance depends on whether the leader is free of stress, whether the task requires cognitive abilities, and whether the group supports the leader. If these conditions hold, the leader's intelligence strongly predicts performance. If the leader is under stress, however, the leader's experience becomes the best predictor of performance, because stress prevents the effective use of intelligence and brings experience more strongly into play. Also, if the task does not require cognitive skill or the group does not support the leader, then the leader's intelligence has little or no effect on performance. As the authors state, their theory and research suggest the "not surprising conclusion that directive leaders who are stupid give stupid directions, and if the group follows these directions, the consequences will be bad" (Fiedler and Garcia, 1987, p. 199). Directive leader behaviors result in good performance only if coupled with high leader intelligence and a supportive, stress-free setting. The theory offers useful new insights into such leadership process variables as stress, which leaders can strive to manage (House and Singh, 1987).

Scholars in organizational behavior and organizational psychology have developed other, less-prominent theories that this review does not cover (see Yukl, 2001). Yet arguably the most striking departure in leadership research in recent decades addresses transformational and charismatic leadership, and that body of research and theory needs attention. Before covering this approach, however, it is useful to review a body of research on managerial roles and behaviors to which the transformational leadership research reacts, and then to cover transformational and charismatic leadership, which have important linkages to the discussion of organizational culture that follows.

Shared Leadership

Throughout most of its history, the study of leadership has focused on the top-down influence of a single leader on his or her subordinates. More recently, however, various scholars have proposed a new conceptualization of leadership as a role shared broadly among senior leaders, middle managers, team managers, supervisors, and even low-level employees (Ensley, Pearson, and Pearce, 2003; Gronn, 2002; O'Toole, Galbraith, and Lawler, 2002; Pearce and Conger, 2003; Pearce and Sims, 2000, 2002). According to Fletcher and Kaufer (2003), shared leadership is a social process that is dynamic and multidirectional and involves a series of shared practices undertaken by people at all levels of the hierarchy. In a similar vein, Pearce (2004) defines shared leadership as a simultaneous and ongoing process of mutual influence within a group in which all members are fully engaged in the leadership role, some as official leaders and others as unofficial ones. He notes that shared leadership is especially appropriate when workers are highly interdependent, when the task requires a significant amount of creativity, and when the task is highly complex. A meta-analysis by Wang, Waldman, and Zhang (2013) that examined the findings of many studies of shared leadership in teams found that shared leadership was positively related to team effectiveness. Shared leadership also improved work-related attitudes like job satisfaction and commitment and team processes like cooperation. Importantly, research suggests that shared leadership and vertical or top-down leadership are complementary. Ensley et al. (2006) and Pearce and Sims (2002) compared vertical with shared leadership in top-management teams and found both approaches to be effective, although the effect of shared leadership outweighed that of vertical leadership.

Servant Leadership

The concept of servant leadership has been gaining in popularity among leadership researchers. It turns the idea of leadership on its head, stressing that the primary role of leaders is to understand and serve the needs and aspirations of followers, help them achieve their objectives, and promote their well-being. Since Greenleaf (1977) introduced the concept in the 1970s, a variety of definitions of servant leadership have emerged, making it difficult to arrive at any clear consensus on its meaning (Spears, 1995; Laub, 1999; Russell and Stone, 2002; and Patterson, 2003). Van Dierendonck (2010) notes, however, that most definitions appear to share six characteristics of servant leaders. First, servant leaders instill confidence in followers and empower them with resources and authority to achieve their goals. Second, servant leaders exhibit humility by acknowledging their own limitations, recognizing the capabilities and contributions of others, and admitting that to succeed they rely on the efforts of others. Third, they demonstrate integrity and are true to their values, interests, and perspectives. Fourth, servant leaders possess the ability to empathize, accept others as they are, and create an atmosphere of trust. Fifth, they provide direction and hold followers accountable for success while giving them latitude. Finally, servant leaders eschew control and advancement of their self-interest in favor of stewardship and achievement of collective aims, in part by setting examples of how to act in the common interest. Although research on servant leadership is in its early stages, findings about its consequences are promising. Studies show that servant leaders generate interpersonal trust (Joseph and Winston, 2005), increase job satisfaction (Chan and Mak, 2014), and improve team and organizational performance (Irving and Longbotham, 2007; Peterson, Galvin, and Lange, 2012;

Chiniara and Bentein, 2016).

Authentic Leadership

Like servant leadership, which also emphasizes integrity and being true to oneself, authentic leadership has emerged within the last two decades as a prominent approach to leadership. Authentic leadership is a complex, multidimensional concept and definitions of it abound. One prominent definition was offered by Avolio, Luthans, and Walumbwa (2004), who characterize authentic leaders as having a strong moral character; possessing the cognitive capabilities of confidence, optimism, hope, and resilience; being attentive to their environment; and having deep awareness of their values and capabilities and those of others with whom they work. In a similar vein, Shamir and Eilam (2005) define authentic leaders as true to themselves even in the face of pressure to conform; informed by their uniquely personal point of view; and motivated by their values and personal convictions rather than personal gain or status. Ladkin and Taylor (2010) reviewed various definitions of authentic leadership and found that many included the idea that authentic leaders have a strong sense of who they truly are; that their thinking and behavior is guided by and consistent with their self-awareness; that they strive to be moral; and that they are perceived as charismatic. Authentic leaders motivate followers and increase their commitment by appearing confident and credible; creating an appealing vision and modeling appropriate behaviors; and appealing to their sense of morality, honesty, and integrity. A modest but growing body of research on authentic leadership points to the advantages of this leadership approach. Gardner, Cogliser, Davis, and Dickens (2011), who undertook a broad review of the literature, found evidence of authentic leadership being positively related to employee attitudes like satisfaction, commitment, engagement, and well-being; interpersonal trust in the workplace; and organizational citizenship behavior and performance.

The Nature of Managerial Work and Roles

As the research on leadership developed, there also emerged a body of work on the characteristics of managerial work, roles, and skills. This literature actually involves something of a trait approach. It seeks to develop general conceptions of managerial activities and competencies. Ever since the classical theorists began trying to define the role of the administrator, the approach of planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting (POSDCORB) (described in Chapter Two), or some variant of it, has served as a guiding conception of what managers must do. Often coupled with this view is the constantly repeated notion that managers in all settings must do pretty much the same general types of work. Allison (1983) illustrated the prevalence of the POSDCORB conception of managerial responsibilities when he used a form of it in one of the most widely reprinted and circulated articles ever written on public management (see Table 11.1).

TABLE 11.1 MANAGING ROLES AND SKILLS

Allison (1983): Functions of General Management	
Strategy Establishing objectives and priorities Devising operational plans	
Managing internal components Organizing and staffing Directing personnel and the personnel management system Controlling performance	
Managing external constituencies Dealing with external units subject to some common authority Dealing with independent organizations Dealing with the press and the public	
Mintzberg (1972): Executive Roles Interpersonal: Figurehead, Leader, Liaison Informational: Monitor, Disseminator, Spokesperson Decisional: Entrepreneur, Disturbance Handler, Resource Allocator, Negotiator	
Whetten and Cameron (2002): Management Skill Topics	
Self-awareness	Effective delegation and joint decision making
Managing personal stress	Gaining power and influence
Managing conflict	Establishing supportive communication
Improving employee performance, motivating others	Improving group decision making
McCauley, Lombardo, and Usher (1989): The Benchmark Scales	
1a. Resourcefulness 1b. Doing whatever it takes 1c. Being a quick study 2a. Building and mending relationships 2b. Leading subordinates 2c. Compassion and sensitivity 3. Straightforwardness and composure 4. Setting a developmental climate 5. Confronting problem subordinates 6. Team orientation	

7. Balance between personal life and work
8. Decisiveness
9. Self-awareness
10. Hiring talented staff
11. Putting people at ease
12. Acting with flexibility

Not so preoccupied with what managers must do as with what they actually do, Mintzberg (1972) produced *The Nature of Managerial Work*, which now stands as a classic in the field. He did something that, remarkably, was considered quite original at the time. He closely observed the work of five managers who headed organizations by following them around and having them keep notebooks. He concluded that their work falls into the set of roles listed in Table 11.1.

Mintzberg also reported that when one actually watches what managers do, one sees the inaccuracy of some popular beliefs about their work. Managers do not play the role of systematic, rational planners but rather emphasize action over reflection. Their activities are characterized by brevity, variety, and discontinuity. Although top-level managers are often told to plan and delegate and avoid regular duties, in reality they handle regular duties such as ceremonies, negotiations, and relations with the environment, such as meeting visitors and getting information from outside sources (to which they have the best access of anyone in the organization). They meet visiting dignitaries, talk with managers and officials from outside the organization, hobnob at charitable events, and preside over the annual banquet. Although managers are sometimes told that they need aggregate, systematically analyzed information, they actually favor direct and interactive sources, such as telephone calls and face-to-face talks and meetings. And though management increasingly has access to scientific supports and processes, managers still rely a great deal on intuition and judgment. Research has supported Mintzberg's observations about management and his typology of managerial roles (Kurke and Aldrich, 1983). Generally, the research finds his typology widely applicable to managers in many settings. Yet Mintzberg also found some characteristics unique to the public sector setting, and these too have been supported in recent research, as discussed later.

Transformational Leadership

During the 1970s, researchers in the field expressed increasing concern about the inadequacy of their theories. Leadership theorists began to argue that research had concentrated too narrowly on the exchanges between leaders and their subordinates in task situations and on highly quantified models and analyses. Some researchers called for more attention to larger issues and other sources of leadership thought, such as political and historical analyses, and more qualitative research using interviews and case studies.

Political scientist James MacGregor Burns (1978) exerted a seminal influence on leadership thought in the management field. Concerned with major political and social leaders such as presidents and prime figures in social movements, he distinguished between *transactional leadership* and *transformational leadership*. Transactional leaders motivate followers by recognizing their needs and providing rewards to fulfill those needs in exchange for their performance and support. Transformational leaders raise followers' goals to higher planes, to a focus on transcendental, higher-level goals akin to the self-actualization needs defined by Maslow. In addition, they motivate followers to transcend their own narrow self-interest in pursuit of these goals, for the benefit of the community or the nation. Martin Luther King Jr. provides an example of a leader who did not simply offer to exchange benefits for support but also called for a new order of existence – a society of greater justice – and inspired many people to work for this vision. Many others refrained from opposing it because of its moral rightness.

Bass (1985, 1998; see also Bass and Avolio, 2002) presented a more systematic analysis of transformational leadership. Like Burns, however, he sharply distinguished transactional from transformational leadership. He saw transformational leadership as uplifting. It shifts followers' focus from lower- to higher-order needs. It motivates them to sacrifice their own self-interest by showing followers that their self-interests are fulfilled or linked to community or higher-order needs. Bass agreed that there must be a shift in needs, but he pointed out that major leaders – Hitler, for instance – can have a transforming influence through a negative shift. Bass argued that the wrong kind of transformational leadership can damage followers and other groups.

Bass's analysis of transformational leadership points out that this form of leadership has an emotional and intellectual component. The emotional component involves charisma, an inspiring influence on followers. The intellectual component involves careful attention to individual followers, often of a benevolent, developmental, mentoring nature, as well as intellectual stimulation. The intellectual aspects can take various forms, such as manipulating symbols, using rational discourse, or evoking ideals, and can involve cognitive stimulation as much as intellectual teaching. Bass emphasized that leadership research has often underrated the importance of leaders' technical competence to their influence and effectiveness. Followers often admire and follow leaders primarily because leaders are very good at what they do. Bass and colleagues (Bass, 1985, 1998) have developed a questionnaire instrument to analyze the component behaviors of transformational leadership, which, according to this perspective, include both transformational and transactional behaviors, as follows:

Transformational Behaviors

- *Idealized influence*: Arouses followers' emotional attachment to the leader and identification with him or her

- *Intellectual stimulation*: Engages followers in recognizing and confronting challenges and in viewing challenges from new perspectives
- *Individualized consideration*: Provides support, encouragement, and coaching
- *Inspirational motivation*: Communicates an appealing vision, using symbols to focus efforts, and models appropriate behaviors

Transactional Behaviors

- *Contingent reward*: Clarifying the work required for rewards and ensuring that rewards are contingent on appropriate behaviors
- *Passive management by exception*: Punishments or other corrective actions in response to obvious deviations from acceptable standards
- *Active management by exception*: Looking for mistakes and enforcing rules to avoid mistakes

Whereas Burns treated transactional and transformational leadership as two polar extremes, Bass argued that transformational leaders also engage in varying degrees of transactional interaction with followers. They have to provide rewards and reasonably clear goals and directions. But overemphasis on exchanges with followers, especially negative or punishing ones, can be harmful. The significance of transformational leadership derives from its capacity to lift and expand the goals of individuals, not by overemphasizing direct, extrinsic satisfaction of self-interest, but rather by inspiring new, higher aspirations. Hence comes the emphasis on relatively intangible, idealized influences through vision, empowerment, charisma, inspiration, individual consideration, and intellectual stimulation. Transformational leaders do not directly control their subordinates but rather seek to influence the climate in which they work. Thus, this view of leadership has connections with another recent trend: the emphasis on managing organizational culture. A meta-analysis of transformational leadership found that it was positively related to both effectiveness of leaders and follower satisfaction with their job and leader (Dumdum, Lowe, and Avolio, 2013). Transactional leadership was also positively related to effectiveness and satisfaction, but it appeared to have less of an impact than transformational leadership.

Charismatic Leadership

As part of the same trend that produced ideas about transformational leadership over the past several decades, leadership researchers have also developed theories of charismatic leadership that have similarities and overlaps with the concept of transformational leadership (Shamir, Zakay, Breinin, and Popper, 1998; Yukl, 2001, pp. 240–253). They have drawn on ideas from Max Weber's work (described in Chapter Two) on how leaders sometimes influence followers not just through traditional or formal authority, but also through exceptional personal qualities that invoke strong confidence, loyalty, and commitment from followers. Those interested in this phenomenon have developed a number of different perspectives on it; two of the more prominent of these are an attributional theory or perspective and a self-concept theory.

The attributional theory of charismatic leadership treats charisma as primarily a matter of the characteristics that followers attribute to their leader. When they attribute these qualities, they come to identify personally with the leader and to internalize values and beliefs that the leader espouses. They want to please and imitate the leader. According to this view of charismatic leadership, followers are more likely to react this way when the leader displays certain behaviors and skills, such as when the leader does the following:

- Advocates a vision that is different from the status quo, but still acceptable to followers
- Acts in unconventional ways in pursuit of the vision
- Engages in self-sacrifice and risk taking in pursuit of the vision
- Displays confidence in the leader's ideas and proposals
- Uses visioning and persuasive appeals to influence followers, rather than relying mainly on formal authority
- Uses the capacity to assess context and locate opportunities for novel strategies

Such leaders are most likely to emerge during a crisis or in situations in which the leader's exceptional behaviors and skills are a good match with a particular context.

The self-concept theory of charismatic leadership actually comes to some very similar conclusions, but it emphasizes more observable characteristics of the leader and followers. It also proceeds more from assumptions about the tendency of individuals to maintain their conception of themselves, including their social identities and their self-esteem, and the effects the leader has on such processes. Leaders have charismatic effects on followers when the followers (1) feel that the leader's beliefs are correct, (2) willingly obey the leader and feel affection for him or her, (3) accept high performance goals for themselves, (4) become emotionally involved in the mission of the group and feel that they contribute to it, and (5) regard the leader as having extraordinary abilities. Charismatic leaders invoke such responses by articulating an appealing vision and using strong, imaginative forms of communication to express it. They take risks and engage in self-sacrifice to attain the vision. They express confidence in followers, set high expectations of them, and empower them. They build identification with the group or organization and carefully manage followers' impressions of them. When these behaviors invoke in followers the responses just described, the followers come to identify with the leader, to internalize the leader's beliefs and values, and to feel motivated to achieve tasks and goals that the leader espouses.

Charismatic leadership drew researchers' attention in part because of important examples of leaders in government, business, and nonprofit organizations who displayed such behaviors and such influences on followers, at least to some extent. For example, during his service as commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, Charles Rossotti, regardless of whether he should be considered a charismatic leader, had a profound effect on the people who worked with him. In interviews, other executives in the IRS and in organizations such as unions and consulting firms that worked with the IRS would use terms such as “superhuman” to describe Rossotti's energy and acuity. These characterizations were all the more interesting because Rossotti is not a person of large stature or imposing physical presence (Thompson and Rainey, 2003).

Charismatic leadership obviously raises a lot of important questions about the nature and appropriateness of such forms of leadership. For example, if an organization becomes highly dependent on the special qualities of an individual leader, this can bring challenges when the leader departs. Also, researchers on this topic have pointed out that there can be a dark side to charismatic leadership, and that there is a difference between *positive charismatics* and *negative charismatics*. Positive charismatics can exert the beneficial forms of influence implied in the perspectives just described. Hitler, however, immediately brings to mind a lot of the obvious problems of negative forms of charisma, such as excessive loyalty to evil and destructive ends. Researchers have noted that one does observe negative charismatics in organizations in the government and in the private sector. Although not as heinous as Hitler, one hopes, such leaders can become self-absorbed, dependent on adulation, and excessively self-confident. They may take excessive risks and inhibit followers from suggesting improvements or pointing out problems.

As with the other theories, the research about transformational and charismatic leadership has raised controversies and criticisms about the adequacy of the theories and the research supporting them. Among many other issues, theorists dispute whether transformational and charismatic leadership are distinct or overlapping and related phenomena. Nevertheless, these streams of research and thought, besides being very interesting, raise for anyone in a leadership position some challenging considerations about a number of matters (see, e.g., Yukl, 2001, pp. 263–266), such as articulating a clear and appealing vision and showing how to attain it; displaying optimism and confidence in oneself and one's followers; using dramatic actions to emphasize key values; setting an example; and empowering people.

Leadership and Organizational Culture

Transformational leaders avoid closely managing their subordinates and organizations. Rather, they exert their influence through *social architecture*, by working with the basic symbols and core values, or culture, of their organization. Writers on organizational culture have described the key roles that leaders play in forming, maintaining, and changing that culture (Khademian, 2002, pp. 15–42; Schein, 1992). Organizational analysts have been interested in similar themes for a long time, as suggested by the work of Chester Barnard and Philip Selznick described in Chapter Two. The topic really came alive in the management literature, however, when management experts began to find that leaders in excellent corporations in the United States and other nations placed heavy emphasis on managing the cultural dimensions of their firms (Collins and Porras, 1997; Ouchi, 1981; Peters and Waterman, 1982). In addition, researchers who study organizational cultures often use methods similar to those used by anthropologists to study the cultures of different societies. They argue that these methods provide deeper, more sensitive understanding of the realities of organizational life than do methods used by other researchers (Ott, 1989; Schein, 1992). They have proposed various definitions of culture and undertaken studies of basic values, symbols, myths, norms of behavior, and other elements of culture in organizations.

Some of these studies have focused on public organizations, and certainly the topic applies to them (see, e.g., Lurie and Riccucci, 2003). Maynard-Moody, Stull, and Mitchell (1986) provided a rich description of the development and transformation of culture in the Kansas Department of Health and Environment. Early in the twentieth century, an influential secretary of the department instituted a culture that emphasized the use of professional expertise in the defense of public health, relative autonomy from political intrusion, strict rules, and adherence to the budget. Through slogans, pamphlets, symbolic political actions, and publicity campaigns, the secretary led the development of a well-established culture that predominated for decades. Much later, the governor and legislators, to bring the department under stronger political control, brought in an outsider as secretary. He and his followers led a reorganization that reduced the status of the adherents of the old culture and their beliefs and values, in part through constant denunciations of the old ways of doing things. The new culture, which emphasized different basic beliefs – such as the importance of political responsiveness and adherence to strict operating procedures – clashed with and eventually supplanted the older culture.

Previous chapters and later ones provide other illustrations of organizational culture in public organizations. The development of strategies and mission statements often draws on ideas about culture, and it in turn seeks to shape culture. Chapter Seven described the efforts of an executive trying to manage aspects of the culture of a law enforcement agency, including its basic assumptions about communicative leadership and decision making. Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen provide further examples of leaders' efforts to influence culture in changing, revitalizing, and building excellence in public and private organizations. These examples force the question of what we mean by *culture*. Scholars use the term in diffuse ways, and journalists and managers often use it very loosely. If very careful, long-term observations are required for researchers to understand *culture*, will it not also be difficult for managers to understand it? If culture is a strong determinant of what happens in organizations, will it not be hard to change?

The literature provides guidance for confronting these challenges. One succinct definition, e.g., says that organizational culture is the pattern of shared meaning in an organization (Trice and Beyer, 1993). In what sense, however, do shared meanings exist? Schein's conception of culture (1992), illustrated in Table 11.2, provides some clarification. Schein contended that culture exists on various levels. The most basic and least observable level, often overlooked in other conceptions of culture, includes the basic assumptions on which the organization operates. Often invisible and unconscious, these assumptions are about the organization's relationship with its environment; about the nature of reality, time, and space; and about the nature of humans and their activities and relationships. The next level of culture involves more overtly expressed values about how things ought to be and how one ought to respond in general. Finally, the most observable level includes artifacts and creations, such as actual technological processes (purposely designed work processes and administrative procedures and instructions), art (symbols, logos, and creations), and behaviors (words used, communication patterns, significant outbursts, and rituals and ceremonies).

A policy about uniforms in a military unit illustrates Schein's three levels (Lewis, 1987). Admiral Hyman Rickover discouraged the wearing of uniforms in the project teams working in the US Navy's nuclear program. Lower-ranking officers with more recent training often had the best knowledge. Uniforms carry symbols of hierarchical rank and authority (representing the first, most observable level of organizational culture). The absence of uniforms reduces the value of hierarchical rank and promotes the value of individuals' technical knowledge (the second level). At the third, most basic level, the underlying assumption is that those with the “best brains, not the highest rank” make the best decisions (Lewis, 1987, p. 107).

Other researchers have developed more elaborate sets of dimensions of organizational culture. Table 11.2 summarizes the dimensions of organizational culture that Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders (1990) used in their study of twenty organizations. Leaders and teams working on the development of organizational culture can make pragmatic use of such dimensions, as well as of the measures of them described shortly. Researchers can work on further developing and confirming the role of such dimensions in public organizations.

TABLE 11.2 CONCEPTIONS AND DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE

Levels and Basic Assumptions of Organizational Culture (Schein, 1992)
Levels of Organizational Culture
1. Artifacts and creations (the most observable level). Examples: the design of

work processes and administrative procedures, art (logos and symbols), overt behaviors (words used, rituals, ceremonies, significant outbursts – such as something a top executive gets openly mad or happy about).

2. Basic values (a less observable level). Examples: values about how things ought to be and how one ought to respond and behave in general (e.g., always help younger employees develop their skills and careers, always have strong relationships with key officials in the legislative branch).
3. Basic assumptions (the most basic, least observable level). Examples: basic assumptions on which people in the organization operate (e.g., decisions should be made by people with the best brains, not the highest rank).

Key Dimensions of the Basic Assumptions

1. The organization's relation to its environment. Example: whether members see the organization as dominant or dominated.
2. The nature of reality and truth, and the basis for decisions. Example: whether decisions are based on tradition or on a scientific test. Subdimensions: the nature of time (e.g., the length of cycles) and space (e.g., perceived availability or constraints).
3. The nature of human nature. Examples: humans as bad or good, mutable or fixed.
4. The nature of human activity. Example: being proactive versus being reactive.

Dimensions of Organizational Culture (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohavy, and Sanders, 1990)

- *Member identity*: The degree to which individuals identify with the organization as a whole rather than some subgroup or specialization.
- *Group emphasis*: The degree to which work is organized around groups rather than individuals.
- *People focus*: The extent to which management considers the effects of their decisions on people in the organization.
- *Unit integration*: The amount of encouragement of coordinated, interdependent activity among units.
- *Control*: The degree to which rules and supervision are used to control employees.
- *Risk tolerance*: The encouragement of risk and innovation.
- *Reward criteria*: The extent to which rewards are based on performance rather than seniority or favoritism.
- *Conflict tolerance*: The degree to which open airing of conflict is encouraged.

- *Means–ends orientation*: The extent of managerial focus on outcomes and results rather than processes.
- *Open-systems focus*: The amount of monitoring of external developments.

Variations Among Cultures

Analysts also emphasize variations among cultures. One such distinction points out that organizational cultures can vary from strong to weak. In organizations with strong cultures, the members share and strongly adhere to the organization's basic values and assumptions. In weak cultures, members feel little consensus and commitment. DiIulio (1994) described how some employees of the US Bureau of Prisons feel a very strong commitment to the mission and values of the bureau, to the point that some retirees will rush to the scene of a crisis in the prison system to volunteer their services.

There may be multiple cultures and subcultures within an organization (Trice and Beyer, 1993, chapters 5 and 6). Subcultures can form around occupational specializations, subunits or locations, hierarchical levels, labor unions, and countercultural groups such as rebellious units. Public agencies often have a single dominant occupational or professional specialization (Mosher, [1968] 1982; Warwick, 1975). Strong differences between cultures or subcultures obviously complicate the challenge of forging consensus on cultural changes and priorities.

Another source of variation is the role of external societal cultures and their influences on an organization. During the 1980s, e.g., interest in the successes of Japanese management led to analyses of their more consensual decision-making processes, their group-oriented norms, and other characteristics of Japanese corporations that reflect their distinctive external societal culture (Ouchi, 1981).

Assessing the Culture

As suggested earlier, the task of developing an understanding of an organization's culture imposes a major challenge on managers and researchers alike. The concepts and dimensions listed in Table 11.2 can serve as focal points for such an assessment. Researchers use elaborate procedures for measuring and assessing culture. Table 11.3 suggests references and sources for this undertaking.

Khademian (2002, pp. 42–47) proposes a *cultural roots framework* for analysis of public organizations. The cultural roots are three basic elements of every public agency or program: the public task to be done, the resources available to do it, and the environment in which the agency or program has to operate. These three elements become integrated in ways that produce commitments or rules about how the job gets done. To influence the organization's culture, Khademian argues, public managers must concentrate on influencing the ways in which these basic elements or roots are integrated, using strategies described later.

TABLE 11.3 BACKGROUND REFERENCES FOR ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Schein (1992, chap. 5). Procedures and interview questions for assessing culture, including the dimensions of culture that his analysis emphasizes. Methods: interviews focusing on surprises and critical incidents, and group interviews about the basic dimensions.

Wilkins (1990). Suggestions and interview questions for assessing “corporate character.” Corporate character emphasizes “motivational faith” along two dimensions: fairness and ability. Methods: interview and self-assessment questions for use in assessing faith in leaders' and their own fairness and in the organization's and their own abilities.

Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders (1990). Description of the measures of the cultural dimensions described in Table 11.2. Method: survey research questionnaires.

Kotter and Heskett (1992). Survey instrument and interview questions used in their study of the relations between corporate culture and performance in numerous business firms. Method: organizational questionnaire survey and interviews.

Ott (1989, chap. 5). General review of methods of studying organizational culture.

The Communication of Culture

Various forms that transmit an organization's culture serve as sense-making mechanisms for people in the organization as they interpret what goes on around them (Trice and Beyer, 1993, p. 80). The forms transmit information about the organization's basic values and assumptions. In analyzing their organization's culture, leaders and teams must determine the current roles of these forms and the ways they need to be transformed.

Symbols. Physical objects, settings, and certain roles within an organization convey information about its values and basic assumptions. The uniforms in the example about Rickover are one example. Goodsell (1977) studied 122 government agencies and found various physical conditions that symbolized either authority or service to clients. For example, flags, official seals, and physical distance between employees and clients symbolized authority. Symbols of a client service orientation included comfortable furniture and descriptions of services available.

Employees use symbols, too. In a large service center of the Social Security Administration, members of a problem-ridden subunit held a funeral for the subunit, complete with black balloons, a small black coffin, and the singing of hymns. Later, when the director had effectively resolved their concerns, the members gave him the coffin with the balloons deflated inside it, as a symbol that the problems were over.

Physical settings can have potent symbolic effects. Zalesny and Farace (1987), in a study of a public agency in a Midwestern state, found that a change to a more open office design – with no interior walls or partitions – had significant psychological effects on employees. Lower-level employees saw the change as promoting more democratic values. Managers felt they had lost status.

Language. Slang, songs, slogans, jargon, and jokes can all carry the messages of a culture. Maynard-Moody, Stull, and Mitchell (1986) described the transformation of the culture of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment. One way that cultural changes were instituted was through derogatory references to "the old way of doing things" that debunked the assumptions and values of the former culture.

Narratives. The people in an organization often repeat stories, legends, sagas, and myths that convey information about the organization's history and practices. Bennis and Nanus (1985) reported that in a large computer company, a manager lost a lot of money on an aggressive project. When he offered his resignation, his superior asked, "How can we fire you when we have just spent ten million dollars educating you?" Repeated around the organization, such a story can send a powerful message about the organization's support of reasonable risk taking and aggressiveness.

Practices and Events. Repeated practices and special events, including recurrent or memorable one-time incidents, can transmit important assumptions and values. These events may include rites and ceremonies such as graduation ceremonies, induction and initiation ceremonies, annual meetings, annual banquets or holiday parties, and homecomings. Rites promote changes and goals such as passage, renewal, elevation or degradation of individuals, conflict reduction, and integration of the group. Leaders' actions at times of crisis, memorable and widely noted speeches, and outbursts can all have such influences. Organizations have taken particular steps to support employees or customers during times of crisis or hardship, leading to legends and stories that symbolize and communicate organizational values.

Leading Cultural Development

Experts on organizational culture heavily emphasize the crucial role of leadership in creating and upholding culture (Khademian, 2002; Schein, 1992; Trice and Beyer, 1993). Leaders create culture in new organizations and embody and transmit it in existing organizations. They can also integrate cultures in organizations that have multiple cultures by forging consensus. These different roles are important, because different types of leaders may play them. A long-term member of the organization, e.g., often plays the strongest role in embodying and transmitting existing cultures. Nevertheless, leaders of high-performance organizations typically strive for an improved culture, even if the organization performs well already (Kotter and Heskett, 1992).

The concepts and points discussed earlier present challenges for leadership. Enhancing culture involves understanding its nature, assessing the particular culture of one's organization, dealing with multiple subcultures as necessary, understanding the different cultural forms in the organization, and using those forms to facilitate change. Leaders and leadership teams can use a variety of methods and strategies to lead the development of effective culture:

1. *Make clear what leaders will monitor, ignore, measure, or control*. For example, a leadership team can announce that a significant proportion of each manager's evaluation and bonus will be based on an assessment of how well the manager performed in developing subordinates' skills.
2. *React to critical incidents and organizational crises in ways that send appropriate cultural messages*. Crises provide opportunities for leaders to demonstrate fortitude, commitment to organizational members, and other values and basic assumptions. The computer firm manager who got the expensive "education," described earlier, provides an example. The Social Security Administration center director, also described earlier, when confronted with the funeral in the troubled subunit, reacted not punitively but communicatively. He thus sent a message about the value he placed on communication and participation.
3. *Practice deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching*. Leaders can show, tell, and encourage values and behaviors they want employees to adopt.
4. *Establish effective criteria for granting rewards and status, for selection and promotion of employees, and for dismissal or punishment*. The earlier example about introducing the development of subordinates as a criterion for managers' performance evaluations and bonuses shows that what an organization rewards its members for sends a powerful message about values and basic assumptions. Punishments send equally strong messages.
5. *Coordinate organizational designs and structures with cultural messages*. Without appropriate structural redesign, a leader's modeling and coaching about new approaches and values can evaporate into empty rhetoric and posturing. If the leader's criteria for rewards conflict with features of the organization that impede the behaviors the leader wants to reward, role conflict and stress for members will surely result. Chapter Thirteen describes how, in the 1970s, large Social Security Administration service centers redesigned their structures and work processes. They changed from large units composed of specialists who worked on only one specific part of a case to work modules made up of different specialists who together handled each case as a whole. The change embodied strong messages about the values of teamwork and communication, and the

removal of status differences among coworkers.

6. *Coordinate organizational systems and procedures with cultural messages*. Systems and procedures – such as technological systems, routine reporting requirements, performance evaluations, and group meetings – provide important messages about important values and basic beliefs. Bourgault, Dion, and Lemay (1993) described how a performance appraisal system for Canadian government executives has a team-building effect, in part because of its basis in shared values. Conversely, studies of pay-for-performance systems, including the Performance Management and Recognition System for middle managers in the US federal government (discussed in Chapter Ten), often illustrate how such systems fail to communicate useful information about important values (Perry, 1986; Perry, Petrakis, and Miller, 1989).
7. *Design physical spaces, including facades and buildings, to communicate the culture*. The study by Goodsell (1977), described earlier, suggests some of the aspects of physical setting and space that can communicate cultural information about public agencies.
8. *Employ stories about events and people*. Leaders can also make use of stories and accounts of past events and people as a way of promoting values and assumptions. Cooper (1987) described Gifford Pinchot's effective efforts to build support for the Forest Service and strong commitment among forest rangers by, in part, taking wilderness treks with foresters. These outings served to build his image as a person committed to his mission and richly appreciative of forest resources.
9. *Develop formal statements of the organizational philosophy or creed*. Formal credos and value statements promote an organization's principles and values, and generally commit the organization to them. Denhardt (2000) provides numerous examples of such statements in public agencies in several different nations. The Social Security Administration provides such statements in the agency's strategic plan, and they can be viewed on the agency's website (US Social Security Administration, 2013, p. 4).
10. *Approach cultural leadership as comprehensive organizational change*. Leadership teams must approach the development of an effective organizational culture as they would any major, influential initiative. Chapter Thirteen covers successful organizational change, discussing how leadership teams can marshal resources, commitment, and consensus in a sustained, comprehensive fashion.

Khademian (2002) has contributed a somewhat different perspective on leading and managing culture, in which she proposes that public managers influence culture by concentrating on the basic elements, or roots, of culture – environment, resources, and task – and explains how their integration has developed commitments that form the culture. She proposes that managers follow a set of strategies for examining and influencing these commitments and their connections to the roots. These strategies include, e.g., identifying the commitments that form the culture and their connections to the roots of culture, identifying and articulating what needs to change, practicing and demonstrating the desired changes, and approaching the changes as an inward, outward, and shared responsibility that involves internal management as well as management of environmental elements and the participation of organizational members and numerous external stakeholders.

As indicated earlier, Chapter Fourteen includes further examples of the importance of effective culture in public organizations. As suggested by Khademian's proposed strategies and at many points in earlier chapters, a major issue for public managers and researchers is the context of leadership in the public sector and how leaders have to work with it in developing culture and carrying out other management responsibilities.

Leadership and Management in Public Organizations

A review of the management literature shows that researchers have treated leadership and management in the public sector as essentially the same as in other settings, including business. Many major contributions to the field, such as the Ohio State leadership studies and Fiedler's theories, were developed in part from research on military officers or government managers. Mintzberg's study (1972) included a public manager (a school system superintendent) and a quasi-public manager (a hospital administrator). Additional studies have found that Mintzberg's role categories apply to managers in government agencies (Lau, Pavett, and Newman, 1980). Although Mintzberg and later researchers (Kurke and Aldrich, 1983) noted some special features of public managers' work, still others found that even these few distinctions do not always hold for all types of public managers (Ammons and Newell, 1989). Small wonder that leadership researchers typically regard a public-versus-private distinction as rather inconsequential. Leaders in all settings face the challenges and general tasks suggested by the theories we have reviewed.

Generalizations About the Distinctive Context of Public Service

Although virtually everyone accepts the premise that all executives and managers face very similar tasks and challenges, a strong and growing body of evidence suggests that public managers operate within contexts that require rather distinctive skills and knowledge. For years, political scientists writing about public bureaucracies argued that the political processes and government institutions in which managers in government settings work make their jobs very different from those of business executives. Those writers did not, however, do as much empirical research on leadership as the organizational behavior and management researchers did. Clear evidence of differences remained rather scarce, and many management scholars noted the evidence of similarities among all managerial roles and rejected such notions as crude stereotypes.

More recently, however, greater attention to the topic of public management has produced additional evidence concerning its distinctive nature. Some of this evidence comes from executives who have served in both business and government and have written about the differences they have seen between the two roles (Allison, 1983; Blumenthal, 1983; Chase and Reveal, 1983; Hunt, 1999; IBM Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002; Rumsfeld, 1983). Although their experiences and opinions have been diverse, they have agreed that the constraints, controls, and political and administrative processes in public organizations weighed heavily on their managerial behaviors. Though these elements of the context of leadership in the public sector have been discussed in earlier chapters, it may be useful here to review a number of them:

- Jurisdiction-wide rules for personnel, purchasing, budgeting, and other administrative functions, usually with an oversight agency administering them, which limit executive authority
- Legislative and interest-group alliances with subgroups and individuals within the organization, which dilute executives' authority over those groups or individuals
- Control by legislatures, chief executives, and oversight agencies over resource and policy decisions, and strong demands for accountability on the part of the agency head for all matters pertaining to the agency
- The influence of the press and the imperative that executives concern themselves with media coverage
- The short tenure of many top executives, which limits their time to accomplish goals and weakens their influence over careerists
- The absence of clear and accepted performance measures for their organizations and the activities within them, and the need to take a particularly broad range of interests and issues into account in decision making

Federal executives report from a very special perspective, of course. There are more than a dozen such reports (Hunt, 1999; IBM Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002; Perry and Kraemer, 1983; Shalala, 1998). Yet more structured academic research paints a similar picture. Various studies of public managers show a general tendency for their roles to reflect the context of political interventions and administrative constraints.

Much of this evidence comes not from studies of leadership practices but from analyses of managerial roles. In his seminal study, Mintzberg (1972) found that the work of all the managers fell into his now well-known role categories. Yet the public manager in the sample (a school administrator) and the quasi-public manager (a hospital administrator) spent more time in contacts and formal meetings with external interest groups and governing boards and received more external status requests than did the private managers. Later, Kurke and Aldrich (1983) replicated the study, including its findings about public management; they pointed to public-versus-private comparisons as an important direction for future research on managerial roles. Lau, Pavett, and Newman (1980), also using a technique based on Mintzberg's, found the roles of civilian managers in the US Navy comparable to those of private manufacturing and service firm managers. Yet they also added the role of technical expert to the role categories for the navy managers and noted that these managers spend more time in crisis management and “fire drills” than private managers. Ammons and Newell (1989), conversely, conducted a survey of mayors and city managers using Mintzberg's categories and found somewhat different results. Comparing the sample of mayors and city managers to private sector samples from previous studies, Ammons and Newell found that these city officials spent no more time in formally scheduled meetings than did the private sector managers. This contradicts the findings of Mintzberg and of Kurke and Aldrich. Yet a closer look shows that the mayors and city managers did spend more time making phone calls and conducting tours than did the private sector managers. Ammons and Newell noted that they could not really say what the phone calls involved, and that they may well represent contacts with external groups and political actors.

A study by Porter and Van Maanen (1983) supported this interpretation. They compared city government administrators to industrial managers and found that the city administrators felt less control over how they allocated their own time, felt more pressed for time, and regarded demands from people outside the organization as a much stronger influence on how they managed their time. At the level of state government, Weinberg (1977) reported on a case study of the management of New Jersey state agencies by the governor, concluding that “crisis management” plays a central role in shaping public executives' decisions and priorities.

In an observational study of six bureau chiefs of large federal bureaus, Herbert Kaufman (1979) found that they spent much of their time in classic, generic management functions such as motivating employees, communicating, and decision making. The political environment figured crucially in their roles, however. Relations with Congress outweighed relations with the higher executives of their departments. Clearly, they operated within a web of institutional constraints on organizational structure, personnel administration, and other matters. The study of legislators and administrators in six countries by Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981), described in Chapter Five, supports this depiction of congressional influence as stronger than that of agency heads.

Boyatzis (1982) conducted a study of managerial competencies that compared managers in four federal agencies and twelve large firms. He found that private managers were higher on “goal and action” competencies; he attributed this to clearer performance measures, such as profits, in the private sector (see Hooijberg and Choi, 2001, for a similar finding). The private managers also scored higher on competencies in “conceptualization” and “use of oral presentations.” Boyatzis suggested that more strategic decision making in the private firms and more openness and standard procedures in the public sector account for this. Interestingly, Boyatzis's findings correspond to those of earlier studies. Like Guyot (1960), he found that public managers show higher levels of need for achievement and power. Yet their lower scores on goal and action competencies reflected less ability to fulfill such needs. Boyatzis's interpretation agreed with that of Buchanan (1975). They both regarded their findings as evidence that fairly ambitious and idealistic people come to managerial work in government but appear to experience constraints within complex government agencies and policymaking processes.

Chase and Reveal (1983) discussed the challenges of public management on the basis of Chase's extensive experience in government, especially in large urban agencies. Their depiction of the key challenges in managing a public agency concentrated on those challenges posed by the external political and institutional environment: dealing with elected chief executives who have shorter-term, more election-oriented priorities competing for a place on their agenda; coping with overhead agencies such as civil service commissions, budget bureaus, and general service agencies (for travel, purchasing, space allocation); dealing with legislators (including city councils); and managing relations with special-interest groups and the media.

Although these studies differ in their findings and types of managers studied and in other important ways, they confirm the general observation that public managers carry out their work under conditions marked by constraints and interventions from the political and administrative environment. The form of influence or constraint may vary between mayors, public school superintendents, governors, and middle managers in federal agencies, but it shows up consistently in one form or another. Formal meetings with controlling groups; fire drills; crisis management; phone calls; external demands on time and priorities; and the power of legislators, media, and interest groups – all are indications of the exposure of the public sector manager to the political process and to the administrative structures of government.

Does Context Affect Performance and Behavior?

Clearly, the executives who reported on their experiences in both sectors in the studies just mentioned did not regard themselves as inferior managers. Yet sharper critiques raise crucial questions about whether the public sector context penalizes excellence in leadership or actually prevents it. From his case study of the US State Department, Warwick (1975) concluded that federal executives and middle managers face strict constraints on their authority. Goals are vague. Congress and other elements of the federal system, including many politically appointed executives themselves, adhere to an administrative orthodoxy akin to the old principles of administration. They hold top executives accountable for all that happens in their agency and expect agencies to show clear lines of authority and accountability. The executives and middle managers have little control over career civil servants, yet they feel intense pressure to control them to avoid bad publicity or political miscues. Because of vague performance criteria, they try to control behavior rather than outcomes through a profusion of rules and clearance requirements. Paradoxically, this approach fails to exert real control on the lower levels and further complicates the bureaucratic system. Warwick referred to this drawing upward of authority as “escalation to the top”; he said that an “abdication at the bottom” mirrors it at lower levels, where careerists emphasize security and accept the rules. When they disagree, they simply “wait out” the executives' short tenure. Top executives also preoccupy themselves with external politics and public policy issues, abdicating any role in developing human resources or organizational support systems and processes, and otherwise developing the organization itself. Warwick cited Downs (1967) pointedly, and his view accords with Downs's and Niskanen's views described in Chapter Ten.

Lynn (1981) and Allison (1983) displayed much less pessimism but nevertheless expressed a similar concern about a performance deficit. Lynn lamented the tendency of many federal executives to emphasize political showmanship over substantive management. He referred to the problem of “inevitable bureaucracy,” in which higher levels try to control lower levels by disseminating new rules and directives, which simply add to the existing array of rules without exerting any real influence. Similarly, the report of the National Academy of Public Administration (1986) lamented the complex web of controls and rules over managerial decisions in federal agencies and their adverse effect on federal managers' capacity and motivation to manage.

In addition, the Volcker Commission (1989) reported a quiet crisis at the higher levels of the career federal service. The poor image of the federal service, pay constraints compared with higher pay levels in the private sector, and pressures from political executives and appointees have damaged morale among these executives and increased their likelihood of leaving the federal service. Recruitment to replace them is hampered by the same factors that discourage these individuals. The demoralization and subsequent loss of experienced executives and the difficulties in finding high-quality replacements will likely diminish effective leadership practices in the future.

Surveys of Leadership Practices

A number of studies by government agencies and surveys of government employees that included their ratings of their supervisors have provided mixed evidence about the quality of leadership in government organizations (National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, 1978; US Merit Systems Protection Board, 1987; US Office of Personnel Management, 1979, 2000, 2003). These surveys and studies tend to find that, in general, public sector employees and managers express favorable impressions of the leadership practices in their agencies. Yet the evidence also indicates some public sector problems and a degree of private sector superiority in developing leaders, participativeness of leaders, and some other leadership practices and conditions. For example, the survey reports sometimes compare government employees' responses to comparable responses in surveys of private employees, and a couple of them have found that about 10 to 15% more of the private employees give favorable ratings of the supervisors and leadership in their organizations (National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, 1978; US Office of Personnel Management, 2003). These results coincide generally with some of the concerns about constraints on leadership in government expressed by the authors cited earlier. Yet they also place those concerns in perspective by showing the inaccuracy of overstatements of the problem. Although governments probably do face constraints in encouraging and developing excellent leadership practices, many excellent leaders and managers serve in government.

Attention to Management and Leadership

Although many observers claim that public managers pay insufficient attention to leading and managing their organizations, the evidence clearly shows otherwise, at least in many specific cases. Critics say that public managers show too little attention to long-range objectives and internal development of their organization and human resources. But critics of business management, especially in recent years, complain that similar problems plague industry in the United States and that firms place too much emphasis on short-term profit. Critics also accuse business leaders of concentrating on achieving huge financial returns for themselves, even when the firm's performance lags. These criticisms of businesses and executives make it hard to depict government as inferior.

Moreover, abundant evidence shows that many government managers work very hard. Ammons and Newell (1989) reported that mayors, city managers, and their immediate executive assistants say they work about sixty to sixty-six hours per week. Executives from the private sector who have served in Washington regularly report their impressions of how hard the staff members and executives in the federal government work (Volcker Commission, 1989).

Do they spend much of this time on political gamesmanship, as some critics of federal executives suggest? Consider the city level: several surveys have asked city officials to report on the time they spend in managerial roles (staffing, budgeting, evaluating, directing, and so on), policymaking roles (forming policy about the future of the city, meeting with other city officials, and so on), and political roles (dealing with external political groups and authorities, such as state and federal officials and active community groups, and engaging in public relations activities such as speeches and ceremonies). Ammons and Newell (1989) found that the mayors, city managers, and executive assistants in their survey reported, on average, devoting 55% of their time to managerial roles, 28% to policy roles, and 17% to political roles. As might be expected, mayors ranged above these averages in their concentration on political activities, and assistants paid more attention to management tasks.

Ammons and Newell asked questions about the importance of the various roles to the officials' success. Most mayors placed the greatest importance on the political role, although 23% emphasized the managerial role as most important. The city managers emphasized the policy role more frequently than other roles, but they also heavily emphasized management; about 40% rated the managerial role as most important. The executive assistants overwhelmingly rated the managerial role as most important. In sum, city officials see themselves as devoting substantial amounts of time to managerial roles.

Similarly, the small sample of federal bureau chiefs in the Kaufman (1979) study noted earlier indicated that they spent much of their time in typical managerial activities, such as motivating the people in their bureaus. This orientation does not square with the complaints that public managers do not manage conscientiously. What explains this distance between various observers and researchers on a key point such as this?

Contingencies and Variations

Obviously, many variations in context and in the individual officials surveyed account for the different views revealed in the preceding section. The bureau chiefs that Kaufman studied tended to be longer-term career civil servants, at levels lower than the short-tenure political appointees who commonly head government agencies. The level of the manager and the institutional context make a lot of difference. As pointed out earlier, officials vary by elected versus appointed status, level in the agency hierarchy, distance from the political center (such as Washington, D.C., versus a district office, or the state capitol versus a state district office), political and institutional setting of the agency (such as executive and legislative authority in the jurisdiction; weak-mayor, strong-mayor, and council-manager structures at the local level), level of government, and other factors. These variations have great significance. At virtually all levels and in virtually all settings, public managers must to some degree balance managerial tasks with policymaking and with handling the political and institutional environment (oversight agencies, legislative and other executive authorities, clients and constituents, and the media). Yet some managers in public agencies (and in many private nonprofit agencies) face intense challenges of the latter sort, whereas others operate in virtual isolation from political intrusions.

Meyer (1979) provided one of many examples of the effects of the variations and contingencies in the contexts of public managers. He concluded from a large study of heads of state and local finance agencies that those in stronger positions politically – those who are elected or who are career civil servants rather than political appointees

– show more ability to defend their agency against pressures for change in structure and against the loss of units to other agencies, apparently because of their greater ability to draw on support from political networks. As another example, Kotter and Lawrence (1974) reported an analysis of the variations in the contexts and behaviors of mayors. They concluded that effective mayors must "coalign" major components of their context. These include the mayors' own personal characteristics (cognitive and interpersonal skills, needs, and values), their agendas (tasks and objectives in the short and long runs), their networks (the resources and expectations of city government members and their relationship to the mayor), and characteristics of the cities themselves (such as size and rate of change). For example, they argue that the mayor's cognitive style must align with the variety and variability of information about the city that must be processed. A technician orientation, emphasizing the analysis of discrete amounts of information, best aligns with a small, homogeneous, stable city, where information varies little and can be analyzed relatively easily. A professional orientation fits a large, heterogeneous city with unstable, hard-to-analyze information. The professional mayor emphasizes using his or her professional judgment and applying professional guidelines and knowledge. Between these extremes, an engineering mayor works best in a large, diverse, stable city where information is highly varied but analyzable. A craftsman most effectively deals with the less varied but less analyzable information in a small but unstable city. This typology draws on Perrow's ideas (1973) about information contingencies of tasks (see Chapter Eight).

Anderson, Newland, and Stillman (1983) also proposed a typology based more on a framework akin to Blake and Mouton's managerial grid (1984), described earlier in this chapter. They argued that cities have varied levels of demand for their officials to display either a people orientation or a technical orientation. Growth communities create high demand both for orientations and for a chief-executive-type manager who works for change within regular organizational structures. Caretaker communities demand maintenance of existing services and an administrative caretaker, a leader with a technical orientation. Arbiter communities require much conflict resolution and therefore more of a people orientation than a technical one; a community leader mode of management best satisfies these requirements. A consumption community demands the most public services for the least cost and hence needs an administrative innovator who will follow the direction set by elected council members and seek innovations for the sake of efficiency and service delivery (that is, less emphasis on people, more on technical skill).

Effective Leadership in Government

A growing body of research on effective and innovative leaders in government also breaks away from overgeneralizations about ineffectual managers struggling with an overwhelming political and administrative system. As mentioned in Chapter One, this stream of work has now developed into a genre in its own right. These studies provide numerous examples of innovative, influential, entrepreneurial leaders in government agencies and programs. For example, Lewis (1980) studied Hyman Rickover's development of the nuclear power program in the US Navy, J. Edgar Hoover's impact on the FBI, and Robert Moses's transformation of the New York Port Authority. In each case, Lewis found an organization that was ineffective at achieving the major goals for which it presumably existed until it experienced a process of mentoring by an effective superior. In this process, the superiors developed appropriate goals and learned how to get things done. They then engaged in an “entrepreneurial leap” that changed the organization and its resource allocation in unforeseen ways, and they created an “apolitical shield” that defended their work from political intervention by casting it as nonpolitical and objectively necessary. Later phases involved struggling for autonomy, reducing environmental uncertainty, expanding the organization's domain, and fully institutionalizing the new organization (with consequent problems of “ultrastability”). Lewis's subjects stand as controversial titans who, through exceptional ambition, energy, and political and technical skill, took advantage of key political and technological developments to build effective organizations.

Other writers have described executives who played major roles in the development of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority, major Department of Defense policies, the Social Security Administration, and the Forest Service. Doig and Hargrove (1987) concluded from a set of such studies that the innovative leaders in the public sector displayed similar general patterns. They identified new missions and programs for their agencies. They developed external and internal constituencies for these new initiatives, identified areas of vulnerability, and neutralized opposition. For their new missions, they enhanced the technical expertise of the agency and provided motivation and training for organizational members. The leaders followed a mixture of rhetorical strategy, involving evocative symbols and language and coalition-building strategy that emphasized the development of political support from many groups. Some leaders relied on both strategies; some primarily emphasized one over the other.

External conditions set the stage for these activities, according to Doig and Hargrove. The entrepreneurs actually took advantage of the diverse and fragmented governance structures often cited as reasons why public managers accomplish little. The difficulties of strong central control in such a system provided these leaders with opportunities to forge their own direction. They also took advantage of patterns of potential public support (e.g., changing public attitudes during the 1930s supported a more active role for the federal government) and new technologies and alliances with elected political officials.

In their personalities and skills, the leaders displayed an “uncommon rationality” – a remarkable ability to perceive effective means to ends. They were able to see the political logic in an emerging historical situation and link their initiatives to broader political and social trends. Doig and Hargrove also stressed the individual's motivation to make a difference, coupled with a sustained determination and optimism. Success depends, however, on the association of personal skills with organizational tasks and with favorable historical conditions, such as public and political support and timely technological possibilities.

Similarly, Riccucci (1995) profiled federal executives who fought heroically against corruption or on behalf of some program or policy to which they were dedicated, often using effective political tactics such as skillful use of the media and expert coalition-building, as well as effective organizational management techniques. Hargrove and Glidewell (1990) brought together authors who have provided biographical descriptions of determined and talented governmental executives struggling with jobs that are, in important senses, impossible. Another important point about the ability of public managers to influence important developments is revealed in studies of policy entrepreneurs (Roberts and King, 1996). This conception of entrepreneurship focuses on people who influence policy, often from outside formal positions, by pressing for innovations in policies and programs. Some develop public support for the innovations, press legislators and administrators for support, and otherwise move the system by taking on a sustained role as a policy champion. Others may play the role of “policy intellectual,” providing innovative ideas. As described earlier, public executives and managers can play such roles, but they sometimes face constraints on their independence to do so. They can also act as catalysts and sponsors by providing support, listening, and responding when policy champions with good ideas press for a hearing.

All these studies of entrepreneurship suggest ways we might reconcile the broad observations about indifferent public management with the evidence that many public managers have hammered out significant change. Marmor and Fellman (1986; see also Marmor, 1987), e.g., offered a typology of public executives that concentrates more directly on the issue of internal program management and program accomplishment, and suggests key distinctions in leaders' motivation and objectives. They argued that public executives vary in managerial skills and commitment to program goals. Among those with low managerial skills are the *administrative survivors*, who also have low commitment to program goals and provide little effective leadership. *Program zealots* have high programmatic commitments but weak skills and also tend to be unsuccessful administrators. As for those with high managerial skills, *generalist managers* show low commitment to program goals. *Program loyalists*, highly skilled managers with strong programmatic commitments, serve as the most likely candidates for having entrepreneurial impact. Whether or not it is valid and complete, such a typology makes the important point, which should be obvious, that executives and managers in government vary widely in their motivations, energies, skills, and orientations. Such variations explain the success of some and the mediocrity of others, and should constantly remind us of the dangers of overgeneralizing about any category of human being.

More recently, the last two decades have witnessed a dramatic growth in empirical research on public sector leadership. Most studies have focused on various leadership approaches and styles, many of which were described earlier in this chapter, pointing to the influence leaders have on public organizations. Research has shown that change-oriented behavior in public organizations increases performance and job satisfaction (Fernandez, 2008), fosters entrepreneurship (Demircioglu and Chowdhury, 2020), and increases commitment to change (Van der Voet, 2016). Fernandez, Cho, and Perry (2010) found that an integrated approach to leadership that combines five leadership styles – task-oriented leadership, relations-oriented leadership, change-oriented leadership, diversity-oriented leadership, and integrity-oriented leadership – improved performance of public organizations. Miao, Newman, Schwarz, and Xu (2014) explored servant leadership in public organizations and found that it increases affective and normative commitment by building trust between leaders and followers. Studies of ethical leaders in government reveal they promote ethical values (Sami, Jusoh, and Qureshi, 2016) and increase organizational commitment and job satisfaction by psychologically empowering employees (Qing, Asif, Hussain, and Jameel, 2019). An analysis of paradoxical leadership, an approach to leadership that enables followers to balance competing demands in the workplace, shows it can promote resilience among public sector employees (Franken, Plimmer, and Malinen, 2020).

Transformational leadership has garnered the most attention among researchers interested in leadership in the public sector. Some experts have wondered whether the myriad constraints imposed on public managers make it difficult for transformational leaders to emerge. Wright and Pandey (2010), however, found relatively high levels of transformational leadership in public organizations despite the presence of higher levels of red tape and other features of bureaucracy. A related study by Wright, Moynihan, and Pandey (2012) suggests that transformational leaders can improve public sector performance by raising public service motivation, clarifying goals, and making the mission and purpose of public organizations more attractive to followers. Belle (2014) found more direct evidence indicating that transformational leadership positively influences performance among public employees with high public service motivation. Caillier (2014) found that transformational leadership in the public sector improves the performance of followers, especially those with a strong attraction to the organization's goals and mission. Other studies reveal that transformational leadership in government promoted positive work attitudes toward work, including job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and turnover intention (Voon, Lo, Ngui, and Ayob, 2011; Kim 2014; Yang, Wu, Chang, and Chien, 2011; Gyensare, Kumedzro, Sanda, and Boso, 2017). Campbell's (2018) study suggests that transformational leaders are more adept at fostering collaboration among public employees. Finally, Van der Voet, Kuipers, and Groeneveld (2016) found that transformational leaders are effective at getting followers to commit to organizational change.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Eleven

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Studies: The Case of the Vanishing Volunteers; A Funeral in the Public Service Center; The Case of Joe the Jerk (or the Very Capable Jerk)

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CHAPTER TWELVE
TEAMWORK: UNDERSTANDING COMMUNICATION AND CONFLICT IN GROUPS

When the US Internal Revenue Service went through the major transformation described at the beginning of Chapter Eight, it appointed twenty-four design teams to plan the new structures and processes the organization would need. Employees from all levels and many different locations came together to work in these teams, and they had to communicate effectively and confront and resolve conflicts. To emphasize the importance attached to these teams, the commissioner and the deputy commissioner of the IRS met with each of the teams in intensive sessions. The commissioner became virtually legendary within the organization for the attentiveness with which he prepared for the meetings by doing all the reading, listened in the meetings, and responded to each meeting with a “whitepaper” that provided a written reaction to the information communicated in the meeting. Meanwhile, the commissioner also continued to communicate with the people in the IRS about the changes that were going on, through videotaped talks, the organizational newsletter, and other channels. The next chapter describes how the Social Security Administration reorganized its public service centers into groups of about forty people in “modules” that would handle the processing of an individual client's claim. In effect, these modules were work teams. The National Organizations Survey is apparently the only survey of a probability sample of organizations – that is, a representative sample of organizations – ever conducted in the United States. In that survey, respondents who worked for government reported more often that their organization employed teams and teamwork than did the respondents from the private sector. This evidence indicates that teams are more frequently used in government than in the private sector. For public sector leaders and managers, skills in building and leading teams are essential.

Jack Medlin provides an additional example of the roles of teams in government (Simpson, 2011). Medlin is a geologist with the US Geological Survey, a federal agency. Medlin and a colleague received the highest award that the Afghan government confers upon civilians. They received the award for leading teams of US geologists in discovering valuable mineral resources and petroleum resources in Afghanistan, and in establishing systems for detecting potential earthquakes. The American geologists' motivation was to provide the Afghans with information about their geological resources that they could use to develop their nations' wealth and industry and to save lives. Medlin and teams of geologists faced significant danger because of Taliban fighters who would target any activities of the United States. The geological teams requested that the US military forces allow them twenty-four hours to analyze the geological resources in areas where airborne detection procedures indicated petroleum and mineral deposits. The military leaders told them that the situation was so dangerous that the teams of geologists could spend only one hour at each site they needed to analyze. A helicopter would land at the site. A platoon of marines would dismount from the helicopter and form a protective perimeter around the site. Then a helicopter would bring in the geological team. Each member of the team had practiced the role that each one needed to play in order to gather maximal information within one hour. As they worked, aircraft circled overhead to provide protection. Ultimately, the teams identified very valuable petroleum and mineral resources at the sites, and the Afghan government contracted with corporations from other nations to develop those resources. These contracts will provide revenues for the government of Afghanistan. The final outcome of these processes remains to be seen. Whatever the outcome, the US geologists went into harm's way to do what they considered a duty and a benefit to the people of another nation, as did the military personnel who led the teams. Teams of government workers risked their lives for what they hoped would benefit the people of another nation, and that would benefit humankind.

The examples of teams are hardly original. Human group processes and behaviors served as one of the founding topics in the social and administrative sciences. Teams, committees, task forces, work units, and other groupings make up the structure and activity of organizations. As the IRS and SSA examples illustrate, many organizational change and improvement efforts involve group processes, such as quality circles, or organizational development interventions, such as team-building exercises or problem-solving groups. Social scientists have studied groups for so many years that the research has discovered more and more complexities. Yet group processes have never lost their significance for managers. A recent trend toward *team-based organization* and *team-based management* has swept through many organizations, including public agencies (Katzenbach and Smith, 2001; Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman, 1995). The literature and practical applications of *high-performance work systems* and *high-performance organizations* in business firms now heavily emphasize the use of teams and the importance of constant communication (Mathieu et al. 2017; Park et al., 2020; Lawler, 2003; Lawler, Mohrman, and Benson, 2001).

Organizational communications and conflict do not occur only within and between groups. As suggested in Chapter Five, in the discussion of managing relations with the media, public managers' communication responsibilities involve managing a complex range of channels and targets (Garnett, 1992; Graber, 2003). Yet much of the research on groups came about because people realized that groups influence communication and conflict among their members and between themselves and other groups. In addition, communication and conflict often intertwine. Conflict may cause or result from bad communication, and the way out of conflict usually emphasizes effective communication. This chapter concentrates on certain fundamental points that figure importantly in understanding conflict and communication and covers the application of these topics to public organizations.

Groups in Organizations

Although groups often place strong pressures on their members to conform with others in their group, they also represent arenas for sharing and communicating (Bradley and Oliviera, 2019). They affect the way we view ourselves and others and the way we behave toward people. They influence our attitudes, including acceptance or rejection of new ideas. Chapter Two describes some of the classic research on groups – by Lewin, the Hawthorne researchers, Coch and French, and others – and how group processes have been a central topic in organizational development over the years. Researchers have developed a number of important and lasting insights about groups. They have shown how groups can influence work habits and productivity, and they have shed light on the attitudes that group members maintain and how changes in those attitudes affect their behaviors. They have found that cohesion and commitment in groups can enforce attitudes and norms within the group and increase or decrease group performance and productivity, depending on the direction of group consensus. Group participation in decision making can enhance the quality of decisions and acceptance of change within an organization. Yet very cohesive groups can also clash with other groups. Developing effective groups, then, involves taking advantage of their potential without falling prey to their pitfalls. The literature now contains abundant guidance for the design and operation of groups and teams (Hackman, 2002; Harris, 2002; Katzenbach and Smith, 2001; Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman, 1995; Zander, 1994), so the discussion here concentrates on basic topics about the nature of groups and their advantages and disadvantages.

Group Formation, Norms, and Roles

Groups may form through official appointments by leaders or under official rules or as a result of task imperatives such as the need for certain specializations. Some groups form entirely voluntarily, and even in formally established groups, members may decide how much to cooperate or engage in conflict. Groups vary in their attraction for members and in their influence over them. Members move into roles that may correspond little to those that are formally designated.

Earlier chapters discussed some of the reasons for these variations, including French's and Raven's typology of power (1968): reward power, coercive power, expert power, referent power, and legitimate power. French and Raven were group theorists and intended their typology for analyses of why groups vary in their power to wield influence as a group, their attractiveness to their members, and their power over their members. Psychologists interested in social comparison processes have pointed out that people often lack clear information about how they are doing and what they should do and thus draw on others as referents for their own behavior. Also, groups gain power and attractiveness as referents partly by dint of their other bases of power, such as their control of rewards and their expert knowledge. As groups form, group norms and values develop. These group norms can induce conformity to certain behaviors and beliefs. Researchers have also analyzed the elaboration of various roles in groups, especially the psychological and social roles that may not follow formal assignments. Leadership obviously figures very importantly, and much of the work reviewed in Chapter Eleven, such as Fiedler's theory, pertains to group leadership. Although leadership in groups obviously may follow from formal assignments and rank, informal leaders often emerge. Researchers who have studied the development of leadership in newly formed groups report such findings as the importance of participation: those who participate most actively often become the leaders in the eyes of other members. Researchers have also discovered, however, that although long-winded, assertive types sometimes come to be regarded as leaders early on, groups later turn to less outspoken, more competent persons. In fact, multiple roles can emerge, with one or several people taking the lead in social and emotional matters, such as maintaining morale and harmony, and another person pressing for effective group structure and task accomplishment.

Group Contexts, Structures, and Outcomes

Researchers have worked on the implications of variations in group settings and characteristics to try to understand the effects of such contingencies as group size, tasks, communications, and team management (Pak and Kim, 2018). Groups often have advantages over individuals (and larger groups over smaller groups) because of the availability of more talents and ideas. Groups often outperform individuals at decision-making and problem-solving tasks. Yet larger groups can often suffer problems related to unwieldiness and diffusion of responsibility. Research has also indicated that social relations tend to become more formal in larger groups and that their members tend to tolerate more impersonal, task-oriented behaviors by leaders.

Researchers have also examined variations in group tasks, such as variations between individual and collaborative tasks and structured and unstructured tasks. Researchers have found evidence of the social facilitation of individual tasks, whereby the mere presence of another person enhances performance on tasks. For more collaborative or group tasks, researchers and theorists have developed concepts about, and relationships among group size and task characteristics. For example, groups with more complex and variable tasks need to have more flexible, interactive processes.

The structure and composition of groups also influence their processes. Highly diverse groups, whose members have different backgrounds and goals, face challenges in establishing smooth working relations, as discussed in Chapter Ten's coverage of the topic of workforce diversity. Examples include groups with an appointed member from each department in an organization or from each of a set of interest groups (such as a community advisory group for a government agency) and groups formed to carry out negotiations between labor and management. The communication structure imposed on a group can also determine many important outcomes. For example, Leavitt (1951) conducted research on communication networks in groups by comparing communication processes and outcomes in groups required to communicate in different patterns. In one pattern, the circle, members communicated with only two members (those adjacent to them), so information had to move around the group in a circle. In a chain pattern, members were arranged in a line, along which communication had to flow back and forth. In a wheel pattern, all communication had to flow through one member occupying the central hub position. Other patterns included a fully interconnected group with all members able to communicate directly with all the others. The patterns determined numerous outcomes for the groups. The wheel produced the fastest transmission of information and good accuracy but low overall satisfaction, except for the person in the middle, who had a great time, usually emerging as the leader of a centralized process. The chain and circle produced slower communication, with less accuracy; nobody liked the chain very much, but members expressed high satisfaction with the circle. In both the circle and the completely interconnected group, communication was often slow, but everyone got the word more effectively than with the other forms, and members felt higher satisfaction. The research thus dramatizes a trade-off faced by managers and groups that is also suggested by contingency theory. Many of the human-relations-oriented models prescribe participation, and these experiments demonstrate that when people more actively participate, they understand more and feel better about the process. Yet the research also shows that such processes often move slowly, and a more centralized structure has some advantages in speed, accuracy, and leadership impact. Managers and groups have to choose the most important outcome.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Groups

Research and experience have made it clear that groups can serve as media for good or bad outcomes, depending on many factors (Sunstein, 2009). Managers must consider when and how groups can operate with the most value. Maier (1967) provided a list of pros and cons of using groups for problem solving, to which people often refer. Groups can bring in more knowledge, information, approaches, and alternatives than individuals. The participation of more people in group settings increases organization members' understanding and acceptance of decisions; members have a better idea of what the group decided and why, and they can carry this information back to people in the other units or groups to which they belong. But the social pressures in groups can bolster majority opinions regardless of their quality. Aggressive individuals or subgroups may stifle more capable members. As indicated by research described earlier, groups may press for conformity and move toward solutions too rapidly by stifling dissent. Some members may concentrate simply on winning, from their own or their unit's point of view.

Maier also pointed out that other factors can be good or bad, depending on the skill of the leader. Effective leaders can manage conflict and disagreement constructively and turn the relative slowness of group decision making to advantage, achieving good outcomes such as conflict resolution. Groups may also make risky decisions. While exerting pressures for conformity, they can paradoxically create a dispersion of responsibility, whereby individuals shirk responsibility for the group's actions or take social cues from others in the group that lead them to mistakenly underestimate the significance of a problem. Individuals may outperform groups when creativity and efficiency are paramount, acceptance of the decision is less crucial, the most qualified person is easy to identify, individuals are very unlikely to cooperate, or little time is available (Gordon, 2002).

Importantly, small group researchers have sought to understand what makes work teams effective. Work teams are a particular type of small group deliberately assembled by managers to create synergy and perform at very high levels. Types of work teams in organizations include cross-functional teams, problem-solving teams, project teams, and virtual teams. Research suggests that work teams can outperform individuals and make higher-quality decisions (Guzzo and Dickson, 1996; Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006). Various aspects of work teams are related to team effectiveness. Robbins and Judge (2018) reviewed the literature and summarized a set of factors pertaining to the context and composition of teams and team processes that contribute to high levels of team effectiveness. These are summarized in Table 12.1.

Groupthink

Irving Janis's work on groupthink (1971) reflected many of the elements of this body of research that have particular significance for managers, especially managers and leaders in government ('t Hart, 1990). Janis said he discovered groupthink not just in many organizational decision-making processes but also in immensely significant decisions, such as major strategic decisions by firms, and public policy decisions such as the bombing of North Vietnam during the Johnson administration and John Kennedy's decision to carry out the Bay of Pigs invasion. Janis argued that groups under the stress of making major decisions often exhibit the symptoms of groupthink. They need consensus and commitment to the course of action they choose, and the pressure for conformity leads members to see the group as invulnerable to opponents. They develop rationales to explain away or avoid serious consideration of apparent problems and threats. They see themselves as morally right and stereotype their opponents as incapable or immoral. Members place pressure for agreement on members who dissent by urging them to agree and support the group and its leader. Members sometimes adopt the role of “mind guards” by withholding information that might shake the group consensus, engaging in self-censorship, and stifling their own impulse to disagree.

TABLE 12.1 FACTORS RELATED TO EFFECTIVE WORK TEAMS

Source: Robbins and Judge (2018).

Context

- Organization should provide support for team (e.g., time, staff, information, and encouragement).
- Leadership within the team and formal structure (e.g., division of labor and coordination).
- Interpersonal trust to facilitate commitment, communication, cooperation, and innovation.
- Evaluate contributions and performance of individual team members as well as the effectiveness of the team itself.

Team Composition

- Team members should possess a variety of technical, problem-solving, and decision-making skills.
- Team members should possess the personal traits of conscientiousness, openness to experience, and agreeableness.
- Allocate roles among team members so that at least one person is responsible for coordination, innovation, promotion, evaluation, organization, production, control, conflict resolution, providing advice.
- Ensure demographic diversity among team members, especially in terms of highly task-relevant characteristics (e.g., skills, occupation, and experience).
- Use the smallest number of members who can get the job done, preferably between five and nine members.
- Select team members who prefer working in groups.

Team Processes

- Develop a common set of specific goals and strategies.
- Be flexible in pursuit of goals.
- Build confidence and team efficacy among members.
- Team members should develop shared knowledge and beliefs about group goals and tasks.
- Maintain moderate levels of conflict among members, especially conflict related

to how best to perform tasks.
- Hold individual members accountable to minimize social loafing.

Janis described instances of groupthink primarily at high levels of authority, but it can occur in many settings. At the annual meeting of the county commissioners' association of a large state, e.g., when the association's governing council convened, council members expressed outrage over new environmental protection regulations that the state legislature was imposing on the state's counties. Council members fulminated against the regulations, charging that they usurped the counties' rightful authority. Members characterized the state legislators behind the changes as tyrants and empire builders and depicted themselves as noble defenders of their constituents' right to govern themselves. They boldly proclaimed their intention to write a strong letter of protest to the legislators and agency officials (a step likely to prove ineffectual). These members reacted scornfully to suggestions that a more reasonable and moderate discussion of the situation would be more productive, as if those making such suggestions lacked courage. They thus displayed groupthink symptoms, such as stereotyping the opposition, overestimating one's own position, and stifling dissent.

Janis prescribed a number of steps leaders can take to help groups avoid groupthink:

- Encourage members to act as critical evaluators and impartial decision makers.
- Accept criticisms of your own actions.
- Invite outside experts to join the discussion.
- Require members to discuss the matter with others outside the group.
- Assign two or more groups to work on the problem separately.
- Assign a member to play devil's advocate.
- Break the group into two subgroups at key points.
- Set aside time to review threats to the group's decision and any possible weaknesses in it.
- At major decision points, hold “last chance” sessions in which members can air their reservations.

Later in this chapter we will consider additional advice and procedures for managing groups. Before turning to those, however, it is useful to cover some basic ideas about communication and conflict.

Communication in Organizations

Besides communication in and between groups, other forms and channels of communication play crucial roles in organizations. The ideas about power, strategy, structure, and leadership considered earlier are relevant here as well, because communication can occur through organizational rules and structures themselves, through formal written documents, and in one-on-one exchanges with superiors (Graber, 2003; Pandey and Garnett, 2006).

Discussions of organizational communication typically begin with a very general model of the communication process. According to such models, communication begins with the source from which a message originates. A transmitter encodes the message and sends it to a receiver, who decodes it and moves it to a destination. Noise influences the accuracy of the transmission. Other general conceptions depict a person as both a sender of messages, through particular channels, to another person, and a receiver of messages, back through the same or other channels, from that other person. Both people also communicate with other recipients and senders concomitantly. These fairly obvious models show what the research and theory emphasize: the nature of sources, senders, and recipients; the channels along which messages flow; and in particular, the problem of noise or distortion that impedes the accurate transmission of information (Downs, 1988).

Typical discussions also distinguish among horizontal communication, vertical (upward and downward) communication, and external (outward) communication with environmental components. Horizontal communications encounter difficulties as a result of conflict, competition, or other differences between subunits and groups. Vertical communications encounter difficulties as a result of hierarchical filtering and superior–subordinate relationships, including resistance, inattentiveness, misunderstanding, and reticence or withholding of information by lower levels. The distinction between formal and informal communications processes, already familiar by now, receives due notice, as does the research on communication networks described earlier.

Communication Roles

Analysts of organizational communication have drawn on concepts from other areas of the social sciences to distinguish roles in the communication process (Rogers and Argawala-Rogers, 1976). *Gatekeepers* occupy positions in which they can control the flow of information between units and groups. Others around *opinion leaders* look to them for information about the form their own opinions should take. People in *liaison* roles transmit information between two or more units or groups. *Cosmopolites* have many contacts outside the organization and bring a lot of external information into the organization.

Communication Assessments and Audits

Beyond these generalizations, obviously, myriad dimensions of communication receive attention from researchers, as illustrated by the now numerous survey instruments and other procedures for assessing communication in organizations (Downs, 1988). Most of these tools ask individuals for their perceptions and evaluations of the information they receive in their organization and of its communication process. For example, the communications audit questionnaire of the International Communications Association asks about the amount of information the respondent sends and receives on an array of topics: job performance, pay and benefits, relationship of his or her own work to the overall organization, new procedures, organizational problems and policies, and so on. It also asks about the amount of information the respondent needs to send and receive. It asks similar questions about the amount of information sent to and received from various sources, such as top management, middle management, immediate supervisors, coworkers, and the grapevine. Other questions ask about respondents' satisfaction with the information they receive, the organization and extent of their organization's communication processes, how much follow-up on communications they need and receive, and the quality of the organizational and work climate. Other communication assessment procedures track specific messages through the organization and map the dissemination of information. Still others map actual communication networks in organizations, analyzing who communicates with whom and about what.

Communication Problems

Obviously, the main issue in communications is getting it right, so the discussion often turns rapidly to what goes wrong. Table 12.2 provides lists of communication difficulties. The exhibit first presents lists of communication barriers. These lists are typical of the way such problems are identified and expressed in the general management and organizational behavior literature. Then the exhibit presents a list of communication distortions that may occur in public bureaucracies, such as jargon, inflated prose, and the manipulation of information for political or bureaucratic purposes.

Some of the greatest literary and journalistic figures of the past two centuries have poured their talents into ridiculing and decrying these tendencies in government bureaucracies. Some of these critiques have become embodied in academic theories that posit that public bureaucracies and bureaucrats distort and manipulate information more aggressively than their counterparts in business. Before examining these and other theories and evidence about communication in public organizations, it is useful to cover the concept of conflict in organizations, which often intermingles with communication processes.

TABLE 12.2 COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS AND DISTORTIONS

Source: Johnson and Johnson, 1994; Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson, 1987.

Barriers to Effective Communication

- *Lack of feedback:* One-way communication, in which the receiver provides no return of information about whether and with what effect the information came across
- *Noise in communication:* Interference with the message during its transmission, ranging from actual physical noise or distortion to distractions or interference from the presence of others, personal biases, or past experiences
- *Misuse of language:* Excessively vague, inaccurate, inflammatory, emotional, positive, or negative language
- *Listening deficiencies:* Receivers' listening inattentively, passively, or not at all

Barriers to Effective Communication Between Groups

- When two groups define a conflict between them as a win-or-lose conflict
- When one or both groups seek to aggrandize their own power and emphasize only their own goals and needs
- When they use threats
- When they disguise their true positions and actively distort information
- When they seek to exploit or isolate the other group
- When they emphasize only differences and the superiority of their own position

Communication Distortions in Public Bureaus

- *Distorted perceptions:* Inaccurate perceptions of information that result from preconceived ideas or priorities or from striving to maintain self-esteem or cognitive consistency
- *Erroneous translation:* Interpretation of information by receivers in ways not intended by the senders
- *Errors of abstraction and differentiation:* Transmission of excessively abstract or selective information; underemphasis of differences in favor of similarities or excessive polarization of fairly similar positions
- *Lack of congruence:* Ambiguity or inconsistency between elements of a message or between the particular message and other sources of information, such as conflicts between verbal and nonverbal cues or between officially communicated values and policies and other communications indicating that these policies and values do not hold
- *Distrusted source:* Failure to accept an accurate message because of suspicions about bias or lack of credibility of the source
- *Jargon:* Highly specialized professional or technical language that confuses

those outside the specialization (and often those within it); sometimes has value, but, as inflated and pretentious language, may be used by officials to appear knowledgeable or important, to intimidate or impede clients, to distort true intentions, or to evade accountability and scrutiny

- *Manipulating and withholding information:* Senders' actively distorting or withholding information in line with their own interests and related influences that they seek to impose on the receiver

Conflict in Organizations

Conflict has always represented a fundamental challenge for organizations and leaders. Frederick Taylor (1919) said that he pursued the principles of scientific management in part because he wanted to diminish conflicts between workers and managers by providing scientific solutions to the questions they regularly disputed. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), in their seminal study of organizational design processes, found high levels of conflict in very effective organizations and very high investments in managing rather than avoiding conflict. Some of the most recent developments in organizational design, such as matrix designs and ideas about fluid and duplicating structures, intentionally design conflict into organizational structures. Research shows that well-managed conflict often improves decision making in organizations. Research also shows, however, that managers, especially in business organizations, tend to dislike conflict and seek to avoid it, even though such conflict avoidance may lead to less effective decision making (Schwenk, 1990).

In public and nonprofit organizations, one expects and even hopes for intense conflicts, although preferably not destructive ones. As noted earlier, public organizations often embody the unceasing political competition and public policy dilemmas of the nation. Government agencies and their subunits and managers compete for resources, for executive and legislative attention, and over their "turf" (Wilson, 1989). They share responsibilities for programs and policies but often have differing points of view and priorities. New administrations and newly elected and appointed officials enter the picture regularly and rapidly. They claim new mandates, attempt to forget or freeze programs into which people have poured their work lives, or set out to do things differently and better. Ombudsmen, examiners, auditors, oversight agencies, and legislative committees and hearings have a duty to take a sharply questioning and often conflicting view of an agency's operations. Often at issue are the very lives or major living conditions of many people and massive amounts of money, power, and influence. The separation of powers designed into the US government actually calls for conflicting interests and authority as checks against one another. Yates (1985) observed that "Madisonian systems" with built-in contentions and divided authority abound in public and private organizations. Schwenk (1990) found that executives in nonprofit organizations see a positive relationship between conflict in the decision-making process and the quality of the resultant decisions, whereas executives in for-profit organizations regard conflict as damaging to the quality and clarity of decisions. The nonprofit executives, which included executives from government agencies, had to consider the needs of diverse constituents and groups. They found conflict unpleasant, but they regarded it as useful in clarifying the needs and goals of diverse groups.

One must expect conflict, then, and try to make a healthy form of it flow in government and its agencies. Keeping it healthy represents the key challenge. Research on organizations has focused on what types of conflict occur, what brings it about, how it proceeds, and, as this chapter later covers somewhat, how to manage it constructively.

Types of Conflict

Experts on organizational conflict point out that numerous types and forms of conflict occur in organizations. Conflict can exist within a person (as the concepts of role conflict and role ambiguity emphasize), between people, and within and between groups and organizational departments or divisions. Conflict can range horizontally, across levels of an organization. It can occur vertically, between higher and lower levels (the classic example is a dispute between management and labor; another common example is conflict within a geographically dispersed government agency or business firm between the people at headquarters and field or district personnel).

Bases of Conflict

All types of conflict can originate in or be aggravated by organizational or subunit culture, values, goals, structures, tasks and functions, authority and leadership processes, and environmental pressures, as well as by the demographics and individual personalities of organizational or group members. You name it and it can cause a flare-up.

Researchers have provided useful lists of some of the most frequent sources of strife; these can help us sort through some of this complexity. They have cited differences in goals, values, cultures, and priorities, of course. Specialization of work and responsibility in an organization, with emphasis on adherence to the rules and goals of specialized units, virtually ensures conflicts among units. Differences in power, status, rewards, and resources among people and groups can lead to feelings of inequity. When two groups' tasks or decision-making processes overlap, are intensely interdependent, or naturally compete, tensions can develop.

Analysts of conflict have also noted what they call the phases of conflict episodes. Pondy's frequently cited classification (1967), e.g., includes five stages:

1. Latent conflict exists when conditions have set the stage for conflict but it has not

yet simmered to the surface.

2. Perceived conflict begins when the people involved begin to sense that conflict exists, even though they may attempt to downplay or deny it.
3. Felt conflict emerges when individuals begin to feel its effects: tension, anxiety, anger, or practical problems resulting from the conflict.
4. Manifest conflict involves open warfare, figuratively or actually. People or groups try to frustrate, harm, or defeat one another. There are three possible outcomes: one group wins or loses; the conflict continues, with destructive effects; or managers and members effectively channel and manage the conflict toward constructive ends.
5. The conflict aftermath is the stage after the outbreak of conflict when some alternative and its results become evident.

As people and groups respond to the onset of conflict, their responses can take various forms. Thomas (1983) pointed out that people can respond through avoidance (trying to ignore or withdraw from the conflict). They can try accommodation, in which they cooperate and make concessions to the other party's demands or needs. Compromise involves an exchange of concessions and cooperative responses (without one side being more accommodating than the other). Competing involves simply trying to force, outdo, or defeat the other party, without any appreciable accommodation or concern for its goals and needs. Collaborating occurs when two parties work together to meet both parties' needs mutually; it differs from compromise in that the two parties do not simply give up on certain goals and values but rather work to find ways to maximize returns for both.

Yates (1985) also offered useful suggestions for developing strategies and tactics for managing conflict. He described methods of fostering a competitive debate among conflicting parties, using neutral language to avoid escalating hostilities and behaving with civility and mutual respect. He suggested approaches that involve identifying mutual problems and avoiding enmity, and win-or-lose situations. One does this through including all affected parties, providing complete information, and keeping communication channels open. Yates proposed a process of conflict management in which the person seeking to manage the conflict seeks to understand the people involved, to establish a sense of shared mission, and to adopt an incremental approach, focusing on gaining agreement on specific issues.

Conflict Outcomes, Suppression, and Escalation

Experts on conflict have also detailed its outcomes and effects. Excessive conflict can induce stress, frustration, dissatisfaction, high turnover, absenteeism, and poor performance among employees. The preceding discussion of types and modes of conflict shows that suppressed or poorly handled conflict can hurt an organization.

Conflict can feed on itself and escalate, aggravating the barriers to communication described earlier: the use of charged language, bias in sending and receiving information, a tendency to interpret neutral statements from the other party as negative or aggressive, reduction of communication, and formation of we–they, win–lose perceptions of relationships. Severely entrenched, intense conflict can make an organization sick, like a mentally disturbed person who does irrational, self-destructive things.

Sometimes managers have to work with organizations facing severe challenges to effective communication and to deal with people and groups that have many reasons to come into conflict. Researchers and consultants have developed prescriptions for managing and improving group processes, communication, and conflict resolution processes in such organizations. After we look at these, the discussion will return to special considerations about public organizations.

Managing Groups, Communication, and Conflict in Organizations

Earlier chapters covered many topics relevant to managing groups, communication, and conflict. The discussion of leadership in Chapter Eleven described Fiedler's contingency theory, path-goal theory, life-cycle theory, and other approaches to understanding how leaders behave toward the groups they lead. These theories emphasize variations in leadership settings and styles and the need for setting and style to mesh. With attention to such variations, group theorists have developed prescriptions for managing groups. The prescriptions for avoiding groupthink are one example. Leaders also must try to enhance the attractiveness of group membership to increase group harmony, cohesiveness, and motivation (Zander, 1994). The typology of power offered by French and Raven (1968) – reward, coercive, expert, referent, and legitimate power – serves as a guide to some of the types of incentives that leaders can enhance and draw on to make groups effective. That typology implies additional incentives for group membership and motivation – such as prestige, a sense of having an impact or being important, and specialness of membership – that group theorists advise leaders to use. Prominent group theorists have typically argued that, in general, effective work groups require participative leaders who respect the dignity of group members and maintain harmony in groups (Zander, 1994).

This human relations emphasis probably comes from the close connections between group theory and the field of organization development (OD). Chapter Thirteen describes OD and some of the specific group techniques used to improve organizations, such as team building and T-group procedures, and to enhance effectiveness, communication, and conflict resolution in work groups. OD consultants also use a variety of techniques to enhance communication and resolve conflicts between different groups (Gordon, 2002). For example, they might use an organizational mirror procedure, in which other groups in the organization report their views of a particular group or unit to that group so that it can better assess its impact on and relations with others. A confrontation meeting brings two or more warring groups together to analyze and resolve the conflicts between them. Third-party interventions and interpersonal facilitator approaches have a person from outside the groups, and often from outside the organization, come in to help with the conflict-resolution process (Blake and Mouton, 1984).

Most of these techniques involve ways of controlling the expression of hostility and aggression to prevent conflict from escalating. They usually try to provide a systematic way to uncover the nature of the conflict and discover a base for resolving it, through such procedures as image exchanges, in which members of the groups relate their views of the other group; sharing appreciation procedures, which call on group members to express appreciation of good things about the other group; and having the members list their expectations about the outcomes of the process. Management consultants may propose the use of a dialectical inquiry technique for managing and encouraging conflict in strategic decision-making processes. In this technique, the development of a strategic plan is followed by the development of a counterplan that questions the assumptions of the original plan. A devil's advocacy approach involves a critique of the basic assumptions of the strategic plan but does not propose a specific alternative (Schwenk, 1990).

Numerous other group procedures and techniques can be employed in organizations. The success of quality circles in Japan led to their proliferation among organizations in the United States and other countries. A quality circle brings the members of a work group or organizational unit together for special group sessions on how to improve the quality of the unit's work and products. Organizations also typically employ special task forces, venture groups, policy committees, and other group-based approaches that explicitly seek to take advantage of group capacities. Several group decision-making procedures, such as the nominal group technique, brainstorming, and the Delphi technique, can facilitate communication and management of potential conflict within and among groups (Gordon, 2002). In the nominal group technique, each group member makes a list of responses to a focal question or issue like this: What are the organization's most important goals? One by one, each group member reads aloud the first item on his or her list, then the second item, and so on. As the lists are read, the items are recorded and displayed for the group to see. The group then discusses the set of items – goals, in this example – to clarify them, discuss disagreements, and combine similar ones. They then follow any of several possible methods for coming to agreement on the final set of goals. These kinds of group processes now have computer software to support them, and may take place in computer labs or technologically sophisticated conference rooms where the groups can use such technology. The procedure allows each person to contribute and channels conflict into constructive patterns. Brainstorming sessions invite members to suggest all alternatives or possibilities about an issue or problem that they can think of. The group records all suggestions and then evaluates them and works toward a conclusion. In the Delphi technique, a smaller group prepares a questionnaire about a topic, circulates it to a larger group, and then uses the latter's responses to prepare a revised questionnaire. This second questionnaire is circulated along with information about the results of the first questionnaire, and the process is repeated until a consensus develops within the larger group.

In addition, communications experts commonly stress the usefulness of conducting organization-wide communication audits of the sort described earlier. They point to the crucial role of the climate or culture of an organization in fostering or stifling communication and in determining whether and how well people manage conflicts.

Special Considerations for Public Organizations

The preceding review demonstrates that researchers and group facilitation experts have treated these topics as generally applicable across all organizations, with no need for a distinction among public, private, and nonprofit organizations. They state the models and propositions at a high level of generality to make them applicable across groups and organizations. They see that managers in government, business, and nonprofit settings face common challenges in dealing with these dimensions of their work and can apply many of the proposed responses just as well in any of the sectors.

Still, time-honored observations about government organizations claim sharp distinctions between that domain and business firms in matters pertaining to groups, communication, and conflict. In many governmental settings, e.g., an elaborate, diverse configuration of groups and authorities contests over organizational policies and decisions. As noted earlier, inside and outside government organizations, “Madisonian systems” operate (the product of laws that formally establish multiple authorities) or arise as a result of groups and individuals seeking to influence government policies – the pluralistic governmental processes long discussed by political scientists. Interest groups, congressional committees, and elements of the executive branch form alliances with units and individuals inside a particular agency. Consequently, some large government agencies become highly diverse confederations of groups whose relative independence weakens the authority of the politically appointed executives at the top (Seidman and Gilmour, 1986; Warwick, 1975).

Observers also say that the goals of public agencies are multiple, conflicting, and hard to specify, and this adds to the complexity. Often, two government agencies or two bureaus within a particular agency pursue diametrically opposed goals – conserving natural resources versus developing natural resources for recreational uses, or enhancing international trade versus preventing the sale of sensitive technology – or have sharply differing priorities for a program for which they share responsibility.

For these reasons, government often involves a high frequency of power-sharing situations (Bryson and Einsweiller, 1995; Kettl, 1993). Government managers need a high level of tolerance for ambiguity and diversity and must frequently deal with conflicts among diverse groups. Public managers must also deal with a particularly wide array of interests and parties. At the same time, government heavily emphasizes control and accountability, but it does so within a context in which clear performance measures such as profits and sales are not available to aid in assessing accountability and performance. The greater complexity of interests in public organizations aggravates their tendency to emphasize reporting, record keeping, and requests for clearances from higher hierarchical levels. The system has become an elaborate array of “centrifugal and centripetal” forces (Warwick, 1975) and “inevitable bureaucracy” (Lynn, 1981).

All this implies that public management typically involves high information intensity. The tasks that public organizations carry out tend to be service-oriented and information-intensive. Studies of information handling in the public and private sectors have shown that public organizations do in fact involve greater information intensity. Private service organizations such as banks and insurance companies come close to resembling public organizations but actually fall into an intermediate range between industrial firms and public agencies (Bretschneider, 1990).

Tullock (1965) developed a pessimistic theoretical argument about the effects of this governmental context on communication and the flow of information. He argued that the size and complexity of government bureaus create information leakage as lower-level officials communicate up the hierarchy. The officials must summarize the information they report upward and screen the information they receive from lower levels before transmitting it upward. This process deletes much of the information. And in addition, lower levels tend to report the information that is favorable to them and screen out unfavorable information. This leads to distortions in upward communications in public bureaucracies, according to Tullock. He argued that private firms are better able to avoid such problems because their higher-level managers can use such measures as sales and profits to prevent the lower levels from inaccurately reporting information.

Downs (1967) elaborated Tullock's observations into a set of hypotheses. According to Downs, most communication in bureaus is *subformal*. Subformal communication increases with greater interdependence among activities, with uncertainty, and with time pressure, but decreases between subunits in sharp conflict with one another. Newer, fast-growing, changing bureaus have less effective communication networks than do older, more stable ones. Information moving up the hierarchy becomes distorted for the reasons that Tullock described, and successful high-level officials use various strategies to counteract this distortion. They develop informal channels of information outside the bureau and set up overlapping responsibilities inside the bureau to create redundant internal channels. They employ *counterbiasing*, which means they adjust their own reactions to information from lower levels in ways that counter the biases they know the reports contain. For example, they reduce reliance on information about future events or qualitative factors. They seek to develop distortion-proof information systems, especially when precise accuracy and rapid transmission are very important. This characterization of the public sector setting, together with preceding ones, if correct, means that communications in the public sector are more intensive and difficult than in the private sector, with conflicts more likely to occur and more difficult to manage.

Searches performed for this book located few public–private comparative studies explicitly dealing with groups, communication, and conflict. In one, Boyatzis (1982) found that a sample of public managers showed lower levels of skill at managing group processes than private sector managers did. In another, Baum and James (1984) compared 2,300 employees from nine “clearly public” and five “clearly private” organizations on their responses to the International Communications Association communications audit survey questionnaire. On most of the questions, the respondents in the public organizations scored less favorably than did the private sector employees. On almost every item about information received and sent, they felt they received and sent less and needed to send and receive more than the private sector respondents. They also scored lower on each of thirty-two questions about organizational climate (concerning relations with coworkers, supervisors, and subordinates; satisfaction with work, pay, communication, and other factors; and quality of products and services). As with the satisfaction studies discussed in Chapter Ten, the public sector respondents expressed reasonably high satisfaction on many of these items but scored lower than private sector respondents. Baum and James concluded that public managers face greater challenges in establishing effective communications and must work harder at it.

Schwenk (1990) compared the perceptions of forty executives from for-profit (FP) and not-for-profit (NFP) organizations regarding conflict in decision making in their organizations. All the executives found conflict unpleasant, but the FP executives felt that conflict diminished the quality and clarity of decisions, and they found it more unpleasant than the NFP executives. The NFP executives reported a positive association between conflict and the quality and clarity of decisions. In describing their decisions, the FP executives much more frequently mentioned criteria related to financial performance, whereas the NFP managers more often mentioned the needs of constituents and the speed and effectiveness of service delivery.

Schwenk (1990) also analyzed the executives' descriptions of their decisions, using the decision framework developed by Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976) described in Chapter Seven. He found that conflict in the NFP organizations more often occurred in the early phases of the decision-making process (the phases concerned with problem recognition and diagnosis) and that NFP decision-making processes involved more steps and more “recycles,” in which the decision process cycles back to an earlier phase. In the FP decision-making processes, conflict tended to occur later, in the phase involving evaluation and choice of alternatives. The NFP executives apparently regarded conflict as useful in clarifying diverse criteria and the demands of diverse interests and constituencies, particularly in the recognition and diagnosis of problems. Although the sample for the Schwenk study was not large, the findings tend to reflect the organizational context of public organizations described earlier in this and in other chapters. They also tend to concur with other researchers' findings about decision-making processes in public organizations compared to private ones (Hickson and others, 1986; Solomon, 1986).

In sum, much theory and expert observation holds that public organizations face greater complexity and more problems in group relations, communication, and conflict resolution than private organizations. Little direct comparative evidence supports these observations, but the few studies that do provide evidence about them tend to show greater complexity and problems in public organizations. This conclusion should not be overstated, however. Previous chapters, and Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen, show numerous examples of public management involving effective communication. The public sector may face greater challenges precisely because of the nature of government as an arena for complex policymaking decisions and political choices. Public managers may not need knowledge and skills significantly different from those that private sector managers need, but they do need particularly well-developed knowledge and skills in facilitating teamwork, communication, and in conflict management.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Twelve

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Study: Grandtown's New Public Library

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

PART THREE
STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING AND IMPROVING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT

The challenge of changing organizations is one of the most important topics in organizational analysis. A voluminous literature addresses organizational change and innovation, with much of it focused on how to change organizations for the better. As earlier chapters point out, controversy simmers over whether public organizations and their employees resist change. The truth is that researchers and experts often note a paradoxical aspect of change in public organizations. Far from being isolated bastions of resistance to change, they change constantly. This pattern may sometimes impede substantial long-term change, however. In many public organizations, the politically appointed top executives and other political appointees come and go fairly rapidly. Shifts in the political climate cause rapid shifts in program and policy priorities. This can make it hard to sustain implementation of major changes. Nevertheless, we now have an abundance of examples of successful change in public organizations, and this chapter describes some of them.

Relatively Natural Change: Organizational Life Cycles

Members of organizations plan and carry out some changes purposefully. Other changes occur more spontaneously or naturally as organizations pass through phases of development or respond to major shifts in their environment. The two types of change intermingle, as managers and other members respond to shifting circumstances. Research on organizational life cycles (birth, development, and decline), analyzed externally imposed and naturally evolving change processes (Aldrich, Ruef, and Lippman, 2020; Baum and McKelvey, 1999; Cameron, Sutton, and Whetten, 1988; Kimberly, Miles, and Associates, 1980). Much of this work concentrates on business firms but applies to public organizations as well (e.g., Quinn and Cameron, 1983; Van de Ven, 1980). Years ago, Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson (1950) noted that public organizations become distinct by the nature of their birth. An influential set of interests must support the establishment of a public organization as a means of meeting a need that those interests perceive, and they must express that need politically. Public agencies are born of and live by the satisfaction of interests that are sufficiently influential to maintain the agencies' political legitimacy and the resources that come with it.

Later, Downs (1967) suggested a number of more elaborate ways in which public bureaus form. For one of these ways, Max Weber coined the phrase "routinization of charisma," in which people devoted to a charismatic leader press for an organization that pursues the leader's goals. Alternatively, as Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson (1950) pointed out, interested groups press for the formation of a bureau to carry out a function for which they see a need. A new bureau can split off from an existing one, as did the Department of Education from what used to be the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Radin and Hawley, 1988). Also, entrepreneurs may gain enough support to form a new bureau. Admiral Hyman Rickover became a virtual legend by building an almost autonomous program for the development of nuclear propulsion in the nuclear power branch of the navy's Bureau of Ships and the nuclear reactor branch of the Atomic Energy Commission (Lewis, 1987).

The Stages of Organizational Life

Downs also said that bureaus have a three-stage life cycle. The earliest stage involves a struggle for autonomy. "Zealots" and "advocates" dominate young bureaus and struggle to build political support for their bureau's legitimacy and resource requests. Once a bureau has established itself and ensured its survival, it enters a stage of rapid expansion, in which its members emphasize innovation. Ultimately, it enters a deceleration phase, in which the administrators concentrate on elaborating rules and ensuring coordination and accountability. Downs associated this process with what he called the rigidity cycle for bureaus. He said that as bureaus grow older and larger and enter the deceleration stage, the zealots and advocates either depart for more active, promising programs or settle into the role of "conservers." Conservers come to dominate the bureau, and it ossifies. Others have pointed out that over time many bureaus form strong alliances with interest groups and legislators, especially legislators on the committees that oversee them. These allies guard the bureaus' access and influence and stave off many change attempts (Seidman and Gilmour, 1986; Warwick, 1975).

Yet Downs oversimplifies change, or lack thereof, in the bureaucracy. Large, old organizations change markedly, as has been recognized in recent life-cycle models. Quinn and Cameron (1983) developed a framework based on similarities among models that others have proposed. Their framework conceives of four stages of organizational life cycle: the entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization and control, and elaboration stages.

In the entrepreneurial stage, members of the new organization concentrate on marshaling resources and establishing the organization as a viable entity. An entrepreneurial head or group usually plays a strong leading role, pressing for innovation and new opportunities and placing less emphasis on planning and coordination. Quinn and Cameron illustrated this stage by describing a newly created developmental center for the mentally disabled in a state department of mental health (DMH). The energetic center director led a push for new treatment methods that involved deinstitutionalizing clients and developing their self-reliance. The center began to receive expanded support from federal grants, the DMH, and the legislature. In this stage, the center emphasized the open-systems model of organization.

Out of the first stage develops the second, the collectivity stage. In this stage the members of the center developed high cohesion and commitment. They operated in a flexible, team-based mode, exhibiting high levels of effort and zeal for the center's mission. This type of shift represents an expanded emphasis on teamwork, marked by adherence to the human relations model as well as to the open-systems component of the competing values framework described in Chapter Six.

The research on life cycles points out that crises sometimes push organizations into new stages. About six years after the formation of the center, a major newspaper ran articles attacking the DMH for inefficiency, poor treatment of clients, and loose administrative practices. The articles cited critical reports from oversight agencies about inadequacies in such control mechanisms as organizational charts, records, job descriptions, policy manuals, and master plans. The DMH conducted a special investigation and instructed the center director to move toward a more traditional organizational structure and more traditional controls. The director left, and the new director emphasized clear lines of authority, rules, and accountability. Staff commitment fell, and many staff members left. The center had clearly moved into the formalization and control stage. In competing values terms, the rational control model predominated, and the importance of open systems and human relations criteria declined.

The case ended at this point, but the life-cycle framework includes a fourth stage, involving structural elaboration and adaptation. Confronting the problems of extensive control and bureaucracy that develop during the third stage, the organization moves toward a more elaborate structure to allow more decentralization but also corresponding coordination processes. The organization seeks new ways to adapt, to renew itself, and to expand its domain. A large corporation may become more of a conglomerate, multiplying its profit centers, or it may adopt a matrix design (Mintzberg, 1979). It appears to be difficult for public agencies to decentralize in these ways, however (Mintzberg, 1989). They have no sales and profit indicators to use in establishing profit centers, and they face stronger external accountability pressures. Note that in the DMH case the press and the oversight agencies both called for traditional bureaucratic structures – charts, manuals, job descriptions. Some public agencies also reconfigure in later stages, however, as described shortly.

Organizational Decline and Death

Many older, supposedly entrenched organizations face pressure to renew themselves. During the 1970s and 1980s, such pressures rose to particular intensity in the United States. Businesses faced surging international competition and swings in the price of oil and other resources. Government agencies faced tax revolts and skepticism about government. This climate bolstered the Reagan administration's efforts to cut the federal budget, including funding for many agencies and for federal support to state and local governments, many of which also faced state and local initiatives to force tax cuts (Levine, 1980a). In the 1990s, these pressures eased in certain ways because of a strong economy, and research on decline in public agencies slackened. Nevertheless, many factors continued to pressure public organizations in many nations to do more with less. In the United States, a drive to reduce taxes and the federal deficit continued. The Clinton Administration's National Performance Review eliminated 324,580 jobs from the federal workforce, bringing federal employment to its lowest level since 1950. As the new century got under way, the Bush administration issued the President's Management Agenda, which criticized the Clinton administration for making these employment reductions in a poorly planned way that did not take into account strategic human resource needs. At the same time, however, the management agenda announced that competitive sourcing would be one of the primary emphases of the administration. This involved conducting competitive assessments to determine whether government jobs and tasks should be outsourced, or contracted out to private organizations (US Office of Management and Budget, 2002). The administration further announced the objective of considering more than 800,000 federal jobs for outsourcing, and the Department of the Army announced a plan to contract out more than 200,000 jobs. In many other nations, reforms as part of the New Public Management movement often emphasized using more businesslike arrangements in government, including contracting out and privatizing governmental activities. So the challenge of reductions, declines, and cutbacks looms very large for people in government.

Organizational researchers regard such pressures as ongoing processes of decline and demise that most organizations go through (Cameron, Sutton, and Whetten, 1988; Kimberly, Miles, and Associates, 1980). Bankruptcy rates among business firms have always been high, and all organizations, including public ones, tend to have low survival rates (Starbuck and Nystrom, 1981). Organizations may decline at various rates and in various patterns for a number of reasons (Levine, 1980b). They may atrophy, their performance declining due to internal deterioration. They may become rigid, inefficient, and plagued with overstaffing and ineffective structures and communications. As described later, the Social Security Administration (SSA) once became so backlogged in processing client requests that everyone involved agreed that something had to be done. More recently, the IRS undertook a major transformation in response to performance problems and public criticisms (Thompson and Rainey, 2003).

Vulnerability and Loss of Legitimacy. Organizations, especially new ones, can be quite vulnerable to the loss of resources or support from their environment. Shifts in consumer preferences can undercut businesses. Government organizations face an analogous problem when voters resist taxes. This issue is related to another reason for decline, the loss of legitimacy. Private firms, such as tobacco companies, can suffer when the public or public officials question the legitimacy of their products or activities. Legitimacy figures even more crucially for public organizations. Public and oversight authorities often impose stricter criteria on public organizations for honest, legitimate behaviors, as in the example of the HUD scandal described in Chapter Seven.

Environmental Entropy. An organization's environment can simply deteriorate in its capacity to support the organization. Resources may dry up. Political support may wane. Public organizations often lose support because of the waning of the social need they address (Levine, 1980a).

Responses to Decline. Organizations respond to decline with greater or lesser aggressiveness and with more or less acceptance of the need for change (Daft, 2020; Whetten, 1988). Some organizations take a negative, resistant disposition toward the pressures for change. They may aggressively strike a preventive posture or passively react in a defensive mode. They may try to prevent pressures for change by manipulating the environment. Public agencies may try to develop or maintain legislation that rules out competition from other agencies or private providers of similar services. Public employee unions sometimes attack privatization proposals because public employees may find them threatening. Conversely, organizations may adopt a less proactive defense against cuts, citing statistics showing the need for their programs and working to persuade legislators that their programs meet important social needs.

Other organizations take a more receptive approach to the need for change, either by reacting or by generating change and adaptation. Many public agencies react with across-the-board cuts in subunit budgets, layoffs, or other reductions in their workforce. Conversely, organizations can also adapt through flexible, self-designing structures and processes. They may allow lower-level managers and employees to redesign their units when they feel the need (Whetten, 1988).

The pressures for reduced government just described have led to a rich discussion of tactics for responding to funding cutbacks. Table 13.1 summarizes Charles Levine's description of some of those tactics (1980b). Rubin (1985) analyzed the Reagan administration's cutbacks in five federal agencies. She found that the agencies' responses in some ways matched what one would expect from the public administration literature and in some ways differed markedly. The president was fairly successful in achieving cutbacks in the agencies. His strong popular support blunted interest-group opposition to the cuts in the early phases. Still, agencies with interest-group support more effectively resisted the cutbacks. Yet Rubin found no evidence of strong "iron triangles" (tight alliances of agencies, interest groups, and congressional committees, as discussed in Chapter Five) protecting the agencies.

TABLE 13.1 ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE AND CUTBACK MANAGEMENT: TACTICS FOR RESPONDING TO DECLINE AND

FUNDING CUTS

	Tactics to Resist Decline	Tactics to Smooth Decline
External political (problem depletion)	1. Diversify programs, clients, and constituents 2. Improve legislative liaison 3. Educate the public about the agency's mission 4. Mobilize dependent clients 5. Become "captured" by a powerful interest group or legislator 6. Threaten to cut vital or popular programs 7. Cut a viable and widespread service a little to demonstrate client dependence	1. Make peace with competing agencies 2. Cut low-prestige programs 3. Cut programs to politically weak clients 4. Sell and lend expertise to other agencies 5. Share problems with other agencies
External economic/technical (environmental entropy)	1. Find a wider and richer revenue base (e.g., metropolitan reorganization) 2. Develop incentives to prevent disinvestment 3. Seek foundation support 4. Lure new public and private sector investment 5. Adopt user charges for services when	1. Improve targeting on problems 2. Plan with preservative objectives 3. Cut losses by distinguishing between capital investments and sunk costs 4. Yield concessions to taxpayers and employers to retain them

	possible	
Internal political (political vulnerability)	1. Issue symbolic responses, such as forming study commissions and task forces 2. "Circle the wagons" – develop a siege mentality to retain spirit de corps 3. Strengthen expertise	1. Change leadership at each stage in the decline process 2. Reorganize at each stage 3. Cut programs run by weak subunits 4. Shift programs to another agency 5. Get temporary exemptions from personnel and budgetary regulations that limit discretion
Internal economic/technical (organizational entropy)	1. Increase hierarchical control 2. Improve productivity 3. Experiment with less costly service-delivery systems 4. Automate 5. Stockpile and ration resources	1. Renegotiate long-term contracts to regain flexibility 2. Install rational choice techniques 3. Mortgage the future by deferring maintenance and downscaling personnel quality 4. Ask employees to make voluntary sacrifices such as taking early retirement and deferring raises 5. Improve forecasting capacity to anticipate cuts 6. Reassign surplus facilities to other users 7. Sell surplus property, lease back when needed 8. Exploit the exploitable

The agencies were not nearly so self-directed and uncontrollable as critics of government often claim. Agency heads tended to comply with the president's cutback initiatives and usually did not work aggressively to mobilize interest-group support.

Career personnel carried out many of the cuts as part of their responsibility to serve the president. Some of the agencies, particularly central administrative and regulatory agencies, had no strong interest-group support and were more vulnerable to cuts. Golden (2000) analyzed the career civil servants' reactions to policy changes that Reagan appointees sought in four federal agencies and found that the careerists put up little strong resistance. Their tendency to resist and their manner of doing so depended on many factors, such as professional background. Attorneys in one agency argued more with the Reagan appointees, but felt that it was part of their professional responsibility to carry out their duties conscientiously even when they disagreed with the priorities of the Reaganites.

These analyses show that agency responses to decline are more complex and less politically resistant than depicted in the general literature. Agencies do change, and they do not necessarily resist change as forcefully as stereotypes and some theories suggest. Still, politics figures importantly in change and cutback attempts and can severely impede them. Understanding when and how one can effect change becomes the major challenge, to which we return later.

The Ultimate Decline: Organizational Death. A conclusion similar to Rubin's comes from a debate over whether public agencies can “die.” Kaufman (1976) investigated the question of whether government organizations are immortal, in view of the many assertions about their staunch political support and their intransigence against pressures for change, reduction, or elimination. He noted many threats to an agency's survival. They face competition from other agencies, loss of political support, and the constant reorganization movements that keep officials continuously searching for ways to reshape government, especially ways that appear more efficient. Kaufman reviewed statistics on the death rates of federal agencies and concluded that such rates are not negligible. Generally, however, federal agencies have a strong tendency to endure. Of the agencies that existed in 1923, he said, 94% had lineal descendants in 1974.

Later, Starbuck and Nystrom (1981) mounted a fascinating challenge to this conclusion. They pointed out that Kaufman had classified agencies as lineal descendants even if they had changed organizational locations, names, or personnel or had substantially different functions. When agencies merged, he treated the new agency as a descendant of both of the former ones. Starbuck and Nystrom pointed out that studies of death rates of industrial organizations typically treat mergers between corporations as resulting in only one existing organization. When a corporation goes bankrupt and employees start a similar new one, analysts do not count this as a continuation. Difficult issues exist, then, in defining organizational death. Starbuck and Nystrom reanalyzed Kaufman's data, using criteria more akin to those used in studies of industry; they found that government agencies and industrial corporations have similar death and survival rates. A large proportion of both government agencies and business firms do not survive very long. The analysis turns on whether one uses criteria biased toward organizational change or against it.

Peters and Hogwood (1988) also reported finding a great deal of organizational change in the US federal bureaucracy. Their analysis showed, however, what other organization theorists have seen when they have studied public organizations (Meyer, 1979): public organizations may be quite change-resistant and intransigent in some ways, and steering them in new and innovative directions can be a major challenge for society. Yet they do in fact change a great deal, including undergoing the ultimate change of passing out of existence. As described in later sections, they can also revitalize themselves after periods of decline.

Daniels (1997) analyzed the termination of public programs, pointing out that programs do get terminated. Termination, he concluded, is hard to achieve, involves a great deal of political conflict, and presents an American political paradox in that "everyone supports it, and everyone opposes it" (p. 70). Similarly, but with more emphasis on the likelihood of agency termination, Lewis (2002) reported a study of government agency mortality between 1946 and 1997 and concluded that 62% of agencies created since 1946 have been terminated. He also emphasized the major role of political processes, concluding that agencies face the greatest likelihood of mortality when shifts in the political climate bring their critics and opponents into power.

Innovation and Organizations

Another response to pressures on organizations, a response that they need in order to survive, is innovation. Innovations in society and in organizations figure so importantly in social progress that a body of research focused specifically on such processes has developed in the last several decades. Some of it addresses the broad topic of diffusion of innovations in societies and across levels and units of government. Numerous studies have explored such topics as the adoption of birth control methods in overpopulated countries, new agricultural methods in less developed countries, and different ways of providing firefighting, garbage collection, and teaching services in governments across the United States. Some studies have also analyzed general measures of innovativeness in a certain type of organization, such as the number of health-related innovations adopted by county health departments. According to Rogers and Kim (1985), the vast majority of these innovation studies have focused on public organizations or public programs, and their application to business organizations remains open to question. They also pointed out that many of these studies followed what they called the classical diffusion model, which includes the following components: characteristics of the innovation itself (see Table 13.2), communication channels in the social system being studied, time (e.g., rate of adoption of innovations), and members of the social system (the characteristics of its individuals and groups and how those characteristics influence their response to innovation). Students of innovation have also developed process models that emphasize initiation and implementation processes in which people perceive a performance gap and match an innovation to a perceived problem, and then implement the innovation through restructuring and institutionalization. Table 13.2 offers a simplified look at this important topic and all the work on it, but it has potential use for practicing managers as well as researchers thinking about the characteristics of an innovation that can influence its success.

TABLE 13.2 ATTRIBUTES OF INNOVATIONS THAT AFFECT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION

1. Cost – initial and continuing; financial and social
2. Returns on investment
3. Efficiency – improvements in efficiency offered by innovation
4. Risk and uncertainty
5. Communicability – clarity of the innovation and its results
6. Compatibility – similarity to existing product or process
7. Complexity
8. Scientific status
9. Perceived relative advantage – whether potential advantages can be demonstrated
10. Point of origin – from inside or outside the organization; from which person, unit, or institution
11. Terminality – whether the innovation has a specific end point
12. Reversibility and divisibility – whether the innovation can be reversed or divided into steps or components so that the organization can return to the status quo if necessary
13. Commitment – the degree of behavioral and attitudinal commitment required for success
14. Interpersonal relations – how the innovation influences personal relations
15. Public- versus private-good attributes – whether the innovation provides public benefits or restricts benefits to a smaller set of individuals
16. Gatekeepers – how the innovation is related to various influential persons or groups that can block or initiate the innovation
17. Adaptability – whether users can modify and refine the innovation
18. Successive innovations – prospects for leading to additional innovations

Of course, organizational researchers have also studied innovation within organizations. Mone, McKinley, and Barker (1998), e.g., argued for a contingency perspective on the relationship between innovation and organizational decline. They proposed that organizations will respond to decline with more innovation when power is more widely diffused in the organization, and when the organization's mission is not strongly “institutionalized.” Other studies tend to concentrate on private sector organizations, involving variables related to market share and competition, in ways that make their application to many government agencies difficult to interpret (see, e.g., Greve and Taylor, 2000).

Innovation in Public and Nonprofit Organizations

In something of a revolt against the literature and stereotypes that cast government organizations as rigid and change-resistant, a stream of research and discussion about innovative government organizations has burgeoned in the past couple of decades (see, e.g., Behn, 1994; Borins, 1998, 2008; Cohen and Eimicke, 1998; Holzer and Callahan, 1998; Ingraham, Thompson, and Sanders, 1998; Levin and Sanger, 1994; Light, 1998; Linden, 1990, 1994). The studies vary widely from one another and offer complex conclusions, making it difficult to summarize them without producing a blurring array of lists of their conclusions. The following examples, nevertheless, offer a picture of some of these contributions.

Linden (1990), on the basis of a set of case observations, drew conclusions about how an innovative manager can make an organization more effective. Innovative managers, he found, share seven characteristics: taking strategic action, holding on and letting go, creating a felt need for change, starting with concrete change, using structural changes, dealing with risk, and using political skills. Innovation involves both rational and intuitive thinking, and successful innovation is a function of many small starts and pilots. Successful innovation also tends to involve the use of multifunction teams and occurs when leaders and sponsors provide time, freedom, flexibility, and access to resources, and when they offer autonomy and support for committed champions while preventing an emphasis on “turf” protection. Linden (1994) later described a set of cases of successful process reengineering initiatives in government organizations, which involved moving away from organizing around functional groupings and toward being “seamless.”

Borins (1998) conducted an elaborate analysis of 217 state and local government programs that had won awards in the Ford Foundation and Kennedy School of Government's Innovations in American Government Awards program. Borins found an array of factors that tended to characterize the programs that had made award-winning innovations. The successful innovations, he concluded, occurred when there was systematic thinking and planning for change, when the programs delivered multiple services, and when they were partnered with other organizations. Effective innovation also tended to occur when the programs applied new technology;

undertook process improvements and organizational redesign; and emphasized empowerment, incentives instead of regulation, prevention instead of remediation, use of the private sector, voluntarism, and internal competition. As for when and why successful innovation takes place, Borins's analysis indicated three main paths: politicians responding to crises, newly appointed agency heads restructuring organizations, and midlevel and front-line workers responding to internal problems and taking advantage of opportunities. Interestingly, Borins found that about half of the persons who initiated the award-winning innovations were career civil servants below the agency-head level.

Light (1998) conducted a questionnaire and case analysis of 26 public and nonprofit organizations in Minnesota, which he identified as innovative, to determine how and why they were innovative. He chose the organizations because of their diversity in mission, size, age, and other factors. He discussed the need to release creativity in organizations by lowering or removing internal and external barriers and debunking myths. He concluded from his observations that innovative organizations must work with and manipulate four factors that make up the organizational "ecosystem" on which long-term, sustained innovation depends: the external environment, the internal structure, leadership, and internal management systems. For each of these components he suggested a lengthy list of "preferred states" most conducive to innovation. For example, concerning the external environment, the organization should "center on mission," "embrace volatility," "lower barriers to external collaboration by working with stakeholders and clients," and "harvest external support." Concerning internal structure, the organization should "stay thin" by avoiding too many layers, pushing authority downward and democratizing to maximize participation, encouraging collaboration, and providing resources to support innovation and innovative thinking. Leadership should, among other emphases, issue a call for ideas, give permission to fail, communicate to excess, and keep faith and inspiration alive. Preferred states for management systems include downplaying pay, measuring performance, celebrating success, and constantly listening and learning. Light found that relatively small nonprofit organizations tend to be the organizations most likely to sustain innovations and innovativeness. He saw no single path to innovation and observed that organizations show different mixtures of states. He concluded that core values, such as honesty, trust, rigor, and faith, play a strong role in this process.

Learning, Improvisation, and Resilience

Earlier chapters emphasized the influence of environments on organizations, thereby making organizations' success and even survival depend on their ability to change, innovate, and adapt to external changes. Major changes and upheaval obviously pressure organizations to display even greater capacities for adaptation. As this book moves toward publication, the international efforts to confront the COVID-19 pandemic illustrate these points in a dreadfully dramatic way. National governments and their subgovernments had to balance decisions about curtailing social and economic activity to prevent the spread of the dangerous, deadly virus against the economic and social damage from restricting activity. Organizations of all types faced wrenching upheavals from both sides of this balance and struggled to adapt. In recent decades organizational analysts have developed ideas related to those abilities to adapt, about organizational learning, improvisation, and resilience. These concepts need at least brief introduction here.

Chapters Two and Six mentioned organizational learning as one of the topics that received emphasis in the wake of contributions such as *The Behavioral Theory of the Firm*. In recent decades, multiple new paths have been taken. Scholars now distinguish among the concepts of organizational learning, improvisation, and innovation.

Organizational Learning involves a systematic change in behavior or knowledge informed by experience (e.g., Levitt and March, 1988; Cyert and March, 1992). Analysts have developed behavioral models of learning that emphasize changes in the mix of organizational routines and action patterns. Others have advanced cognitive models of learning that emphasize alterations in ideas, causal models, and cognition. These approaches distinguish between organizational learning and long-term organizational change (Argote, 1999).

Improvisation involves "the deliberate fusion of the design and execution of a novel production" (by individuals, teams, or organization) (Cunha et al., 2017, p. 560; Miner et al., 2001, p. 314). Improvisation includes both spontaneity and planning. Some portion of the action occurs spontaneously during execution of a novel action, and some part of the activity may have been planned in advance (Weick, 1998; Crossan and Sorrnti, 1997; Cunha et al., 1999). Preexisting routines or interpretive frameworks can serve as referents for improvisation (Feldman, 2000). Improvisation is a special type of real-time learning and a special case of innovation (Miner et al., 2001). For example, as part of a strategic action plan, an organization offers a set of services to customers. To offer the services and to explain them, employees use guidelines or scripts developed by a planning committee. A pandemic forces the organization to change their services and practices for developing them (such as by increased working from home). During the COVID-19 pandemic, manufacturing firms shifted from other products to materials and equipment needed to protect healthcare providers. Other organizations added services in testing for the virus and later in providing vaccinations. Many hospitals faced overcrowding and stress and overworking of their personnel. News media and other information sources reported numerous ways in which people in organizations improvised modified versions of their services and their scripts that guided delivery of the new versions. These new behaviors and procedures can be short-term or long-term and may involve different levels of the organizations. Observers of such processes in the federal government began to discuss whether work-from-home alternatives would continue after the pandemic passed because of learning processes that identified benefits of the new arrangements.

While such improvisation resembles innovation, those developing the two topics distinguish between them. Innovation can start with existing knowledge or practices but requires a significant deviation from them (Van de Ven and Polley, 1992). Innovation is broader than improvisation. Innovation is necessary for improvisation to occur but not all innovation is improvisation (Van de Ven and Polley, 1992; Miner et al., 2001).

Resilience refers to the ability and determination to contend with adversity, drastic change, and novel risks. The global pandemic, the economic downturn, and the sudden work-from-home requirements brought changes far more drastic than most organizations and the people in them commonly experience. Novel risks outside our experience and often outside our imagination can materialize and wreak sudden havoc on organizations, thus raising the importance of resilience to contend with them (Kaplan et al., 2020).

Researchers observe that resilience can be learned and developed (see Chapter Ten). People in organizations can develop routines, rules, and the ability to improvise so that their organizations can cope and survive drastic upheavals (Suarez and Montes, 2020, p. 47). Suarez and Montes (2019, 2020) argue that managers can build resilience by actively training employees to alter methods of decision making. Routines, heuristics, and improvisation can be altered to confront unexpected scenarios (2020, p. 51).

Routines, heuristics, and improvisation offer three decision tools. Suarez and Montes (2020) prescribe techniques for building organizational resilience by understanding how the organization currently uses these tools and how they can be adapted to new situations. They suggest the following approaches:

- Understand the assumptions underlying every routine and process already in use and consider how the organization would operate if those assumptions did not hold. For example, some actions may require authorization from high-level management. Determine an alternative process that could occur if that authorization was not available.
- Develop an understanding about how each unit or department fits into the whole of the organization. Develop ideas for what might be done if one or more units are suddenly missing.
- Practice doing more with less. Most crises involve resource scarcity. Brainstorm about how the organization would respond if resources suddenly became unavailable.
- Identify the organization's priorities. Determine the most pressing concerns or

activities that are essential for the organization's survival if there is sudden turmoil. Imagine different crisis scenarios and how the organization could adjust.

Large-Scale Planned Change

Besides facilitating innovations, organizations also undergo major, large-scale transformations and planned processes of development, such as the transformation of the Internal Revenue Service mentioned at several points earlier. A vast literature presents many different perspectives, models, and research issues about major organizational change (e.g., Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999; Burke, 2010; Kuipers, Higgs, Kickert, Tummers, Grandia, and Van der Voet, 2014; Pettigrew, Woodman, and Cameron, 2001; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Rather than covering this range of material, the discussion here concentrates on certain key issues, such as resistance to change and types of change, followed by perspectives on the leadership and management of change and development, including organization development, some analyses of successful leadership of change, and examples of successful and unsuccessful change leadership in public organizations.

Resistance to Change

From the beginning, management and organization theorists have recognized the problem of resistance to change in organizations. Many authors have argued that traditional bureaucratic forms of organization inhibit change. They assign people to positions and departments on the basis of rules and job descriptions, require people to adhere to them, and reward them for doing so. This aggravates the normal human tendency to resist change for all the reasons implied by analysis of the characteristics of innovations (Table 13.1): change can be costly, troublesome, threatening, and difficult to understand and accomplish.

Human resistance to change can be a destructive, dangerous tendency, but managers and researchers often appear to forget that people have good reasons to resist change. A new manager may enter an organization with a desire to have an impact and not simply to serve as a caretaker. Employees sometimes throw objections and obstacles in the way of the new manager's proposals. Quite often, the new manager expresses frustration with longtime employees' commitment to the status quo.

Certainly, the new manager may have good reason to complain, but he or she may also cripple effective change by too readily assuming that resistance means laziness, selfishness, or stupidity. People may have well-justified reasons to resist. Some ideas are simply bad ideas, and the people with the most experience realize it. The *New Yorker* magazine once ran a cartoon in which two employees of a fast-food restaurant watched a family stop in their car at the drive-through window of the restaurant. The family members were leaning out of the car with tongs in hand, struggling to serve themselves out of a large salad bowl perched on the windowsill of the drive-through window. Cherry tomatoes bounced like Ping-Pong balls on the pavement. Lettuce floated in the wind. One employee was saying to the other, “Well, it looks as if the drive-through salad bar is an idea whose time has not yet come.” Some ideas are bad ideas. They deserve to be resisted.

Unsuccessful ideas abound in government and industry. As one prominent example, Lyndon Johnson directed that the planning and program budgeting system (PPBS) be adopted in all federal agencies. Within a few years the directive was withdrawn. Many elected officials and politically appointed executives at all levels of government initiate new programs, reforms, or legislation but show a disinclination to become too deeply involved in implementing them. They often feel that their duty involves setting policy and directing the bureaucracy rather than closely following its management. Many of them do not stay very long in their positions. Their mandate is often far from clear, no matter how much they claim that it is. This can deprive the change process of essential support and leadership.

The point is not to defend the prerogative of the public bureaucracy to resist change but rather to emphasize a dilemma about organizational change in government. As described later, successful organizational change usually requires sustained support from leaders, participative planning, and flexible implementation. Government managers achieve these conditions more often than many people suppose, but much of the literature nevertheless suggests their scarcity in the public sector. What we learn from the management literature on change makes the point that, in the example just provided, the reason for the failure of PPBS was not necessarily that it was a bad idea. It was a well-intentioned innovation advocated by many experts on public administration. Good ideas are not simply born, however; they are developed and nurtured through appropriate change processes. Too negative a view of resistance to new initiatives and ideas can cloud the message that people may have reasonable objections that can make a dubious idea into a better one. The challenge for public managers is to find ways to overcome obstacles to such participation and flexibility amid the political complexities and accountability pressures in government.

Types of Change

Many types, levels, and degrees of change complicate the discussion of the change process. Researchers have not thoroughly incorporated these variations into their models; instead they have moved to highly general frameworks that broadly cover many types of change. Still, the variations bear noting and have implications that are taken up in later sections.

Daft (2020) points out that organizations undergo at least four types of change:

- Technology changes occur in production processes and equipment, as in the installation of computerized client information systems or word processing systems.

- Administrative changes include new performance-appraisal systems, such as the Performance Management and Recognition System for all middle managers in the federal civil service; pay-for-performance systems, such as those that state and local agencies have tried to implement; and affirmative action programs.
- Changes in products and services abound in all types of organizations. As described later, the SSA has struggled for the past several decades with steady increases in the number and nature of Social Security services mandated by Congress.
- Human resource changes occur as a result of training, development, and recruitment efforts aimed at improving leadership and human relations practices or upgrading employee skills.

While each of these different domains may undergo limited change relatively independently, they frequently intertwine. In fact, for major changes, the challenge is to coordinate them. Tichy (1983) argued that most approaches to organizational change have concentrated on one of three primary dimensions: the political, technical, or cultural aspects of change. Strategic change, as Tichy called it, involves moving beyond these more fragmented approaches and coordinating these three dimensions to effect large-scale transformations in an organization's relationship to its environment.

There are a variety of strategies and tactics for leading and managing these different types and degrees of change (Daft, 2020). Before covering frameworks and suggestions about leading major change processes, it is useful to explore the topic of organization development, a well-established subfield of organization theory that concentrates on changing the human relations aspects of organizations for the better.

Organization Development

By applying social scientific theory and techniques, writers and practitioners in organization development (OD) work to improve the functioning of organizations, especially along the lines of human relations and social dimensions. OD consultants or “change agents” work with people in organizations to improve communication, problem solving, renewal and change, conflict airing and resolution, decision making, and trust and openness. They often go into organizations to help them diagnose and overcome problems they have in these areas. Ideally, they seek to leave the organization better able to manage such processes effectively. A mountain of books, articles, and professional journals, as well as a number of professional associations, deliberate about OD, and large corporations and government agencies sometimes have OD offices or bureaus that minister to the other parts of the organization.

As this description suggests, OD has firm roots in the human relations orientation in organization studies and in the group dynamics movement. It also draws on various elements of social science and organizational behavior, such as theories of motivation, leadership, systems, and techniques such as survey research. OD theory and practice vary widely but tend to have common basic values and assumptions about organizations and the people in them. French and Bell (1999) pointed out that OD involves common assumptions about people, groups, and organizations:

- People have a drive to grow and develop, especially if they are provided with an encouraging environment. They want to make a greater contribution to their organization than most organizational settings permit.
- For most people, the work group is a very important factor. People value acceptance and cooperation in work groups. Leaders cannot provide for all leadership needs, so members of groups must assist one another.
- Suppressed feelings are detrimental to satisfaction, trust, and cooperation. Most groups and organizations induce suppressed feelings more than they should. Solutions to most problems in groups must be transactional, involving changes in people's relationships.
- The leadership style and culture at higher levels tend to pervade the organization, shaping levels of trust and teamwork throughout.
- Win-lose conflict management strategies usually do harm in the long run.
- Collaborative effort has value. The welfare of all members of the system is important and should be valued by those who are most powerful in the system.

OD practitioners tend to value personal growth and a more rich, meaningful, enjoyable, and effective life for people in organizations, especially through allowing peoples' feelings and sentiments to have a legitimate value. They also value commitment to both action and research, and also democratization and power equalization in organizations. One can begin to guess some of the controversies that these assumptions and values engender among management experts. Before looking at them, however, it is useful to consider how OD interventions in organizations tend to proceed.

OD Interventions and Change Processes

OD consultants take a variety of approaches, but the action-research model shown in Table 13.3 illustrates a typical pattern. Key executives perceive a problem or performance gap. They bring in a consultant, who conducts a diagnosis of the organization and the problem, often using interviews, surveys, and group meetings. The consultant feeds the results back to the clients and works with them in interpreting the results and developing plans for the OD program, including objectives, problems to be addressed, and techniques to be used. The consultant continues gathering information for use in the activities, using such tools as group problem-solving and team-building sessions. Further planning takes place as new ideas arise from the activities, and the consultant continues to gather information to assess the newly planned activities and their effects. The consultant continues this developmental process for a time, until eventually he or she leaves the people in the organization to continue it on their own. Similar models include an ultimate phase, consisting of institutionalizing the changes that the OD project has developed and terminating the relationship with the consultant (Burke, 1994; French and Bell, 1999; French, Bell, and Zawacki, 2000).

OD Intervention Techniques

OD consultants can draw from an array of responses to the problems they help an organization identify. The literature in the field provides a variety of models, typologies, and tables suggesting the type and level of intervention that the people in the organization and the consultant might select (Burke, 1994; French and Bell, 1999). For example, if the organization wants to focus on problems at the level of individual organizational members, it might work on new approaches to recruitment and selection, training and development, counseling, and job design. At the broader organizational level, OD may involve organization-wide survey-feedback processes, grid OD projects, quality-of-work-life programs, management-by-objectives projects, or intergroup conflict-management procedures.

TABLE 13.3 PHASES OF AN ACTION RESEARCH MODEL FOR ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT

Source: Burke, 1994; French and Bell, 1999.

1. Performance gap: Key executives perceive problems.
2. Executives confer with an organizational consultant.
3. Diagnosis: The consultant begins a process of diagnosis and data gathering.
4. Feedback: The consultant communicates the results to key clients and client groups.
5. Joint action planning: The consultant works with client groups in planning the objectives and procedures (such as team building) for the OD program.
6. Further data gathering: The consultant continues to monitor perceptions and attitudes.
7. Further feedback: In team-building sessions or other settings, the organizational members address the problems identified in the diagnostic work.
8. The client groups discuss and work on the data from the diagnosis and earlier sessions. New attitudes emerge.

9. Action planning: The groups set objectives for further development and develop plans for getting there.
10. Action: The plans are carried out, and new behaviors develop.
11. Further data gathering.
12. Further feedback.
13. Further action planning.
14. Continuation and consultant departure: The cycle of diagnosis, feedback, planning, and action continues until the appropriate point for the departure of the consultant.

For the development of group processes, an OD project might employ team-building techniques that work groups can use to develop more effective relationships. Team-building exercises typically focus on setting goals for the group, analyzing members' roles and responsibilities and the work processes of the team, and examining the relationships among the members. The OD consultant might draw on various techniques to support these efforts, such as a role negotiation process in which members list the things they feel each other member should do more or less of in the group. Then the members negotiate agreements about the changes and confirm these agreements with a written contract.

OD consultants also employ a technique they call process consultation. The consultant observes the work groups and other activities; gathers observations and information about key processes such as communication, teamwork, and interpersonal conflict handling; and consults with the members on interpreting and improving these processes.

OD projects in the past often employed T-groups, encounter groups, or sensitivity sessions. All are group sessions intended to develop communication and understanding among the members of the group and enhance each member's sensitivity to the feelings and viewpoints of the other members. These approaches grew out of the work of Kurt Lewin and his colleagues described in Chapter Two. Such groups engage in intensive discussions aimed at helping participants learn more about how other people see them and respond to them and how they perceive others. The sessions follow a diverse array of approaches, often involving such exercises as having members take turns expressing perceptions of other members. In some versions, these techniques become highly confrontational and emotional, and participants often find the experience exhilarating. These techniques were widely used during the 1960s, but their use has dwindled, apparently because of controversy about whether they had much long-term impact, and evidence that when they did have an impact it often appeared to be damaging to some participants (Back, 1972).

OD Effects and Controversies

Just how a consultant selects, combines, and uses all these procedures depends on his or her experience and skill. No organizing theory links the aspects of OD or systematically guides its practice. OD consultants play a role much like that of clinicians in psychology or psychiatry in that they have no clear, uncontested theory or guide for practice. They operate on the basis of their experience and intuition, choosing from an array of loosely defined procedures. The complexity of organizations and their problems makes it hard for OD consultants to establish and prove clear successes. Critics sometimes attack OD for this lack of substantive theory and theory-based research. They say that OD's concentration on human relations issues can lead to misdiagnosing an organization's problems when they involve other dimensions, such as the accounting system or production processes. Some critics, e.g., argue that OD concentrates on human resource issues in organizations when large-scale strategic change requires coordinating those issues with strategies for improving the organization's technical and political dimensions. OD adherents respond that they know their efforts are often valuable, even if they cannot always produce simple, clear evidence of marked improvements in profits or other performance criteria. They also argue that other areas of organization theory hardly provide managers with beautifully crafted guides to changing and improving their organization, and that they are justified in trying to go out and do what they can to apply behavioral science knowledge to the problems that organizations face.

OD in the Public Sector

Despite these controversies, OD remains a widely used approach for improving and changing public and nonprofit organizations (Carnevale, 2003). OD experts who work with public sector organizations regularly discuss whether public and private organizations differ in ways that affect the application of OD. That discussion has an interesting history.

In a leading contribution to this debate, Golembiewski (1969; see also 1985) cited greater challenges in the public sector as a result of factors much like those discussed in earlier chapters. He said that five primary structural constraints complicate the application of OD in government:

1. Multiple actors have access to multiple authorities, thus presenting a complex array of possible supporters or resisters for an OD project. For example, the State Department began Project ACORD (Action for Organizational Development) after a career official with strong ties to key members of Congress pushed for it. Yet the project stalled when other prominent actors – the department head and officials in the budget and personnel bureaus – attacked it. The newspapers even got into the act, with editorials calling for the State Department to leave its long-term civil servants alone and not pester them with a dubious program.
2. Conflicting interests and reward structures complicate the problem. Different congressional committees, legislators, and administrators may respond to

different incentives. For example, some actors may press for improved organizational operations, while others may seek to defend political alliances.

3. The administrative hierarchy is fragmented and weakened by these competing affiliations, thus making it harder to sustain the implementation of OD projects. Administrative officials may have stronger ties to congressional allies and stronger commitment to their programs than to the top executives in their department or to the president.
4. Weak relationships between career civil servants and politically appointed executives produce a similar problem of diffuse authority.
5. Golembiewski agreed with Kaufman (1969) that the political system continually shifts its emphasis among several goals for the executive branch – representativeness, executive leadership, and politically neutral competence. During a period of emphasis on the first two, such as President Reagan's drive to master and reduce the federal bureaucracy, the climate for OD deteriorates.

Golembiewski argued that these factors interact with managerial “habits” in government in ways that hinder OD. Higher-level executives tend to avoid delegating authority and to establish multiple layers of review and approval because of their tenuous authority over lower levels. Legislative and legal strictures constrain many dimensions that OD often seeks to reform, such as reward systems and job classifications. Government agencies, more often than business firms, have secrecy and security requirements. People in government show more “procedural regularity and caution.” The role of the professional manager is poorly developed in government compared to business, according to Golembiewski. He suggested that this results in part from the difficulty of enhancing public managers' sense of ownership of organizational objectives and values, due to the public nature of the organizations they lead. This in turn poses greater challenges in enhancing managers' commitment to their agency.

Golembiewski concluded that these conditions create differences in the culture that predominates in public agencies. Unlike in other settings such as private business firms, managers in public organizations face more constraints and have fewer supports and rewards for inventiveness, risk taking, and effort. Not surprisingly, some public managers are cautious about supporting initiatives in their organization.

Most other authors who have examined this issue agree with Golembiewski in general but make variations in his analysis. Davis (1983), e.g., offered a similar analysis of the effects of the external political environment on the use of OD in the public sector. Yet he more heavily emphasized the problem of public agencies' pursuit of multiple goals with vague programs and performance criteria (perhaps because he drew on an OD project in a human services agency, the area of government in which these problems are probably severest). These writers and others (Carnevale, 2003) have nevertheless emerged from these discussions with the conclusion that OD certainly can succeed in the public sector. While their depictions of the public sector environment have made some common notions of bureaucratic rigidity sound positively optimistic, these OD experts treat the public sector context as perhaps more challenging than the private sector but ultimately manageable, and as presenting a set of conditions for which one can be prepared.

Golembiewski (1985) reported evidence that OD projects in the public sector enjoy a relatively impressive success rate, apparently in line with that of projects in the private sector. First, he and his colleagues reviewed numerous published reports of OD initiatives in public organizations and classified the difficulties they apparently encountered. They found that in 270 reports of OD applications, the writers frequently mentioned the sort of constraints that Golembiewski had described. They noted external constraints such as procedural rigidity (in 124 cases), diversity of interests and values (111 cases), public scrutiny (87 cases), and the "volatile political/ administrative interface" – the rocky relationship between legislative and administrative units and between career officials and political officials (62 cases). They also mentioned internal constraints such as lack of professionalism (78 cases), weak chains of command (70 cases), complex objectives (61 cases), and short time frames (52 cases). In addition, the reports for city governments were generally similar to those for other levels of government. Although the reports cited these complications, Golembiewski noted that the large number of reported initiatives suggested that "the constraints may be tougher in the public sector, but they are not that tough" (p. 67), especially considering that agencies carry out many efforts that are not reported in the professional literature.

Golembiewski also analyzed studies that have sought to assess the effectiveness of OD applications in both sectors. One of his students assessed the success of the 270 OD initiatives just mentioned, using procedures similar to those used in previous studies of OD success rates, and found that most of the reports indicated either positive effects (43%) or highly positive effects (41%), with only 7% indicating no effect and 9% reporting negative effects (Golembiewski, 1985, p. 82). The results also suggested that the public sector initiatives included a healthy percentage of the most demanding OD applications; furthermore, they did not indicate that the success rate in public agencies resulted from a tendency to try more limited forms of OD interventions in government. In addition, Golembiewski had independent observers do similar ratings of 44 OD applications in city governments and found even higher success rates. These success rates are very similar to those reported for the private sector, Golembiewski concluded, and indicate that despite the apparent constraints of the government context, OD practitioners do fairly well at adapting to them.

Robertson and Seneviratne (1995) reported on a study that generally supported Golembiewski's conclusions. They performed a general analysis (a meta-analysis) of about fifty studies of planned change interventions in public and private organizations. They found that OD interventions in public and private organizations showed similar rates of success in such areas as work setting and organizational outcomes. They found some differences in more specific areas, however. The evidence indicated that change efforts in the private organizations led to positive changes in four components of work settings: organizing arrangements, social factors, technology, and physical setting. In the public organizations, however, the change efforts appeared to have a positive effect only on organizing arrangements and social factors, not on technology and physical setting. In addition, even though change efforts showed positive effects on organizing arrangements in both sectors, these effects were significantly stronger in the private sector. Also, change efforts in both sectors showed positive influences on a general measure of organizational outcomes, with no significant difference between the sectors. Change interventions in the public organizations, however, showed a significantly stronger relationship to one dimension of the organizational outcomes measure – improved organizational performance – than change efforts in the private organizations. These results support many of the observations about public and private organizations cited in previous chapters, such as the greater constraints on organizational structures in public organizations. They also generally support Golembiewski and his colleagues' conclusion that public agencies may face certain challenges. Generally, however, planned change initiatives appear to succeed about as often in public organizations as they do in private organizations. In spite of stereotypes and some academic assertions based more on simplistic theory than on systematic evidence, organizational change initiatives occur with frequency and apparent success throughout government.

Success and Failure in Large-Scale, Planned Organizational Change

The evidence of successful change initiatives in public organizations illustrates the importance of how the members of an organization manage and implement change. Organizations have always periodically undertaken large-scale planned change processes that are well beyond the scope of OD initiatives. In recent decades, challenges from international competition and other pressures have caused many US corporations to undergo thorough overhauls. The management literature began to resound with terms such as transformation, reinvention, and reengineering, all referring to strategies for large-scale planned change in organizations. Under the pressures described earlier and in previous chapters, governments have followed suit (Gore, 1993; US Office of Management and Budget, 2002). As noted earlier, the literature on large-scale organizational change is quite diverse and difficult to summarize succinctly. Two articles, however, in which the authors summarized patterns of organizational change and transformation, provide particularly valuable observations about analyzing and managing successful initiatives. Although they were published some thirty years apart, they have some interesting similarities, and according to recent overviews of the topic, they also show similarities to the perspectives of other organizational change theorists and researchers (Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999).

Over four decades ago, Greiner (1967) analyzed eighteen major organizational change attempts and drew conclusions about the patterns of successful change. He noted that some frequently used approaches to change often seem to founder. Examples include unilateral actions, such as top-down decrees or commands for structural changes; limited attempts at power sharing through group decision making; and efforts to encourage delegation of authority through T-group training. The successful change efforts that Greiner observed involved much more comprehensive approaches, as illustrated in Table 13.4.

As indicated in step 5 (Phase III) of Table 13.4, and implied in other phases, Greiner emphasized the key role of power sharing in successful patterns of change. He concluded that success requires power sharing and that it must occur through a developmental process. The failures he observed involved more unilateral pressures for change, with an illogical sequence of steps.

About thirty years later, Kotter (1995), a prominent author on leadership, organizational change, and other topics, published an article on organizational change in the same journal in which Greiner's article had appeared, the *Harvard Business Review*. In the article, Kotter presented a number of reasons for the failure of organizational transformations (a currently fashionable term for large-scale, comprehensive change efforts). Table 13.5 turns Kotter's reasons for failure around, transposing them into requirements for success. Kotter's observations about organizational change differ from Greiner's in important ways. Kotter referred to vision, a contemporary and much discussed topic in management theory today. He also emphasized the role of a guiding coalition, in contrast to Greiner's focus on a change leader who comes in from the outside (a later section in this chapter describes a successful change in the SSA that did not involve a change leader from the outside). Kotter's phrasing is consistent with other research on large-scale change in organizations that emphasizes the essential role of shared values (which can equate to vision in important ways) and leadership teams rather than individual, heroic leaders (see, e.g., Huber and Glick, 1993).

TABLE 13.4 PATTERNS OF SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Source: Adapted from Greiner, 1967.

Phase I: Pressure and Arousal

1. There is significant external and internal pressure for change. There is a widespread perception of performance gaps and of a need for change, placing pressure on top management.

Phase II: Intervention and Reorientation

2. A new person enters as change leader. The person has a record as a successful change agent and enters as a leader of the organization or as a consultant working with the leader.
3. The new person leads a reexamination of past practices and current problems. The newcomer uses his or her objective, external perspective to encourage examination of old views and rationalizations and attention to "real" problems.
4. Top management becomes heavily involved in the reexamination. The head of the organization and his or her immediate subordinates assume a direct, heavily involved role in the reexamination.

Phase III: Diagnosis and Recognition

6. The change leader engages multiple levels in diagnosis. The change leader involves multiple levels and units in collaborative, fact-finding, problem-solving discussions to identify and diagnose current problems. The diagnosis involves significant power sharing.

Phase IV: Invention and Commitment

7. The change leader stimulates a widespread search for creative solutions, involving many levels.

Phase V: Experimentation and Search

8. Solutions are developed, tested, and proven on a small scale. Problems are worked out and solved. Experimentation is encouraged.

Phase VI: Reinforcement and Acceptance

9. Successes are reinforced and disseminated and breed further success. People are rewarded. Successes become accepted and institutionalized.

TABLE 13.5 STEPS FOR SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION

Source: Adapted from Kotter, 1995.

1. Establish a sense of urgency.
    - Examine market and competitive realities.
    - Identify crises and opportunities.
2. Form a powerful guiding coalition.
    - Assemble a group with enough power to lead the change effort.
    - Encourage the group to work as a team.

3. Create a vision.
    - Create a vision to help direct the change effort.
    - Develop strategies for achieving that vision.
4. Communicate the vision.
    - Use all available means to communicate the new vision and strategy.
    - Have the guiding coalition teach the necessary new behaviors by example.
5. Empower others to act on the vision.
    - Remove obstacles to change.
    - Change systems or structures that present obstacles.
6. Create short-term wins.
    - Plan for visible performance improvements.
    - Create those improvements.
    - Recognize and reward employees involved in those improvements.
7. Consolidate improvements and produce further change.
    - Use increased credibility to change systems, structures, and policies to pursue the vision.
    - Hire and develop employees who can implement the vision.
8. Institutionalize the new approach.
    - Articulate the connection between the new behaviors and organizational success.
    - Ensure leadership development and succession.

The similarities between the two views, offered thirty years apart, and their similarity to other current perspectives (Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999), are striking. Fernandez and Rainey (2006) conducted a search and review to find patterns of consensus among authors and research studies about organizational change, which showed similarities to the Greiner and Kotter frameworks. Examining several dozen analyses of organizational change, they identified the determinants or conditions of success summarized in Table 13.6.

TABLE 13.6 DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Proposition	Sub-propositions

Ensure the need. Managerial leaders must verify and persuasively communicate the need for change.	- Convince organizational members of the need and desirability for change. - Craft a compelling vision of change. - Employ written and oral communication and forms of active participation to communicate and disseminate the need for change.
Provide a plan. Managerial leaders must develop a course of action or strategy for implementing change.	- Devise a strategy for reaching the desired end state, with milestones and a plan for achieving each one of them. - The strategy should be clear and specific; avoid ambiguity and inconsistencies in the plan. - The strategy should rest on sound causal theory for achieving the desired end state.
Build internal support and overcome resistance. Managerial leaders must build internal support and reduce resistance to change through widespread participation in the change process and other means.	- Encourage participation and open discussion to reduce resistance to change. - Avoid criticism, threats, and coercion aimed at reducing resistance to change. - Commit sufficient time, effort, and resources to manage participation effectively.
Ensure top management support and commitment. An individual or group within the organization should champion the cause for change.	- An “idea champion” or guiding coalition should advocate for and lead the transformation process. - Individuals championing the change should have the skill and acumen to marshal resources and support for change, to maintain

	momentum, and to overcome obstacles to change. • Political appointees and top-level civil servants should support the change.
Build external support. Managerial leaders must develop and ensure support from political overseers and key external stakeholders.	• Build support for and commitment to change among political overseers. • Build support for and commitment to change among interest groups with a stake in the organization.
Provide resources. Successful change usually requires adequate resources to support the change process.	• Provide adequate amounts of financial, human, and technological resources to implement change. • Avoid overtaxing organizational members. • Capitalize on synergies in resources when implementing multiple changes simultaneously.
Institutionalize change. Managers and employees must effectively institutionalize changes.	• Employ a variety of measures to displace old patterns of behavior and institutionalize new ones. • Monitor the implementation of change. • Institutionalize change before shifts in political leadership cause commitment to and support for change to diminish.
Pursue comprehensive change. Managerial leaders must develop an integrative, comprehensive approach to change that achieves subsystem congruence.	• Adopt and implement a comprehensive, consistent set of changes to the various subsystems of the organization.

	• Analyze and understand the interconnections between organizational subsystems before pursuing subsystem congruence.

These elements appear luxurious to public sector managers, because so many public organizations face frequent turnover of top executives, interventions and constraints from external authorities, and other conditions that might block some of these steps. Nevertheless, the following sections note examples of the effective adoption of many of these elements of successful change in public agencies.

Successful Revitalization in Public Agencies

Many of these conditions and steps, together with an emphasis on transforming organizational culture, characterize successful revitalization efforts in public organizations that had declined (Abramson and Lawrence, 2001; Decker and Paulson, 1988; Holzer, 1988; Poister, 1988a, 1988b; Poister and Larson, 1988; Stephens, 1988).

Poister (1988a) pointed out that these transformation efforts reflect multifaceted processes of strategic change, involving many policy, managerial, technological, and political initiatives and a series of strategies that developed over time. While diverse, they all emphasize developing a shared vision and mission, strategic planning, and developing the organization's leadership and culture. They involve redistributions of power toward more active involvement of the agency's members. Yet they also emphasize enhancements of management systems, such as financial, productivity-measurement, and information-management systems. Effective revitalization campaigns also required the agency managers to develop and maintain effective political support in order to provide resources and a mandate for the changes. Thus successful revitalizations occur in different types of public organizations, often in patterns very similar to those in private firms. Yet success requires more than skillful employment of generic principles of organizational change; it requires skill in dealing with the political context and administrative features of public organizations. These skillful applications and the conditions supporting them can be further clarified by a comparison between a successful and an unsuccessful attempt at large-scale change in public agencies. Besides these examples and those described earlier in this chapter, there are many additional examples of successful leadership of change and development in public organizations (e.g., Behn, 1994; Denhardt, 2000; Svara and associates, 1994; Thompson and Jones, 1994; Thompson and Rainey, 2003).

Two Contrasting Cases

Reviewing two cases of large-scale change in government agencies helps to clarify the applicability of Greiner's and Golembiewski's observations. Warwick (1975) reported on a failed attempt in the US Department of State to do what everyone would love to do – reduce bureaucracy. The SSA, however, succeeded in a similar effort. When the SSA faced extreme problems with administrative foul-ups and delays in processing claims, the people in the agency responded with a successful redesign of the organization and its claims processing system and improved performance. These cases illustrate the validity of the many observations about the ways in which the political and institutional context of government and the internal cultures of public agencies can impede change. Yet they also support the claim that, under the right circumstances, applying sound principles of change, skillful public managers and employees can carry out major changes effectively.

The "O Area" Reforms in the Department of State. Warwick (1975) described a fascinating case in which a well-intentioned undersecretary in the State Department initiated an unsuccessful effort to decentralize decision making and eliminate levels of hierarchy. An administrative area known as the O Area had become a complex array of hierarchical layers and diverse offices. The undersecretary's reforms eliminated six hierarchical levels (including 125 administrative positions) and started a process of management by objectives and programs. According to the undersecretary's plan, the program managers at the levels below the eliminated layers would manage more autonomously, without so many administrators above them and with more direct lines to the deputy undersecretary. They would also follow a management-by-objectives program in which they would specify objectives, target dates, and needed resources.

Although the undersecretary's ideas for reform were heavily influenced by McGregor's concept of Theory Y management (1960), other managers commented that he sought to apply Theory Y using Theory X methods. The undersecretary made the changes fairly unilaterally and then called together a large group of managers and employees to announce them. Rumors had gone around about the reforms, but the nature of them, according to Warwick (1975, p. 37), caught "even the most reorganized veterans off guard."

Yet Warwick devoted most of his analysis to the factors hindering change in the State Department, which he tended to generalize to all government agencies. Externally, congressional relations and related politics played a major role. Some of the administrators whose positions were targeted for elimination had strong allies in Congress and among interest groups that opposed the changes. The State Department had several different personnel systems (foreign service officers and others), which complicated the change process. A bill that would have unified the systems, however, did not pass in Congress. A civil service union opposed it, a powerful senator felt that it would dilute the foreign service, and the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave it little support because he wanted better cooperation from the secretary of state on matters pertaining to the war in Vietnam. The secretary of state became concerned about the wide span of control that the reduction in the hierarchy created (with many program managers reporting to the undersecretary).

Warwick argued that an administrative orthodoxy prevails in Washington and elsewhere in government. Legislators and political executives expect traditional chains of command and hierarchical arrangements and worry that their absence means disorganization. The secretary of state was facing a great deal of political pressure from Congress and the public over decisions about the Vietnam War and did not want to waste political capital on any controversy over the administration of the State Department.

Warwick argued that career civil servants are accustomed to turnover among top political executives every two or three years. Motivated by caution and security, they can easily build defenses against the repetitive cycles of reform and change that the political executives attempt during their short stays in public agencies. The careerists can simply wait out the top executives by doing nothing, or they can mobilize opposition in Congress and among interest groups. Like many public agencies, the State Department also had internal conflicts among units and specialists, including a tradition of rivalry between foreign service officers and other groups of State Department employees and between units organized by function and units organized by geographical regions of the world. These internal conflicts complicated change efforts, especially because the participants often had external political allies.

The undersecretary implemented his changes with some good effect. The changes appeared to have beneficial results for the autonomy, willingness to experiment, and motivation of some of the units and managers. Yet coordination appeared to suffer, and internal and external resistance mounted. Not long after attempting the changes, the undersecretary left the State Department. His successor derided the reforms, and within about nine months he eliminated most of them. Some useful remnants endured, according to Warwick, and some of the lessons learned proved valuable in later change efforts. Yet Warwick concluded that the reforms had clearly failed.

More generally, Warwick suggested that the types of conditions he found in the State Department tend to sustain complex bureaucracy in all government agencies. Congress and interest groups often resist change because they develop alliances with agencies and their subunits. They jealously guard against reorganizations that threaten those arrangements.

Rapid turnover at the tops of agencies has the effects already noted. The diversity and interrelations of government agencies complicate change efforts. Any one public policy arena tends to involve many different agencies (e.g., the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce and many other agencies are involved in foreign affairs). Because legislation and policymaking decisions may involve many agencies, consensus and support become elusive. Statutes and system-wide rules govern many aspects of organization and procedure, sometimes dictating the actual agency structure and placing constraints on job descriptions, purchasing, space procurement, personnel decisions, and many other processes. Administrative orthodoxy, coupled with diffuse agency goals, reinforces the tendency to impose classic bureaucratic control.

Warwick noted conditions particular to the State Department that had a lot to do with the outcome of the reforms: the problems of the Vietnam War during this period, a history of complex political influences on the department, internal rivalries, the particularly great need for secure communications, and the worldwide scope of operations. Still, he moved toward gloomy conclusions about prospects for changing public bureaucracies. Almost as if he was determined not to end on such a note, however, he offered suggestions about reducing and changing bureaucracy that echo those of Greiner and the OD experts. He pointed out that facile prescriptions for participative management in public agencies face some sharp challenges. Many of the conditions described earlier weigh against prospects for highly participative processes; but to facilitate successful change, government managers must deal with these conditions. Warwick argued that one cannot eliminate bureaucracy by decimation – firing people or merging or cutting units – or by top-down demands for reform. Effective debureaucratization, he concluded, must have strong roots within the agency. The people in the agency must see the changes as important and useful to them. All significant internal constituencies must participate in considering the problem. There must be a careful, collaborative diagnosis, followed by broad-based discussions about concrete alternatives for change. Then proponents of the change must seek support from external controllers and allies. To avoid the problem of rapid turnover among top executives, a coordinating body should monitor and sustain the change, and this body should include more than one senior political appointee.

Modularization of Claims Processing in the Social Security Administration. While the very words “modularization of claims processing” summon up the impulse to doze off, this example represents an effective attempt to do something similar to what the State Department reforms failed to do: reform bureaucracy in the direction of decentralized control over the work and an enriched work environment. In the 1960s, the SSA became overloaded and backlogged in processing claims for Social Security payments. Clients complained to the SSA and to members of Congress, who passed the heat along to the agency. At one point, the SSA struggled with a backlog of one million claims. Something had to be done.

The problem had developed largely because Congress had added new programs and new forms of coverage to the original Social Security program, such as extending coverage to dependents, farmers, the self-employed, and the disabled. Along with population growth, these additions continually expanded the number of claims to be processed. Also, because of the different programs and the complications of individual cases, some of the claims could raise confounding difficulties. A claimant might have worked under multiple aliases, e.g., and have a degenerative brain disease and no memory of his or her original name and birthdate.

The organizational system for handling the claims proved more and more ineffective at responding to the load. The SSA had several major functional bureaus – for the retirement and survivors' insurance (RSI) program, for disability insurance, for data processing and records, and for supervising the district offices. The district offices, located around the country, took in claims from clients applying for their benefits. For the RSI program, they then forwarded the claims to one of six program service centers (PSCs). These were located in six regions of the country. Each had about two thousand employees. When a claim arrived at a PSC from the district office, a clerical support unit would prepare a folder for the claimant and forward it to a claims unit. There, a claims authorizer would determine the type and degree of eligibility for Social Security payments. The folder would then be forwarded to a payments unit, where a benefit authorizer would compute the amount of the benefit payment and do some paperwork necessary to begin processing the payment through the computer. The folder would then go to an accounts unit, which assembled and coded information about the case, then to another unit for entry into the computer, then to a records maintenance unit for storage. In some of these units, hundreds of people worked at desks in long rows, receiving deliveries of stacks of folders from shopping carts, with coffee and lunch breaks announced by the ringing of bells. Control clerks and supervisors, emphasizing the technical issues and production rates of their unit, spot-checked the work for accuracy.

Any incomplete information or disagreements among the technical specialists would delay a claim, because it would have to be sent back to the earlier point in the process for clarification or correction. Communication about the problem usually had to be in writing. There was no provision for getting a problem claim back to the same person who had done the earlier work. The increasing number of claims and the complications of many of the claims increasingly clogged the system. The system created incentives for employees to "cream" the cases by avoiding the very difficult ones or even slipping them to the next phase to get them off their desk. Problem cases piled up.

Robert Ball, the long-term, highly respected commissioner of the SSA, appointed an experienced SSA official, Hugh McKenna, as director of the RSI bureau, with a mandate to correct the problems. McKenna initiated an open-ended process of change, with some four years of research, development, experimentation, and morale building. Several task forces with internal and external representation studied management processes, case handling, and labor relations. A consulting firm analyzed the case-management process. Large team-building and morale-boosting meetings were held between managers and staff from the PSCs, district offices, and the RSI central office. The office staff worked with the PSCs to develop training courses on participatory management. Interestingly, someone made a comment about McKenna similar to the one made about the State Department undersecretary – that he "ordered participatory management." He did, but there was obviously a crucial difference in the way that order was imposed.

Out of these efforts emerged the concept of modular claims-processing units. The planning staff in the central office suggested setting up smaller units – composed of fifty employees – containing all the technical specialists needed to process a claim and letting them handle claims from beginning to end. Professing to draw on the ideas of McGregor, Herzberg, and Maslow (described in Chapters Two and Nine), the proponents of the module concept argued that it would provide job enrichment and participatory management. Individuals would identify with their tasks more and see their clients as individuals, they would have easier access to supervisors and managers, and they would have more control over the process and their part in it.

One of the PSCs tried out one such unit on an experimental basis and then created a total of six modules. Problems arose. At one point, productivity dropped in the modules, and termination of the experiment was seriously considered. However, the staff decided that the problems could be corrected. Managers apparently had some trouble adjusting to the new system. In one instance, two module managers tried to merge their modules to create combined functional units for files, accounts, claims, and so on. The central staff had to urge them back to the original concept. The blending of clerical staff and technical specialists in the modules caused some racial and status conflicts. Relations with other agencies, such as the Civil Service Commission (now the Office of Personnel Management), required skillful handling to obtain new space and to receive approval of new personnel structures. Ultimately, other PSCs adopted the modules, with some modifications. In one module, the specialists involved in processing a claim sat around a desk together and worked through individual cases in direct contact with one another. This modular approach was also adopted by the Disability Insurance Bureau, although with more employees per module.

The modular concept became widely accepted in the agency as a success. At one point, processing time for new claims in the PSCs had dropped by 50%, to an average of twenty days; and it later dropped further, to an average of fifteen days, with very few long-delayed cases. Some employee surveys showed increased job satisfaction in the modules. The picture was not all rosy, however. Some long-standing employees disliked the change. Problems with computer systems complicated matters. Morale later suffered badly when the agency began a process of eliminating 17,000 employees in the 1980s, which apparently made it difficult to properly staff some of the modules. Nevertheless, many people in the agency regarded the modular concept as successful. Today, the PSCs are all organized into modules, and the employees regard them not as an innovation but as a standard feature of the centers. Recent developments, such as computerization of claims processing, are causing some problems for the modular design. Some of the centers are experimenting with new forms of organizing the claims-processing work. As they do so, managers and employees frequently express concern about moving away from the modular design, a sign of just how successful this change has been.

The success may simply reflect the proper application of some of the generic principles of change. The change was widely recognized as necessary, it had support from the top, and there was flexible implementation, with adaptation, feedback, experimentation, and a realistic strategy for achieving the agency's objectives. The change did, in a sense, have a top-down character, but in this case it appears to illustrate what the experts mean by "support from the top." There must be sponsors and champions of the change with sufficient authority and resources to see it through.

Some particulars about the SSA case distinguish it from the State Department case; these are summarized in Table 13.7. SSA had as chief executive a long-term career civil servant who had enjoyed trust and support from key congressional figures and thus could gain a grant of authority to solve the agency's problems without interference. SSA has strong support from a large clientele receiving a specific service, and the agency's tasks tend to be clear and mechanistic. The people in the agency were able to encapsulate their work processes and management methods and seal them off from political intervention.

While such factors may have provided SSA with advantages, the case suggests some key additional considerations about successful change in public organizations (Rainey, 1990). SSA had a durable, skillful power center that was committed to successful change. Ironically, for all the stereotypes about career bureaucrats resisting change, in this case the long-term civil servants were the champions of change. In one instance, they even had to outwit a conservative political appointee who sought to undercut the reforms because he thought they would result in "grade creep" – that is, employees might get higher salary grade classifications because of increased responsibilities in the modules. The leaders of the change effort hurried through an approval of the new personnel structure by the Civil Service Commission to prevent any blockage of the reforms. In this and many other ways, they utilized their knowledge of the political and administrative systems to sustain the change. Also, they were not leaving soon. They had the career commitment to the agency to want the changes to succeed, and they and others knew they would be there for the duration.

TABLE 13.7 CONDITIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CHANGE IN A FEDERAL AGENCY

Source: Rainey and Rainey, 1986.

1. A durable power center, committed to successful change
    - Strong, stable leadership by career civil servants
    - An internal change agent (career agency executive) with sufficient authority and resources
    - An active, creative bureau staff

2. Appropriate timing for collective support
    - A political "window of opportunity"
    - Political overseers (congressional committee heads) who are supportive but not interventionist
    - Political sophistication of agency leaders and staff – effective management of relations with Congress and oversight agencies (OPM, GSA)
    - Strategies that blend sincere employee involvement with decisive exercise of authority
3. A comprehensive, clear, realistic alternative process
    - A long-term change strategy, using group processes to develop new structures
    - A major structural reform, focused on measurable outputs, that decentralizes operational responsibility
    - Reasonable clarity about the nature and objectives of the new structure and process

In addition, the SSA change took place at the appropriate time for it to garner collective support. (See the section on the agenda-setting process in Chapter Five for a discussion of the concept of windows of opportunity in the political process.) As noted earlier, the reform at the State Department was hindered by the Vietnam War and by other problems with the timing of the change. Of course, the SSA enjoys no inherent immunity from political interference; many agencies that do mechanistic work with clear outputs get buffeted by external political forces. The timing was right for this change at the SSA, however, in that no distracting crises or controversies weighed against it. The need for change was widely recognized both inside and outside the SSA. In part this reflects luck, and in part it reflects the skill of experienced public managers and staff members who knew when and how to work for better alternatives.

Indeed, they did develop a better alternative, one that was comprehensive, clear, and realistic. Rather vague, prepackaged models, such as management by objectives, will fail if they are not adapted to fit the particular structural and cultural conditions within an organization. The sponsors and champions of the change in the SSA applied relatively firm, consistent pressure for a reasonably clear, realistic idea, while allowing a degree of experimentation and variation in its implementation.

Other aspects of the Social Security program and related policies can be debated at length. Nevertheless, in this case, experienced career civil servants in the SSA brought about an effective improvement in a process essential to one of the largest single categories of disbursement from the federal budget of the United States, and that very directly affects the lives of at least sixty million Americans. The public has heard little about this. News reporters have overlooked it. But perhaps it should not receive heroic treatment because it represents only one of many instances of skillful change and management that go on in government continually.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Thirteen

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Study: Habitat for Humanity of Medina: Confronting the Changing Times

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
ADVANCING PUBLIC MANAGEMENT THROUGH COLLABORATION

Pundits and politicians have at times asserted that government could be more efficient and effective if it operated like a business. This call for “running government like a business,” while seriously simplistic, has figured importantly in approaches to reforming public organizations. In nations around the world, reforms have often proposed that governments adopt purportedly business-like practices, such as pay for performance, giving superiors more authority to manage subordinates, and reducing “red tape.” Reforms have often called for increased reliance on the private sector more generally by shifting and delegating important government responsibilities to parties outside government (Greve et al., 1999; van Thiel and van der Wal, 2010). An international governmental reform movement that came to be called New Public Management (NPM) took various forms in different nations, but usually included proposals similar to those mentioned above. As Chapter Five describes, however, during this same period one could also observe a shift in theory and practice toward emphasis on more collaborative forms of organizing and operating (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). In recent years proponents of effective government increasingly called for government to serve as an active partner in collaborative activities (O'Leary and Bingham, 2009). This trend emphasizes government's important role in the pursuit of public value through shared responsibility with other entities within government and in the private and nonprofit domains (Moore, 1995; Hefetz and Warner, 2004; Stoker, 2006).

Collaborative governance involves multiple organizations, often of different sectors, working together to achieve common goals (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). These collaborative arrangements can involve partnerships, contractual relationships, networks, and other forms of shared responsibility for public policies and services. This chapter starts with an overview of reform strategies that proponents of NPM have often proposed. The chapter then discusses important ideas associated with collaborative governance. Next, a review of the collaboration literature focuses on four subtopics: the reasons for collaboration; partner selection; mechanisms for collaboration; and performance. Experiences with collaborative approaches have shown that conventional contracts that detail what the parties expect from each other do not always work. An alternative to conventional contracts, called formal relational contracts, emphasizes long-term strategic partnerships, with management strategies that build trust and promote flexibility (Frydlinger, Hart, and Vitasek, 2019). The chapter ends with a summary of the guiding principles for drafting and implementing formal relational contracts.

Reform Movements: Forerunners to Collaborative Governance

For decades, numerous nations have attempted to reform their government structures and practices (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). In the United States, e.g., presidential administrations have repeatedly advanced initiatives to reform governmental administrative processes. The Clinton presidential administration undertook the National Performance Review (NPR; 1993), a major effort to improve the performance of the federal government. Among many objectives, NPR sought the elimination of "red tape" and the creation of outcome-based standards to make government agencies more accountable.

The George W. Bush administration introduced the President's Management Agenda (PMA). The PMA proposed making government more market-based and results-oriented. During the administration of President Obama, reform efforts sought to enhance the government's role as a model employer and to enhance pursuit of goals shared among federal agencies. President Trump's administration then reverted to priorities very much in keeping with a "run government like a business" theme. These included very controversial efforts to use Presidential directives to make it easier to fire and reassign federal employees.

Internationally, reforms drawing on the theme of "New Public Management" have advocated a wide range of techniques (Pollitt et al., 2007), including privatization and the outsourcing of government services. Other reform strategies include the introduction of performance indicators, the use of public–private partnerships to build and manage infrastructure projects, civil service reforms, and the treatment of "citizens as customers" so as to allow them to choose among public services or to opt out of services (Kaboolian, 1998; Pollitt et al., 2007).

Because NPM is a global phenomenon, reform models and strategies differ in different national contexts (Pollitt, van Thiel, and Homburg, 2007). In the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Korea, e.g., core government organizations (ministries) have distributed responsibilities by creating new agencies that operate at arm's-length from ministries (Greve et al., 1999; van Thiel and van der Wal, 2010). These new agencies implement policy and even function as regulatory bodies. In reports about these developments, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) refers to them as "distributed governance." In other examples of reform, countries in Africa and Asia have adopted strategies that emphasize a culture of performance orientation and decentralization (Mathiasen, 1999).

The many reforms in many nations often show influences of the idea that governments should adopt business-like practices. The examples of reforms also show, however, an increase over time in the recognition that arrangements involving collaborative relations and shared responsibilities need also to be considered as important alternatives in designing reforms.

From NPM to Collaborative Governance

While receiving more emphasis in recent decades, the concept of collaboration has a long history. In 1960, Grodzin (1960) described the US system of federalism as “an enduring model of collaborative problem solving, whereby federal-state-local collaboration is the mode of action” (p. 266). Yet evidence indicates that the term has been used more and more frequently in contemporary literature and practice. A search in Web of Science finds over 98,000 publications that either focus on or discuss collaboration from 2015 to October 2020. When a search includes “collaboration” with the phrase “public management,” the search finds 221 citations. This compares to only 62 citations for the same term in the five-year period around Grodzin's writing (1960 to 1965).

Despite this increased interest in collaboration there is no clear consensus on a definition of collaboration in administrative settings. In the public management literature, the term “collaboration” is often used together with the term “governance” to form the phrase “collaborative governance.” For example, Agranoff and McGuire (2003) describe collaborative governance as involving organizations, often of different sectors, working together to achieve common goals. O'Leary et al. (2009) propose a more detailed definition: collaborative governance is “the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations. Collaborative means to co-labor, to achieve common goals, often working across boundaries in multi-sector and multi-factor relationships. Collaboration is based on the value of reciprocity. Collaborative public management may include participatory governance: the active involvement of citizens and government decision-making” (p. 3).

For some scholars, collaborative governance describes a new relational model of engagement for the delivery of public services – a model that contrasts with older models of service delivery that were more hierarchical and more contained. For example, Kamensky and Berlin (2004, p. 4) suggest the transition to new models of governance implies collaboration within agencies, between agencies, between levels of government and public, private, nonprofit sectors. Likewise, Milward and Provan (2006, p. 12) suggest that collaboration and contracting come together with “relational contracting,” a phrase invoked by economists to describe contracts that embrace trust and reciprocity. According to Van Slyke, successful contracts between government and nonprofits involve a high degree of collaboration (p. 142).

In a slightly different yet consistent usage, scholars invoke the term to describe NPM shortcomings. Stoker (2006) describes an approach to delivering public services that contrasts with both traditional administration and NPM. According to Stoker, public sector governing is “not the same as shopping or more broadly buying and selling goods in a market economy" (2006, p. 46). Stoker contends that distinctions between the public and private sectors are important, because politics and governmental entities must play a significant role in activities that seek to enhance public values. This is quite different from the "input" status politics held in both traditional administration and NPM (Stoker, 2006, p. 46). Similarly, in a discussion about public sector outsourcing, perhaps the most frequently used NPM tool, Hefetz and Warner (2004) argue that in transactions with suppliers, private sector firms focus on efficiency, quality, security, and reliability, while public managers must combine these concerns with attention to public accountability and to public (i.e., collective) preferences.

The Literature on Collaboration

The terms collaboration, coordination, and cooperation are often used interchangeably (Castaner and Oliveira, 2020). Similarly, a large literature discusses the various governance forms that have evolved when organizations collaborate. This has given rise to a wide range of concepts that are also often used interchangeably (Davis, 2016). For example, Rivera-Santos and Inkpen (2009) define an alliance as "any agreement between two or more organizations to jointly carry out a task involving more interaction than the one-time arm's-length contract" (p. 199). O'Toole (1997) defines a network as "structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement" (p. 44).

In addition, authors often refer to processes and structures similar to collaboration, including social partnerships (Waddock, 1991; Warner and Sullivan, 2004), intersectoral partnerships (Waddell and Brown, 1997), cross-sector partnerships (Selsky and Parker, 2005), social alliances (Berger et al., 2004), strategic partnerships (Ashman, 2000), and public–private partnerships (Greve and Hodge, 2010).

In reviewing the literature on collaboration, we identified four key questions in the literature: (1) What motivates parties to collaborate? (2) How do parties select partners for collaboration? (3) What mechanisms are used to sustain collaborative relationships? (4) What do we know about collaboration performance?

Reasons for Collaboration

Organizations collaborate for many reasons. The two reasons cited most frequently in the literature are to obtain needed resources and to solve complex problems. Analyses that emphasize resource needs start with the premise that "no organization is an island." Organizations seek relationships with other organizations to obtain the resources they need (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Cyert and March (1963) frame the resource problem as one of uncertainty. That is, a main cause of uncertainty is resource scarcity. An organization is vulnerable if the resources it needs are not consistently available. From this standpoint, organizations adopt collaboration as a strategy for reducing uncertainty and achieving stability. Although organizations often need tangible resources, such as buildings or equipment, the literature also devotes attention to collaborations that provide access to intangible resources, such as expertise, technology, knowledge necessary for innovation (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996), or even legitimacy (Van Slyke, 2007).

Another stream of research emphasizes the importance of resource bundles (Barney, 1991). The concept of bundles refers to combinations of an organization's internal and external resources that can yield a synergy (Harrison et al., 2001). According to this way of thinking, a collaboration is motivated not as much by pursuit of resources critical to survival but rather by the quest for resources that can provide a strategic advantage, e.g., by making the organization more competitive. This perspective emphasizes the complementarity of resources and the value of resources when they are combined. The value of combined internal and external resources depends on an organization's objectives (Soda and Fulotti, 2017). Whether resources are complementary depends on several factors, including the degree to which the resources sought differ from those that the organization already has (Teece, 1986), the potential synergies when resources are combined (Dyer and Singh, 1998), and whether combining resources will accomplish strategic aims (Wang and Zajac, 2007).

Empirical research firmly establishes that collaboration is more likely to occur under both conditions, that is, when it reduces uncertainty over resources an organization needs (Hillman et al., 2009) and when benefits can be expected to accrue from resource complementarity (Harrison et al., 2001). For example, Weisbrod (1997) makes the case that competition for resources has prompted nonprofit organizations to consider alternatives to going it alone. Choi and Choi (2005) discuss partnerships between state governments and external organizations when the federal government conditions federal aid (i.e., resources) on collaboration. Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006, p. 46) point out that “cross-sector collaborations are more likely to form in turbulent environments,” that is, in fluctuating circumstances that create uncertainty about resources.

Analysts of nonprofit organizations often refer to collaboration as imperative (Butcher and Gilchrist, 2016; Murphy and Bendell, 1999). They also emphasize, however, that those seeking collaborative arrangements must carefully consider the role of stakeholders in affecting the collaboration decision. External stakeholders can affect the decision to collaborate. In a study by Nasi et al. (1997), stakeholders cautioned a forestry organization to consider profitability in deciding on a collaboration aimed at environmental preservation. In a nascent partnership between a Canadian supermarket chain and a national advocacy group called Pollution Probe, external stakeholders objected to a partnership (Lawrence and Hardy, 1999). According to Ebers (2004), parties are not always equally enthusiastic about collaborations. Nonprofits are cautiously optimistic about partnering with business in comparison (Elers, 2004).

Major social problems have wide scope and complexity and often involve multiple policy areas (Vurro, Dacin, and Perrini, 2010; Westley and Vrendenburg, 1997). Such problems have led those confronting them to coin the term “wicked problems.” Wicked problems have “circular causality, persistence, absence of well-structured alternative solutions, or relative lack of room for trial and error learning” (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Dorado and Ventresca, 2013, p. 69).

For example, the problem of homelessness has implications beyond housing policy. Homelessness involves challenges in health, drug, and employment policies. Homelessness often disproportionality affects military veterans. A single organization usually lacks the capacity and range of expert knowledge to address complex social problems adequately (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Waddock and Post, 1995; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, 2006). Government increasingly turns to cross-sector collaboration to address complex social issues (Stadtler and Karakulak, 2020) in many policy areas. Research on cross-sectoral arrangements occurs in the domains of environmental policy (Grady and Chen, 2006), emergency management (McGuire, 2009), and disaster relief (Curnin and O'Hara, 2019), among other policy areas.

Problems can also be complex when they involve a range of different stakeholders with different views on how the problem should be addressed. In the delivery of health care public, private, and nonprofit lab centers, dialysis centers, and hospices all play some part in shaping how any health program will operate. Community hospitals, sometimes public and sometimes nonprofit, treat thousands of patients on a daily basis. Private sector insurers, for their part, make decisions on coverage and charge copayments. All of these entities likely have different views on such issues as who should receive health services, how services should be delivered, how much it should cost, and who should pay. In addition, efforts to solve one aspect of the problem such as eligibility for coverage may have cascading effects, e.g., on government budgets and insurer solvency. The range of effects, long-term and short-term, intended and unintended, are more likely to surface and to be considered when multiple and diverse stakeholders are involved in the service. Collaboration that includes several parties can be a way to obtain buy-in from stakeholders as well as to preempt or deal with adversarial relationships (Pasquero, 1991).

Partner Selection

Collaborations can include a range of organizational partners: large and small, public and private, and representing multiple industries. Partner selection is one of the most important decisions that organizations make when they consider collaborating (e.g., Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008; Shah and Swaminathan, 2008; Beamish and Lupton, 2009; Dekker and Van den Abbeele, 2010).

The rationale for a public manager to seek collaboration partners from the same sector – e.g., other public agencies instead of partners from profit-driven organizations – depends on whether sector distinctions have implications for outcomes. Consider a government agency that considers a partnership with a private, for-profit organization to vaccinate a population at a specified (low) cost by a given date. The government agency may have a mandate to provide the same health services to all, and to provide vaccines for all segments of the population, regardless of their ability to pay. The private organization may have different incentives. The private organization may need to consider profitability and proprietary control of their resources. Thus, government agencies differ from their private sector counterparts in their incentives to offer services to those who are constrained in their ability to pay. As pharmaceutical corporations began to make vaccines available in the COVID-19 pandemic, the vaccines disseminated in wealthy nations earlier and more rapidly than in nations with lower levels of economic wealth and development. Representatives of the less wealthy nations, and of international organizations such as the United Nations, began to call for the pharmaceutical corporations to share their vaccines, and related knowledge and information, with the less fortunate nations. The corporations reportedly balked at sharing knowledge that would compromise their ownership of patents for the vaccines.

In a recent theoretical contribution that addresses cross-sector collaborations, Lazzarini (2020) offers a theory of organizational alignment by identifying comparative outcomes for different forms of collaboration, including government in partnership with a for-profit organization and government in partnership with a nonprofit social enterprise. According to the theory, distinct organizational forms change the managerial incentives to provide inclusive high-quality social services based on three main factors: the relative attractiveness of beneficiary segments, their cost structure, and extent of fixed costs to implement and operate services. Some combinations of such factors can create disincentives for nongovernmental, for-profit participants (and therefore compromised outcomes) when a public program aims to create social value, defined broadly as social benefits to a given population (including more vulnerable groups).

The literature relevant to partner selection often extols the attributes of nonprofits. For example, Van Slyke (2007) describes the unique strengths that nonprofits bring to partnerships with government for the provision of social services. Van Slyke (2007; pp. 143, 150) describes the potential advantages of government-nonprofit relationships. Nonprofits often have general experience in serving clients and elected officials, citizens, and the media often perceive nonprofits as legitimate. Similarly, Waddell and Post (1991) point to nonprofits' experience with managing stakeholder relationships (p. 3).[1] Witesman and Fernandez (2013) find a number of differences in the way public managers structure and manage contractual relationships with nonprofits compared to relationships with for-profits. They conclude that nonprofits are perceived to be more trustworthy and reliable partners for government.

Cross-sector partnerships are generally considered valuable because they can provide a range of competencies for addressing complex social problems (Austin, 2000; Waddell, 2000). Yet there are important contingencies to consider. Bryson and Stone et al. (2006, 52) caution that cross-sector relationships need to be built on already strong relationships with key political and professional constituencies. If they are, the success of cross-sector relationships is more likely. Gulati (1995) makes a similar case regarding the advantage of prior working relationships. On the other hand, in assessing R&D collaborations, Diestre and Rajagopalan (2012) observe that governments prefer government-business partnerships. In these conditions, the perception that businesses embody a culture of entrepreneurship is likely to be a factor in partner selection.

In collaborations initiated by government, a public agency or public department is the entity making the choice among partners. A growing literature in public management emphasizes the importance of shared values when selecting partners. Drawing on Moore's (1995) work on public values, Stoker (2006) articulates a public value management model of collaboration, which he describes as an overarching framework for collaborative governance (Stoker, 2006, p. 41). Other public management scholars also emphasize the importance of finding partners that fit with the pursuit of public value, as well as management skills focused on conflict resolution, trust building, information, and goal clarity (Domberger and Fernandez, 1999; Entwistle and Martin, 2005).

At the same time, van Thiel and van der Wal (2010) caution that we should not assume value congruence within the public domain. This is important since multi-partner collaborations often include multiple government agencies, and value incongruence among potential partners makes collaboration and partnering more challenging. Combining data from two Dutch surveys (n=324), they find evidence of value incongruence between ministries (that is, the parent public organizations in the Netherlands) and semi-autonomous executive agencies under the auspices of the ministry, called quangos. Quangos receive government funding but operate at “arm's length” (with high levels of autonomy) from the ministries. Quangos are “quasi-NGOs”; NGOs are nongovernment organizations. A quango usually administers a specific function, as with an Arts Council or a Forestry Commission. Van Thiel and van der Wal also find different levels of value incongruence among quangos. They conclude that the quality of relationships between parent ministries and quangos also varies (see also Lyons et al., 2006).

Collaboration Mechanisms

Collaboration mechanisms are the tools that facilitate continuity, lessen the potential for conflict, and make collaboration less vulnerable to dissolution.[2] They are the formal and informal rules that provide structure for interaction (Hoffman, 1999). Put another way, mechanisms are the glue intended to sustain the collaboration. Some scholars predict collaboration failure without the right mechanisms in place to transform the relationship from a lose-lose situation to a win-win situation (e.g., Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke, 2016).[3]

Rules can serve as collaboration mechanisms. In describing the multi-level institutional elements of governance, Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom (1990) identified three types of rules that guide behavior: operation rules, policy rules, and constitutional rules. In a collaborative or network setting, operation rules govern day-to-day network activities. Policy rules determine what activities are allowed in networks, and constitutional rules decide who can participate in the collective decision-making process and how collective choice rules can be changed. These levels of rules can play important roles in governing collaborations and partnerships (see also, Stone et al., 2010, 2013). Uncertainty and the lack of information are key factors that create the need for collaborative mechanisms that foster accountability. Since parties cannot anticipate all possible scenarios ahead of time, there will always be gaps and omissions in the agreement. Collaborating partners frequently address this challenge by inserting clauses in the formal contract documents that specify how contingencies will be handled. Alternatively, partners may appoint members to a board dedicated to settling disputes should they arise (Williamson, 1991, p. 280). The possibility that parties with an information advantage may use that advantage to exploit other parties is another reason for accountability mechanisms. This can occur when service quality or level of effort is not easily measured. But it can also occur when a party makes upfront investments specific to the relationship at hand (Williamson, 1986, 1991). In such a situation, the investing party depends on contract continuation, at least until the investment is recouped; this could lead the non-investing party to behave opportunistically (Coase, 2000), e.g., by forcing a renegotiation for more favorable terms. This is called the hold-up problem, as the non-investing party can hold up the former for the value of the commitment. A contract provision that requires a reimbursement of the investment in the event the contract terminates prematurely is one possible mechanism to address the hold-up problem (Rogerson 1992).

Rosell and Saz-Carranza (2020) and their colleagues analyze different structural mechanisms for accountability. They empirically examine the governance configurations of 37 rule-enforcing networks in the European Union, finding three basic structures used for accountability: a configuration with legal accountability, which is characterized by having a board of appeals; a configuration with administrative accountability that, in addition to a board of appeals, has powerful executive boards and professional experts in the network plenary; and configuration providing for democratic accountability, which incorporates legislative representatives into the network (Saz-Carranza, Albareda, and Ryan Federo, 2020). Devarakonda and Reuer (2018) provide a similar example. They explore how administrative controls in collaborations regulate knowledge transfers across partners. These administrative controls can take the form of board-like joint committees having explicitly delineated authority over certain alliance activities. This research shows that governing committees can serve as important instruments for administrative control and demonstrates how the contract serves as a mechanism to facilitate knowledge flows. It also describes how governing committees safeguard against a partner misappropriating resources, particularly when a partner possesses the incentive and ability to engage in such behavior.

The need for accountability is not the only reason for collaboration mechanisms. Administrative mechanisms are often employed to facilitate communication and coordinate tasks. Collaboration agreements can involve multiple actors simultaneously completing different tasks, all toward a common end. Complex tasks, such as those that require reciprocal coordination, require more elaborate administrative mechanisms (Thompson, 1967). Such cases require more interactive coordination and mutual adjustment (Adler, 1995; Thompson, 1967). One way to do this is to specify communication and decision-making processes in the collaboration agreement (Gulati and Singh, 1998). As for the logical underpinnings of coordination, Reuer and Devarakonda (2016) develop a theory of the contractual delegation of authority and posit that partners are more likely to employ steering committees to help partners guide their interactions and address unanticipated contingencies when there is a substantial need for coordinated adaptation.

In addition to categorizing mechanisms according to the challenges they address, the literature frequently distinguishes between formal and informal mechanisms. Many of the formal mechanisms discussed in the literature are explicit in contract documents. In general, written contracts set standards of conduct and guide the parties' behavior. Within the contract documents themselves, partners commonly encourage cooperative behavior with incentives and discourage noncooperative behavior (also called “perfunctory behavior”) with sanctions.

Researchers offer several pointers for developing specific and effective contract requirements, including ways to enhance partner accountability (e.g., Romzek and Johnston, 2002; LeRoux, 2007; Malatesta and Smith, 2011), adapting the contract to service characteristics (Warner and Hefetz, 2010), aligning values and institutions (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke, 2006), and the need to strike the right balance between incentives and sanctions (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke, 2016, 47).

Some scholars are critical of formal mechanisms and propose that parties rely more on means to enhance relationships, such as by building trust. According to this way of thinking, stipulations that parties “shall do this” or “shall complete that” can cast a negative tone over the relationship and even encourage bad behavior. Informal mechanisms can prevent opportunistic behavior (Bertelli and Smith, 2010) and reduce contracting costs for activities such as contract monitoring and third-party enforcement through the court system (Marvel and Marvel, 2007).

The use of alternative informal mechanisms can also guide the collaboration relationship. This is sometimes referred to as relational contracting. Relational contracting has a basis in law (MacNeil, 1985) and has influenced management generally (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) and public management more specifically (Van Slyke, 2007; Bertelli and Smith, 2010). In relational contracting, factors such as trust, reputation, and shared values help to build social capital among parties (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright, 2012; Feiock and Andrew, 2006; Van Slyke, 2007; Fernandez, 2009). Applying a relational contract framework, Curnin and O'Hara (2019) explore interorganizational collaboration in the nonprofit and public sectors during disaster recovery efforts. Based on interviews with practitioners involved in the recovery following a flooding event, they find that collaboration is reliant not only on established interorganizational structures but also on trusting relationships.

Of all the attention given to informal mechanisms, trust is perhaps the most frequently discussed in the literature. The evidence suggests prior interactions can create trust (Das and Teng, 1998; Bryson et al., 2006; Vangen and Huxham, 2005; Stone et al., 2010), and trust can be built by sharing information and by demonstrating competency through reaching smaller or intermediate goals (Vangen and Huxham, 2005). Small acts of cooperation above and beyond what is explicitly stipulated in a written agreement can encourage goodwill, called tit-for-tat behavior (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke, 2016). On the other hand, trust is easily lost when parties perceive others' behavior as uncooperative or unfair. And when one party ceases cooperation in one form or another, other parties are prone to react with their own retaliatory behavior, called shading. The act of one party taking advantage and the other parties reacting is also a form of tit-for-tat.

Several scholars consider the potential interaction between formal mechanisms and relational governance mechanisms (Gong et al., 2007; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008; Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). After identifying different dimensions of trust, Dyer and Singh (1998) find a positive association between relational mechanisms of network governance and trust and a negative relationship between formal governance mechanisms and the level of inter organizational trust. Tobias-Miersch (2017) finds that trust can explicitly be used as a substitute to replace conventional controls. In contrast, Poppo and Zenger (2002) provide evidence that formal contracts can complement (rather than substitute) relational governance mechanisms as the complexity of transactions increases. Likewise, Lui and Ngo (2004) provide evidence that the use of formal governance mechanisms can encourage the development of trust in a network because they act as safeguards and reduce risk for those involved. Taking a different approach, Inkpen and Curral (2004) propose a temporal model to follow the evolution of trust and control mechanisms in strategic alliances.

In a multiple case study Romzek et al. (2014) explore the interpersonal interactions within collaborative systems, among subsystems, and among organizations and illuminate the informal mechanisms that facilitate collaboration. The researchers find informal interpersonal dynamics nested in combinations of vertical and horizontal ties with mixed administrative authority arrangements derived from both formal and informal accountability relationships.

Research insights about cognition and interpretation have in turn influenced research on collaboration mechanisms. For example, Gray et al. (2015) describe how communication frames are used as mechanisms. Frames are schematics of interpretations that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label what happens in the world around them (Goffman, 1974, 21). The main idea is that issues are framed differently by different actors, which is central to the communication process. Frames are considered a mechanism of communication because they can define which actors are involved, what problems are addressed, how these problems are defined, and what kind of solutions belong to the set of solutions.

Performance

Since there are many reasons parties decide to collaborate as opposed to going it alone, there are many ways to measure performance. Put another way, whether or not a collaboration can be considered successful depends on the partners' initial goals. The vast literature on collaboration performance suggests there is no simple answer about how to successfully manage collaborative public networks or on how to solve so-called wicked problems (Cristofoli, Meneguzzo, and Riccucci, 2017). The same holds true for public–private partnerships (P3s), which are widely considered a form of collaboration.[4] Carston Greve and Graeme Hodge, in their extensive work on public private partnerships (P3s), discuss the challenges with evaluating the performance of P3s. Acknowledging the many different motivations for P3s, they analyze both extremes: P3s considered successful and those considered failures. Hodge and Greve (2007) call for strengthening future evaluations and to conduct such assessments away from the “policy cheerleaders” (2007, p. 545; see also, Greve and Hodge, 2007; Greve, 2015; Hodge, Greve, and Biyguante, 2018).

Case study research on a work release program in Illinois highlights some of the typical challenges in determining and measuring collaboration performance. Yung et al. (2016) compared different approaches to program delivery: direct provision by government and a collaborative contract between government and Safer Foundation, a nonprofit organization. The two approaches were implemented with similar specifications in different parts of the city of Chicago. The Illinois Department of Corrections was motivated to collaborate because Safer Foundation had connections within the community to assist prisoners in job placement. The explicit goals of the collaboration included reducing costs, increasing program completion rates, and increasing job placements. The researchers found improvements in completion rates as well as significantly better employment and earnings associated with the government-nonprofit collaboration. However, it was not at all clear that the collaboration reduced costs, as compared to direct provision by government. In implementing the program, the government organizations became so intertwined with Safer Foundation that it was impossible to accurately assign costs. For example, key personnel who were on the government's payroll performed many of the management functions associated with the collaboration, working side by side with management of Safer Foundation. This type of symbiotic relationship is more common than uncommon in collaborations involving the public sector, making cost comparisons virtually impossible. The researchers also evaluated factors associated with the collaboration that are theoretically reasoned to yield positive performance outcomes. They found evidence of mission alignment, sufficiency of resources, and expertise of the nonprofit organization. However, there was no way to determine the relative importance of each factor to the program outcomes. In addition, the researchers found a number of problems associated with the collaboration that caused tension in the relationship, such as ambiguity in the contract document, a lack of operational transparency on the part of Safer Foundation, and a depletion of government expertise. In the end, this case underscores claims researchers have made regarding collaboration success. That is, success is almost always difficult to verify, and subject to differing interpretations and to controversies (e.g., Hodge and Greve, 2007). Going one step further, establishing success through metrics can even undermine collaboration outcomes (Harris and Tayler, 2019; Muller, 2018).

In spite of the complications, however, research on collaboration identifies a number of key factors for collaboration success, with the role of the manager primary among them. According to Davis (2016), the manager is key to mobilizing network participants to perform collaborative work. And Obstefeld, Borgatti, and Davis (2013) propose that the ability to access resources depends on the manager's active involvement and influence in their organization because necessary contacts may be deep inside organizational networks and distant from the locus of action. Research by Van Slyke and Hammonds (2003, p. 146) finds that public management capacity increased as a result of privatization; one can interpret this finding as consistent with calls for treating the manager as significant in collaboration success.

The manager's experience can play a very important role in success. For example, Sytch, Wohlgezogen, and Zajac (2018) find that experience in intraorganizational collaboration may lead to success in complex interorganizational settings. They find that matrix firms are more likely than nonmatrix firms to enter into complex alliances. (See Chapter 8 for discussion of matrix organizational structures.) They reason that managers of matrix firms have greater familiarity with coordination, knowledge sharing, and conflict management challenges in intraorganizational context, which in turn gives them greater confidence in their ability to manage similar challenges in complex alliances.

The literature identifies a wide range of factors that either enhance the prospects of success or threaten success in collaborations. The importance of relationships is frequently emphasized. For example, Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006, p. 52) suggest that cross-sector collaborations are likely to be more successful if built on strong relationships with key political and professional constituencies, while Coleman (1990) describes how common linkages can strengthen ties. Looking at a different dimension of relationships, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002, p. 39) claim it's the potential for future relationships that matter. Specifically, they proffer that informal agreements are sustained by value of future agreements.

The literature also acknowledges the role of partners' rivalries (Park and Ungnson, 2001) and partners' reasons for friction and withdrawal (Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, and Rowley, 2010). Collaboration success may therefore be a function of how well interdependent network participants successfully navigate and balance cooperation and competition over time (Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2017). Boyne (2003) observes that more partners or a larger network mean more potential for conflict. Likewise, Beckman et al. (2007) find that multi-partner alliances have disadvantages over dyads because multiple parties increase likelihood for conflict and disagreement; they call the phenomenon *relational pluralism*. Heidi, Steensma, and Phelps (2014) argue that different partner members will form divisive fault lines, while Sytch and Tatarynowicz (2014) suggest that collaborations lead to subgroups, which in turn isolate some of the initial members from the larger group.

The institutional logic perspective provides a framework for analyzing the interrelationships among organizations and institutions in social systems. This developing literature offers an opportunity to advance our understanding of collaboration relationships. The main idea is that different types of organizations are said to have their own "institutional logic," which may drive conflict and create challenges for work coordination. Institutional logic is the socially constructed historical pattern of cultural symbols and material practices, assumptions, values, and beliefs by which organizations produce and reproduce their material substance, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their daily activity, all of which complicate coordination across organizational boundaries. For example, hospitals operate according to their own logic as do research institutes, schools, and governance boards. Competing logics mean more challenges for managing relationships, more potential for misunderstandings, and more potential for conflict. The literature includes other terms that refer to the same dynamic. Similarly, Jarzabkowski et al. (2009) notes that "institutional pluralism" can occur at the organizational level, and Kratatz and Bock (2008, p. 244) refer to "multiple logics" that affect coordination of hybrid organizations. On the other hand, organizations with umbrella affiliates may perform better compared with their freestanding counterparts because of the benefits they receive from standardization and economies of scale (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright, 2008).

Simmel (1955) refers to a great variety of roles and idiosyncratic approaches that collaborative activity can involve. Similarly, recent literature increasingly emphasizes the challenges inherent in collaborations of diverse partners (e.g., Gray and Purdy, 2018). In a similar vein, Seibel (2015) describes collaborative arrangements that are comprised of different formal or informal institutional arrangements owing to overlapping sectoral segments and combinations of governance mechanisms (p. 697). Organizations from different sectors can have conflicting core values (Nicholls and Huybrechts, 2016), and distinct values held by subgroups can create conflict.

Following this line of thought, Bryson et al. (2006) discuss the degree to which members of a collaboration embrace market-based logic, state-based logic, and democracy-based logic as essential conditions to the design and implementation of cross-sector collaboration (p. 50). Likewise, Herranz (2008) uses community-based, entrepreneurial-based, and bureaucratic-based networks to describe different sector-based values and strategic orientations in multi-sector networks.

Of course, as the seminal work of Thompson (1967) reminds us, even the most compatible partners may face challenges in coordination. Obtaining partner cooperation becomes more challenging as partners become more interdependent in performing tasks (Thompson, 1967; Gulati and Singh, 1998). In their case study of four organizations, Stadtler and Karakulak (2020) observe the use of broker organizations to facilitate collaboration. Surprisingly, they found that not all broker organizations improve coordination; specifically, two of the four broker organizations weakened the collaboration by gradually replacing the partners' cross-sector tasks and decision making with unilateral, broker-based ones. This study reveals the processes underlying brokers' role drift and unintended collaborative weakening and those allowing them to maintain their facilitation role. In sum, this study illuminates the boundaries of using broker organizations as a mechanism to facilitate cross-sector collaboration.

This section reviewed the literature on collaborative governance, making certain points clear. First, collaborative activities have become prominent across the globe and in all sectors, resulting in a “stunning evolutionary change in institutional forms of governance” (Alter and Hage, 1993, p. 12). Collaborations are motivated mainly by the need for resources and the need to tackle complex societal problems. Collaborations are generally unstable and thus require proactive planning and attention to mechanisms to foster accountability, reduce conflict, and enhance coordination. Whether collaboration is successful is hard to pin down but the literature offers a range of suggestions and considerations likely to facilitate desirable outcomes.

Ending this section calls for underlining a point made in the beginning of the chapter – a point emphasized by prominent scholars (Hefetz and Warner, 2004, pp. 171–174; Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). That is, collaborative governance properly considered in the context of government includes a broader conceptualization of performance for public organizations, one that features public values, mutual understanding, and relational contracts, as well as the need to achieve effective coordination and cooperation. Collaborative governance does not dismiss the value of public and private organizations working together, but it does feature the role and importance of public managers in solving complex social problems – in contrast to the foci and emphasis of NPM models, which often assume the superiority of the private sector and its practices. In addition, collaboration in the public sector requires attention to an array of policies, rules, and procedures, many of which are embedded and specified in formal contract documents. The next section discusses what we have learned about optimizing these formal contracts and about a new approach called relational contracts that has garnered recent scholarly attention.

From Formal Conventional (Transactional) Contracts to Formal Relational Contracts

There is no shortage of sources on best practices for government contracts, which are by nature formal and transactional. In 2014, the O'Neill School of Environmental Affairs at Indiana University put together an expert panel to advise state and local governments on government outsourcing. The panel was co-chaired by Stephen Goldsmith, a professor of Harvard University and former mayor of Indianapolis, and Ed Rendell, former mayor of Philadelphia and former governor of Pennsylvania. Well-known scholars on the project included David van Slyke, Jocelyn Johnston, Mildred Warner, Graeme Hodge, Deanna Malatesta, and Sergio Fernandez. The panel pulled together lessons from prominent outsourcing cases that covered the range of activities and involved different government jurisdictions. The panel concluded with a report, offering nine different recommendations supported by on-the-ground experiences and recommending scholarly literature on each recommendation. We were inspired to build upon and update their recommendations by detailing the most overlooked considerations for successful outsourcing. Table 14.1 includes six broad considerations: low cost/ efficiency, performance assessment, desired performance outcomes, enhancing competition via contract specifications, outsourcing's effects on government employees and partner selection. The table explains and advises on each consideration. It also provides theoretical and empirical sources for students who wish to dive deeper into the topic.

TABLE 14.1 OFTEN OVERLOOKED CONSIDERATIONS FOR OUTSOURCING SUCCESSFULLY

Consideration	Explanation/Advice	Influential Citations
Low cost/ efficiency	Outsourcing can enhance efficiency when multiple service providers compete for business.	Alonso et al. (2015); Krugman (2003)
	Outsourcing has not consistently delivered on low-cost service or quality.	Hart, Schleifer, Vishny (1997); Megginson and Netter (2001);

		Boardman and Vining (1989)
Performance assessment	When objectives are hard to measure, the power of incentives is weakened.	Laffont and Tirole (1991); Tirole (1994)
	Hard-to-measure services are one of the many challenges often overlooked in performance management.	Moynihan (2008); Van Slyke 2003
	Effective performance monitoring requires sufficient resources, including government personnel with both contract and program expertise; this is often overlooked.	Cooper (2003, p. xi); Kelman (2002, p. 90)
	The problem is more acute with knowledge workers.	Gulati and Nickerson (2005)
Desired performance outcomes	Public-sector organizations aim for more than efficiency, e.g., maximizing social welfare, transparency, equity. Determine how range of outcomes will be assessed.	Cooper (2003); Van Slyke (2007)
Enhancing competition via contract specifications	While it is important to clearly specify duties, obligations, and rights, the contract document is also a tool to facilitate competition. The market "is defined by contract specification."	Domberger and Jensen (1997, p. 68)
	The scope/range of activities is an important mechanism to control opportunism. For example, a smaller scope will attract more bidders.	Oxley and Sampson (2004, p. 724); Rufin and Santos (2012)
	The contract binds the parties for the specified length, effectively creating monopoly until the contract end date.	Williamson discussion of "small numbers bargaining" (1973)
Outsourcing's effect on government employees	Motivations of public and private personnel differ, a fact sometimes used to justify government provision.	Francois (2000); Perry (2020)
	Research shows outsourcing's differential effects on government employees.	Lee et al. (2019, 2020)
	Contracts are not always at expense of goal alignment. Effects may depend on whether government is considered the principal in principal–agent relationship or steward.	Donaldson et al. (1991); Van Slyke (2007)

Partner selection	Government can select among a range of partner types (public, private, nonprofit), each with different motives. Consider entire range of options.	Laffont and Tirole (1991); Van Slyke (2007); Gulati and Nickerson (2005)
	Repeated transactions with the same supplier can build trust, reduce transaction cost.	Fledderus, J. (2015)
	The objective of the private firm is to maximize profit.	Milgrom and Roberts (1992); Gulati and Nickerson (2005, 2008)
	Repeated transactions with the same suppliers can build trust, lower transaction costs, enhance exchange performance.	Williamson et al. (1975); Williamson (1979); King and Pitchford (1998, 2002); Van Slyke (2007)

Importantly, when public organizations enter into a contract with an external party, certain contract provisions are required. The specific provisions required depend on factors such as the jurisdiction, contract amount, and service type. For example, if the contract amount is over $100,000, federal policies require the formal agreement to include an anti-lobbying certification. The language for the certification is dictated by federal code (44 CFR Part 18). If the contract involves legal services, the contractor is required to notify the government if the attorney of record is disbarred (called a Suspension and Debarment clause). Federal and state-level contracts include a "termination for convenience clause," providing the government with the right to terminate the contract without cause. These are standard boilerplate provisions that facilitate a degree of necessary accountability but also set a tone for the relationship.

As Frydlinger et al. (2019) explain, it is not uncommon for conventional contracts between two organizations to exceed one hundred pages that detail obligations and outline dozens of metrics to measure performance. Government contracts can be even more onerous given the additional boilerplate clauses that the agencies are required to include. Further, contracts filled with "supplier shall" statements can undermine trust and confidence in the relationship (p. 119). According to this way of thinking, these contracts are traditionally used to protect against the possibility that one party will extract benefits and therefore needs to be held accountable. The formalities and language embodied in these contracts create an adversarial mindset and can lead to a downward spiral of negative tit-for-tat behaviors. Frydlinger et al. (2019) discuss how such a contract undermined the relationship between Federal Express and Dell Computers, bringing them to the breaking point.

What's needed, these scholars argue, is an alternative approach that provides flexibility and trust to accommodate the need for adaptability and cope with uncertainty (Frydlinger et al., 2019, p. 118). The alternative approach is called a *formal relational contract*. Formal relational contracts specify mutual goals and establish governance structures to keep the parties' expectations and interest aligned over the long term; they are designed to foster trust and collaboration, yet they are also legally enforceable. Formal relational contracts are especially useful for highly complex relationships where parties are interdependent and future events are highly unpredictable.

Frydlinger et al. (2019) outline steps to put formal relational contracts into practice. Although their instructions are intended to guide large for-profit companies, they are just as relevant to government (see Table 14.2). Formal relational contracts do not replace traditional transactional contracts, but they should be part of the contracting toolkit to govern highly complex relationships and demand collaboration and flexibility (p. 125). In the case of public organizations involved in collaborations, including outsourcing, public officials need not (and cannot) abandon the procedures and substantive clauses required by oversight agencies. However, they can supplement the requirements while attenuating the negative tone associated with "supplier shall" clauses. In sum, public organizations can approximate formal relational contracts in undertaking collaborations.

TABLE 14.2 STEPS INVOLVED IN FORMALIZING A RELATIONAL CONTRACT

Source: Adapted from Frydlinger et al. (2019).

Step	Action	Explanation/Examples
1	Lay the foundation.	The primary goal of step one is to establish a partnership mentality. Both parties must make a conscious effort to create an environment of trust – one in which they are transparent about their high-level aspirations, specific goals, and concerns.
2	Create a shared vision and objectives.	To keep expectations aligned in a complex and changing environment, both parties (not just one with the greater power) need to explain their vision and goals for the relationship.
3	Adopt guiding principles.	When the contract environment includes many unknowns, there is a high risk of friction and a high risk that one or both parties will feel unfairly treated. In step 3, there is a commitment to six guiding principles that contractually prohibit opportunistic behavior. Shading refers to retaliatory tit-for-tat behavior when one party stops cooperating or makes countermoves. The six principles are reciprocity, autonomy, honesty, loyalty, equity, and integrity. (Example: Autonomy: We agree to give each other

		freedom to make decisions within the framework of our unique skills, training, and professional responsibilities.)
4	Align expectations and interest.	Now that the foundation is in place, the parties work on the terms of the deal (e.g., responsibilities, compensation, metrics).
5	Stay aligned.	The parties go beyond crafting the terms of the agreement and established governance mechanisms that are formally embedded in the contract. For example, the parties might name a team to monitor the health of the relationship and another team to work out schedules and deadlines.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Fourteen

- Key terms
- Discussion questions
- Topics for writing assignments or reports
- Exercises
- Case Studies: Rethinking a Monumental Contract Failure: Is Relational Contracting the Answer?; Confusing Performance Metrics with Strategy

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.

Notes

1. Young (2000) summarizes the many forms that government-nonprofit partnerships can take.

2. The phrase "collaboration mechanism" has also been used as a label to describe more overarching means of bringing parties together and coordinating activities. Examples include references to informal agreements (Leroux, 2007), social networks (Feiock, Steinacker, and Park, 2009; LeRoux, Brandenburger, and Pandey, 2010), and formal agreements (Andrew, 2009; Rodrigues, Tavares, and Araújo, 2012; Shrestha, 2010). We use the phrase here to describe mechanisms as at different levels, e.g., as a means to coordinate activity among network organizations that is specified within a formal agreement.

3. Classic literature on collective action and institutional design are a starting point for understanding the challenges in sustaining exchange relationships and have inspired research on collaboration mechanisms (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). Indeed, collaborations pose the classic collective action problem: although multiple parties may benefit from a certain action, the cost of such action makes it unlikely that they will do so. Collaborations are further vulnerable because parties engaged in them cannot anticipate all possible contingencies ahead of time.

4. A vast amount of literature analyzes public–private partnerships (P3s). P3s are so frequently mentioned in the literature on collaboration that they are hard to ignore. Definitionally, P3s include a wide array of hybrid structures and many combinations of organizations, public bodies, NGOs, quangos, and businesses. P3s also vary in functions assigned to sector parties, with degrees of planning, financing, and operating shared by parties. According to Hodge, Greve, and Boardman (2010, p. 3), there remains much debate about what a P3 actually is, the

origins of P3 as a delivery mode, and even the legitimacy of the practice. Hodge and Greve (2007) conceive of five broad categories of P3 arrangements: (1) institutional cooperation for joint production and risk sharing; (2) long-term infrastructure contracts; (3) public policy networks that emphasize loose stakeholder relationships; (4) civil society and community development; and (5) urban renewal and downtown economic development. These categories cover an array of governance types in the US and elsewhere, including contracts and alliances. Not unlike the contracting literature, the overlapping P3 literature includes topics such as the policy decision to enter into a P3, the management practices associated with P3s, and ways to evaluate P3 outcomes. Somewhat differently, Wettenhall (2005) conceives P3s on a continuum. On the one end is contracting out, where a public body decides not to do something itself but to pay another party to perform the function under contract agreement. At the other end of the continuum is a more complex arrangement whereby private involvement is more extensive and often includes financing a project, operating it on a long-term basis, and even retaining some portion of the earnings.

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NAME INDEX

A

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

L

M

N

O

P

Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

Y

Z

SUBJECT INDEX

A

C

H

I

J

M

O

S

U

V

W